

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN PEACE SOCIETIES

1867-1899

By

Irwin Martin Abrams

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PREFACE

By Sandi E. Cooper

Irwin Abrams launched his formidable career, spanning over half of the 20th century, with his original and insightful doctoral dissertation, "A History of European Peace Societies, 1867-1899" which earned the Sumner Prize at Harvard University in 1938. Amid the clear signs of an impending second major war in Europe, Irwin Abrams managed to research the forgotten phenomenon of the well organized international movement in the 19th century that realized what warfare would do to civilization and had struggled to prevent it.

Abrams produced the first major study of European peace activism and internationalism in an American university, a parallel to Merle Curti's work on U. S. movements. As a graduate student, Abrams was able to meet some of the survivors of the organizations that he investigated and was able to visit nearly every European archive that housed pertinent papers. In one remarkable year abroad, 1936-7, he reached into archives spanning Europe from Copenhagen and Oslo to Switzerland, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. His task of exploring and reviving the ideas, arguments, committees, congresses and proposals of those progressive, intrepid citizens of Europe who saw into a future of organized peace was challenged repeatedly by the violent daily headlines of the Spanish Civil War, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the continued drag of the Depression, the unfurled triumphalism of Nazi Swastikas and the pomposity of Italian claims to restore the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean.

The peace campaigners whom Irwin Abrams restored to historical consciousness may have been derided as dreamers but their dream has become the institutional reality of the 21st century – the European Union is both a manifestation and vindication of what 19th century activists could only fantasize. Abrams' dissertation – overwhelmed by the sadness of World War II and the Cold War – has served as the basis of the astonishing revival of peace history following the 1960's, a revival which is now transnational and global. Irwin Abrams' intellectual descendants include two new generations of peace scholars who revived the subject in the 1960's and who have produced thousands of works across the continents since then. Irwin Abrams himself has become the global authority on the Nobel Peace Prize in his second career as a peace historian.

At 90 years of age (in February 2004), we salute his enduring achievement.

Sandi E Cooper

Professor of History, College of Staten Island and The Graduate School - CUNY

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FOREWORD

The present study makes no attempt to consider the peace movement in its broadest sense. Its aim is simply to tell the tale of the pacifists themselves during thirty years of their history, of their hopes, their fears, their schemes, and their endeavors. It begins in 1867 with the inauguration of the Continental Peace Movement, and ends with the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, with which event the peace movement enters a new phase. The pacifists were not makers of history; theirs is not a story of great victories and brilliant triumphs. It is a story rather of bitter struggles and almost consistent failure, but a failure which is in itself significant for an understanding of the history of the time. It is a story, moreover, which forms an important chapter in the history of international organization, one which has never received the attention which it deserves.

So little mark upon their time did the pacifists make that it is no easy task to track down their story. The manuscript material dealing with their activities has almost completely ceased to exist, and much of the printed matter has also disappeared, for it was not until after 1900 that large libraries like that of the Nobel Institute at Oslo and that of the Peace Palace at The Hague began to attach any importance to the collection of such material. Consequently the attempt to reconstruct the picture has meant a search far and wide for the forgotten documents, and I wish to express here my gratitude for the Sheldon Traveling Fellowship which made it possible for me to take up this quest abroad. The trail led into many lands and put me under heavy obligation to many kind helpers along the way, of whom I can name but a few. I have first of all to thank Professor William L. Langer, under whom the investigation was conducted. To Professor Merle Curti of Columbia University I am especially indebted for valuable aid and advice, as well as to Dr Jacob ter Meulen, Director of the Library of the Peace Palace at The Hague. My friend Mr. Albert Goldsmith was of great aid in the final preparation of the manuscript. Among those who put valuable material at my disposal or were otherwise helpful I wish to thank in particular M. Henri Golay, Secretary of the International Peace Bureau at Geneva; Dr. Hans Wehberg of Geneva; Dr. T. P. Sevensma, Librarian of the Library of the League of Nations; M. Jules Puech, of Paris; Professor Paul Passy of Paris; Professor Michel Revon, of the Sorbonne; Miss C. E. Playne, of London; Mr. E. G. Smith, of the National Council for Prevention of War; Miss M. H. Huntsman, of the International Arbitration League; Mr. Wyndham A. Bewes, Secretary of the International Law Association; Mr. John Stead, of London; Dr. Ragnar Sohlman, Director of the Nobel Institute of Stockholm; Frau Dr. A. H. Fried of Vienna; and Gustav Schuster, Secretary of the *Österreichische Friedensgesellschaft*. I wish, also, to express my gratitude to the staffs of the many libraries in which I have worked, especially to those

of the Harvard College Library, the Harvard Law Library, the Library of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Library of the American Peace Society, the Library of the Peace Palace, the Library of Friends House in London, and the Library of the League of Nations.

INTRODUCTION

"Individual aspirations toward a future of peace between the peoples", wrote a prominent pacifist, "date without doubt from the day when blood was first shed on a field of battle"¹. Indeed, if war has been man's lot here below, his dream has been of peace, and the brutal and sanguinary conflicts of past ages have had their counterpart in noble conceptions of the peace to come. Yet concerted efforts to end war are comparatively recent. They began as a reaction to the long drawn-out horrors of the Napoleonic Wars, but they were only a part of the greater movement for humanitarian reform which was gaining momentum in the early Nineteenth Century. It was the time when men of goodwill, filled with a Christian sense of duty to their fellow men and strong in their faith in man's capacity to fashion the future after his own desire, were embarking upon crusades to free the slaves, to convert the heathen, to brighten up factories and prisons, and to end various evils of the day. Certain of these reformers set themselves the task of ridding the world of war, and the organized peace movement was begun.

The first European peace society, the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace, was founded at London in 1816 and patronized by the same non-conformist groups who were providing the inspiration for much of the humanitarian reform of the day. Its basic principle was declared to be that "war is inconsistent with the Spirit of Christianity and the true interests of mankind". But, while the spirit of the founders was non-resistant, the Peace Society never aspired to end war by persuading all Christians to refuse to take up arms. Like their fellow humanitarians the members of the Peace Society placed their confidence in institutions; they hoped to achieve their object by persuading Christians to set up machinery which would make it unnecessary for them to take up arms. They wanted to abolish war by introducing a method of pacific settlement of international disputes, and this method was to be international arbitration.

As the years went on, the propaganda became broader and broader. Side by side in the society's journal, *The Herald of Peace*, were to be found quotations from Scripture, anti-war passages from classical authors, rational arguments against war from the works of Eighteenth-Century *philosophes*, and economic considerations taken over from the Liberal Economists. It was especially in the Eighteen-Forties that the pacifist propaganda was liberalized, for it was then that the free-traders were turning to foreign affairs after their victory had been won at home. They worked independently of the pacifists, but they proved to be powerful allies all the same, and for a time the peace movement was identified with important political currents of the

day. Like the members of the Peace Society, Cobden and his friends were moved by motives of the highest moral order. Peace to them was not simply the end result of the application of their economic teachings, nor merely a more profitable state than war; peace was the destiny of man for which he was prepared by his Maker. Cobden's main objection to war was not economic but moral, and he saw in Free Trade "God's diplomacy", which was to unite the peoples in the bond of peace².

Not only did the free-traders help broaden the base of the peace movement but they made possible the holding of the international congresses at the middle of the century which remained the high point of the early period of the movement. The first congress, held at London in 1843, was attended chiefly by Englishmen and delegates from the United States, where pacifism had developed along lines similar to the British movement. In 1848 continental delegates first appeared at the Brussels Congress. In 1849 was held the brilliant congress at Paris, over which Victor Hugo eloquently presided and at which such notables as the French economist Bastiat and the journalist Girardin raised their voices for peace along with Cobden and the English friends of peace. So closely were all the humanitarian movements bound up with one another that, as Cobden remarked, had the steamers carrying the English delegation sunk in the Channel, all the philanthropic enterprises in the United Kingdom would have been stopped for a year³. The next assemblies at Frankfort in 1850 and London in 1851 were not nearly as spectacular as the preceding ones. The theme of them all was admirably summed up by Henry Vincent, one of the English delegates at the Paris Congress, when he said: "Our design is to convince the governments that 'arbitration' is more Christian, more humane, and more economical than war"⁴.

For all the brilliance of the 1849 congress the peace movement remained strictly Anglo-American. There had been attempts to carry it to the Continent, but they had met with little or no success. Soon after its foundation the London Peace Society sent an agent to Paris to begin the good work there, but he encountered too many obstacles. When in 1821 the humanitarian *Société de la Morale Chrétienne* was established in Paris, international peace was on the list of its endeavors. A correspondence was kept up with the London association, but the French group paid far more attention to such evils as gambling, slavery, and capital punishment. In fact, the main importance of the society, founded as it was by progressive seigneurs and

¹ Elie Ducommun: *Précis Historique du Mouvement en Faveur de la Paix* (Berne, 1899), p.1.

² Wm.H. Dawson: *Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy* (London, 1925), p.84; J. A. Hobson: *Richard Cobden. The International Man* (London, 1919), pp.36-37,246.

³ Chas. Northend: *Elihu Burritt* (N.Y., 1879), p.76.

⁴ *Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Congress* (London, 1849), pp.31-32.

liberal Protestants, was to serve as a training ground for the men of the July Monarchy⁵.

There was a strong internationalist current in the ideas of the early French Socialist theorists. It was under the influence of the ideas of Saint-Simon that a certain Madame Niboyet, a bourgeois liberal, founded the *Société de la Paix de Paris* in 1844. The aim of the little group of men and women which she gathered together was to prepare "a strong peace, based upon justice, maintained by law". The appeal was confined to a small section of the intelligentsia and the society did not last, but the principles which it enunciated were to become the very heart of the modern French peace movement⁶. The only other early French peace society known was the "Society for the Union of Peoples", which Bouvet, a member of the National Assembly, called into life on his return from the Brussels Peace Congress. Even the appeal inherent in its inspiring title was not enough to keep Bouvet's creation going⁷.

Elsewhere on the Continent the story was similar. The first peace society came to Germany in 1850, when a delegate to the Frankfort Peace Congress returned, inspired, to Königsberg. Julius Rupp, a radical Protestant pastor, became the leading spirit of the group, and he published the first German peace journal, drawing heavily upon the literature which he found in the *Herald of Peace*. Apparently the society prospered for a short while, but its life-span was measured by months, for the police of the City of Kant ended its labors in May, 1851⁸. The dove of peace fared somewhat better in Geneva, where in 1830 the philanthropic Count de Sellon, uncle of Camillo Cavour, founded the Geneva Peace Society. The association lasted for nearly a decade, but its activity seems to have been restricted to the efforts of its founder, and it did not long survive him⁹. These early continental peace foundations are worth recording, but their only influence on the later peace movement was to provide occasions for the pacifists of later days to celebrate anniversaries.

The London Peace Society, in the person of its ubiquitous agent, Stephen Rigaud, eagerly supported all these efforts, but in vain. Rigaud wandered from town

⁵ "The Past Operation of the Peace Society", in *Herald of Peace* (March, 1881), pp. 198-199 [Hereafter cited as *H.P.*]; Ferdinand Dreyfus: *Un Philanthrope d'Autrefois. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt* (Paris, 1903), pp.492-503; Chas. H. Pouthas: *Guizot pendant la Restauration* (Paris, 1923), pp.342ff.

⁶ M.Thibert: "Saint-Simoniennes et pacifistes", in *La Paix par le Droit* (1923), XXXIII, 196-198 [Hereafter cited as *P.D.*]; *Advocate of Peace* (August, 1844), p.237 [Hereafter cited as *A.P.*]; for the internationalist thought of Saint-Simon and his school, of Fourier, Pecqueur, Leroux, and Proudhon, cf. J. L.Puech: *La Tradition Socialiste en France et la Société des Nations*.

⁷ *Report of Proceedings of Second General Peace Congress*, p.2.

⁸ C. L. Siemering: *Von der creten deutschen Friedensgesellschaft* (Frankfort, 1909).

⁹ Guiseppe Gallavresi: "Le Centenaire d'un Precurseur: Jean-Jacques de Sellon", in *Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge* (1931), XIII, 348-358; centenary articles in *Friedens-Warte* (1930), XXX, 221-22, 353-356 [Hereafter cited as *F.-W.*].

to town on the Continent, seeking out good Christians who would form peace committees. Sometimes he found them, but by the time his optimistic birth announcements appeared in the *Herald of Peace* his creations were usually non-existent. Nowhere on the Continent could it have been expected that the Peace Society's Christian appeal would find anything like the response it did when addressed to English non-conformist circles. Furthermore, the four decades after 1815 were years of peace, and it was difficult to build up resentment against an inactive Demon. That was why so much time was spent in the congresses and so much space used up in the propaganda tracts painting the horrors of war. War was a long way off; the public had had no immediate experience of it. As late as the fifties the peace propagandists were still drawing upon the Napoleonic Wars for their grisly examples of the horrors of battle.

In several specific instances the early pacifists left interesting traces in the political records of the day. Cobden, their champion in the House of Commons, pressed for the reduction of armaments quite consistently, and his arbitration motion of 1849, although defeated, called forth the first serious discussion of the problem. Then there was the famous Quaker Deputation to the Tsar. The story was told in the standard history of the Crimean War, and generally believed, that a delegation of English Quakers had helped precipitate the war by giving the Tsar the idea that the English were unwilling to fight. Actually the peace mission of a few Friends to St. Petersburg was entirely without effect. Better luck had a deputation from the Peace Society to the English plenipotentiary Clarendon at the Congress of Paris, which was liquidating the Crimean War in 1856. After listening to the pacifists, Clarendon went so far as to ask the other negotiators for a clause in the peace treaty making resort to mediation obligatory in case of dispute. Such a far-sighted proposal belonged to another century, and all that the English statesman was able to get was general agreement to a *voeu* that, in case of a difficulty, quarrelling States should resort to good offices of a third power before appealing to arms. This was not much, but it at least gave the British Foreign Office something to invoke in later efforts to prevent the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars¹⁰.

Although their influence of their times was slight, the early pacifists did valiant work in marking out the trails for the artisans of peace of the next period to follow. The pioneers presented their successors with an armory of unassailable anti-

¹⁰ Christina Phelps: *The Anglo-American Peace Movement in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (N.Y., 1930), pp.153-158, and *passim*; Alex Wm. Kinglake: *The Invasion of the Crimea* (4th ed., Edinburgh and London, 1863-1887), I. 414-415; Gavin B. Henderson: "The Pacifists in the Fifties", in *Journal of Modern History* (Sept.,1937) IX. 329, 335-339; Kurt Rheindorf: "Die englisch-deutschen Verhandlungen über eine Abrüstung im Frühjahr 1870" in *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte* (1925),

war arguments, to which little was ever added. They began the agitation for arbitration treaties, for an arbitration court, for international disarmament, and although they concentrated on these planks of their platform, they recognized the necessity for international organization and the congresses approved the plan of the American, William Ladd, for a Congress of Nations. The Peace Society sent agents to give lectures over the face of England, its members organized meetings in support of Cobden's parliamentary peace activities, they made no small use of the printing press, distributing thousands of tracts and seeking to put the newspapers to their own use, they organized deputations, memorials, and petitions to the government, sponsored petitions - in short, the technique of propaganda was already at hand for their successors. The task of those who took up the work after 1867 was to broaden the base of the peace appeal, to deepen the peace doctrine, and above all, to internationalize the peace movement¹¹.

IV. 442-443; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, ed. by A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (3 vols., N.Y., 1923), III.4, 6, 35.

¹¹ On the early movement there is the very useful work of Phelps, *op. cit.*; cf. also A. C. F. Beales: *The History of Peace* (N.Y., 1931), pp.45-116. On the American side cf. Merle Curti: *The American Peace Crusade* (Durham, N.C., 1929); W. Freeman Galpin: *Pioneering for Peace* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1933).

CHAPTER I

BEGINNINGS OF THE CONTINENTAL PEACE MOVEMENT 1867-1870

The world was rapidly growing together in the eighteen-sixties; international manifestations were multiplying on every side. While the swing from free-trade to protectionist policies was beginning, the blind economic forces continued to bind the nations together, and the accelerated growth of transportation facilities provided the means by which a rising internationalism could make itself felt in congresses and international associations. In the decade after 1860 over twice as many international congresses took place as in the entire preceding period. Governments in conference assembled laid down rules for the first time for the governance of international postal exchange, of international telegraphic communication, of monetary regulations, and attempts were made to regulate the international sugar trade and to establish a fixed relationship between gold and silver. The one-man propaganda of Henri Dunant produced the Geneva Convention for the sick and wounded in war, and the Red Cross Society entered upon its holy mission. Scientific congresses became regularized, workers joined hands in the First International, and the World Fair of 1867 at Paris, the third international exposition to be held, gave striking testimony to the existence of a world solidarity¹.

Yet Europe was not living in peace but in the age of nationalist State-making through methods of blood and iron. The most conspicuous exhibit at the Paris Exposition was a monstrous Krupp Cannon. In 1866 Bismarck sent the Prussian legions against Austria, and the crash of cannons sounded ominously close to Paris. The French Liberal Economists, their thinking dominated by conceptions of a pre-ordained harmony in the world, felt painfully the contradiction between economic solidarity and political conflict. Michel Chevalier expressed their fears in a remarkable article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in June, 1866. He declared that for the merchants and manufacturers peace was "the object of a cult"; yet he recognized that "in international politics there is no more security, and the future is dark for all Europe without exception". "Is there not", Chevalier asked, "some way to prevent the storms and the dangers which we have reason to feel are imminent?"². One writer suggested that the way was for the bankers and financiers to unite in a League of

¹ J. C. Faries: *The Rise of Internationalism* (N.Y., 1915); there is a chronological table of international reunions in *Annuaire de la Vie Internationale*, (Brussels, 1908-1909), I. pp.1285ff.

² M. Chevalier: "La Guerre et la Crise Européenne" in *Revue des Deux Mondes* (June, 1866), LXIII, 758-785; cf. also his *Introduction to the Exposition Universelle de 1867 à Paris: Rapports du Jury International* (Paris, 1868), pp. 511ff. L. Reybaud: "L'Economie Politique et la Guerre", in *Journal des Economistes* (July, 1866), ser.3, III. 5-12.

Peace and refuse to make any war loans. He found the support of Girardin, but the capitalists paid no heed. Girardin himself was waging a campaign against war and the armed peace in the *Liberté*, in which every day he added up the costs and called for a general disarmament. The Republicans under the Second Empire looked upon the army as an instrument of oppression. They put no stock in Louis Napoleon's proclamation: *l'Empire, c'est la Paix*; and they called for disarmament and the substitution of the armed nation for the standing army. In this sentiment they were joined by the socialists, in whose journals at the time appeared articles against war and the idea of the fatherland. Students felt the anti-war spirit, and on the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War a group of them addressed a stirring appeal to the students of Italy and Germany, telling them that they were being duped by false ideals³.

The approach of war roused Freemasons to action. In 1866 at a general assembly of the lodges of Geneva it was decided that the individual members should support the promotion of a European peace congress⁴. More important was the initiative which came from the brothers at Le Havre. The three lodges there were inspired to work for peace through the efforts of Santallier, a prominent journalist, and out of their discussions grew the *Union de la paix*, founded in 1867. Adhesions were plentiful at Le Havre, where the affair was the event of the season; and thus encouraged, Santallier drew up a circular addressed to "all men of goodwill in France and abroad", which was translated in foreign languages and widely distributed. "Brothers of all humanity!" the appeal began, and it proposed that an international tribunal to decide all disputes be established by a world-wide election carried out by private initiative. Santallier's circular was characterized throughout by a deep distrust of governments and just as deep a faith in the peoples. Many other lodges adhered to the ideas of the message, although they did not attempt to follow out the specific suggestions, and the Freemason Congress convoked at Le Havre in 1868 considered among other things how Freemasons could combat the idea of war, "which is the negation of human fraternity". Santallier did not receive the support which he expected from non-masonic sources, and before long the Imperial Government, not relishing the republican idealism of the association, tendered to the *Union de la Paix* a polite invitation to abstain henceforth from all propaganda⁵.

³ E. Cavaglioni: *La Ligue de la Paix par l'Exposition* (Paris, 1867), pp.3-6; articles by Girardin from *La Liberté*, reprinted in *J.D. Econ.* (1866), 3^e sér., III, 435-437; and in *H.P.* (February, 1867), pp.162-164; Georges Goyau: *L'Idée de Patrie et l'Humanitarisme* (Paris, 1903), pp.22-32; Marc de Préadeau: *Michel Bakounine* (Paris, 1912), pp.91-92; E.Dolléans: *Histoire du Mouvement Ouvrier* (Paris, 1936), I, 291-292.

⁴ Nottermann to Ducommun, June 8, 1893, and accompanying memorandum. Files of International Peace Bureau, VIII. A. {Hereafter cited as B.I.P. MSS}.

⁵ Goyau, *op. cit.*, pp.66-71; F. Santallier: *Friedens-Union zwischen allen civilisirten Völkern* (Havre, 1867); R. Lévy-Guenot: "L'Illusion de la Paix en 1867" in *La Révolution de 1843* (1922), XIX, 6-20; E. Potonié-Pierre: *Historique du Mouvement Pacifique* (Berne, 1899), pp.113-114; *H.P.* (Sept., 1867), pp.253-254; *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de la Paix* (July-August, 1872), p.7.

The extent of the peace sentiment in the sixties is well illustrated in the efforts of Edmund Potonié to found a Universal League of Public Welfare, with the aim: "to combat monopolies and extortions, to demonstrate the advantages of all the liberties, to preach peace". Potonié was unable to organize his league until 1866, and even after that the association seems to have consisted of Potonié and nobody else, but he was not disappointed in the men from whom he solicited moral support of his principles. In the lists of adhesions, published in a little journal which Potonié was enabled to put out by the aid of English pacifists, we find everyone from free-traders like Cobden; English non-conformists such as Henry Richard, Secretary of the London Peace Society; Catholic Liberals like Father Gratry; Liberal Economists such as Chevalier, Molinari, Prince-Smith, and Frédéric Passy; leading Freemasons like Jean Macé; republicans like Garibaldi, Victor Hugo, and Jules Simon; and even members of the Socialist International⁶. The English pacifists naturally hailed with delight such evidence of the advance of peace principles on the Continent, and they began to talk of taking up again the international congresses where they had been interrupted by the Crimean War⁷.

Peace was only too well represented by the sad and forlorn figure in Daumier's lithographs in *Charivari*, and *L'Equilibre d'Europe* actually meant, as he conceived it, no more than a Europe balanced on bayonets. When Prussia thrust Austria out of Germany in 1866 and began to form her own German State, by the rules of the game of power politics the balance of power was declared broken, and France, in order to maintain her security as well as her dignity, had to have compensation. At first Louis Napoleon cast longing eyes at the banks of the Rhine, but Bismarck soon discouraged that. Eventually Luxemburg was fastened upon, and negotiations were begun with Holland, whose king was grand duke of the principality and in need of money. Just when the deal was about to be closed the news leaked out in Germany, a Germany fresh from the victories of 1866 with nationalism still at fever heat. Luxemburg, still technically part of the German Confederation, was considered to be German, and the thought that it should belong to France was insufferable. The protest raised was loud and long. The situation was now altered. Exclaimed Bismarck, "It is no longer a question of Luxemburg, but of our position as regards Germany and its feeling of national honor". This was serious, for as Bismarck explained, "If a people feels its honor injured, then it is injured, and it must be handled accordingly. National feeling and national honor are powers which cannot be measured by logic"⁸.

⁶ Potonié, *op. cit.*, pp.82-110; *H.P.* (May-July, 1864), pp.57-58, 83-84; *ibid.* (April, 1867), pp.183-189.

⁷ *H.P.* (1865-1866), VIII. 207, IX. 64, 97-98.

With national feeling aroused in Germany Bismarck was brought to promise in the Chamber that the interests of Prussia and Germany would be upheld. He gave Holland to understand that if war broke out the blame would be hers, and the king thereupon withdrew his offer. Napoleon III now found himself placed in a position where he either had to declare war on Prussia or retire as gracefully as possible. In France, according to the Prussian ambassador, Louis Napoleon's policy was denounced for running the risk of war for so contemptible an object as Luxemburg, yet public opinion was bitter against Prussia and prepared to consider war necessary in the interest of France's honor⁹. But Napoleon did not want war. He was opposed to it personally, and furthermore, his army was not ready and the diplomatic constellation was unfavorable. Nor did Bismarck wish to begin another campaign so soon, before Germany had quite recovered from the last, and especially before the South German States were won over to his plans for unification. England, Austria, and Russia were anxious to avoid any unpleasantness, and so a *modus vivendi* was found in a conference of the Great Powers, in which any concession made would be made to Europe as a whole and not to the rival State. When it seemed that the conflict would find a peaceful issue, King William of Prussia wrote to his Queen: "It would be an indescribable piece of good fortune if we could maintain peace *with honor* and not have to spend a thaler"¹⁰. The conference of the Great Powers met at London, neutralized Luxemburg, and peace with honor for all was secure for several years more¹¹.

The war scare was at its height during the month of April, 1867. The first audible protest against the war came from a group of Berlin workers, the Engine-Builders Society, which sent an address to the workers of France on April 14, insisting that the working-class had no interest in dynastic wars. This was answered by the Paris Bureau of the International in a letter which sounded the note of peace and liberty and declared: "It is in the name of the universal solidarity, invoked by the International Association, that we exchange with you the greetings of peace, which will cement anew the indissoluble alliance of the workers". The first congress of the International in 1866 had demanded the abolition of the standing armies and the arming of the people, and now the Parisian members took the initiative in forming a

⁸ Kurt A. Schierenberg: *Die Deutsch-Französische Auseinandersetzen und die Luxemburger Frage* (Marburg, 1933), pp.65, 72.

⁹ *Die auswärtige Politik Preussens 1858-1871*, Dritte Abteilung, VIII, ed. by Dr. H. Michaelis (Oldenburg, 1934), no.463.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 553n.

¹¹ In addition to the documents on the Luxemburg Affair published by Michaelis in Volume VIII of the Prussian collection, one may also consult: *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Les Origines Diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870-1871* (29 Vols., Paris, 1910-32) vols. XIII-XVI; [Hereafter cited as *O.D.*]; H. Oncken: *Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon III* (3 vols. Stuttgart, 1926) translated in part as *Napoleon III and the Rhine* (N.Y., 1928), cf. pp.84-89; Henri Salomon: *L'Ambassade de Richard de Metternich à Paris* (Paris, 1931).

Ligue Internationale du Désarmement, proclaiming that "the chief cause of War is the army". This proclamation was the *Ligue's* first and last act of life. Meanwhile the peace messages accumulated. University students in both Germany and France began to circulate appeals, and the French Liberal politician Garnier-Pagès set out for Berlin to assure the German Liberals that the French people wanted no war¹².

On April 25 there appeared in *Le Temps* a letter calling upon the French people to begin a great manifestation for peace, making known their will for peace in the press, through petitions, and by interpellations in the Chamber. The editor of the journal, Nefftzer, thought this chimerical and printed it only because the author, Charles Dollfus, a fellow-Alsatian, was a personal friend who had helped him found the newspaper in 1861. But that same evening Jules Favre deposed a request for an interpellation, and Nefftzer received two more pacific appeals, strikingly similar in tone, but composed independently of one another and before the letter of Dollfus had appeared. Nefftzer had been resigned to accept war. Now, still sceptical, he decided to publish these letters to see if there really existed a strong public opinion for peace. They were printed on April 26. One was from Gustave d'Eichthal, the noted Saint-Simonian publicist. He viewed with alarm the muteness of public opinion in the face of what was "perhaps the greatest crime of treason to civilization that history will ever have to record", and he called for an articulate protest from all parts of Europe, from all classes of society, from all leaders of public opinion, against the threatening war. The second letter was from Frédéric Passy, known as the popularizer of the science of political economy in France. The approach of war had left him so distraught that he could neither sleep nor eat until finally he thought of a way of preventing it. On the morning of April 23, after a sleepless night, Passy wrote an eloquent appeal to Nefftzer, imploring him to make *Le Temps* "the declared organ of the adversaries of war". Relying upon the example set by Jean Macé, who a short time before had issued just such an appeal in the press for the establishment of his *Ligue de l'Enseignement* and had received adhesions by the thousand, Passy sent out the call for adherents to a *Ligue de la Paix*, asking Nefftzer to inscribe his own name as the first on this "international list of the friends of justice, of moderation, and of mutual respect". In printing these letters Nefftzer associated himself with their ideas and opened the columns of *Le Temps* for adhesions. "Let the *Ligue de la Paix* come", he wrote, "and may it quickly grow". But he warned that the manifestation would have

¹² *Le Temps*, April 25, June 12, 1867; [Karl Abel:] *Letters on International Relations* (2 vols., London, 1871), I.255, 271, 280; E. Fribourg: *L'Internationale des Travailleurs* (Paris, 1871), pp.104-107; O. Testut: *L'Internationale et le Jacobinisme* (2 vols., Paris, 1872), I.237-239.

to be international, that the voice of France would have to be answered by the voice of Germany¹³.

The response was amazing. By the very next day, April 27, the voices of peace were so numerous that *Le Temps* had room only for the collective adhesions. An exception was made for the letter of the prominent Protestant minister, Martin-Paschoud, who later sponsored an address from the pastors of France to the pastors of Germany. Paris industrialists began to circulate an appeal to the deputies of Paris, declaring, "We consider war as the most frightful of calamities. ... The moment has come to form the sacred union of peoples". French co-operators answered the Berlin mechanics. Addresses were sent to Germany from French Freemasons, from the students of Paris and Strassburg. The German colony at Paris adhered to the *Ligue*. Adhesions poured in from all over France, and they did not stop coming after the Luxemburg Question had been settled in London in the second week in May. Already on April 27 Charles Lemonnier had sought to mobilize republican anti-war sentiment separately in the radical *Phare de la Loire*, and now other journals of the provinces gave over columns to the cause. By May 1 Nefftzer had to admit that "we are evidently in the presence of a serious movement which we did not anticipate, and at which we remain astonished". John Stuart Mill congratulated his friend d'Eichthal for his letter, telling him how he delighted to see "with what energy the voice of a large part of your nation has responded to that appeal"¹⁴. Journals like *L'Opinion Nationale*, *Le Siècle*, and Girardin's *Liberté* attacked *Le Temps*, charging that it stood for peace-at-any-price. What you need to make the *Ligue* consistent, observed Girardin who was found alternately on the side of the friends of peace and of their opponents during all these years, is the adhesion of M. Bismarck. To such critics Nefftzer answered, as did Jules Ferry in his articles in *Le Temps*, that what he and his friends opposed was an aggressive war for Luxemburg; there could be no question of refusing to fight in a war of defense. All along Nefftzer continued to insist upon the necessity of a counter-demonstration from Germany, but the response from the other side of the Rhine was hardly satisfactory. It was confined to workers' associations and democratic circles, and when the German university students did answer the addresses sent to them, one group claimed that a free and united Germany was the best guarantee for peace, while another lectured to the Strassburgers for daring to speak in the name of France. It could not be said that the voice of France had been answered by the voice of Germany. After the Conference of London had settled the matter peacefully, the crisis was forgotten. Passy, who had been regularly sending in

¹³ *Le Temps*, April 25, 26, 27, 1867; René Martin: "Un Pacifiste sous l'Empire: Charles Dollfus", in *P.D.* (1926), XXXVI. 387-391; Passy's reactions to the threat of war are described in A. Brisson: *Les Prophètes* (Paris, n.d.), pp.89-90.

¹⁴ J. S. Mill: *Correspondance inédite avec Gustave d'Eichthal*. Ed. by E. d'Eichthal (Paris, 1898), p.213.

articles to *Le Temps*, was reminded that he was not a member of the staff, and after May 26 the rubric, *La Ligue de la Paix*, was seen no more in the journal's pages¹⁵.

Frédéric Passy never forgot these events. Again and again he referred to them in his addresses and his writings and it became a sort of legend among the pacifists that an enlightened public opinion had been able to prevent war in 1867. Unfortunately things had not gone as he had thought. As we have seen, Napoleon III had many reasons for not wishing to go to war over Luxemburg, and it was with a great sigh of relief that he embraced the first likely suggestion of a way out. When the agitation began in *Le Temps* on April 26, the negotiations for the calling of the conference were already under way, and the Prussian ambassador dated the peaceful phase of the conflict from about April 23¹⁶. There is no doubt but that the disinclination of French public opinion to support any aggressive design on Luxemburg played a part in Louis Napoleon's considerations, but the pacific outburst in *Le Temps* came too late to act as a decisive factor in the termination of the conflict, and it is not even mentioned in the published documents. In fact, in Berlin they attached far more importance to the bellicose notes which they heard in the French press¹⁷. This was to err in the other direction, but it was the business of the Prussian ambassador to be more sensitive to the war-like voices than to those of peace. It cannot be denied that the crisis called forth a remarkable manifestation of public opinion in favor of peace. It was a spontaneous peace plebiscite unique in the history of the time.

The apparent victory was impressive. In 1861, after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Commerce Treaty, Arlès-Dufour, the wealthy Lyons industrialist and convinced Saint-Simonian, had urged Cobden to form an International Peace League, but Cobden had objected that the only way to promote peace was through commercial intercourse¹⁸. Now it appeared that there was another way. Early in May Arlès-Dufour sought out his friend Passy. "Passy", he said, "You have prevented a war. It is well, but it is not enough. We must prevent WAR, make all war impossible. We shall found the *Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix*, and you will be the secretary-general". And so it was done. First, to prepare public opinion, Passy gave a public lecture on war in the auditorium of the Medical School on May 21. His theme was that war does not pay, but he did not fail to paint some of the other horrors of war

¹⁵ *Le Temps*, April 25-May 26, 1867; Passy: *Pour la Paix* (Paris, 1909), pp.12-16; *idem*: *Notes Autobiographiques* (MSS), pp.110-111; *H.P.* (June, 1867), pp.217-220; Abel, *op. cit.*, I.296; H. Hetzel: *Die Humanisirung des Krieges* (Frankfort, 1891), pp.55-56; Goyau, *op. cit.*, pp.52-54; J.Gaumont: *Histoire Générale de la Coopération en France* (2 vols., Paris, 1923-24), II.625-628.

¹⁶ Michaelis, *op. cit.*, VIII, no. 565.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 538.

¹⁸ Arlès-Dufour in a speech at the Cobden Club. *Report of the Proceedings of the Annual Dinner*, June 24, 1871 (London, 1871), p.27.

and, insisting that war could be abolished, he ended on the moral note: "God wills it! and we shall do it". On June 2 appeared in *Le Temps* an address of the organizing committee of the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix*. It bore the signatures of Michel Chevalier; Martin-Paschoud; Jean Dollfus, the Alsatian manufacturer and father of Charles Dollfus; the Grand Rabbi Isidor; Father Gratry; the Germans, Varrentrap, a Liberal publicist, and Baron von Liebig, the famous chemist who happened to be in Paris for the Exposition; and Arlès-Dufour and Passy. A bureau to receive adhesions was opened in the Alsatian Pavilion on the grounds of the Exposition. A circular issued on October 1 established the character of the *Ligue*: it was purely humanitarian, not political, and its aim was to enlighten public opinion. "Within the *Ligue* there is only one thought: the appeasement of international discords, only one flag: the flag of justice and of mutual respect". Membership was open to all, man or woman, Catholic or Jew, worker or industrialist, republican or Bonapartist. "Whoever loves peace, from whatever motive it may be, he is with us"¹⁹.

The response was disappointing after the earlier success. Ardors had cooled when the war scare was over, and the worship of the arts of peace at the Exposition served to hush for a time the whisperings of Mars. The Catholic Church, from which so much was expected, held entirely aloof, and even its individual members refused to adhere. Those who did join, in particular Fathers Gratry and Perraud, were persecuted by the powerful ultramontane *Univers*, which declared the *Ligue* to be a "Protestant contrivance". The spirit of religious intolerance was riding high, and the orthodox condemned outright any cooperation between the faithful and the heretics. Then the very fact that the *Ligue* included men of all political persuasions acted to limit its appeal. Some of those who had joined with enthusiasm in the first hour withdrew with alacrity when they saw their names placed on the lists next to those of their political enemies. Nor was the government friendly. Associations of whatever kind were bound to be suspect under a dictatorship. Louis Napoleon's government could not openly disavow the ideals of peace by suppressing the society, but it never failed to throw obstacles in its path. The necessary official authorization for public meetings was not always forthcoming, and once the police even confiscated some of the society's papers, although they were later returned. Government officials were not alone in their suspicions. Passy tells how certain individuals left the *Ligue* when they discovered that its humanitarian phrases concealed no deep-dyed political purpose after all²⁰.

¹⁹ Cf. Passy's article on Arlès-Dufour in his series "Ceux qu'il faut honorer", in *P.D.* (1910), XX.321-324; *Le Temps*, June 2, 1867; Passy: *Conférence sur la Paix* (Paris, 1867); *idem*, *Pour la Paix*, pp.18-23; *idem*, *Historique du Mouvement de la Paix* (Paris, 1904), p.17; *J.d. Econ.* (May, 1867), ser. 3, VI. 284.

²⁰ Georges Seigneur: *La Ligue de la Paix, Appel aux Catholiques* (Paris, 1868), Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.20-34; *idem*, *Historique*, pp.17-19; *A.P.* (Sept., 1868), XVIII. 127.

Nevertheless, the membership ran to several hundreds. The majority were well-to-do business men and professional men, and the lists included many prominent economists and publicists. The collective support of several bourgeois industrialist societies was also tendered the society. Such adhesions were prompted by the prevalence at the time among the commercial classes of the pacifist principles of free-trade and the harmony of economic interests. Ministers of God took part in the society to some extent, but to a degree far less than in the English and American peace organizations. In fact, the most prominent members of the clergy, Father Gratry and Martin-Paschoud, were themselves members of the Society of Political Economy, the custodian of the Manchester tradition in France. Father Gratry was a vigorous champion of the oppressed nationalities, and another Priest, Father Hyacinthe, declared at one of the public assemblies of the *Ligue*: "If it were a war of independence, I would be the first, if not to fight it, at least to preach it". This was not pacifism as the English and American friends of peace understood it. Scandalized, they saw in such expressions "very little of Christian principle". The society was based upon principles far removed from those of non-resistance. Its members admitted the right of legitimate defense and went even further; they proclaimed that "to resist injustice and oppression is a duty". Catholics generally abstained from participation, and the society was in the hands of the Protestants. The statutes admitted women on the same terms as men, a move which was very liberal for the time and which was hailed by Saint-Simonians like Arlès-Dufour as a great step forward on the road to women's rights. The fair sex may have brightened up the meetings, but they took no prominent part in the society's work. In name, the society was international, but hardly so in fact. There was a small committee in Geneva and one in Italy, where the members included Mancini, deputy and professor of international law, César Cantu, the well-known historian, and Castiglia, the deputy who in 1868 brought in a bill for the abolition of international war. Some echo was found in Belgium, where Couvreur spoke in the Chamber against conscription, and in Sweden, where the editor Hedlund was active and where several pieces of propaganda were translated from the French and widely distributed. Elsewhere there were personal adhesions, the most surprising of which came, in answer to a communication of the society, from none other than the Queen of Prussia!²¹.

An attempt to hold an international peace congress in Paris during the Exposition of 1867 was blocked by the Imperial Government, which refused to heed the earnest pleas of Henry Richard and the French peace men. The next year the

²¹ *Deuxième Assemblée Générale de la Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix* (Paris, 1869), pp.208-212 (list of the members); 107, 76, 194; A. Gratry: *La Paix* (Paris, 1861); *A.P.* (Dec., 1869),

authorities were just as reluctant to authorize a public meeting for peace, but Passy blackmailed them into accession by threatening to publish the facts. So the *Ligue* held its first public assembly in 1868, and this was followed by a general meeting and the second public assembly in 1869. The speeches were eloquent, as French addresses usually are, and sincere. Their tenor is summed up by Passy: "We pronounce war anathema in the name of heaven and earth; we prove that it is indicted by religion, that it is condemned by ethics and by science and disavowed by any policy worthy of that name". That war is unprofitable was insisted upon by the economists Chevalier, Laboulaye, and Passy himself, while the Catholic priest Father Hyacinthe delivered a stirring ethical sermon against war²².

This was merely preaching to converts. What was of greater importance was what struck a journalist who attended the assembly of 1868. He spoke of "the interesting and instructive spectacle of seeing a Grand Rabbi (Isidor) publicly disavowing the God of armies, a Protestant minister (Martin-Paschoud) reading the eloquent adhesion of a Catholic priest (Gratry) and offering his hand to free-thinkers..." This public cooperation by men of different creeds who were united in a higher cause was the practice of what the pacifists were preaching. How unusual at the time was this spirit of tolerance is shown by the fate of several of those who had courage to take part. At the general assembly of 1869 Father Hyacinthe, whose thought had for some time been taking a turn that was not fit and proper for a Carmelite, dared to put Protestantism and Judaism on an equal footing with Catholicism. The utterance of such blasphemy brought down upon him the condemnation of the Catholic press and the Church authorities and provided the occasion for his departure from the fold. Both Gratry and his disciple Perraud were publicly censored by their superior for their collaboration with the *Ligue*, and after Perraud's inspiring sermon on the Gospel of Peace, which he delivered in 1869 at the request of Passy, the pulpit was denied him for several years²³.

By 1869 the young society had received sums roughly equivalent to \$ 4,000, which was about one fourth of the income of the London Peace Society for the single year 1868-1869. Owing to the various obstacles to individual and collective action in the France of that time, no vigorous campaign could be inaugurated, but there was no

n.s. I.177; Hetzel, *op.cit.*, p.59; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, p. 197; Passy: *Notes Autobiographiques*, pp.49-50.

²² Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.25-26, 198-202; *A.P.* (August, 1867), pp.321-322; *Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix: Bibliothèque de la Paix*, n° 4; Première Assemblée Générale 1868, n° 9: Deuxième Assemblée Générale; n°7: *Les Maux de la Guerre*.

²³ *J. d. Econ.* (June, 1868), ser.3, X.469-470; *ibid.* (1869), ser.3, XVI. 76-102, 154-155; R. P. A. Chauvin: *Le Père Gratry* (Paris, 1901), pp.340-341; Augustin Largent: *L'Abbé Charles Perraud* (Paris, 1895), pp.32-35; *Revue de la Paix* (1906), XI.209-210 [Hereafter cited as *R.P.*]; Albert Houtin: *Un*

difficulty in using up the funds. For a while in 1868 Passy was enabled through the Dollfus interests to reach a wide public by inserting in *Le Temps*, on the same basis as a paid advertisement, a *Bulletin* which described the activities of the *Ligue*. Such activities seemed to consist in the energetic labors of the secretary-general of the *Ligue*, Passy, who lectured in behalf of peace in many cities of France as well as in Belgium and Switzerland. Then began to appear a series of cheap little books of propaganda called *La Bibliothèque de la Paix*. Of them all the most popular was Leroy-Beaulieu's study of Contemporary Wars, which was translated into English and other languages and distributed far and wide. Today its totals of war's grim costs are not so appalling, but the little volume remains the first systematic attempt to reduce the horrors of war to mathematical terms. Another of the books dealt with war as the cause of epidemics, one was a compilation of anti-war quotations, and Perraud's sermon was also published in the series. More interesting as precursors of later thought were the two pamphlets which examined military aspects of the problem of war. Both based their argument upon the fact that the new weapons had apparently given defense a great superiority over attack. One author, anticipating Bloch, concluded that that meant the end of war; the other, anticipating later Socialist thought, sketched a plan by which France could disarm her standing army and entrust her security to an armed citizenry trained as *franc-tireurs*. These scientific treatments of the war question were a distinct contribution to the literature of peace and war, although the extent of their circulation was probably not very large²⁴.

Such were the fortunes of France's first important peace society. *La Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix* began as an effort to capitalize upon the wide-spread pacifist protest evoked by the policy of Napoleon III which brought France dangerously close to war over Luxemburg. It found support in sections of the business community where Saint-Simonian and free-trade doctrines were held, yet it failed to hold its wider public after the war scare died down. Its members developed no constructive program to prevent war. Instead, led astray by what seemed the easy victory of public opinion over the war demon in the spring of 1867, and anxious not to antagonize the Government in any way, the French pacifists pinned their hopes on public opinion and confined their labors to educating the public in the belief that war was wrong. They were to be rudely disillusioned in 1870.

Prêtre Marié. Charles Perraud (2nd ed., Paris 1908), p.12n; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.29-30; *idem*, *Notice Nécrologique sur Martin-Paschoud* (Saint Denis, 1873), pp.19-20.

²⁴ *Bibliothèque de la Paix*: n° 1, Leroy-Beaulieu: *Les Guerres Contemporaines (1853-1866)*; n°2, Comte de Dreuille: *Comment on pourrait réduire l'Armée tout en assurant la Défense Nationale*; n°3, M. F. Guilhaumon: *La Guerre et les Epidémies*; n°5, A. Larrieu: *Guerre à la Guerre*; n°6, L. A. Beaudemoulin: *La Guerre s'en va*; n°8, Perraud: *L'Evangile de la Paix*; n°10, *La Bataille et la Retraite de Leipzig. Extrait des Souvenirs d'un ex-Officier*.

More important was another manifestation of internationalism which was called forth by the same Luxemburg crisis. On the day on which the Conference of London met to liquidate the conflict, May 5, 1867, there appeared an editorial in *Le Phare de la Loire*, most radical of French democratic journals, in which the editor, Mangin, called attention to the inability of the governments to give Europe a lasting peace. Mangin recalled the peace congresses of 1849 and 1850, and he suggested that a congress of the peoples meet in Geneva to discuss ways and means to make the voices of peace more authoritative and to dispel the terrible national prejudices. Taken by the idea, a small group of French republicans, dominated by Charles Lemonnier, met at the home of the lawyer Acollas in Paris to talk about the organization of such a congress. The group formed itself into a committee and on June 11 sent out a manifesto setting the date for the Geneva congress and proclaiming that the establishment and maintenance of peace "can be attained only through the confederation of peoples, which is inseparable from their political emancipation". In the first days of July a further note from the Paris committee defined the aim of the Congress of Geneva as to determine "the political and economic conditions of peace among the peoples, and in particular of the establishment of the United States of Europe. It aspires to be the assizes of the European democracy..." A new appeal at the end of July designated the coming assembly as "a congress of peace by liberty". The circulars went the rounds of Europe, and the adhesions began to pour in. In Geneva, Jules Barni, a democrat who had fled the Empire, won the adherence of the local Radical political leader, "Grandfather" Fazy, who hoped to gain prestige in the eyes of the Genevese by presiding over a distinguished gathering of European democrats, and the local arrangements were taken care of²⁵.

From this the ideals of the organizers are quite clear. They were proclaiming once again the grand ideal of the solidarity of peoples, which the French revolutionists had first announced to Europe, which had had a brief but spectacular resurrection in the stirring days of 1848, but which since then had gone into exile with the political refugees who lived for the past but kept faith with the future. For the Paris group Lemonnier was providing much of the inspiration. He placed the enterprise on a scholarly basis by giving to his friends lectures on the history of the idea of peace. He showed them how the Great Design of Henry IV and Sully was lacking in morality, how the plans of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and of Saint-Simon were lacking in liberty, while Kant's scheme was based upon ethics and failed to consider politics. Lemonnier alone announced the complete formula for the future federation of Europe: it was to be based on the familiar principles of fraternity, liberty, and equality, and

²⁵ *Annales du Congrès de Genève*, p.1-7; Charles Lemonnier: *La Vérité sur le Congrès de Genève* (Berne, 1867), pp.4-6; Lemonnier: *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (Paris, 1872), pp.85-87; Dide: *Jules Barni* (Paris, 1892), pp.156-164.

thus the three essential elements, the ethical, the political, and the juridical, would be included. Needless to say, such lectures were not authorized by the Imperial Government²⁶.

Adhesions multiplied until 10,666 individuals and societies had associated themselves with the principles of the organizers. On the lists were names of great exiles like Victor Hugo, Louis Blanc, and Edgar Quinet; the parliamentary opposition, including Carnot, Jules Favre, Jules Simon and Pellatan; and other prominent republicans and radicals, like the Reclus brothers, Naquet, Potonié, Clamageran, Jules Ferry, and Scheurer-Kestner. From all over Europe masonic lodges and workers' organizations hastened to send in their adhesions, and the congress was postponed so that delegates of the International could be present. From England came the support of John Stuart Mill and John Bright. The Reform League adhered and sent as delegates William Randal Cremer and James Odgers. The Peace Society was friendly at first, and when Lemonnier wrote Richard that the aim was to give Europe an "International morality", the English pacifists approved. But when Richard came to Paris to establish relations with the new peace groups and found that the promoters of the Geneva congress placed liberty before peace, the Peace Society could be only a spectator. Lemonnier invited both the English pacifist and Passy to cooperate with him and his friends, and a long conference was held in Paris. But Richard warned them that "the cause of peace *cannot* be advanced by weapons of war", while Passy, who shunned politics, was careful to make a declaration of non-adherence²⁷.

In Germany the National Liberals held aloof, and in the name of the Progressives, Schulze-Delitsch wrote the Paris committee: "From the political point of view, the adhesion of the chiefs of the German democracy to the League of peace would be an error which would imperil its influence forever, for that step would appear anti-national in these times when all they are talking about in Germany is the armament of France". Only some workingmen's societies and South German democrats adhered; the single prominent name was that of the old democrat, Johann Jacoby. In Italy it was a different story. Garibaldi was announced as honorary president, but even before that many workers' organizations, democratic groups, and masonic lodges had warmly responded to the first appeal. Mazzini, the prophet of Italian republicanism, abstained. In his letter he spoke of the "holy and inevitable war" which was to bring justice and peace to the world. The Polish republicans, too, were suspicious of the stressing of peace when the emphasis should have been on

²⁶ Léon de Montluc: *Charles Lemonnier* (Paris, 1924-1925), pp. 5-7.

²⁷ *Annales*, pp.98-99, 36, and *passim*; *H.P.*, (August, Sept., 1867) pp.240, 245-246; Lemonnier: *La Vérité*, pp.7-8; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp. 24-25.

liberty, and their support was not unanimous. Otherwise the support from the European democracy was complete and wholehearted²⁸.

The Congress, when it met in September, 1867, turned out to be one of the largest international gatherings that had yet been held. Fully six thousand individuals attended. Political outlaws of every stripe, radicals, and socialists flocked to Geneva from all quarters. The program was vague, and consequently for four days the Electoral Palace at Geneva became the safety-valve of Europe. Suppressed in their own countries, the orators used the Congress as a tribune from which to pillory mercilessly all the reactionary forces of the day. Napoleon III, his government, Bismarck, the Russian government, the Pope, even the Bible - each came in for its share of abuse. Nor were the speakers averse to using the congress for their own political purposes. Garibaldi, who was then planning the campaign against Rome which was to end shortly afterwards at Mentana, proclaimed the deposition of the Papacy, hoping to stir up public opinion in his favor. This alienated the Catholic element in Geneva, while the rest of the Genevese, alarmed at the excesses of the Congress and the violent denunciations of foreign governments, began to fear that Swiss neutrality might be imperilled. There was talk of "throwing the foreigners into the Rhone", and inside the Congress the Fazyists tried to prevent any action by their obstructionist tactics. Wild and stormy scenes were the order to the day, and the newspapers took the greatest delight in the depiction of this peace congress as a "congress of war".

Such diverse elements went to make up the Congress that confusion was bound to result. Garnier-Pagès and the other actual leaders of the French democracy had feared that the radical elements would compromise them, and they stayed away. The result was, as Clamageran, one of the original promoters, recognized, that there was a lack of intelligent direction, and the younger revolutionary element in France which seized the opportunity to come forward, was ardent and hot-headed. Quinet was the only elder statesman present, and his classical pronouncement on "The Death of the Human Conscience" was received very coolly²⁹.

Then there was the disturbing presence of the socialists. Over the bitter opposition of Karl Marx, who spoke of the "peace windbags" and the "asses of the peace congress", the International decided to adhere, making its support dependent upon the acceptance by the Congress of the socialist declaration that peace could be secured only through the establishment of "a new order of things", when one class no

²⁸ *Annales*, pp. 59-60, 67, 336-42.

²⁹ Tchernoff: *Le Parti Républicain* (Paris, 1906), p. 467n.; Jules Clamageran: *Correspondance* (Paris, 1906), pp.291-294; Madame Quinet: *Depuis l'Exile* (Paris, 1889), pp.324-326.

longer oppressed the other. At the Congress the Belgian collectivist, de Paepe, reiterated this viewpoint, insisting that "social reorganization is the condition *sine qua non* of peace". The Liberal Economists at the Congress, headed by Molinari, promptly drew up a protest, refusing to admit the existence of any class struggle. The republicans had little desire to take up the Social Question, but they murmured their approval when Chaudey, the friend of Proudhon, proposed what seemed to be a likely compromise: the workers were to aid the bourgeoisie to secure political liberty, while the bourgeoisie would aid the workers to secure economic liberation. The aftermath was that the Paris branch of the International took part in the demonstration at the tomb of Manin, November 2, 1867, protesting against the French occupation of Rome. This marked the first departure of the French socialists from the non-political principles of Proudhon and their entrance into active opposition against the Empire. But this was done as much to allay current suspicions that the members of the International enjoyed relations with the Imperial Government as for any other reason, and the alliance between workers and republicans never really matured³⁰.

In the midst of all the excitement the promoters were able to push through their original program. In the opening speech Jules Barni presented the ideas of Kant upon peace, ideas which were to dominate the doctrines of the League about to be founded throughout its history. The resolutions which were finally voted contained the following phrases:

Considering that the governments of the great states of Europe have been shown to be incapable of preserving peace and of assuring the regular development of all moral and material forces of modern society; considering that the existence and the increase of standing armies constitute latent cause of war and are incompatible with the liberty and with the welfare of all classes of society, principally of the working class; the international Congress, desirous of founding peace upon Democracy and Liberty; Decides: That a league of peace and liberty, a real cosmopolitan federation will be founded.

The Congress declared for the organization of a Central Committee which was to organize the *Ligue*. Meanwhile, the individual members were urged each to work in his own country to root out war prejudices, to agitate for the substitution of national militias for standing armies, and to work for the improvement of the state of the poorer classes³¹

³⁰ *J. d. Econ.* (Oct., 1867), ser.3, VI 118-123; Karl Marx and Friederich Engels: *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfort, Berlin, 1927-1935), Abteilung III, ed. by V. Adoratskij, III.n°1044; *Annales*, pp.295-240-243; James Guillaume: *L'Internationale* (4 vols., Paris, 1905-1910), I.37; Fribourg: *L'Internationale*, pp.114, 116-118; G. M. Stekloff: *History of the First International* (N.Y., 1928), pp.105-108; Dolléans: *Mouvement Ouvrier*, I. 304-305.

³¹ *Annales*, pp. 118-122, 304-305.

So the Congress of Geneva came to an end. What was its significance? Observers thought it just another manifestation of opposition to the Empire, and they remarked nothing beyond the tumult, the violence, and the contradictions. The Congress had a bad press; even the assemblies of the International received more favorable mention in the newspapers. Dostoyevsky, who happened to be in Geneva at the time, wrote to a friend: "Never in my life have I heard such absurdities, and I did not even imagine that men would be capable of such folly". Yet there was something at Geneva which the traditionalist Dostoyevsky could not see, something which the excesses and the excitement hid from his contemporaries. In those few days in that little Swiss town there burned once more for a time the democratic idealism of 1789 and 1848. From all over Europe the democrats came to denounce the tyrants, to pledge themselves anew to the cause of Liberty, to toast the "confederation of free peoples" of the future. National boundaries were forgotten as French and German republicans made a mutual declaration of love, as democrats of all lands fraternized, worshipped the hero who belonged to them all, Garibaldi, and paid ardent testimony to the ideal of the solidarity of peoples. It was the first congress of its kind, and it was to be the last of its kind, for after this final brief flicker of liberal internationalism Europe was to be plunged wholly into a nationalist night³².

The Central Committee of the new *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* was soon established at Berne. Professor Vogt of that city was named president, and among the names of other prominent Swiss who took part was that of Elie Ducommun, a local Radical, who was later to play a major role in the peace movement. Seven nationalities were represented on the committee, and the French members, named secretly lest reprisals be taken by the Imperial police, included Lemonnier, Mangin, Naquet, and Acolas. The first thing to do was to become articulate. Lemonnier hastily got out his record of the doings at Geneva, *La Vérité sur le Congrès de Genève*, in order to refute the calumnies and distortions of the press, and Barni edited the official *Annales de la Congrès de la Paix et de la Liberté*. At the end of October the committee announced the forthcoming publication of the organ of the *Ligue*, which was to bear the appropriate name "*Les Etats-Unis d'Europe*", a phrase first conceived by Mazzini and used with great effect by Victor Hugo at the

³² Helene Iswolsky: *La vie de Bakounine* (3rd ed., Paris, 1930), pp. 207-208; cf. also Fyodor Dostoyevsky: *Letters* (Mayne ed., London, 1914), p.130; Chief sources for the congress besides the *Annales* and Lemonnier's *La Vérité sur le Congrès de Genève* are Lemonnier's article in *H.P.* (Nov., 1867), pp.271-273; the account of the socialist Guillaume in *L'Internationale*, I.41-56; and the letter Clamageran wrote to a friend, printed in his *Correspondance*, pp. 291-294. Tchernoff gives it some attention in his *Parti Républicain* (pp. 467-472), relying upon the reports in the press and the recollections of Alfred Naquet. More recent secondary accounts are Marc Préaudeau: "La Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté", in *La Revue des Sciences Politiques* (1912) XXVIII. 243-260, 344-357, for which some small use was made of the contemporary press; and E. H. Carr: "The League of Peace and Freedom", in *International Affairs* (1935), XIV. 837-844, which is based entirely upon the *Annales* and Guillaume.

peace congress at Paris in 1849. Specimen numbers appeared in November and December, 1867. The first issue hurled forth the battle-cry: "To work, soldiers of peace, champions of Liberty! Our client is humanity, our adversaries ignorance and oppression, our judges public opinion." From January, 1868, the journal was published regularly each week in both French and German. By 1869 there were 1200 subscribers. Only extracts printed in *Le Phare de la Loire* could reach French readers, for all the publications of the *Ligue* were confiscated at the frontier by the watchful police. The loss of the French market proved disastrous. By March, 1869, the original funds were exhausted, and *Les Etats-Unis* did not appear again until the beginning of 1870, and then only in the greatly reduced form of a monthly bulletin³³.

In December, 1867, the committee sent out one of its members, Amand Goegg, to drum up support for the *Ligue* in Germany and England. Goegg was "a man of '48", a leading figure in the Baden revolution of that day. Now he found very little republican sentiment left. The republican *Volkspartei*, headed by Jacoby, was the sole support of the old ideals in Germany, and the result of Goegg's visit was that an assembly of representatives of this party urged all its members to join the *Ligue*. In England Goegg met with only partial success. He succeeded in forming an English branch, of which Edmund Beales, president of the Reform League, was elected head, and which Odgers and Cremer, who had recently left the International, supported. After an appeal to the "friends of peace and liberty of Great Britain and Ireland", the group appears to have lapsed into inactivity. Goegg found very little encouragement from the colony of German exiles in London. To Marx and Engels the whole idea was ridiculous; Goegg was "a stupid cow" who could not forget the past and whose name was rightly pronounced "Geck" [fool]. An invitation to Marx to cooperate was looked upon by him as a piece of "impudence"³⁴.

All was not going smoothly at Berne. The Central Committee decided that all its members had to reside in that town, and so the valuable advice and counsel of Lemonnier was lost. In his absence, the committee became involved in long and useless discussions in attempting to formulate a program for discussion at the next congress. One member of the committee was very sure of what he wanted. This was Bakunin, who had forced his way into the group with but one purpose in mind, to convert the bourgeois league to socialism. It was due to his manipulations that the program as eventually formulated specifically stated that "the present economic

³³ Montluc: *Lemonnier*, pp. 10-11; Potonié: *Historique*, pp.110-112, quoting from the first number of *Les Etats-Unis*; *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (January 31, 1869), II.17 [Hereafter cited as *E.-U.*]; Lemonnier's résumé of the history of the journal given at the 1877 conference of the *Ligue* in *Bulletin Officiel*, pp.96-97.

³⁴ *E.-U.* (January, 1868) I.4, 2-3, 10-11; *H.P.* (January, 1868), *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, Part iii, IV, nos 1095, 1096.

system must be radically changed", and it was as a result of his efforts that the committee addressed a letter to the congress of the International, which was meeting at Brussels, inviting the socialists to participate in the coming assembly of the *Ligue*. This time the influence of Marx was paramount, and the International's reply was to draw up the following resolution: "The delegates of the International believe that the *Ligue* has no *raison d'être*, in the presence of the work of the International, and invite that society to join with it, and its members to join the sections of the International"³⁵.

The democrats could not be expected to take such an insult meekly, and they arrived at Berne for the congress angered and anxious to leave no doubt as to their essential opposition to the socialists. When the convention assembled in September, Bakunin was able to marshal no more than twenty-five followers to oppose the seventy-five democrats. There was no great crowd at Berne as there had been at Geneva; sympathizers remembered the events of the year before and stayed away. Bakunin and his group regretted the Brussels declaration, but they asked the congress to take revenge by frankly avowing socialist principles and thus stealing the International's thunder. The democrats would have none of this. In the discussion on the Social Question, the majority discarded the communist principle implicitly by recognizing the right of private property, and the Socialists only waited until the end of the congress to resign from the *Ligue* in a body. Bakunin's attempt to wield the workers and the democrats into an alliance was just as ill-fated as his subsequent effort to capture the International for his own ideas³⁶.

Other reforms declared to be necessary for the establishment of peace were the separation of Church and State, the institution of federative decentralization as opposed to the highly centralized type of government, the equality of woman, and the substitution of national militias for standing armies. Peace and social reform were considered indivisible. Only the first of those resolutions called forth much dispute; the minority, not content with the proclamation of anti-clericalism, insisted upon the necessity of propagating atheism. The reiterated demand for the abolition of standing armies was a familiar one in republican circles at the time, in which the army was looked upon as the prop of an oppressive regime as well as a waste of money. In the French Chamber, Jules Favre and Jules Simon led the republican opposition to the

³⁵ Montluc: *Lemonnier*; M. Dragomanov, ed.: *Correspondance de Michel Bakounine* (Paris, 1896), pp.281-283; M. Nettlau: *Michael Bakunin. Eine Biographie* (3 parts, London, 1898-1900), I.236, II.251; Circular, *Deuxième Congrès de la Paix et de la Liberté convoqué pour le 22 Sept., 1868*; Guillaume: *L'Internationale*, I. 72-74, 67. The International declared at this Brussels Congress that the cause of war was economic and that workers could effectively prevent it by the general strike. Such a policy seemed absurd to Marx, who wrote to Engels of "the Belgian stupidity of wanting to strike against war". (Guillaume, *op. cit.*, I 68-69; Dolléans: *Mouvement Ouvrier*, I. 312-313).

³⁶ Nettlau: *Bakunin*, II. 251-262; Guillaume: *L'Internationale*, I. 72-79; Elisée Reclus: *Correspondance* (3 vols., Paris, 1911-25), I. 280-284.

military reforms of Marshal Niel and called for a national army on the style of Switzerland. Favre even went so far as to propose that France take the initiative in a general limitation of armaments. Lemonnier was wiser. From the beginning he had recognized that while standing armies were "a plague", yet disarmament could come only when a federation was formed, and even then a federal army would be needed³⁷.

The Berne congress had been fairly respectable, and so the Lausanne congress of 1869 attracted over a thousand delegates and adherents. Victor Hugo honored the assembly by his presence upon the platform, Jules Ferry took part, and Quinet delivered one of his polished lectures. The object of the congresses was, as Barni announced, "to prepare, by free and public debates, in which citizens of all nationalities take part, the future federation of the peoples of Europe". In truth, the Lausanne meeting resembled more a republican discussion group than a peace congress. The speakers expressed in no uncertain terms their opposition to Napoleon III and Bismark, as well as to all centralization, and they gave their sympathy to the oppressed nationalities. They made a liberal declaration recognizing that the social question and the political question were inseparable, but they steered clear of any adherence to *étatisme*. The main business of the congress was to determine the bases of the federal organization of Europe. It wholeheartedly approved Lemonnier's report which declared

that the only means of establishing peace in Europe is the formulation of a federation of peoples under the name of the United States of Europe; that the government of that union must be republican and federative, i. e., resting upon the principle of popular sovereignty, and respecting the autonomy and the independance of each of the members of the confederation.

The resolution further provided that the constitution of the confederation should be amendable, and that no nation could enter it whose citizens did not enjoy the full exercise of the right of universal suffrage, the right of taxation with representation, the power to declare or not to declare war, control over foreign policy, and the right to amend its constitution. Here, then, was the republican conception of international organization. Its recognition of the doctrine of national sovereignty might seem a little naïve today, but its fundamental principle that justice and liberty must pervade

³⁷ Reclus: *Correspondance*, I. 279-288 (in a letter to his brother he tells the story of the congress); Courcelle-Meneuil: "Les Congrès de Bruxelles et de Berne", in *J. d. Econ.* (Oct. 15, 1868), ser. 3, XII. 49-56; M. de Préadeau, *loc. cit.*, XXVIII. 344-357; (The minutes of the congress were published as *Bulletin sténographique du deuxième congrès de la paix et de la liberté tenu à Berne, 1868*, but I have not found this volume). Maurice Reclus: *Jules Favre* (Paris, 1912), pp.313-318; *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa* [German edition of *E.-U.*] (August 23, 1868), II. 133-144.

the whole system, from the base of the pyramid to its summit, is an ideal which will never grow old³⁸.

Lemonnier and his friends were ill-informed regarding the earlier peace efforts, and they continued to regard them as worthless sentimental aspirations. They felt that the Peace Society of London was pursuing a chimera in seeking to influence the governments, when peace could come only from a federation of the peoples. While the Christian sentiment of the brotherhood of man was very noble, far more important was the ideal of Law based on justice. Moreover, the efforts of the Peace Society were not free from the danger of cosmopolitanism, while the *Ligue* strengthened the ideal of the fatherland by promoting a federation of nations. Although the *Ligue* tried to remain upon good terms with the English pacifists, for Passy's society at Paris its chiefs had nothing but contempt. Not only was it seeking peace with the same lack of realism as the Peace Society, but it was suspected of enjoying Imperial favor. "It pursues an impossible aim: the maintenance of peace together with respect for Bonapartism." The activities of the Paris *Ligue* were reported with but little sympathy in the columns of *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe*. It was pointed out there that the high membership dues were adjusted not to the pocketbooks of the masses, but to those of the world of high finance, and Passy's fraternal salute was received with ill-disguised scorn. On the other hand, the respectable and non-political Paris society did its utmost to keep itself distinct from the radicals of the Geneva congress. The confusion of names of the *Ligue internationale et permanente de la Paix* and the *Ligue internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* of Berne proved often embarrassing. The Paris peace men agreed with their friends of the London Peace Society that the republican Leaguers were striving for anything but peace. "A pity!" wrote Martin-Paschoud to Passy after witnessing the Berne Congress of the *Ligue*. "It is the congress of war - universal and eternal."³⁹

While the new peace establishments were beginning to flourish on the Continent, the old London Peace Society also found its fortunes favored by the prevailing pacific winds. The lean years following the Crimean War seemed to be ending, and in 1866 the secretary of the society could report: "The Peace Society has, at least, attained to the dignity of being abused". Peace societies were always delighted when they found themselves moving up from beneath the notice of their adversaries. In these years subscriptions steadily increased, the lecture schedules which already included most of the large towns of England were better organized, and pamphlets were spread by the thousand. It was in 1868 that there was begun the plan

³⁸ *Bulletin Officiel du congrès de la paix et de la liberté* (Lausanne, 1869), p.11, pp.177-178, and *passim*. Madame Quinet, *op. cit.*, p.353; Tchernoff: *Parti Républicain*, pp.483-485.

of sending peace items to the newspapers for reprint, a scheme which proved successful in reaching a wider public. Already in 1865 Henry Richard, the indefatigable secretary of the Peace Society, was busy agitating for peace during the General Election, and further propaganda along political lines was undertaken when the Reform Bill of 1867 gave the vote to the workers of the towns. In 1868 Richard was elected to Parliament, and now the Peace Society was to have its spokesman in the Commons and the political activity of the friends of peace could begin in earnest. They were not long in capitalizing upon this stroke of good fortune. In the very first recess Richard was sent to the Continent to work for disarmament, and he went in the capacity not merely of the Secretary of the Peace Society, but as an English Member of Parliament and man of affairs⁴⁰.

The earlier thinkers who wrote upon the peace problem in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries considered disarmament only as part of the larger problem of international organization. Such, as we have seen, was the conception of the clear-sighted Lemonnier, and Passy, too, insisted that disarmament was not the beginning but the end of the evolution of peace⁴¹. It was only in the nineteenth century that with the piling of armaments the doctors of peace prescribed treatment for the symptom, rather than for the disease, of international anarchy. The earliest support for disarmament came in England, where utility was measured by shopkeeper standards. Disarmament had figured in the mid-century peace congresses, and Cobden had raised the question in the Commons. The peace men realized that Great Britain could not be expected to preach disarmament by example, often as they gave vent to the pious hope that she would. They felt that disarmament could come by a general agreement of the Great Powers. In the later sixties there developed a wave of protest against the bloated armaments on the Continent which led them to believe that the time was ripe, and they were especially encouraged when Clarendon, England's Foreign Secretary, returned home in September, 1869, from his peace journey to the European courts with reassuring words.

Disarmament was indeed the topic of the day. In France the Left was clamoring for the abolition of the standing army, Girardin was preaching disarmament day after day in *La Liberté*, *L'Opinion Nationale* joined in the hue and cry, and the other journals seriously examined the question. The prospect of Niel's army reform alarmed the nation, and resistance to the new project was no monopoly of the

³⁹ *E.-U.* (1868) I. 89-90, 98, 109, 142, 182-183, 201; Lemonnier: *Les Etats-Unis*, pp.77-84, 107-108, 111-112; Passy: *Martin-Paschoud*, p.28; *Bibliothèque de la Paix*, n°12, pp.114-115.

⁴⁰ *H.P.* (June, 1866), IX. 65; Annual Reports of the Peace Society, published in *H.P.*; Beales, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

⁴¹ Letter to Girardin, August 30, 1867, quoted in Passy: "Ceux qu'il faut honorer", in *P.D.* (1913) XXIII. 34-35.

republicans. In Germany, especially in the southwest, the particularist opposition to Prussianism was crystallizing in outspoken protest against Prussian militarism; even in Berlin the newspaper columns were filled with discussion of the problem of disarmament. The French diplomatic representative at Prussia's capital reported in September, 1869. "There is probably no subject, which in the works of the publicists of our day, and even in the conversations of politicians, is more often discussed than that of a disarmament"⁴².

So Henry Richard set out to get into touch with politicians in the various continental capitals, hoping to prevail upon them to institute collective action for disarmament in the parliaments. In Brussels he found that August Couvreur had been corresponding with many influential men for over a year with the same object in mind. The Belgian politician had received encouragement from Gladstone himself, and he was convinced that the English Liberals were only waiting for some sign that the middle parties on the Continent would support such a project. At The Hague, Richard was kindly received, although there was no immediate prospect of a disarmament motion. It was at Berlin that he scored what was regarded as his greatest success. His ideas met with the approval of the Progressive Party, and in October, 1869, less than a week after Richard's departure from Berlin, Virchow, one of the party's leaders, gave notice of a disarmament motion in the Prussian Chamber. Meanwhile Richard went on to Munich, to Vienna, and to Florence, and then he returned to Paris to tell of his successes at a banquet arranged by Passy's society. It was there that he met the prominent deputies of the Left, Jules Simon and Jules Favre, who indicated that they would support the idea of disarmament in the French Chamber⁴³.

Observers in Germany could see no great future for Virchow's impending motion. The correspondent of *The Times* anticipated that "the only result will be a debate". Similarly the French diplomats pointed out that such a movement for disarmament could find little or no support at a time when Germans were keenly aware of the intention of foreign nations to hinder the work of national unification on which they had set their hearts; nor could Prussia be expected to modify in any way the army which had made her great. In the newspaper controversy which preceded the motion, the French read the lesson that while the parties might be at odds

⁴² *Congrès International des Sociétés des Amis de la Paix* (Paris, 1880), p.97; *C.D.*, XXV, n° 7650; Colonel Stoffel: *Rapports Militaires écrits de Berlin* (Paris, 1871), pp.131-132. Girardin's curious plan for disarmament is printed in his *Le Désarmement Européen* (2nd ed., Paris, 1859).

⁴³ Statement of Richard at the 1879 Conference of the Association for the Reform and Codification of International Law, *Report*, p.242; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp. 217-218; Annual Report of Peace Society for 1869, in *H.P.* (June, 1870) XII.65-66; Charles Miall: *Henry Richard, M.P.* (London, 1889), pp.167-168; Lewis Appleton: *Memoirs of Henry Richard* (London, 1889), pp.101-102; *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de la Paix* (Feb. 1873), 2nd series, n° 1, pp.12-13.

regarding domestic policies, they were in perfect agreement regarding questions relating to "the greatness and the future of the country". Only the Progressives, a party of no great influence, favored the reduction of armaments, and there was cause to suspect that they acted from none other than political motives⁴⁴.

Virchow defended his proposition on November 5, 1869. In a speech based entirely upon the hard facts of economics he asked the Prussian House of Deputies to invite the government of the North German Confederation to reduce military expenses. By so doing, North Germany would be setting "the good example", and her action would be followed by that of other nations upon whom the armament burden was more pressing than upon Germany. Relying upon what Richard had told him, Virchow said: "I cherish the hope that in no representation of the people among the continental states will there fail to be advocates of the opinion which we are putting forth here". Lasker, chief of the National Liberals, declared that only when Germany was unified could there be any disarmament. "As long as there are political disagreements", he remind his hearers, "each power will stretch its resources as far as it is able". The motion was lost by a two to one vote⁴⁵.

In Saxony, already in September, 1869, the publicist, Dr. Eduard Loewenthal had founded the *Europäischer Friedensverein* in Dresden. As he saw it, the "sole remedy for the malady of standing armies" was the union of European states in a federation, but Loewenthal was determined to avoid the mistake which the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* had made of antagonizing the governments. All states, republican or monarchic, were free to join his federation, which was to provide a court to which all disputes between members of the union would have to be referred⁴⁶.

In November, 1869, there appeared in the little town of Ebersbach in Saxony the first number of the *Friedensblatt*, a journal whose principal aim was "to represent war as incompatible with the principles of religion, of reason, of international law, and of the present state of civilization". It was edited by a certain Herr Freude, an old man, member of the Progressive Party and already known as a writer on social questions. He had come across some of the documents of the Paris *Ligue* and was inspired by the pacifist ideas of the time. His journal tells the story of the interesting movement for peace and disarmament which took place in Germany in the winter and spring of 1869-1870. On November 10 the Saxon Chamber heard the Progressive

⁴⁴ Abel, *op. cit.*, I. 71; *O.D.*XXV, nos 7728, 7753, 7736, 7746.

⁴⁵ Hans Wehberg: *Die Internationale Beschränkung der Rüstungen* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), pp.40-44.

⁴⁶ Eduard Loewenthal: *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1907), pp.14-17; *Un meeting à Londres* (Bibliothèque de la Paix, n° 11), pp.139-150

deputy, May, speak for his motion that the government should be instructed to take the initiative for a general European disarmament, without which any secure peace was impossible. Over the opposition of the Cabinet ministers both the lower and upper Houses passed the resolution. In December when the Austrian Reichstag convened, it was seen that the seed Richard had sown had not fallen on barren ground. Certain deputies of the Left began to talk of proposing a reduction of the military budget, and such a motion was actually made in the following spring. Meanwhile in Germany the Progressive Party announced as definite parts of its program the reduction of armament and the unification of Germany by peaceful means. In Württemberg a petition was circulated against the Prussian military service laws, and over 150,000 signatures, representing more than twelve per cent of the entire population, were obtained. In Frankfort, in Bavaria, and elsewhere in South Germany the movement against Prussian militarism continued to grow. By the spring of 1870 pacifists were building their hopes high, but then came the roll of drums and their hopes were dashed to earth. With the issue of July 16, 1870, Freude bade the subscribers to *Friedensblatt* farewell. He felt that the disarmament and peace efforts had made such progress in Germany that only friends of peace would have been elected in the scheduled elections; nor was he alone in thinking so. But now the war was at hand. "With feelings torn by the deepest sorrow and with the consciousness of having done our utmost for the cause of peace and the abolition of all war, we conclude our paper and take temporary leave of our readers. May God take our Fatherland and the defenders who fight for it into His gracious protection and bestow upon them the victory"⁴⁷.

Disarmament also played a role in the high politics of the day. When Napoleon III in 1863 called upon his brother monarchs to meet in a congress for the "pacification of Europe" - a call that went unheeded - he was thinking of removing the evils of the armed truce. "Shall we keep forever", he asked, "a state which is neither peace with its security nor war with its happy chances?"⁴⁸. Nor did the Emperor forget disarmament in the ensuing years. In 1867 he personally broached the subject to King William of Prussia, but he found no encouragement. That Napoleon III was reputed to have such sentiments was a factor in the considerations of Beust, Austria's foreign minister, when he developed in 1868 a scheme for a sort of *revanche* against Prussia. Looking upon disarmament rather as "a card to play", he suggested to the French Emperor that he issue the call for a general disarmament. Prussia would refuse, and then France would come in for all the glory and Prussia all the blame, while if the war came, Prussia would be clearly the aggressor. Napoleon III declined,

⁴⁷ *Friedensblatt*, (Nov. 1, 1869 to July 15, 1870) *passim*, esp. pp.18, 50-55, 81-82; Wehberg, *op. cit.*, pp.44-50; *Bulletin* (Feb., 1873) ser. 2, no.1, pp.12-13.

fearing the repercussions of such a move on public opinion in his own country. Besides, as he advised Beust, "Before talking of disarmament one must be armed, and you are not"⁴⁹.

In the autumn of 1869 when Clarendon spoke with Napoleon III about the danger caused by the piling up of armaments, he found that the Emperor was in complete agreement with him, yet the monarch felt that there could be no reduction of armaments during the lifetime of King William and as long as the Prussian system lasted. Reports from the French diplomats in Germany left the Emperor under no illusions as to Prussia's inability to disarm effectively, even if the will were present. Prussia's military institutions were such an integral part of her social and political organization that, as the French military attaché wrote home, repeating a current epigram, "Prussia is not a country which has an army, but an army which has a country"⁵⁰.

At the beginning of 1870 the new Liberal ministry under Ollivier was formed in France. Count Daru, the foreign minister, was anxious to inaugurate his tenancy of the Quai d'Orsay by scoring a diplomatic success, and when he heard that Count Oldenbourg, a relative of the King of Prussia, was about to ask King William personally to take the initiative of a disarmament proposal, he had a brilliant idea. What if Prussia were officially invited to participate in a general disarmament? Either acceptance would mean a lasting peace for Europe, with all the credit for it to France, or Prussia would bear the odium of refusal⁵¹. Daru appears to have been ignorant of Beust's earlier plan. Ollivier was sceptical, but he recognized the advantage of conciliating public opinion for support against the socialists and revolutionaries in France. Nor was the Emperor hopeful. He felt with the premier that "a check would mean war", and he authorized the negotiations only on condition that the invitation to Prussia come from a third party. So the aid of Clarendon was enlisted. He, too, doubted if anything would come of it, but he was willing to risk a "snub" in a good cause⁵².

Both as a measure for domestic appeasement and as evidence of France's will for peace, the Government prepared to reduce the annual army contingent from

⁴⁸ Dr. J. ter Meulen: *Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation* (2 vols., The Hague, 1917-1929), II, pt. i, pp.326-330.

⁴⁹ Albert Pingaud: "Un Projet de Désarmement en 1870", in *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Feb., 1932), CII. 905-907; Oncken: *Napoleon III and the Rhine*, pp. 111-117; Eduard von Wertheimer: "Zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges von 1870", in *Deutsche Rundschau* (Oct., 1920), CLXXXV, pp. 15-20. The Austrian aide-memoire on disarmament is printed in Oncken: *Rheinpolitik*, III. 28.

⁵⁰ John Morley: *Life of Gladstone* (3 vols. in one, N.Y., 1932), II. 321; Stoffel: *Rapports Militaires*, p.398, also pp.131-136, 385-411; *O.D.*, XXV, nos 7728, 7736, 7650.

⁵¹ *O.D.*, XXVI, nos 7883, 7888.

100,000 to 90,000 men. Daru thought that this would add "great weight to the party in Germany which demands to be relieved from military burdens", and Clarendon also felt that the opposition to Bismarck would be provided "with a fresh weapon against their war budget"⁵³. Thus the movement for disarmament in Germany had not gone unnoticed. Indeed, Daru took it quite seriously, perhaps too seriously. He was especially impressed with the events in the Parliament of Saxony, and more than once he referred to "the remarkable movement for disarmament". So convinced was he that "the populations of the other side of the Rhine want to disarm" that he made this the basis of his policy: "To put M. de Bismarck in a more difficult situation toward Germany if he refuses the overtures which are made to him, to assure the peace, at least for some years, if he does listen to these overtures - such is the aim of the policy which I am pursuing"⁵⁴.

Clarendon's note to Bismarck on disarmament might well have appeared in the columns of the *Herald of Peace*. As a pacifist document stemming from the Foreign Office and as a convenient summary of the sentiments prompting the disarmament agitation of the day, the message is worth quoting:

But it is in the general interest of Europe, of peace, and of humanity that I desire to invite the attention of Count Bismarck to the enormous standing armies that now afflict Europe by constituting a state of things that is neither peace nor war, but which is so destructive of confidence that men almost desire war with all its horrors in order to arrive at some certainty of peace - a state of things that withdraws millions of hands from productive industry and heavily taxes the people for their own injury and renders them discontented with their rulers. It is a state of things in short that no thoughtful man can contemplate without sorrow and alarm, for the system is cruel, it is out of harmony with the civilization of our age, and it is pregnant with danger⁵⁵

Here are all the humanitarian, the economic, and the practical reasons for disarmament brought forward by its advocates. Gladstone felt that the phrasing could not have been improved upon⁵⁶

Bismarck recognized Clarendon's idea as another of "those Utopias which are met with in the English, who always look at continental conditions from an oblique angle and often more than reasonably let themselves be guided by vague humane ideas, which generally prevail in public opinion"⁵⁷. The Prussian statesman never seriously entertained the idea of disarmament, which seemed to him pure Utopia. But

⁵² *O.D.*, XXVI, n° 7901; Lord Newton: *Lord Lyons* (2 vols., London, 1913), I. 246-250.

⁵³ Newton, *op. cit.*, I. 258, 260.

⁵⁴ Oncken: *Rheinpolitik*, III, nos 778, 779; *O.D.*, XXVI, no 7907.

⁵⁵ Newton, *op. cit.*, I. 251.

⁵⁶ Morley, *op. cit.*, II, 321.

⁵⁷ Rheindorf: "Abrüstung", p.458

he had to give Clarendon some excuses, so he talked of the opposition of King William, of Prussia's exposed position in the heart of Europe, of the danger from France, of Prussia's unique military institutions, and in the course of the discussions with the English ambassador he made a keen observation. He asked what guarantees the other powers could offer "such as would compensate Germany for the decrease in the amount of security which she has hitherto owed to her armies"⁵⁸. Bismarck never really thought that there existed such guarantees, but it was enough that he raised the question. And he tried hard to bring the English to forsake the oblique angle for a bit. "It is all very well for you", he reminded them, "living on an island, where no one can attack you, to preach disarmaments, but put yourselves into our skin. You would then think and act differently. What would you say if we were to observe to you that your navy was too large?"⁵⁹.

So the attempt failed as it was bound to. Clarendon's negotiations remained confidential, and thus Prussia was not indicted before the bar of public opinion, as the French had wished. The only effect of the whole affair was to convince the English of Prussia's heavy responsibility for the armed peace and to inculcate in Bismarck a deep distrust of the English, when he later found out that he had been deceived and that Clarendon had been playing the game of the French. However, the episode was enlightening. The faith that disarmament would mean peace, the coupling of disarmament with security, the role of England, even the measure of hypocrisy - these were all to remain factors in the disarmament problem all through its history.

⁵⁸Newton, *op. cit.*, I. 262-263.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, I.275. Lord Newton's account, *ibid.*, I. 246-279, based upon the correspondence of the English ambassador in Berlin, was the first fully documented report of the disarmament negotiations, although Pingaud had used the unpublished French documents in the preparation of his article, "Napoléon III et le Désarmement" in *La Revue de Paris* (1899), no. 3, pp.286-308. Rheindorf based his study of the episode on unpublished material in the Berlin archives (*loc. cit.*, 1925, IV. 442-482). The French documents, now published, do not alter the main lines of the story already established by these investigators. The relevant documents are in *O.D.*, XXVI, nos 7883, 7888, 7901, 7907, 7913, 7922, 7931, 7937, 7956, 7966; XXVII, no 8009.

CHAPTER II

WAR AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

Early in 1870 the peace men had cause to be jubilant. The ideals of peace had advanced in Germany; the inauguration of the new Liberal government in France and its reduction of the army contingent gave abundant proof of the determination of Napoleon III to maintain peace; and there were even rumors that the Emperor of the French was preparing a general disarmament. In Belgium, Couvreur was ever active; in Spain, the deputies Pastor and Marcoartu were ready to support the cause; in Italy, there was an echo in the parliament and a peace society was formed at Ravenna; in Holland, a committee in the chamber asked for the substitution of arbitration for war; and in Sweden, thanks to Hedlund's efforts, sixty members of the diet joined the International Peace League of Paris. In high spirits the president of the Swiss Committee wrote to Passy: "The cause is now won past all chance of defeat. We have nothing more to do. I have dismissed our battalions"¹.

Yet barely had the peace movement set in when it was rudely swept away by the rush of events. As the French and German makers of policy pictured their respective interests, there was a deeplying conflict between them, a fundamental disagreement which could not have been settled by a tribunal of arbitration. Prussians regarded the unification of Germany under their leadership as inevitable, and their leaders were prepared to fight if necessary to bring it about; whereas to the French, the reorganization of Germany by Prussia was not in the course of things at all, but simply an unwarranted ambition on Prussia's part to increase her own power at the expense of her neighbors, and they hoped to prevent it. The French missed the essential fact of German nationalism, and they were inclined to overestimate the strength of such forces of opposition to Bismarck as the campaign of disarmament. The director of Prussian policy, Bismarck, was logical, sure of himself, and knew exactly what he wanted; the director of French policy, Napoleon III, was so tormented by illness that he could hardly think at times, he lacked confidence, and he knew only what he did not want. The result was that when a crisis arose over the Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of Spain, the French Government soon blundered into a position where it was faced with the alternative of war or the loss of prestige, and France's masters chose war- "with a light heart".

So the war came and the voices of peace gave way before the voices of hate. A great upsurge of national feeling took place in Germany. The *Times* correspondent

reported: "In the first flush of excitement people absolutely felt relieved at the prospect of circumstances permitting them to fight it out. Thank God! they now could hope to unsheathe the sword in a rightful quarrel." A corresponding spirit arose in France, especially when the fall of the Empire and the German invasion transformed an Imperial adventure into a war of defense of the fatherland. A Paris paper thanked Bismarck: "He has restored to us our energy, our hatred of the foreigner, our love for our country, our contempt for life, our readiness for self-sacrifice, in short, all the virtues which Napoleon III had killed in us". Neither side had a monopoly of the virtue of hatred, and a glance at the war literature of the years 1870-1871 reveals a mobilization of the intellectuals behind the national ideal in a manner unprecedented and which was to be pregnant with meaning for the future².

The voices of peace were not completely silenced. In September, for example, Belgian Freemasons addressed a moving appeal for peace to their French and German brothers. It was not heard in the din of the battle, and in fact, the war-time political action of the French lodges brought the German lodges to break with them, and the rift went unhealed for forty years³. The socialists attempted to remain true to their internationalist tradition. Three days before the declaration of war, the Paris section of the International published a manifesto pledging solidarity with the workmen of Germany in the name of "we who want peace, labor, liberty", German workmen replied, denouncing the war as dynastic, but they were inclined to accept it, although "with deep sorrow", as a defensive war. A manifesto of the General Council of the International in London pointed with pride to this interchange of fraternal addresses and condemned Louis Napoleon as the instigator of the war. After his deposition, the General Council issued manifestos in sympathy with the French republic and against any annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. In Germany the Central Committee of the Social Democratic party spoke out against annexation and for this the leaders Bebel and Liebknecht were arrested⁴.

It was not easy to profess peace when the fatherland was challenged by the foe. A group of representative Dresden Liberals, convened by Loewenthal a few days before the declaration of war, while declaring that "neither the French nor the German nation has an interest in making war upon the other", admitted that nothing more

¹ Léon Henry: *Le Crime des Crimes* (Paris, 1873), pp.xxxvii-xli; *R.P.* (1903), VIII, supplément, p.2.

² Abel, *op.cit.*, I. 128; J. Holland Rose: *Nationality in Modern History* (N.Y., 1916), p.155n; Hetzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-226, gives excerpts from the war and peace literature of these years.

³ Gaston de Roy: *Une Page d'Histoire Pacifiste* (Tournai, 1906); Friederich Kneisner: *Geschichte der deutschen Freimauerei* (Berlin, 1912), p.209.

⁴ *The General Council of the International Workingmen's Association on the War, July 23, 1870*; Edward Beesly: "The International Workingmen's Association", in *Fortnightly Review* (Nov., 1870), XIV. 532-533; Dora N. Raymond: *British Policy and Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War* (N.Y., 1921), pp.160-162, 259; Stekloff, *op. cit.*, pp.185-187, 189-190.

could be done for peace and branded Napoleon III as the aggressor. The story of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the organ of the German democracy, well illustrates the fate of liberal internationalism in these years. During the diplomatic crisis, the editor, Sonnemann professed to see no more than a quarrel of princes, but when he attempted to open a discussion of the war-guilt question, he found his paper isolated in Germany. After France declared war, Sonnemann accepted the struggle as defensive, but he expressed his fear that an easy victory would mean national unity through the establishment of a Bismarckian type of military state for all Germany. When the French Republic was proclaimed, he demanded peace, and all along he warned against annexation. The only way for Alsace-Lorraine to become German, he insisted, would be for its inhabitants to express their will to be German. Sonnemann was one of the two deputies in the Reichstag to vote against the annexation, but once it became a *fait accompli* he came to believe that Germany should keep the provinces⁵.

On July 24 at Basel on the frontiers of France and Germany, the representatives of the European democracy came together in an extraordinary congress of the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté*, convened by the Central Committee at the outbreak of war. Once again the tyrants were flayed for plunging the peoples into war. Frenchmen and Germans declared that their nations had not wanted it, yet as Barni had to admit, "It is true, there still remains an old leaven of chauvinism which can be made to ferment only too easily; and once war is declared, what was at first only a rivalry of princes becomes a matter of national self-respect". An "Appeal to the Peoples of Europe" was drawn up and despatched to all the democratic journals. It arraigned the kings as the war-makers and declared that such dynastic wars could be prevented only when the peoples were masters of their own destinies:

In this supreme moment, when, it is said, the only word to be spoken must come from the cannon, we will add one also for right, for reason, and for humanity. We make our appeal to the people: that ... they shall swear with us to labor to conquer for themselves such forms of government as shall render forever impossible the renewal of these fratricidal struggles, and shall secure, in conformity with the principles of our league, the realization of the United States of Europe.⁶

"Patriots!" wrote Lemonnier scornfully in answer to French critics of the action of the *Ligue*, "We are the patriots, rather than those who accuse us. From the bottom of our hearts we repeat all of that grand saying: Every European war is a civil

⁵ Loewenthal, *op. cit.*, pp.25-26; Albert Stollsteiner: *Die Stellungnahme der Frankfurter Zeitung zur Elsass-Lothringischen Verfassungsfrage 1870-79* (Tübingen, 1929), pp.10-11, 13ff., 22-26, 115.

war." Soon the Empire fell, and now a democratic France was fighting a holy war of self-defense. The Central Committee of the *Ligue* approved "the resistance of the Republic", and Barni drew up an address in its name to the French and German peoples. It appealed to the French to fight not for conquest but in the spirit of 1789 and called on the Germans to demand peace. It was signed by a German, a Swiss, an Italian, and a Pole. Members of the Central Committee did their part: Barni left for Amiens to aid in the reconstruction of the Republic; the Polish general Bosak-Hauké died fighting under Garibaldi for the defense of France⁷.

In London the political refugees, both socialists and democrats, united in signing a declaration condemning the war. The address which was sent abroad for further signatures resembled that of the Basel Congress. It declared that "the Nations are brethren, and that they have no enemies but their despots". Among the adherents were Oswald, the promotor, Marx and Engels, Michelet, Louis Blanc, the brothers Reclus, Bebel and Liebknecht, and Jacoby. Lemonnier sent his support, and even Passy joined the chorus, although with reservations⁸.

It was a hard time for the International League of Paris. The diplomatic crisis, arising with great suddenness, found the members scattered for their vacations. Passy took the responsibility of speaking in the name of the society and once again addressed the newspapers, hoping to invoke the same spirit as in 1867. Events moved too swiftly and his phrases found no hearing. His words on the Hohenzollern Candidacy indicate how the diplomatic causes of the war appeared to a man with much common sense and no understanding of the mysterious ways of high diplomacy. All of a sudden, he writes, a peaceful world learns:

that somewhere in Germany there is some prince or other, possessed by the need of putting on his head one of those burdensome and dangerous yokes which are called crowns, and that, if the people in whose name the advances to him were made, does not close the door in his face, or if the government of the country where he lives does not hasten to intern him in order to make it impossible for him to pursue the quest for his future kingdom, then it is absolutely necessary that five hundred thousand men cut each other's throats, and that all the *marvels* of modern butchery, tried and untried, be put into action⁹.

Passy realized that now if ever was the time for the friends of peace to forget their differences and to work together, and that is why his name is found next to that

⁶ *E.-U.* (July, August, 1870), III.56, 65-72; Dide: *Barni*, pp.188-192; the appeal is printed in Moncure Daniel Conway: *Autobiography* (Boston and N.Y., 1904), II. 223.

⁷ Montluc: *Lemonnier*, p.14; Dide: *Barni*, 193-195.

⁸ Eugene Oswald: *Reminiscences of a Busy Life* (London, 1911), pp.411-418.

⁹ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp. 41-42, 203-206.

of Karl Marx and Louis Blanc in the London Declaration. Yet when he and the Swiss Committee of the Paris League made overtures to the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté*, they were politely told that there could be no cooperation between the two because of the fundamental difference in principle¹⁰. This vital disagreement was never more apparent than when the Paris *Ligue* began to supplicate the very princes whom the democrats were denouncing at Basel as the chief malefactors. On July 18 Martin-Paschoud sent an appeal to the Emperor of the French and the King of Prussia to give heed "to the will of God, to the precepts of the Gospel, and to the example of Jesus Christ", and to recall their troops. After the Empire fell on September 4, the *Ligue* sent a telegram to Queen Augusta of Prussia, reminding her of the sympathy she had shown the *Ligue* and imploring her to intervene in behalf of overtures for an honorable peace. Apparently the Queen did not remain deaf to this appeal, for Bismarck's trusty Boswell records that in January, 1871, the Prussian statesman spoke of the International League of Peace, which he declared to be simply a disguise for communism. "But", he concludes, "certain august personages have even now no idea of that. Foreign countries and peace!" On September 9 Passy and his friends sent another letter to the King of Prussia, begging him to call a halt, now that the defensive war he had declared had become a war of offense. Then, hearing nothing more of the fate of such *démarche*, the men of the Paris *Ligue* determined on a desperate move. Passy, Martin-Paschoud, the Grand Rabbi Isidor, and the Archbishop of Paris, whom they enlisted, prepared to take the extraordinary step of appealing to the finer feelings of King William in a personal audience. The French authorities refused them permission, and further letters to the King were written in vain. So the plan was abandoned. Passy left Paris and waged a campaign against the aggressor in the newspapers, while several other members made independent pleas for peace. But any concerted effort on the part of the *Ligue* was over. True, it was out of a sense of duty to God and to Humanity that these men dared to address the mighty rather than because of any confidence that their voices would be heard, yet they never ceased to regret that the opportunity to reach the conscience of the King of Prussia had been denied them¹¹.

The London Peace Society could look upon the war as the justification of their teachings. "That which we have so long feared has come upon the nations." So began the address of their Committee to the friends of peace, dated August 1, 1870. And it continued:

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.42; *E.-U.* (October 25, 1870), III. 77-78.

¹¹ *Bulletin* (January, 1872), pp. 3-5, 22-28; Passy: *Historique*, pp. 26-37; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.41-56, 207-209; Dr. Moritz Busch: *Bismarck* (3 vols., N.Y., 1898), I. 337. Address of Arlès-Dufour to the English People, in *H.P.* (Nov., 1870), XII. 138-139; address of J. de Gasté to the King of Prussia, in *Bulletin Officiel des assemblées de la Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* (Geneva, 1887), pp.21-23.

But while overwhelmed with sorrow at this terrible event, we at least can look upon it with a conscience free from remorse ... For many years we have not ceased, to the extent of our abilities and opportunities, in our endeavors to impress upon governments and peoples the duty of using the lucid intervals of peace in adopting means which would give some guarantee to the nations against so dire a calamity as that which has now overtaken them.

Richard declared in the *Herald of Peace* that "the present war is the direct consequence of the prolonged 'armed peace'"; but he was inclined to lay most of the blame at the door of the governments. He said that they were almost always responsible for the disputes leading to war, and then they aroused the passions of the peoples to secure their endorsement of the war policies. Another cause was seen in "the sinister and selfish emulation of the military class in the two countries". Richard's distinction between the governments and the people was the same which the republicans were making at Basel. It was a part of the Liberal faith of the day. Gladstone was known once to have become exceedingly angry when Disraeli enunciated the iniquitous doctrine that it was the peoples and not the governments that made the wars. This was equivalent to proclaiming the reactionary dictum that peoples have the governments they deserve. From the events across the Channel Richard drew the lesson that "our work as promoters of peace is still with the people", and he went on to say that the pacifists would have to strive harder to convince the people that Honor, Glory, Patriotism, and Valor were false Gods. But it was a lesson badly learned, and the greater part of the work of the Peace Society continued to consist in efforts to influence the governments¹².

During the war the members of the Peace Society devoted all their efforts to promoting a public opinion in favor of non-intervention. So fearful were they that England might become mixed up in the quarrel that they refrained from proposing that the English Government take any measures which would bring the war to an end. While non-intervention provided the theme for their lectures sponsored by the society and their publications, in the Commons Richard gave strong support to the neutrality policy of the government, and he opposed any strengthening of British "defenses"¹³.

The members of the Peace Society had their work cut out for them. The English began to grow restless and dissatisfied with non-intervention. They saw great events taking place on the Continent, and they felt resentment at not being allowed to share in them. Deep psychological forces were at work, and had it not been for the

¹² *H.P.* (August, 1870 - January, 1871), XII. 39-90, 101, 122, 158-159; the address of August 1 is also printed in *A.P.* (Sept., 1870), ns., II. 232; and *J.d. Econ.* (August, 1870), ser. 3, XIX. 295-297.

¹³ *H.P.* (June, 1871), XII. 221-222; Miall; *Richard*, pp.176-177, 179-180; Appleton; *Richard*, pp.112-113.

wise forbearance of Gladstone and the early termination of the conflict, they might have driven the English into the war. At first Englishmen had experienced indignation at the high-handed policy of the overbearing Napoleon III, but soon this feeling was followed by a wide-spread sympathy for the brave French Republic, battling the invader against overwhelming odds. First only the democrats pushed for action, charmed by the magic of the name "Republic"; then the conservatives added their voices, especially after Russia's repudiation of the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris convinced them that England was taking a back-seat in directing the affairs of Europe¹⁴.

Frederic Harrison, the Positivist chieftain, was the spearhead of the attack on the neutrality policy. He wrote vigorous articles in the *Fortnightly Review*, attempting to whip up British enthusiasm for France. "Act, for act you must", he called to his countrymen, "It will be the knell of peace and liberty when the triumphant Empire of Germany bestrides the Continent without an equal". He set on foot an agitation for the recognition of the Republic and British intervention to prevent the dismemberment of France. The aid of Radicals like Bradlaugh was secured, and certain sections of the laboring population, where sympathy for the young Republic waxed strong, were stirred up by the organization of meetings and popular demonstrations¹⁵.

Even the *Times* pushed for intervention. Conservatives were bitter against the Manchester philosophy, which they believed prompted Gladstone's undignified policy, and they inveighed against "the so-called policy of peace inaugurated by Quaker platitudes at Christian tea-meetings" and the pretty moral notions of "sugar and carpet philosophers"¹⁶. Liberals too found fault with the purely negative principles of the Peace Society. Wrote Viscount Amberley:

Moreover, it is, after all, a radically false ideal of national conduct which is upheld by the Peace Society. For if we understand them aright, they confine themselves mainly to urging particular nations to keep out of wars engaged in by others. ... It is probably because the Peace Society fails to recognise any such thing as a just cause for that forcible intervention that it has so little influence, even among peace-loving citizens ... In such death-struggles of freedom against tyranny, a free and brave nation should not desire to stand apart in cold neutrality"¹⁷.

¹⁴ The whole story is told in Dora N. Raymond, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ Raymond, *op. cit.*, pp.296-297; Frederic Harrison; *Autobiographic Memoirs* (2 vols., London, 1911), II. 13-15. Several of his articles are printed in his *National and Social Problems* (London, 1908), pp.3-70; see also his piece on "The Effacement of England" in *Fortn. Rev.* (Feb., 1871), n.s., IX. 145-166. H. B. Bonner: *Charles Bradlaugh* (2 vols., London, 1894), I. 312-321.

¹⁶ Raymond, *op. cit.*, pp.258, 312.

¹⁷ Viscount Amberley; "Can War Be Avoided", in *Fortn. Rev.* (May, 1871), n.s., IX. pp.615-616.

Actually, Gladstone's policy was far from being based upon any peace-at-any-price principles. He had too highly developed a sense of internationalism, too keen a consciousness of the moral interdependence of Europe and of England's duties to it, for that. Gladstone held the balance even between the two belligerents and saw no moral or material considerations justifying any other than a policy of strict neutrality for England. He was no mere isolationist, despite all his talk of a Happy England, secure behind her "streak of silver sea". To him the policy of absolute neutrality urged by the Peace Society was just as immoral as the principles preached by the conservatives, which he defined as "doctrines of national self-interest and self-assertion as supreme laws". He later clearly stated his position: "I value our insular position, but I dread the day when we shall be reduced to a moral insularity...". His fundamental disagreement with the Peace Party was underlined when on August 9, 1870, he committed England to the defense of Belgium by an agreement with Prussia and France. John Bright and Henry Richard opposed any such treaties of guarantee, whereas Gladstone made this pledge, as he explained to Bright, in order to prevent actions "which would amount to a total extinction of public right in Europe". No European statesman of his day had as deep-rooted a conception of the moral rights and duties of nations as had Gladstone. But morality had little place in that clash of forces which was international politics, and Gladstone had to take the system as he found it. The pacifists did not always understand that what was needed was a "new morality" not merely for the statesmen, but for all Europe¹⁸.

It was as an expression of non-interventionist sentiment that there came into being a new peace society, the Workmen's National Peace Association, founded by William Randal Cremer. Cremer had taken a leading role in the growing labor movement of the sixties. His record is itself an index to labor's activities in these years. Beginning as a carpenter, Cremer had helped organize his fellow craftsmen into the first Carpenters' Union; he had been Secretary of the Workmen's Committee formed to promote the cause of the North during the American Civil War; he had been Secretary of the International in the non-revolutionary days before Marx gained control; he was a prominent member of the Reform League, which helped win the vote for the workers; and he had aided Goegg to form an English section of the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté*¹⁹.

Now, disturbed by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, Cremer sent out a circular on July 29, 1870, convoking some of his old colleagues of the Reform League to a meeting "for the purpose of considering the advisability of holding a Public

¹⁸ Morley: *Gladstone*, II. 317-318, 341-342, 573-580; J. Travis Mills: *John Bright and the Quakers* (2 vols., London, 1935), II. 253.

¹⁹ Howard Evans: *Sir Randal Cremer* (London, 1909), pp.25-55.

Meeting ... to express the views of Working Men in relation to the war just entered on by France and Prussia; also the policy which our Government ought to pursue in relation thereof". Cremer's concern that England might become involved was shared by the others, and it was decided to hold the larger meeting on July 21. It was this meeting which gave consistency to Cremer's endeavors by the formation of a Workmen's Peace Committee, composed of some fifty members, among whom were Edmond Beales, Cremer, Odger, who was the Secretary of the London Trades Council, Mottershead, Lucraft, and others wellknown in the labor movement. In August the Committee edited an address to the Working Men of Great Britain and Ireland. It declared that "the interest of the Working Classes, throughout the civilised world, is one and the same", and it invited its readers to join in the protest against the war, and to insist upon the abolition of standing armies, the maintenance of neutrality, and the use of arbitration as a substitute for war. Henry Richard and the Committee of the Peace Society naturally greeted with open arms this unexpected support from a new quarter. On the back of this address of the Workingmen's Peace Committee there was a pertinent paragraph on "Christian Greatness and True Valour", which indicates the source of the funds which made the circulation of the address possible²⁰.

The response was evidently satisfactory, for at the next meeting of the Committee on August 29, it was decided to form the Workmen's National Peace Association. This decision was ratified by a large meeting of workmen held in St. James Hall on September 10, which pledged support for the establishment of such an association. Other resolutions hailed the rebirth of the French Republic, entreated the Germans to cease their march on Paris, and invited the Government to "take every friendly step" to bring peace. The resolution on war in general was proposed by Cremer himself. It followed the Peace Society formula, although with inverted emphasis, condemning war as "repugnant to every principle of reason, humanity and religion", and all "civilised and Christian peoples" were invited to insist upon "the abolition of standing armies, and the settlement by arbitration of all international disputes". The tenor of these resolutions testifies to the difference of opinion which set in after the fall of Napoleon III. Resolutions of sympathy for France were hardly consistent with Cremer's original design, which had been to hold the Government to a policy of strict neutrality. In the many meetings held among the working classes during the month of September the contradiction became more and more apparent. The resolutions voted continued to pay tribute to the ideal of ending all war by the introduction of a system of international arbitration, yet more and more they came to espouse the cause of France and to urge England's intercession in France's favor. Finally a group headed by Odger broke away entirely from the Workmen's Peace

²⁰ Workmen's Peace Association: *Minutes of Council*. Meeting of July 21, 1870. Cremer's original circular is pasted in. There is a copy of the address in the British Museum.

Association and joined the Positivists in pushing for war against Prussia. Now the tables were turned upon Cremer and his friends. Instead of being able to mobilize the workers behind a campaign to force the Government to maintain neutrality, they found themselves confronted with a serious demand for war within the ranks of the workers themselves. To meet this threat the Council tried to bring home to the workers the realization of just what war would mean, as far as its costs and its effects were concerned. They presented these facts in a series of Questions for the Workingmen of Great Britain, which they were to ask themselves before they voted at public meetings in favor of a war to save France. These were widely circulated and came in for much notice²¹.

Meanwhile the work of organizing the Association went on. On December 3 the Rules and Principles were adopted. The objects were declared to be:

1. To advocate the settlement of all International Disputes by Arbitration and the establishment of a High Court of Nations for that purpose.
2. To place before our countrymen the danger, immorality and expense of standing armies.
3. To urge upon our Parliamentary Representatives that, in the interests of civilization and religion, it is the duty of the Government of the United Kingdom to take the initiative in promoting International Peace, by proposing a large mutual, and simultaneous reduction of all armed forces, with a view to their entire abolition.

Anyone who agreed to these principles would become a member. On the same day an address was drawn up stating the facts of the repudiation of the Black Sea Clauses by Russia and opposing any punitive war. Judging from the resolutions which were prepared by the Council for submission at various meetings during the following months, it is evident that its members were most exercised over the armament burden which weighed so heavily upon the working classes. Resolution after resolution denounced England's re-armament, declared for disarmament, and February, 1871, when the German armies were encircling Paris, was even considered an "opportune" time for the English Government to take the initiative for a simultaneous reduction of armaments²².

Disarmament and arbitration were, of course, formulas taken over from the Peace Society, although there was a working-class dislike of the army and resentment at the armament burden. The Workmen's Peace Association did, however, contribute

²¹ *Minutes of Council*: August 29, 1870; Resolutions voted at meeting at St. James's Hall, September 10, 1870. Raymond, *op. cit.* pp. 167-171. (Miss Raymond fails to recognize the presence of two contending groups among the workers.) Article in *Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 14, 1871, quoted in John Ruskin, *Works* (39 vols., London & N. Y., 1903-1912), XXVIII. 26-27.

²² *Minutes of the Council*: December 3, 1870; January 6, February 20, March 8, April 26, May 17, 1871.

something new. The Council realized that they were appealing to hard-headed laborers and that they had to have something concrete to offer. So after a good deal of discussion they succeeded in drawing up the outlines of a plan for the establishment of their High Court of Nations, a novel feature of which was a clause declaring a nation which refused to obey the court's decision as "Internationally Outlawed", and providing for diplomatic and economic sanctions. With this plan was sent out a manifesto which attempted to prove that the members of the Association did not have their heads in the clouds, but, on the contrary, had their feet planted firmly on the ground. It began: "We are not fanatic dreamers; we are not utopian theorists. We share with you that common inheritance of our race, the practical mind ... "Several thousand copies of these were distributed. Arbitration, fastened upon here as a practical means of ending war, was to become Cremer's *idée fixe* and to dominate the Association throughout its history. Another note was struck in these early days which was to be sounded again and again later on. The Association paid much attention to the settlement of the *Alabama Claims*, and in the first Annual Report, Cremer declared that if the two Anglo-Saxon nations set the example by agreeing to refer all disputes to a Joint High Commission or some other agency, then the rest of the world would follow, and war would be banished from the earth. It was on this Anglo-American terrain that Cremer was to win great successes in the future²³.

The Workmen's Peace Association was just another of the orderly labor associations in England, and the Peace Society was taking no chances when it favored the infant organization with generous subsidies. Although Cremer and his associates did not base their opposition to war upon Christian principle, neither did their position rest upon the international solidarity of the proletariat. It was due rather to the common-sense realization that it was the workers who suffered more than any other class from wars and from the maintenance of huge military establishments. Yet Cremer had not been a member of the International for nothing, and his class consciousness transcended national limits. While Henry Richard was joining Frédéric Passy in condemnation of the Paris Commune, the Council of the Workmen's Peace Association was regarding "with horror and indignation the outrages on humanity committed in the name of order by the French army in the streets of Paris". Before this bloody suppression of the Commune, the Council had even planned an excursion to Paris, "with a view to bringing about a better understanding between the Working Classes of the different Nations of Europe, preventing the disastrous and inhuman

²³ Evans: *Cremer*, pp.84-86. There is a copy of the plan for the arbitration tribunal among the papers of Charles Sumner in the Harvard Library (Sumner MSS, *Foreign*, CXLVIII. 168). *Minutes of Council*: March 29, April 26, 1871; *H.P.* (August, 1871), XII. 252-253; *Arbitrator* (August, 1872), pp.1-3.

wars which their rulers are constantly plunging them into ..." Such plans were to find partial realization at another time²⁴.

Not only in England did the war provoke the founding of peace societies. A remarkable movement took place in the Netherlands. In 1867 Bachiene, State Counsellor at The Hague, had conferred in Paris with Michel Chevalier about the possibility of forming a Dutch section of the Paris League. Nothing was done, nor did the visit of Richard in 1869 inspire any organized work for peace. It was not until the clash of arms in 1870 that peace stirrings were evident in the Netherlands. As a reaction to the Franco-Prussian conflict, which brought the horrors of war so close to Holland, peace groups sprang spontaneously into life in Amsterdam, The Hague, and many of the smaller towns. The Hague circle took the lead. Meeting at the home of Bachiene, who had some experience with the peace movement, the friends of peace in The Hague decided to form an association on the non-secretarian and non-political model of the Paris League. They realized that Holland was small and uninfluential, and so in their circular they declared their main object to be "to attach ourselves to some permanent international peace movement". On November 10 a general assembly of the representatives of all the local societies met at Utrecht and determined to found a national league of peace. Appointed to the provisional committee were Jolles, later minister of justice; Bachiene; de Bosch Kemper and Asser, professors of law; and von Hoorn, a pastor. On January 26, 1871, the *Nederlandsche Vredesbond* was officially constituted. In February its council sent out a circular in which the customary defense was made against charges of Utopianism and lack of patriotism. ("Defense of the fatherland is a sacred duty", read the circular.) On July 5, 1871, was held the first general assembly at Amsterdam, with Bosch Kemper presiding. The usual pacifist planks of arbitration, international law, and disarmament were adopted. It was decided that efforts were to be made to enlist influential men from all over Europe in the cause of peace, and an international peace congress was suggested²⁵.

The rise of the Dutch peace movement was phenomenal. By 1871 twenty-six local groups had been formed. But the movement soon waned. Once the war was ended the branches began to die out, while an internal disagreement led to the retirement of the Amsterdam members, and such men as Asser and Domela

²⁴ *J. d. Econ.* (August, 1871), ser. 3, XXIII, 299-302; *Minute of Council*: June 14, March 15, April 29, 1871.

²⁵ *De Vredesbond* (Dec. 31, 1870), no 13, pp.49-52 and *passim*; Bachiene's article, "De Vredesverenigingen in Nederland", in *Jaarboekje van het Nederlandsche Vredesbond* (The Hague, 1873), pp.19-32; *Revue de Droit International* (1870), II. 719-720, (1872), IV. 357-358; Dr. B. de Jong van Beek en Donk: *History of the Peace Movement in the Netherlands* (The Hague, 1915), pp.6-8; *H.P.* (Oct., 1870), XII. 119-120, 152; H. Ch. G. J. van der Manderer, "Eene Halve Eeuw Nederlandsche Vredesbeweging", in *De Nieuwe Gids* (July-August, 1921), XXXVI, pt.ii, pp.99-104.

Niewenhuis were lost. In his presidential address in 1871 Kemper complained that the society had not been accorded general support: the Dutch were too practical and would contribute only when they could see the benefits which would be forthcoming, and furthermore, although the society eschewed all politics, there was a suspicion that peace was merely a mask for political aims. Another objection constantly encountered was that Holland was not important enough for peace work there to mean anything. The Dutch pacifists replied by stressing the fact that they were cooperating with an international movement, but actually such a movement did not exist. So the Dutch peace movement passed rapidly down the road of decline. Its weekly organ, *De Vredebond*, which had been called into existence by the mushroom-like growth of the societies in 1870, published its last number in September, 1871. By 1874 the 26 groups had become 12, the 1800 members had dropped off to 1250. In 1879 there were only 8 sections; in 1884, 5; in 1891, 2. The movement never reached the people but came to exist solely in the individual efforts of a few zealous adherents, especially van Eck, who became president and Belinfante, the able editor of the Yearbook. Symptomatic of their general conservative attitude was the pacific address which they sent to the three Emperors who met in Berlin in 1872. It was acknowledged with thanks by the Tsar²⁶.

In Belgium the Franco-Prussian War failed to produce the anti-war reaction that it had in Holland. There was, however, an attempt to found an *Association Belge des Amis de la Paix* by a certain Z. J. Godimus, a teacher of economics and popularizer of the Manchester doctrines. He was in touch with Passy and familiar with the work of the London Peace Society, and the association which he planned was to be built along the general lines of the Paris *Ligue*. The journal which Godimus published, *L'Harmonie Sociale*, tells the story of his ill-fated efforts. Programs were drawn up, provisional meetings held, and a prize of five subscriptions to this periodical was offered for the best Catechism of Peace for Youth, but the society never materialized. The same story was true of a local society which briefly saw the light of day in Verviers²⁷.

A few words must be said in conclusion about the first years of the continental peace movement. It was clear from the beginning that the religious influences which had attended the birth of the Anglo-American movement would play a small part on the Continent. One source of inspiration for the continental pacifists was the free-

²⁶ Bosch Kemper: *Discours d'Ouverture de la première assemblée ...* (The Hague, 1872), pp. 16-17; Henry Richard in *Nederland* (Leiden, 1874), p.34; J. B. Breukelmann: *Algemeen Nederlandsch Vredebond. Redevoering* (The Hague, 1896), p.18; van der Manderer, *op. cit.*, pp.104-111; van der Manderer: *De Vredesbeweging* (Leiden, n.d.), pp.131-132, 210; Jong, *op. cit.*, p.9.

²⁷ *L'Harmonie Sociale* (Nov. 1870-November 1871), II. 91-92, 127-130; III. 170-172, 196-197, 223, 63; *H.P.* (Sept., 1871), XII. 265.

trade philosophy then in vogue among certain sections of the commercial classes; it was that which breathed life into the *Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix* of Paris. The other important force was the republican internationalism which was the inspiration for the founding of the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté*. Both associations came into being as a protest against dynastic policies which were leading the nations into war, for to both philosophies war was abhorrent. It was a leading thought of the Paris *Ligue* that nations were divisions of labor and had been made to trade with one another, while to the republican Leaguers, nations were brothers and had been made to love one another. A third internationalist current was Marxian socialism. Its proponents recognized no national boundaries but addressed themselves to the workers of the whole world, whose interests, they claimed, were everywhere the same. They declared their independence of the other internationalist movements as early as 1868, when the International invited the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* to close up shop, claiming that the socialists alone could bring the peace. Of the three, only international socialism was to grow stronger in the succeeding years; liberal internationalism and free trade were to go down before the onslaught of nationalism and the national State.

While the claim of the pacifists that they had stopped a war in 1867 was baseless, the peace movement was not altogether without influence upon political life. The disarmament agitation organized by the friends of peace played some part in the disarmament negotiations of the spring of 1870, even though the result was all that could have been expected with Europe in a state of international anarchy. The first great test for this internationalism which had given birth to the peace movement was the Franco-Prussian War, and the victory was to nationalism. Internationalists of every stripe were agreed that it was a Cabinet War made by the governments, but it became a national war as soon as it was declared. Whether the French and Germans advanced "with deep sorrow" or thanking God for the privilege of unsheathing the sword "in a rightful quarrel", it was in the name of the national ideal that the mutual slaughter was carried on. There was a good deal more than was suspected in that "old leaven of chauvinism", of which Jules Barni spoke.

CHAPTER III

ARBITRATION AND CODIFICATION 1871-1878

From 1871 to 1914 the Great States of Europe lived in peace with one another, yet it was a peace that was not a peace. During those years Europe lived under the spell of nationalism and in the shadow of war. Once again the peoples of the world had a common faith, but the truth they had found made them not free but prisoners, each to its own nationalist ideology. It was not the generous nationalism of the idealists of 1848, who had caught a vision of a new Europe, a Europe of free and united nations, competing with one another for the prizes of peace. It was a fierce relentless nationalism, a mutually exclusive nationalism which engendered bitter national prejudices and international distrust and suspicions. The national State became more and more the embodiment of some mystical ideal, whose call took precedence over the needs, the rights, and the conscience of the individual citizen. Nationalist ideals came to supply in ever greater measure the needs less and less adequately satisfied by weakening religions, and nationalist extravagances such as colonial wars, newspaper wars, and Imperial Jubilees helped the masses flee from the dismal cares of a humdrum existence. The growing intensity of nationalism poisoned the international atmosphere and brought closer the specter of war. Those supreme realists, the military men, regarded peace merely as the interlude between wars, and made their plans accordingly. Diplomats continued to look upon the use of force as simply a continuation of policy. Diplomacy without arms, as Frederick the Great of Prussia put it, was like music without instruments. War was in the Nineteenth Century, as it is in the Twentieth, an instrument of national policy, an instrument whose employment was to be avoided if possible, yet not shirked if necessary. Thus was war felt to be inevitable, despite the great scientific and industrial advance which had brought the peoples more closely together than ever before and which at the same time, permitted the mobilization of entire nations for battle and made war more of a disaster than ever.

The events of 1870-1871 crowned Bismarck's work as the unifier of Germany, a work which had been carried out thoroughly in accordance with the principles of this self-declared champion of blood and iron. A great object lesson that might meant right in international relations was given the world, and it caught the popular imagination. Certain quarters took fright at the prospect. A writer in the *Edinburgh Review* declared that "the most painful and alarming symptom of the present state of

the world appears to us to be that force rather than law at this moment governs the most civilised nations of the earth ..."¹

In the Franco-Prussian War statesmen read the lesson that they had better look to national defenses, but, as usual, the war also made some minds aware of the need for an international organization which would prevent war. The war and peace literature of these years is full of plans for the pacification of Europe². Renan's famous article on the war, written in the heat of the conflict, ended with this hope: "The end of war will be seen when, to the principle of nationalities, there will be added the principle which is its corrective, that of the European federation, superior to all nationalities"³. In England Professor Seeley presented before the Peace Society a plan for the United States of Europe, a supra-state with a legislature, an executive, a judiciary, and a federal army. Professor Lorimer devised a scheme for a congress of nations, which was to be a looser organization than Seeley's, but it was to have at its disposal an international police force. An interesting feature was the provision that member States were to vote in proportion to their power, which was to be determined on the basis of population, free revenue, imports and exports. Viscount Amberley proposed the establishment of a central international tribunal, empowered to arbitrate between rival nations and make war upon an aggressor. He was careful to point out: "While, however, the Council would prohibit unwarrantable aggression, it must not be supposed that it would have nothing to do but to uphold the *status quo* throughout the world". Emile de Laveleye, the Belgian economist, made a study of the causes of war, very thorough for his time, and he ended by advocating a code of international law and a High Court of diplomatic representatives aided by jurists. All these designs and others proposed at the time, while they disagreed as to what type of institution was needed, were alike in recognizing the necessity of providing for forcible sanctions. Only the Peace Society and the projects inspired by its principles insisted upon moral sanctions alone⁴.

The greatest impetus to the peace movement came not from the Franco-Prussian War, but from the settlement by other means than war of a conflict between two great nations. This was the Geneva Arbitration of the dispute between the United States and Great Britain over the *Alabama* Claims. During the American Civil War

¹ "The German Empire", in *Edinburgh Review* (April, 1871; CXXXIII. 459-484), p.476.

² Cf. Dr. J. ter Meulen: *Bibliographie du Mouvement de la Paix. Listes Provisoires*, pp.47-52

³ Ernest Renan: "La Guerre entre la France et l'Allemagne", in *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Sept. 15, 1870), LXXXIX. 264-283.

⁴ Seeley: "United States of Europe", in *Macmillan's* (March, 1871), XXIII. 436-448; J. Lorimer: *Studies National and International* (Edinburgh, 1890), pp.53-61; Viscount Amberley: "Can War Be Avoided?", in *Fortnightly Review* (May, 1871), n.s., LIX. 614-633; de Laveleye: "On the Causes of War and the Means of Reducing their Number", in *Cobden Club Essays*, 2nd ser., 1871-1872 (London, 1872), pp.1-52.

Great Britain had allowed the construction in British shipyards of privateers for the service of the Confederacy, despite the protest of the United States, and these vessels, of which the most famous was the *Alabama*, had wreaked havoc on the merchant marine of the North. After the war the two governments began a long and tortuous negotiation to settle the claims arising from the depredations of these ships. The Treaty of Washington was finally concluded in May, 1870. It provided for the setting up of a tribunal at Geneva to arbitrate the dispute, and it laid down certain rules of maritime neutrality by which the case was to be judged. The thorny question of indirect claims, which excited feelings on both sides of the Atlantic, was overcome through the patience of Gladstone's government and the tolerance of the American member of the Geneva tribunal, Charles Francis Adams. The arbitrators decided that Great Britain had departed from the rules of neutrality, as defined at Washington, and they awarded to the United States a sum which always seemed excessive to the British, but which they honorably paid.

In the light of history the success of the arbitration appears to have been due more to such factors as the Anglo-Saxon tradition of settling political disputes by law courts, the racial and cultural ties linking the two nations, and the unfortified Canadian frontier, than to the immediate forces making for appeasement. Yet the importance of the circumstances of the day must not be minimized. The United States, still weak from one war, did not want another, while at England's helm stood Gladstone, a man with a deep sense of justice who had the cause of peace much to heart. A factor which weighed heavily with the British was England's weakened position toward the Continent. Finally, the services of the English and American pacifists should not be forgotten. During the whole conflict they remained on duty, organizing public opinion, bringing pressure to bear on the governments, ever letting their voices be heard on the side of moderation when snags were encountered⁵.

Now the artisans of peace could rejoice at the success of the principle which they had so long proclaimed. Jurists too regarded the Geneva award as the triumph and justification of arbitration. More important to them than the actual work at Geneva was the Treaty of Washington, which had pronounced for the settlement of important international conflicts by a way other than that of force and which had laid down certain rules of international law⁶. The bloody clash between France and Prussia had convinced internationally minded persons of the vital necessity of doing something to prevent such catastrophes in the future; the success of the Geneva Arbitration seemed to point out the way. It served to help thrust the peace movement

⁵ Curti: *Peace or War*, pp.86-94.

⁶ Egidio Reale: *L'Arbitrage International. Le Règlement Judiciaire du Conflit de l'Alabama* (Lausanne, 1929).

into the groove of arbitration in which it remained during the rest of the century, while its immediate effect was to provoke a campaign for the codification of international law.

A warless era in the minds of the earlier pacifists meant an age in which the Rule of Law was supreme, for the Rule of Law meant the exercise of the Will of God. The Utilitarians were in the habit of prescribing law codes for the ills of society, and it was no great jump for their minds from civil society to the international realm. The mid-century peace men had called for a congress of nations, whose task it was to be to promulgate a code of law and then set up a court to apply it to all international differences. The earliest and most lucid argument for codification of international law as a prerequisite to the establishment of universal peace came from Louis Bara, a Belgian lawyer, who won the prize offered by the peace congress of 1848 for the best essay on the means of abolishing war. *La Science de la Paix*, not published until 1872, criticized the peace societies for spending all their time trying to prevent disputes from leading to war. More fundamental, Bara pointed out, was the necessity for preventing disputes from arising at all, and this could be done by laying down the rules which would regulate relations between nations⁷. The feeling that arbitration had to go hand in hand with codification was strengthened by the actual experience of the *Alabama Claims*. The pacifists saw how the negotiators had to lay down the rules for the arbitrators to apply, while on the other hand, the strongest objection to the arbitration was that England was being judged on the basis of principles not in existence at the time of her alleged transgression.

The science of international law was then in its infancy. In most learned quarters the Australian view prevailed that it was not really law at all, for it lacked a visible power to proclaim it and to provide a sanction for disobedience. Chairs of international law were few in number. To the sober London *Times* the international lawyer was "that amphibious being who works mid-way between law and morality"⁸. This the international jurists attempted to refute, insisting that it was the peace societies who "have never sufficiently distinguished law from ethics; sentimental aspirations from exigencies of practical reason"⁹. The first attempt to draw up a code of international law was that of Domin-Petrushevecz, an obscure Austrian official, in 1861. Far more important was the international code of the well-known jurist, J. G. Bluntschli, which dated from 1868. Bluntschli's inspiration came from Francis Lieber, who had drawn up such a successful set of regulations for the armies of the

⁷ Phelps: *Anglo-American Peace Movement*, pp. 129 ff. Louis Bara: *La Science de la Paix* (Brussels, 1872).

⁸ *Times*, July, 1886, quoted in *H.P.* (Sept., 1886), p.107.

⁹ Rolin-Jaequemyns: "De la Nécessité d'Organiser une Institution Scientifique Permanente", (*Rev. d. Droit Internat.* (1873), v. 463-491), pp. 478, 474.

North in the Civil War, and who himself had long advocated the calling of a conference of jurists for the codification of international law. Independently of these efforts, Dudley Field, who had done so much for state codes in the United States, had been preparing, "in the interests of humanity and peace", the code which he published in 1872¹⁰.

Codification was a cherished hope of the veteran American pacifist Elihu Burritt. In 1871 he enlisted the support of Reverend James B. Miles, Secretary of the American Peace Society, and these two sent out the official call for an international congress of publicists, jurists, statesmen, and philanthropists of all countries to elaborate an international code, which would provide for arbitration. This was to be purely an unofficial body, the reputation of whose members alone would be enough to ensure the adoption of the code by the governments. The work of the "Senate of Jurists" was to be given publicity by a popular peace congress held after the code was completed. Burritt and Miles decided that the latter would go to Europe to sell the idea to prominent men abroad, and he was soon supplied with letters of introduction from American jurists, who saw a happy augury in the success of the Geneva Arbitration and were willing to support the plan¹¹.

In January, 1873, Miles sailed from New York. He could speak no foreign languages, and he was inexperienced in the ways of the Old World. But he was a man with an idea, a man of sincerity, and deep conviction, and it was with his trust secure in the Lord that Miles ventured forth. The first stop was England. There he found a warm welcome from the English pacifists, but Henry Richard was cool to his proposals, as he was then planning an arbitration motion in the House of Commons, and he wanted nothing to interfere with his own project. Only after the motion had been made did Richard begin to show a "lively interest" in Miles's efforts and to cooperate actively with him.

In Paris Miles discovered that Santallier had already inspired the revived Peace League, now called the *Société des Amis de la Paix*, with an idea similar to his own. For eight or ten months the Paris friends of peace had sought to persuade jurists to form an international code committee, but without success. Now that the presence of Miles testified to the international interest in the subject, the support was secured of men like Charles Calvo, Drouyn de Lhuys, former statesman, Parieu of the Institute,

¹⁰ Heinrich Lammasch: "Zur Geschichte der Friedensideen in Österreich", extract from *Österreichische Rundschau*, LI, Heft 1, pp.1-5; Francis Lieber: *Life and Letters*, ed. by S. Perry (Boston, 1882), pp.323-325, 767, 391; J. B. Scott: "The Gradual and Progressive Codification of International Law", in *American Journal of International Law* (1927), XXI. 417-450; H. Field: *The Life of David Dudley Field* (N.Y., 1898), pp.221-241.

and Charles Lucas, the reformer of penal laws, who had himself already written in favor of calling a scientific congress to codify international law. Passy proved invaluable. He called together a special meeting of the French pacifists to hear Miles propound his ideas, he acted as general interpreter, and he secured Miles greater publicity by introducing him at the Society of Political Economy. Passy furthermore gave the American clergyman advice on the course to follow on his future journeys, and he even wrote ahead to prepare the way for him. It was Passy who obtained for Miles an interview in Turin with Count Sclopis, president of the Geneva Tribunal, and Sclopis was interested and very cordial. Great success was had in Rome, where Mancini took Miles in hand, introduced him to the Italian statesmen, and gave him a written adhesion along with one from his son-in-law Pierantoni. "In view of our success in this nation", wrote Miles, "we are constrained to say Glory to God in the highest". In Vienna John Jay, vice-president of the American Peace Society, was the American minister, and he was very helpful. Then to Berlin - "I confess I went hither with fear and trembling". But Virchow was sympathetic and the jurists Heffter and Holtzendorff gave their adhesion. At Brussels the venerable friend of peace Visscher gave Miles a royal reception and put him in touch with Rolin-Jaequemyns at Ghent¹².

While the jurists agreed in principle with Miles's idea, there were some significant objections. They were almost unanimous in condemning the proposed popular congress. On the Continent such assemblies too often took the turn of the notorious Geneva Peace Congress of unpleasant memory, and in any case, such gatherings were universally frowned upon by the governments. Count Sclopis admitted: "The gathering of an extra-legal assembly of 1500 to 2000 persons frightens me". He was in favor of having the proposal raised in the legislatures and forcing the governments to take official action by parliamentary majorities. The whole idea of a grand campaign undertaken by private initiative was something foreign to continental notions of what was proper and practicable. And the pacifists, as such, were distrusted. In their note of adhesion the Germans Neffter and Holtzendorff made no bones about laying down the condition that all debates on eternal peace and absolute condemnation of war were to be rigidly excluded. "They are of the opinion that the work of the so-called Congress of Peace must not be confused with that of the proposed assembly." The lawyers did not want to become associated with such a Utopian goal as the abolition of war. The aim of their craft was, as Rolin-Jaequemyns expressed it, "the realization of the idea of juridical community between independent

¹¹ *A.P.* (April, 1871, November, 1872), n.s., III. 40, 228-229; J. B. Miles: *Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations. A Brief Sketch of Its Formation* (Paris, 1875).

¹² *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de la Paix* (July-August, 1872), pp.8-14, (February 1, 1873), pp. 1-14, (March-April, 1873), pp.46-50, (May-June-July, 1873), p.68; *A.P.* (March, 1873), pp.20-22, (April, 1873), pp.28ff., (May, 1873), pp. 34-40, (June, 1873), pp.44-45, (July, 1873), p.55, (November, 1873),

nations". And as war would be present as long as the existence of independent nations was admitted - even if only as the execution of the judgments of some international tribunal - what the international jurists were working toward was not the abolition of war, but a state of peace, where war was only "the last extremity"¹³.

After Miles visited Rolin-Jaequemyns at the jurist's home in Ghent, he wrote to his friends: "Imagine my delight on learning that at the time of my arrival at his residence he was engaged in the preparation of an article for the Law Review, in which he advocated a movement in all its essential features concordant with my own plan"¹⁴. Rolin-Jaequemyns' inspiration came from Lieber, who in a letter of September, 1871, broached his favorite idea that the foremost jurists should assemble unofficially as a sort of juridical ecumenic council to settle the important doubtful questions of international law. Almost at the same time Moynier, a prominent member of the Red Cross Committee in Geneva, had a similar idea, and he came to Ghent to discuss it with Rolin-Jaequemyns. The Belgian jurist then wrote private letters to some of his colleagues requesting advice, and he received favorable replies from Bluntschli, Holtzendorff, Calvo, and others. It was Bluntschli who first suggested that the assembly of jurists become a permanent organization. Just after these first steps had been taken, Miles arrived at Ghent, full of enthusiasm for his own project. It bespeaks well for his persuasiveness that Rolin-Jaequemyns was carried away at first, and he promised to cooperate with Miles, suggesting Ghent as the meeting place. After the departure of the wandering pastor, he thought better of it but he was encouraged by what Miles had told him of the attitude of other lawyers with whom Rolin-Jaequemyns was not in contact himself. So he sent out circulars to some twenty jurists, proposing a private meeting. Only when assenting responses were received did he take the first public step of publishing the plans in his *Revue de Droit International*¹⁵.

Up till now, Rolin-Jaequemyns said in his article, the movement toward the regularization of international relations, the transformation of a society of fact into a true society of law, has manifested itself in two ways: (1), by diplomatic action, such as in the Geneva Convention, regulating the rules of warfare and in commercial treaties; and (2), by the individual scientific action of jurists. Now he proposed a

p.84; Passy to Miles, February 7, February 13, March 12, 1873. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

¹³ The replies of the jurists are printed in *Bulletin* (March-April, 1873), pp.31-46; also in *A.P.* (August, 1873), pp.57-59, 64; cf. also Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.210-216. Rolin-Jaequemyns' opinion on the abolition of war is expressed in his article: "De la Manière d'apprécier... les Faits de la Dernière Guerre" (*Rev. de Droit Internat.*, 1872, IV. 481-525), p.520.

¹⁴ *A.P.* (May, 1873), pp.36-37.

¹⁵ Rolin-Jaequemyns: "De la Nécessité", loc. cit., V. 480-486; Visschers to Miles, June 16, 1873. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

third: "collective scientific action". As indications that the time was opportune, he pointed to the need revealed by the Franco-Prussian War, by the increasing political relations between the States, and by the difficulties encountered by the Geneva Tribunal; while the recent success of Richard's arbitration motion in the English Parliament showed that public opinion was ready, and the writings and endeavors of Field, Lorimer, de Laveleye, and Miles were proof that the idea was in the air. Hence, he concluded, "the moment appears to have come to found a permanent institution, purely scientific, which, without proposing either the realization of far-distant Utopias or an immediate reform, can nevertheless aspire to serve as the organ, in the realm of the law of nations, for the legal conscience of the civilized world". Rolin-Jaequemyns was quite frank in admitting that the idea was not his alone: "We confine ourselves to serve modestly as the organ of a conviction born at the same time and a long time ago in many distinguished minds, unknown to one another, to serve as promoter of a project for which the time of action seems to have arrived!"¹⁶.

In June Rolin-Jaequemyns wrote to Miles expressing his personal esteem for the American and his sympathy with Miles's general aim, "despite our disagreement on certain points, particularly on the *practical* utility of Peace Societies". He made it explicitly clear that his object would "not be directly the preparation of a code of International Law, but only the establishment of an international institute for the study and promotion of International Law"¹⁷. Yet some of the pacifists never overcame the feeling that Rolin-Jaequemyns had not played fair. Visschers, for one, thought him guilty of bad faith, and Burritt in his letters to Miles kept charging "the Ghent Man" with sharp practice and fulminating against what he thought was "stolen march and stolen thunder"¹⁸. But what Burritt had thought was entirely his own invention had been conceived independently in New York by Lieber, in Geneva by Moynier, and in Paris by Santallier and Lucas. The whole episode only goes to show how ideas owe allegiance to no one individual but rather to the Spirit of the Time.

Back in New York Miles told the story of his adventures to an interested group which met at the home of Dudley Field. They formed themselves into an International Code Committee and on June 30, 1873, sent out the invitations for a consultation of publicists to take place in Brussels in October for the purpose of discussing an international code. The invitation bore the signatures of many eminent Americans, including Field, Sumner, Reverdy Johnson, Whittier, Bryant, Emory

¹⁶ Rolin-Jaequemyns: "De la Nécessité", *loc. cit.*, v. 480, 485-486, *passim*..

¹⁷ Rolin-Jaequemyns to Miles, June 7, 1893. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

¹⁸ Visschers to Miles, June 16, 1873. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*; Merle Curti: *The Learned Blacksmith. The Letters and Journals of Elihu Burritt* (N.Y., 1937), pp.224-225, 232-233.

Washburn, and Noel Porter. Such names ensured wide public notice, even though of the signers only Field and Miles could get to Brussels for the conference¹⁹.

On September 8, 1873, there assembled at Ghent the ten wellknown savants who came in answer to Rolin-Jaequemyns' summons in the name of international law. There were present Field, Calvo, Besobrasoff, the Russian political economist, Mancini, Pierantoni, Bluntschli, Lorimer, Asser, de Laveleye, and Moynier, all known to one another through their works but meeting one another for the first time. Their aim, as Mancini expressed it in his opening speech, was to assure to international law "its legitimate influence on the governments and the peoples, and to have accepted and legislatively consecrated the principles of eternal justice in international relations". They knew just what they wanted to do, and they wasted little time in debate. After six sessions, lasting three days in all, the Institute of International Law was founded.

It was to be an exclusively scientific body, composed solely of experts and meeting once a year. Its objects were declared to be to favor the progress of international law by seeking to become the "organ of the legal conscience of the civilized world"; to further the science of international law and to secure recognition of its principles; "to labor, within its proper sphere, whether for the maintenance of peace or for the observance of the laws of war"; to examine current difficulties and to give its opinions if asked; and to contribute "to the triumph of the principles of justice and humanity which ought to regulate international relations". Here was a set of principles dominated by the conception of international law as the science of peace-making. Yet the lawyers were careful to avoid any taint of Utopianism. In his speech Mancini explained the position of himself, and his colleagues as follows: "We are placed at an equal distance from the virtuous Utopians who hope for the immediate and permanent abolition of war, eternal peace, and the timid souls, without faith in the moral progress of humanity, who are struck by a state of things which they believe to be practically inherent in the nature of human societies"²⁰.

On October 13 took place the Brussels meeting which Miles and Field had prepared. Thirty-three attended, jurists, men of affairs and pacifists, from twelve different lands. The original purpose was not achieved. The conference declared that an international code "defining the rights and duties of nations and of their members is eminently desirable in the interest of peace, of friendly relations, and of the common prosperity", and that nothing should be neglected in its preparing for it. But

¹⁹ *A.P.* (July, 1873), p.51; Miles: *Sketch*.

²⁰ *Rev. de Droit Internat.* (1873), V. 674-676, 705-712; Lorimer: *Studies*, pp.77-87; Baron Alberic Rolin: *Les Origines de l'Institut de Droit International* (Ghent [1923]).

although the conference declared founded the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, it was decided to leave the scientific work of codification to the newly-formed Institute of International Law. And so were the relations between the two organizations defined, with the concurrence of many of the founders of the Institute, who came on to Brussels²¹.

It was in the discussion of arbitration that the difference between the humanitarians and the lawyers came most clearly to the fore. Passy and Richard wanted a pronouncement in favor of arbitration for all cases without exception; the more practical jurists raised the question: Do we want a general principle or something which will be accepted? Bluntschli, while most conciliatory, was anxious that the conference adopt no resolution which would allow public opinion to say: "These gentlemen have made phrases, but they have done nothing practical". He was persuaded that the governments would never accept arbitration in matters involving "vital interests", and he wanted to make this exception explicit. His position was supported by Mountague Bernard, professor of International Law at Oxford and one of the negotiators of the Washington Treaty. The opinion of this experienced jurist, as later expressed in a letter to the *Times*, was this:

Arbitration is an expedient of the highest value for terminating international controversies; but it is not applicable to all cases and under all circumstances, and the cases and circumstances to which it is not applicable do not admit of precise definition. Arbitration, therefore, must of necessity, be voluntary; and though it may sometimes be a moral duty to resort to it, cannot be commanded in any form by what is called the positive law of nations.

The conference finally adopted a compromise resolution, which advocated arbitration but admitted that there were exceptions to its use²².

All along the conception of the International Law Institute had been developed slowly and cautiously, and while it never came to have the strong influence for peace which its founders had hoped that it would possess, the Institute was almost everything else that they had planned it to be. In their quiet and unobtrusive way the members did their part in the service of international justice. Principles which they discussed and defined became part of international law. The rules they laid down for the submarine cable and the Suez Canal were enacted in the eighties; their studies of the laws of war were used by the Hague Conferences; and they did valuable work with problems of prize courts, international arbitration, and international private law.

²¹ *International Law Association: Reports of the First and Second Conferences* (London, 1903), pp.6-7, 9-11, 23, 44-48.

²² *Ibid.*, pp.25-44; International Law Association newscuttings.

While the work was entirely of the character of research, it did contribute in its way to the growth of the international mind, and so much was thought of the services of the International Law Institute in the cause of international peace that it was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1904²³.

On the other hand, the conference which gave birth to the other law association was far from being a realization of the grandiose schemes of its promoters. The fact that thirty-three individuals had left their firesides and had come together to pursue such high aims was itself a notable demonstration in behalf of international peace. But they had been assembled to elaborate an international code, and beyond declaring the necessity of leaving nothing undone in the preparation of this code, they did nothing about it either at Brussels or later. The fact was that the pacifists soon realized that codification was not as simple a thing as they had been led to believe. At Brussels the lawyers told them that they could not hope to thrust a ready-made code upon the governments, but that codification would have to come by treaties among the States, and Bluntschli, himself the author of an international code, warned the peace men that this would be a gradual process²⁴. So codification was left to the scientific deliberations of the Institute, where extreme prudence ruled the roost, and there it remained. While they continued to recognize the part which codification must play in international organization, never again in the ranks of the peace advocates did the clamor for codification assume such grand proportions. And the subsequent history of codification has justified the caution of Bluntschli and his colleagues, for the governments have always shown the greatest reluctance to accept codes, even when the jurists have been fortunate enough to agree and formulate them.

The Association itself turned out to be a disappointment to the pacifists who had prepared the Brussels meeting. In numbers it flourished, and by 1878 there were 500 names upon the membership rolls. Besides lawyers and peace men there were merchants, ship-owners, underwriters, delegates from Chambers of Commerce, and others who were interested in the immediate reform of international law, but in laws regulating international business relations rather than in laws governing international politics. Already at the second meeting in Geneva, 1874, this new interest was seen in the papers read on the need for copyright laws, on international coinage, and on the need for a code for negotiable securities. Other subjects which came to take a prominent place in the discussions of later conferences were Bills of Exchange, the General Average, Collisions at Sea, and Maritime Capture. In fact, the unification of the rules of General Average came to be considered the Association's greatest

²³ Ernest Lehr: *Tableau Général de l'Organisation, des Travaux, et du Personnel de l'Institut de Droit International* (1873-1892) (Paris, 1893); Baron Descamps: *Tableau Décennal ... (1894-1904)* (Paris 1905); N. Politis: "L'Institut de Droit International" in *R.P.* (1908), XIII. 280-286.

achievement. At the Conference of 1877 the president, Lord O'Hagan, paid tribute to the noble design of the founders, and he continued, "But the Association wisely resolved to deal with other pressing questions of law and usage, affecting individual interests throughout the world". He found it a matter for mutual congratulation that the Association "has not lost itself in the cloudland of speculative thought or wandered far afield in search of a Utopia"²⁵. When at the Conference of 1879 Henry Richard read a paper on disarmament and reminded the Association of its original ideals, hoping that it would take up what were to him "the weightier matters of the law of nations", the worthy Alderman Atkinson of Hull, Chairman of the Hull Chamber of Shipping, objected that arbitration belonged to the province of social science, not international law. After a discussion Richard was forced to withdraw his resolutions²⁶.

Thus the Association slipped out of the hands of the pacifists who had founded it. Yet the pacifist influence did not disappear. Miles died in 1875, but Richard, Passy and Field remained as regular attendants and tried to hold the organization true to the ideals which had called it into being.²⁷ Richard who had done little to help Miles at the beginning was not long in seeing that the conferences of international law provided a likely substitute for the popular peace congresses, which always ran the danger of compromising the cause through the excesses of a few individuals²⁸. Despite the attitude of the business men, whose affairs took up most of the time of the Association, the conferences did serve as the only regular international rendezvous of the friends of peace before the peace congresses were taken up again in 1889. Few gatherings failed to hear Henry Richard expound the virtues of disarmament or arbitration, and after his death, Darby, his successor as Secretary of the Peace Society, carried on. Even greater was the influence of the firm friend of peace, Joseph Alexander, who as Honorary General Secretary compiled the Reports for many years and never neglected to give liberal space to matters concerning international arbitration. In 1890, when the York-Antwerp Rules occupied all the attention of the Association, Alexander told the other members quite plainly that if it was an Association for the Reform of Maritime Law, he was in the wrong place.²⁹ Hesitancy was still expressed in the eighties at the introduction of the subject of arbitration, but by the nineties arbitration had begun to enter the domain of practical politics, and the opposition was no longer as articulate as before³⁰. But it was the Association for the

²⁴ *International Law Association: Report of the First Conference*, p.17.

²⁵ *Report*, pp.16-17, 23.

²⁶ *Report*, pp.234-251.

²⁷ Field: *Field*, pp.262-264; Passy to H. G. Webster, June 8, 1875. *International Law Association SS*.

²⁸ *H.P.* (October, 1883), p.285.

²⁹ Conference 1890, *Report*, p.277.

³⁰ *Reports*, 1887, p.101; 1892, pp.152-162; 1893, pp.35-39; 1895, pp.54-102.

Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations which had caught up with the times; it had not led the way.

The two new law associations had their immediate origin in the movement in favor of the extension of international law which was itself inspired by the reaction to the Franco-Prussian War and the Geneva Arbitration. They were but a natural consequence of the increasing number of intellectual, economic, and political relations between the nations, of the growing international interdependence which fostered the rise of an international consciousness. The very turn which the Association for Reform and Codification took when captains of commerce tended to displace the pacifists was indicative of the international links which were being forged daily through the progress of trade, industry, and communications. While these men's thinking was dominated politically by the national State, economically their thought encountered no national boundaries. In discussing the need for an international coinage, for uniform maritime legislation, and for a regularized system of international exchange, they were groping toward the concept of an International Government, which was, in the final analysis, incompatible with that of the sovereign and independent national State.

Parallel with the development of private international associations went that of the public international unions. In 1873 the International Bureau of Weights and Measures was established; in 1874 the convention was signed which created the Universal Postal Union; in 1875 the Telegraphic Union received its final form from a conference held in St. Petersburg. As Charles Lemonnier saw it: "Without noise, without any tumult, and especially without war, the great European unity is being established administratively little by little"³¹.

Of a piece with the campaign for codification was the renewed crusade for arbitration, which followed the triumph of Geneva. One of the purposes of the proposed codification was to regularize the practice of arbitration. Field's code, for example, provided for an international tribunal. The Workmen's Peace Association in appealing to the workmen of America on the *Alabama* Difficulty asked that they join their English brethren in demanding that their respective governments empower a Joint High Legal Commission to frame a code of international law and that they establish an international tribunal to administer the law. When Senator Sumner was in England in 1872, Cremer approached him in this sense, and other English friends of peace put pressure on the American statesman to help make the Anglo-American arbitration permanent³². What gave point to the arbitration campaign was when in

³¹ *E.-U.* (November 7, 1885).

³² Cremer to Sumner, October 30, 1872; Yardley Warner to Sumner, June 3, June 6, 1873. Sumner MSS. *Foreign*, CXLVIII, CL.

August, 1871, just three months after the signing of the Treaty of Washington, Henry Richard gave notice in the House of Commons of the following motion:

That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that she will be graciously pleased to enter into communication with foreign Powers, with a view to further improvement in International Law, and of the establishment of a general and permanent system of arbitration.

The forces of the Peace Society soon mobilized to work up sentiment in favor of the motion. Great meetings were organized in all parts of the country, at which Richard delivered strong speeches, the twelve agents of the Society were kept busy lecturing throughout the land, and the usual petition was started. The efforts of the Workmen's Peace Association proved even more efficient than those of the more experienced paternal organization. Cremer well knew how to make the best use of the technique he had learned as a labor agitator. The two hundred honorary agents of the Association, many of them officers of labor organizations, were given their cue, and soon workers were holding meetings all over England, even in the agricultural districts, passing resolutions in favor of Richard's impending motion, signing their names to the petition, and sending appeals to their representatives in Parliament. The publication of a journal, the *Arbitrator*, was begun, and the 1500 copies were spread as widely as possible. It was to last only during the campaign, but so successful were Cremer's first attempts as an editor that the *Arbitrator* was continued and it had lasted until today, always honest, blunt, and plain, a typical worker's sheet. Cremer succeeded in making arbitration the order of the day in the councils of the various trade unions, and he pushed through the Trades Union Congress a resolution favoring the notion. The laboring classes were solidly lined up behind the arbitration motion, and when all the returns were in it was found that over one million workmen were represented on the monster petition which was handed in to Parliament. All this Cremer did on a meager budget of less than \$3,000, much of which came from the treasury of the Peace Society³³.

The motion was postponed several times when trouble cropped up in the course of the settlement of the *Alabama* claims, but Richard was finally able to bring it on July 8, 1873. He spoke earnestly and in measured words, conscious of the seriousness of his great task, and the House of Commons listened with attention. He began by stressing once more the cost of the armed peace to the Powers - "their subjects ask for bread, and they give them bullets," - he told how the game of beggar my neighbor could be ended by the substitution for war of arbitration, and he listed the successful instances of its employment. Asking England to take the glorious initiative which would make mutual disarmament possible and be the first step toward

³³ *Arbitrator* (Feb., 1872-July, 1873), *passim*; Appleton: *Richard*, p.128.

a lasting peace, Richard ended with some ringing phrases all going to show that he had his country's national honor, her true national honor, very much to heart. Gladstone gave serious consideration to the eloquent speaker, upon whom, it was said, the mantle of Cobden had fallen. He expressed sympathy for the principle of arbitration, but he opposed the motion on the ground that English diplomacy should be unfettered in such troublous times. Richard refused to withdraw, and to the surprise of everybody his motion was carried by ten votes³⁴.

It was a warm summer's evening and the attendance in the House of Commons was not large. Richard himself realized that if he tried again he would be defeated. But that mattered little. And it did not matter so much that, although many of the newspapers welcomed Richard's proposal, the leading journals were against him; nor was it of fatal significance that Richard was entirely deceived when he expressed the confidence that "this recorded vote of the House of Commons is sure to have its weight hereafter in influencing our national policy"³⁵. What really counted was that, no matter what the circumstances, the voice of peace had been raised in the Mother of Parliaments and raised triumphantly. Everywhere the pacifists took heart and redoubled their own efforts. It was a great victory for peace, and for the rest of the century the pacifists continued to refer to this success with pride and pleasure. Richard was overwhelmed with messages of congratulations, and he decided to capitalize on the situation. He remembered his disarmament pilgrimage of 1869 and he thought of the advice of Sclopis that the best thing to do was to have the questions of peace raised in all the legislatures. So, striking while the iron was hot, he set out from London in September to gain the cooperation of the continental chieftains of peace³⁶.

At Brussels he found that Couvreur was already planning a resolution in the Belgian Chamber, and at The Hague he was warmly received and given the assurance that van Eck and Bredius would take action in the Dutch Parliament at the earliest opportunity. In Berlin he met Duncker, Heffter, and Loewenthal, but he failed to obtain any concrete support for his views. After leaving Vienna the peace apostle noted in his diary that the official classes seemed chary of associating with him, but Baron Kübeck had been hopeful and Deak had expressed himself favorably to the Englishman's ideas. It was in Italy that Richard found the star of peace in the ascendant. Men of all classes, of all political parties united to do him homage. An official address of congratulation was signed by Garibaldi, the presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber, Lanza, Sella, Mancini, Saffi, Depretis, Crispi, and any

³⁴ Miall: *Richard*, pp.192-199; Appleton: *Richard*, pp.130-132.

³⁵ Richard to Sumner, July 29, 1873. Sumner MSS, *Foreign*, CL.

³⁶ *H.P.* (August, 1873), pp.297-298, 309-312; (June, 1874), pp.77-80.

number of other politicians, as well as university professors, professional men and presidents of the important Chambers of Commerce. Labor organizations, agricultural societies, and masonic lodges joined in the demonstration. It was a remarkable manifestation of the will for peace of all Italy, but it should be remembered that of all lands Italy in 1873 was most anxious to remain at peace in order to work out the perplexing problems to which national unification had given rise. Richard's visit reached a fitting climax when he sat in the gallery of the Italian Chamber and heard Mancini carry a unanimous resolution in favor of arbitration. In Paris there was the usual banquet, arranged by Passy, and then Richard returned home after his three months journey, "with the strongest conviction that there was diffused throughout society, in all parts of the Continent, an intense abhorrence of the war system, and a longing for deliverance"³⁷.

The result of Richard's efforts was that by 1875 his arbitration motion had been copied in the legislatures of Italy, the United States, Holland, Sweden, and Belgium³⁸. It was not always with success, nor did any of the governments actually take any steps to establish a permanent system of arbitration. But it was enough that the principle was proclaimed, that widespread publicity was gained, and above all that it became evident for the first time in those days of big guns and big battalions that there was a little group of men from many lands who dared lift their voices in public in joint protest and point out a better way. Richard seems to have intended to regularize his relations with the other peace deputies by forming some sort of a loosely organized conference of parliamentarians which would meet at intervals and prepare concerted action in the different legislatures³⁹. In 1875 he planned in this way to bring pressure upon the governments in favor of the codification of international law⁴⁰. Here was the germ of the idea which later found realization in the Interparliamentary Union, but in 1875 the time was still not yet ripe and Richard's project had to be laid aside.

A fatal flaw in the scheme was the absence of representatives from Germany and France in the intended international club of deputies. Richard's attempts to inspire an arbitration movement in Berlin were fruitless, and he had no better luck in Paris, where the newspapers did not even pay any attention to his speech in the House of Commons⁴¹. After the banquet tendered him by Passy and his friends, one of the diners, the deputy Gagneur, was moved to action. He proposed to Louis Blanc, to

³⁷ Miall: *Richard*, pp.208-241; Appelton: *Richard*, p.138.

³⁸ *H.P.* (Jan., 1874), pp. 1-3, (Jan., 1875), pp.178-181; (March, 1875), pp.204-205, (July, 1878), p.94.

³⁹ Couvreur to Passy, December 16, 1891, published in Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp. 218-222; *R.P.* (1909), XIV. 338-339.

⁴⁰ Bredius to Miles, January 19, 1875. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

⁴¹ Passy to Ducommun, October 4, 1894. B.I.P. MSS. VB1.

Schoelcher, the French Wilberforce, and to many others among his colleagues that a motion in favor of international arbitration be put forward in the Chamber of Deputies. But he found that most of them "persisted in dreaming of armed *revanche*". Three years later when he sounded out his friends anew, his idea was still judged highly inopportune⁴².

The ruins left by national and civil strife were still smoking in the Paris of 1872. While the demand for armed revenge soon gave way before the realization of its impracticability, hope was never abandoned for the return of the lost provinces, and while fear brought peace to the hearts, peace on the lips was felt to be cowardly. Some sort of satisfaction was longed for; the thought of an acquiescence in the mutilation of the fatherland was out of the question. Moreover, while republicans like Gambetta used the imperial generals as scapegoats for the disasters of the war, conservatives blamed the republicans themselves who had preached disarmament at the very hour when the enemy was plotting France's downfall. And the pacifists were attacked for their crime in encouraging the delusion. It was recalled that the International Peace League of Paris had been provoking thoughts of peace just when France should have been preparing for war. "It was the time," recollected a prominent journalist, "when Monsieur Passy demonstrated once a week on the ground floor of *Le Temps* that war was the most frightful of institutions and that it had to be done away with ... when the faithful of the new cult were convoked at Herz Hall to commune together ..." And he asked what had been the effect of all these platonic speeches, all these pamphlets, all the agitation carried on by the Utopians.

Their dreams were swept away at the first puff. War is one of the laws of this world... We have believed too much these last thirty years in the absurdity of war and the possibility of a universal peace ... The cajolers must not come again to lull us to sleep with their delusive utopias. They are wrong still to shake that idea of the *patrie*, which is already so weakened in our souls. Let us listen no more to the phrasemongers of universal peace⁴³.

It was in the face of this situation, that, regardless of its empty treasury and its old debts, and despite the warnings of friends that this was manifest folly, Passy decided to reestablish the old peace society which had been inactive since the war. He acted with the conviction that "of all the faults which those who do not want to die can commit, the most serious is to do nothing to stay alive⁴⁴". And it was rather from

⁴² *Bulletin* (April-May, 1883), p.182.

⁴³ Francisque Sarcey in *Le Gaulois*, Sept., 1871. Guébin Collection at the Library of the Peace Palace. On French public opinion and the idea of peace after the war see the diagnosis of Santallier in *Bulletin* (July-August, 1872), pp.718, and the account of the experiences of David Urquhart, who came to Paris seeking to submit peace projects to the National Assembly, in G. Robinson: *David Urquhart*. (Oxford, 1920), pp.291-292. Cf. also E. Malcolm Carroll: *French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1870-1914* (N.Y., 1931), pp.46-65.

⁴⁴ *Bulletin* (July-August, 1872), p.3.

a sense of duty than of confidence that Passy once again advanced the attack. The society was declared to be of *durée illimitée*, and Passy said, "We must struggle and struggle resolutely, not with illusions, but with faith: not in promising ourselves that we will dispatch the monster; but in knowing well that it is in our power to give him some serious blows and that it is our duty to do so"⁴⁵.

In the first days of January, 1872, Passy sent out the call to the old members to reconstitute the society. First he made it clear that the pacifists bore no responsibility for France's defeat. "Despite all the attacks and the scoffing which have been spared us neither before nor after the war, of all we have done we regret nothing, nothing save that we did not succeed." Naturally the sad events of the past year had not left him cold:

We ignore nothing, we abandon nothing, we pardon nothing, we forget nothing. ... we protest, on the contrary, in the name of eternal and imprescriptible justice, against the ephemeral works of force, which it is naively supposed go before law, and we maintain, with a persistence whose very moderation attests its energy, the incessant revindication of law against force... We believe in the revision of unjust decrees and in the slow but inevitable reparation due to those whom injustice has injured.

We do more : we demand that reparation and we shall demand it until the future has granted it.

Reparation could not come from an armed revenge, continued the circular, but only through the moral and spiritual revival of France, and through the triumph of the two great principles of self-determination of peoples and the solidarity of nations, principles whose guarantee and sanction lay in the practice of arbitration. Not *Revanche* but *Relèvement* was the watchword of the new society⁴⁶.

Passy here struck the note which was to dominate the French peace movement from then on. The cause of justice was identified with the cause of France. Wronged by force, France was to turn to law to seek redress. Far from counselling a meek resignation to the injustice which the fatherland had suffered, the French pacifists never accepted the Treaty of Frankfurt, but they called upon their compatriots to help them hasten the dawning of the day of international justice, which would be the day of reparation.

In 1872, however, minds were still too inflamed for peace doctrines to have any success, even when urged in the name of a masked *revanche* and with a new emphasis upon arbitration. Some letters from former members printed in the *Bulletin*

⁴⁵ *Bulletin* (July-August, 1872), p.50.

of the society testify to their limited appeal among the old circle. Revenge at the moment was impossible, all the letters agreed, but preparedness for war was felt by many to be urgent, and while wars of conquest were still denounced, a war for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine would be defensive. From Metz came a tragic note from a former friend of peace who had lost his all in the war. It ended: "I have in my heart a hatred against Prussia which beats against my breast and makes my hand tremble ... How can I today, how would I be able in conscience to call myself a friend of peace!". Passy had to admit that the taking of Alsace "has given such an ardent, and if I dare to say, such a just indignation and feeling of revenge, it is exceedingly difficult to make people understand war is not the good way"⁴⁷.

Yet enough of the pre-war members answered the call to reconstitute the society. The name was changed to *La Société des Amis de la Paix*, so that there would be no more confusion with the republican *Ligue* and also in order to remove the "International," which had come into bad repute in the days of the Commune. Prominent in the lists of new members were the names of Renouard, attorney-general at the Cour de Cassation; Peugeot and Steinheil, wealthy business men; Thiaudière, journalist; Garnier, economist; and Gustave d'Eichtal. Shortly afterwards Passy recruited Adolphe Franck, the well-known teacher of philosophy. The greater part of what support there was came, as before, from merchants and manufacturers. A *Bulletin* was begun for private circulation among the members, but its publication became very irregular, and the newspapers seemed to be observing a conspiracy of silence toward the society, not even deigning to attack it. Even Garnier, as editor of the *Journal des Economistes* did not feel able to give the society the publicity he had accorded it before the war. It was felt inadvisable to hold a public meeting and the only propaganda engaged in consisted in the issuance for several years of an *Almanach de la Paix*, gotten up in the manner of other popular almanacs of the time and containing articles on peace and arbitration. Finances remained precarious and the society would have gone bankrupt in short order and disappeared altogether had it not been for the aid of the London Peace Society and the personal sacrifices of Passy⁴⁸. The organization gave little enough evidence of life as it was, and after the temporary stimulus provided by the visit of Miles, it relapsed into almost complete silence. Only the influence of Passy kept the society together in the years after the war, and when he was forced to withdraw in 1874 because of the pressing needs of personal affairs, it looked like the end⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ *Bulletin* (Jan., 1872), pp.7, 15-20; Passy: *Historique*, pp.40-46; *idem*, *Pour la Paix*, pp.61-78.

⁴⁷ *Bulletin* (June, 1872), pp.34-35, 27-29, 35-36, 39; Passy to Miles, March 12, 1873: American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

⁴⁸ Passy to Miles, March 12, 1873. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

⁴⁹ Passy to Miles, August 18, 1874. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign*.

The *Société des Amis de la Paix* did manage to survive, but in the form of a small discussion group rather than of an active peace society. Of the several hundred persons whose names were on the membership rolls only a mere handful met periodically in private reunions to discuss the problems of war and peace. They were agreed that they were all good patriots, and in 1878 the name was changed to *Société Française des Amis de la Paix*, so that there could be no mistaking that fact. "See in us neither cosmopolitans nor internationals", said Franck, the president. "We are a French society which offers its hand to all foreign societies pursuing the same aim as we ... to suppress patriotism is not a way to have peace, it is the way to have universal confusion and egoism"⁵⁰. Rarely were the study sessions very lively. Once there was an interesting debate between those who felt that free trade was the sole vehicle in the attainment of peace and these who maintained that peace could be gained only by the spread of ideas of fraternity. The free-trade faction asserted that because of economic progress, "war is becoming, even for the victor, an immense dupery". They were met with the charge of materialism, and it was pointed out that trade often leads to war, not to peace⁵¹. The dispute was a precursor of the debate which arose among the pacifists years later when one of the greatest pacifist propaganda tracts ever written condemned war not as "an immense dupery", but as a "Great Illusion", and its author was consequently attacked by some of the pacifists as a crass materialist.

The rumble of guns in the East served to awaken the society to its first public action of any consequence. In November, 1876, it issued a manifesto protesting against any armed intervention in the Balkans, and in April of the next year an address was sent to the Tsar of All the Russias imploring him in the name of humanity to desist from his advance against the Turks. The appeal was not couched in the moving language which Martin-Paschoud had used to touch the hearts of the sovereigns of France and Prussia in 1870, but it had a new value and all the French journals gave it notice, attacking or supporting the move according to the side each took in the Russo-Turkish conflict. The attacks were in the minority and the society registered contentment: "The public conscience, by approving our *démarche*, has accorded us the sole satisfaction we sought"⁵². This flicker of publicity proved useful in aiding the drive for new members, and in 1878, the year of the peace congress at Paris, there were over five hundred. But the treasury was never very full, and any agitation on a large scale, even if the members had been inclined to chance it, was impossible.

The *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* continued its metamorphosis after the Franco-Prussian War. It still clung tenaciously to its

⁵⁰ *Bulletin* (1st semester, 1878), p.95.

⁵¹ *Bulletin* (February, 1876), pp.257ff.; Henri Bellaire: "L'Echange et la Fraternité à la Société des Amis de la Paix", in *J.d. Econ.* (March, 1876), ser.3, XLI. 454-457.

principles of republicanism and to Mazzinian internationalism. But the appeal of republicanism was severely limited, while the new nationalism had now almost completely superseded the old; the words, my country right or wrong, were written on each patriot's heart. Because of the rigid doctrine, followers could be recruited only among the democrats. In Switzerland there was little need for any agitation for peace and liberty, but the support of the future presidents of the Confederation, Comtesse and Ruchonnet was secured. In the United States there was little or no interest in the *Ligue*, and the only effect of the propaganda tour of Goegg in 1872 was the beginning of the collaboration between the *Ligue* and the non-resistant Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia⁵³. From Spain came cheering news that the great Spanish republican, Castelar, had declared that the Spanish Republic of the future was destined to be one of the cornerstones of the United States of Europe⁵⁴, but the future was still far off and the Spanish republicans had too much to do at home to bother about the *Ligue*. In Italy the members of the Republican Left remained faithful to their international ideals, and Saffi, Garibaldi, and Macchi supported the *Ligue*. But the ideal of the Republican International was farther away from realization than ever.

What was left of republicanism in Germany after the Franco-Prussian war was soon swallowed up in the rising socialist movement. It was significant that the only periodical in Germany which exchanged with *Les Etats-Unis* was the socialist *Vorwärts*. Although the *Ligue* followed with sympathy the political battles of the German socialists, it could not approve of their doctrines. At the assembly of the *Ligue* in 1871, when the Treves lawyer, Ludwig Simon, carried a resolution condemning the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as a conquest pure and simple, the German democrat Sonnemann took no part in the discussion. Simon was a "man of '48'" and remained one. A mutual friend remarked that for Simon as well as for Jacoby, another member of the Central Committee of the *Ligue*, France was still the France of the French Revolution, and "nothing new had happened in the world since the Coalition of Pillnitz"⁵⁵. On the other hand, Sonnemann was a deputy in the Reichstag, editor of an important newspaper, and a man who hoped to have some influence in his country. He, too, subscribed to the ideals of the great German democrat Ludwig Börne, and he placed humanity above the nation and subordinated national honor to individual liberty. In fact, Sonnemann remained a valued member of the *Ligue* until 1879. But he understood that ideals can never remain entirely free from the tarnish of compromise if they are to exert any immediate influence in the arena of practical politics. He accepted the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and when

⁵² *J.d. Econ.* (November, 1876), ser. E, XLIV. 249-252; *Bulletin* (March-July, 1877), pp.33-41.

⁵³ Lemonnier: *Les Etats-Unis*, pp. 112-114; *Congrès ... 1872, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.27-35.

⁵⁴ *E.-U.* (April 18, 1872), p.4.

⁵⁵ Ernest Feder, ed.: *Bismarcks grosses Spiel. Die geheime Tagebücher Ludwig Bambergers* (Frankfort-on-Main, 1932), pp.89, 92-93.

the *Ligue* began to talk of a plebiscite - although this is what he himself had demanded in 1871 - he broke off relations with it. The taint remained, and in 1882 Sonnemann had to answer certain attacks by having a declaration read in the Reichstag, which affirmed that he and his party, the *Volkspartei*, entirely accepted the constitution of the Empire as it then was. This moved Lemonnier, who was more of an idealist than a politician, to some bitter words on his former colleague's "apostasy"⁵⁶.

The strength of the *Ligue* in France had come originally from its stand against the Empire, but now that France was a republic the old militants like Barni were entering public life, and they felt that the *Ligue* had no more *raison d'être*⁵⁷. Internationalism of all sorts was in bad odor, and even the *Ligue's* brand, which had its roots deep in French tradition, was suspect. The Conservatives charged the *Ligue* with socialism and radicalism and succeeded in banning the journal from France in the years 1873-1876, but what cut deepest was when Gambetta refused to renew his adhesion to the *Ligue*, with talk about the vague cosmopolitanism diminishing patriotism⁵⁸. Under the circumstances, the Committee decided to abandon any attempt to swell the membership totals and to concentrate henceforth on gaining only those adherents who would be staunch and true allies. Victor Hugo still favored the assemblies of the *Ligue* with his annual blessing; Mangin remained loyal; and Codet, Couturier, and Laisant, deputies of the Left, were won. The publication of *Les Etats-Unis* was resumed at the insistence of Lemonnier, who regarded it as a sacred duty. It had first been published in 1400 copies, but now 500 were deemed adequate, and by 1878 the number of subscribers had dropped off to less than 300. The finances of the *Ligue* were very slender, and the journal was kept running only through the personal efforts of Lemonnier, who regularly made up the deficit with an annual contribution of over \$200.

The assemblies of the *Ligue* continued to be held, but they became tame affairs, practically private discussions which came in for little outside notice, a far cry from the tumultuous Geneva congress which had ushered the *Ligue* into life. The last assembly of any notoriety was the gathering held in 1871, when the presence of several Communards gave the proceedings a little life⁵⁹. But the spark never died. The resolutions had the ring of old, as witness that passed in 1873:

We, citizens of France, of Italy, of Germany, of Switzerland, of England, of Spain, of Belgium, of Slavic nations, of Greece, etc., etc.,

⁵⁶ Stollsteimer, *op. cit.*, pp.36-37; *E.-U.* (April 1, 1882); Montluc: *Lemonnier*, p.19.

⁵⁷ Dide: *Barni*, pp.205-206.

⁵⁸ *Congrès... 1871: Bulletin*, p.14.

⁵⁹ *Congrès...1871: Bulletin*, pp.42-43; *La Constitution*, Septembre 28, 29, 1871. Guébin Collection.

Cursing the wars and those who stir them up, we declare that the European peoples are made to love one another, and that, while remaining profoundly attached to our respective fatherlands, we must consider Europe as our great fatherland⁶⁰.

The meetings were usually run off without incident, and they were most businesslike. There was debate but rarely serious disagreement. The new harmony was possible because the *Ligue* came under the domination of one man, and its assemblies became the sounding-board for his theories. This was Charles Lemonnier, of whom his former opponent Passy later wrote: "In attaching himself to the cause of peace and in working for it, he finished by incarnating it in some way in his person"⁶¹.

Lemonnier had already lived through three score very full years when he began to devote himself to the cause of peace in 1867. As teacher, lawyer, scholar, he never forgot the convictions he had assimilated as an ardent Saint-Simonian in his youth. The Saint-Simonians loved humanity, they taught that all mankind was one, and they dreamed of the international order of the future which was to unite the peoples. It was the disciple Lemonnier who made the most important attempt to realize that dream. "*Aimer et travailler*" - such was the motto he chose for himself, and to it he always remained true. Even as an octogenarian Lemonnier continued his ceaseless labors in behalf of humanity, and in his diary he planned how he could best allocate his weakening forces so to be able to serve his fellow-men until the very end. There is a note in his journal in 1890, when he was eighty-four years of age, telling of his arising at five in the morning to work on the preparation of some publications for the *Ligue*⁶². Death took him at his post. The last letter he wrote, dated two weeks before he died, had to do with the cause to which he gave the last twenty-five of his life⁶³. Lemonnier was a kind and loving soul, yet he pursued his ideals with a relentless legal logic, and at times his mild and gentle manner yielded to his warm and battle-loving disposition. He inspired his associates with a feeling of affection and esteem akin to veneration. One of them wrote of him: "He was one in whose presence it was impossible for any man to utter a frivolous or unworthy word. There was a dignity and gravity in him, combined with an utter absence of egotism and self-consciousness; withal a suppressed passion for what was just and true"⁶⁴. The French statesman Spuller said of him, "*C'est un sage*"⁶⁵.

⁶⁰ *Rev. de Droit Internat.* (1873), V.633-634.

⁶¹ *Almanach de la Paix pour 1893*, p.50.

⁶² Lemonnier MSS. Notebooks, July 29, 1890, and *passim*.

⁶³ Lemonnier MSS. Letterbook, Reply to Bajer, Nov.16, 1891.

⁶⁴ Hodgson Pratt in *Concord* (Dec., 1891), VI. 183-184.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Barodet's funeral oration, *E.-U.* (Jan., 1892).

In his papers Lemonnier always referred to the *Ligue* as his own creation, and such it was in the years from 1871 to 1891. His voice was generally the deciding one in the Committee which prepared the conferences, he was usually the reporter of the most important question on the agenda at the assemblies, and never was his decision vetoed. Even more important was his role as editor of the mouthpiece of the *Ligue*, *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe*. For the twenty years of his stewardship this journal was practically the only one in Europe to judge contemporary events not from the standpoint of the necessities of practical politics, but from the standpoint of ethics. It was no easy task to prepare its publication. It required a thorough knowledge of the tendencies of the time and a day-by-day acquaintance with international affairs. Some of the daily notes on topics of the day which Lemonnier kept in preparation for his articles have survived and they testify to the religious devotion to his task with which he labored⁶⁶. And when it was all done, there was the financial burden to be borne, and this Lemonnier gladly took upon himself, although it meant doing without the comforts to which his old age entitled him.

Lemonnier was a firm republican, the sort who would spontaneously write in his diary, "*Vive la République!*" on July 14. His ethics he took from Kant. Again and again he refers to the German philosopher in his papers, and it was a fact, as Lemonnier told his colleagues, that Kant was "the real father of our *Ligue*"⁶⁷. The *Ligue* proclaimed the great principle that "policy must be subordinated to ethics", and preached the autonomy of the individual from which was deduced the principle of national self-determination. Kant had spoken of the legal state which would succeed the state of nature which then characterized international relations; he had indicated the need of a tribunal and postulated the "federation of free States", which would provide for that need; he had insisted that only republican States could join the federation; he had demanded the abolition of standing armies⁶⁸. These all became doctrines of the *Ligue*. In *Les Etats-Unis* Lemonnier pointed to every diplomatic crisis, and every unethical pronouncement by a statesman as further proof that international relations were still in a state of nature. "It is therefore evident", he would say again and again, "that Europe is actually in a state of war, in truce at the most, but not in peace..."⁶⁹. He was always consistent in his republicanism and had little patience with such appeals as that of the *Nederlandsche Vredesbond* to the Three Emperors. "Flattery or naïveté" exclaimed Lemonnier. "To ask peace from the Caesars is to throw oneself into the jaws of the wolf"⁷⁰. Although in explaining his position to the English, he qualified his stand by declaring any people which had the

⁶⁶ Lemonnier MSS. Notes Quotidiennes, August 15, 1889-June, 1891.

⁶⁷ *Congrès ... 1871, Bulletin*, p.35.

⁶⁸ A. Aulard: *La Paix Future. D'Après la Révolution Française et Kant* (Paris, 1915), pp.19-24.

⁶⁹ *E.-U.* (April 25, 1872).

⁷⁰ *E.-U.* (September 12, 1872).

right of the declaration of war as fit for his federation, Lemonnier generally ruled out any federation with monarchic States⁷¹. To him the republic meant the peace. "The policy of republicanism leads directly to peace; by suppressing dynasties it removes one of the principal causes of war; war in a republic, if it breaks out, is an accident contrary to the principle itself ..." ⁷². Yet the methods of the *Ligue* were explicitly declared to be "exclusively pacific". Lemonnier glorified Mazzini's dictum that "peace can be born only through liberty", but he refused to heed the prophet's prediction that Europe could be made over only by the great European war which was inevitable. Lemonnier did not advocate revolution; he claimed that the true republic could be established only by the free consent of all. "We want to make the light burn before all eyes which burns before ours; we want to preach everywhere and for everybody the great truth which will at the same time enlighten and liberate the peoples; by the word, by the press, by individual and collective propaganda we want to combat oppression, destroy tyranny ..." ⁷³

Lemonnier never worked out the details of his conception of the international federative State of the future. He expected that it would be modelled on the Swiss and American lines, that it would have a federal code, a supreme federal court, and a federal army, composed solely of national militias⁷⁴. "To force superseding law, we must oppose force employed in the service of law"⁷⁵. The principle upon which the whole system was to be based was that of the autonomy of the individual. Lemonnier did not follow the line of thinking which led certain disciples of Kant to justify Prussianism. He issued a timely warning against the substitution for the idol of the King of the idol of the Nation: "The individual is sacrificed to the Republic just as the monarchists sacrifice him to the monarchy, in both cases for *raison d'Etat*. The altar, the sacrificer and the deity have been changed, but the victim remains the same." And Lemonnier recognized that the "patriotic fanaticism" which was guilty of such excesses was "perhaps the greatest obstacle to the federation of peoples"⁷⁶. His diagnosis was keener than he knew.

Lemonnier's logic convinced him that the current panaceas of the peace movement, arbitration and disarmament, could only become realities after a federation was established⁷⁷. It was in particular the idea of disarmament at which his rational spirit rebelled. "Let us not at all forget", he wrote, "that the state of war prevails among the peoples and the principle of war is distrust. What guarantee will the

⁷¹ *Bulletin Officiel des Assemblées de la Ligue ... 1874*, pp.122-133.

⁷² *E.-U.* (August 29, 1872).

⁷³ *Bulletin Officiel du 6^e Congrès...* 1872, p.115.

⁷⁴ Lemonnier: *Les Etats-Unis*, pp.127ff.

⁷⁵ Fauvety, Lemonnier's colleague, in *E.-U.* (April 18, 1872), p.3.

governments give of their sincerity...? If such a conference could be established, by that alone would war disappear, for good faith is nothing else but peace ..."⁷⁸. Yet while Lemonnier's logical mind regarded the plan of a federation of peoples as "theoretically unassailable", it had to recognize that "ideas which are unassailable in theory can never be realized from one day to the next... We must take things as they are."⁷⁹ He believed that the first step toward federation would be a union between France, England, and Italy. But, taking things as they were, he had to admit that these nations were not yet ready for it. Hence some alternative had to be accepted, and arbitration appeared to be the path to follow. It was not to be the establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal with a code of international law to apply. That could only be possible after the federation of peoples was established. It was to be some systematization of the practice of arbitration by the conclusion of arbitration treaties which would substitute little by little, the ideas and methods of peace for those of war. It was the very imperfection of arbitration, leaving as it did national sovereignty untouched and demanding no vital reform of international relations, which gave it in Lemonnier's eyes an incontestable practical worth. "The Arbitration Treaty is therefore a transition, a stage in passing from the present to the future, which appears to us all the more happily proposed because it makes few innovations, because it hardly changes what actually exists"⁸⁰.

In the *Ligue* assemblies of 1873 and 1874 Lemonnier developed his "Formula for a Treaty of Arbitration", which was designed to serve as a model for the treaties of permanent arbitration between the States. In providing for the settlement of *all* disputes by arbitration, it did a little more than hardly change the rules of the game, as Lemonnier claimed. Nor could he refrain from drawing up the principles of international law to which the arbiters were to refer, a statement based upon the doctrines of the *Ligue* which an international lawyer like Rolin-Jaequemyns regarded as vague, ambiguous, and a confused mixture of law, ethics, and politics, with little distinction made between natural and positive law⁸¹. Yet few of the pacifists then or later had as clear a perception of just what was the actual value of arbitration as had Lemonnier. And although he began to lobby with diplomats to bring about the conclusion of treaties modelled on his design, he never lost his distrust of these white-

⁷⁷ *Bulletin Officiel des Assemblées ... 1877*, pp.65-66; *Bulletin Officiel des Assemblées ... 1878*, pp.138, 141.

⁷⁸ *E.-U.* (December 9, 1875, March 30, 1876).

⁷⁹ *Bulletin Officiel des Assemblées ... 1878*, p.70.

⁸⁰ Lemonnier: *Formule d'un Traité d'Arbitrage entre Nations* (Geneva, 1874), pp.7-10; cf. also the conclusion of his article, "La Politique de la Paix" in *E.-U.* (February 4, 1875).

⁸¹ *Rev de Droit Internat.* (1873), V. 632-634. Montluc credits Lemonnier with being an inspiration for Rolin-Jaequemyns in the founding of the Institute of International Law (Montluc: *Lemonnier*, p.15). While it is true that the jurist would have soft-pedalled any connections with the radical *Ligue*, I have found no evidence to substantiate this claim.

gloved gentlemen of the green table⁸². He continued until the end to condemn the governments and to put his trust in the peoples. Disgusted by some diplomatic machinations in 1889, he declared:

The policy of peace, of real peace, had nothing to gain from such diplomatic intrigues, and we would fear for its continuance if we did not reckon on the ardent desire of the peoples to avoid a European conflagration. Whatever the masters of the world may say, that desire can suffice sometimes to act as counterpoise on the scales to the heavy sword of Brennus⁸³.

The *Ligue* was highly important for the spirit which it kept alive and for the personal efforts of Lemonnier, yet one reason that it could never live up to the hopes of its founders was that it never became really international. The same was true of the whole peace movement at this period. Any movement for international reform must be international by its very nature. It must take root and thrive equally in all lands, else it will only serve to create the very distrust which it seeks to dispel. The history of the modern peace movement before the Great War is the history of one long effort to become consciously and effectively international. In 1872 the peace forces on the Continent were scattered. The *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* had become a small group of exclusive democrats meeting in Switzerland and possessing little influence. The *Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix* of Paris had proved neither international nor permanent, and it survived only as the purely French *Société des Amis de la Paix*, which was struggling to keep alive. In Holland the *Nederlandsche Vredebond* was already hurrying down the path to oblivion, and the few healthy stirrings in Scandinavia were too far away from the main scene of action to come in for any notice. And as before 1867, the brand of pacifism peddled by the London Peace Society had proved to be unsuitable for export to the Continent.

In Germany there were no peace societies to speak of. Loewenthal attempted in 1874 to revive at Berlin his European Union under the name of the *Deutscher Verein für Internationale Friedenspropaganda*. The idea of federation was abandoned, and he was now content to agitate for arbitration and the reform of international law. There was no response from the Berliners, not once did the society hold a public assembly, and the affair came to an end when Loewenthal left Germany in 1875. Soon after news of the rebirth of the society reached pacifist circles abroad, the *Société des Amis de la Paix* sent a letter asking Loewenthal to declare flatly that Alsace-Lorraine should have the right of self-determination, otherwise there could be

⁸² *Bulletin Officiel des Assemblées ... 1877*, pp.63-64, 87-90; *Bulletin Officiel des Assemblées ... 1878*, pp.36-37, 35-45.

⁸³ *E.U.* (Nov., 1889). Brennus was the warrior chieftain of the Gauls who demanded one thousand pounds of gold to lift his siege of Rome. In weighing the gold he added to the scales the weight of his sword, saying: "Vae victis".

no cooperation between the two organizations. Loewenthal answered that historically completed facts should be left outside the considerations of the friends of peace, and there was no more correspondence between the two peace groups. Some months later Loewenthal suggested that the peace societies gather yearly congresses and that in case of a threatening war their presidents should meet and take steps to form a court of arbitration themselves. This was vetoed all around, and the Dutch Society in particular stood aghast at the proposal of any such political activity⁸⁴. How little known was Loewenthal's creation is best shown by the fact that in March, 1874, Edmund Potonié was himself trying to form a peace society in Berlin, apparently totally oblivious of any other peace work there. He began the publication of his *Feuille d'Olivier*, but he had just as bad luck as Loewenthal. In 1878, he ceased the thankless labors and bequeathed to Lemonnier and *Les Etats-Unis* "the tiny terrain which I have won to our cause amid the clusters of Prussian bayonets"⁸⁵.

In 1874, the First Socialist International was disintegrating. Cremer, one of the original founders, looked on with complacency, for he felt that it had come into the hands of "men who cared more for their *isms* than for the cause of real progress". But he regarded the idea as too good to be abandoned, and he toyed with the thought: "whether the Workmen's Peace Association contains the nucleus of the future International"⁸⁶. Cremer was not very far to the Left in his politics. Even Lemonnier's republicanism was too radical for him, and his relations with the *Ligue*, while cordial, never passed the bounds of mere courtesy. British labor was then much closer to British Liberalism than to labor movements abroad. Yet Cremer recognized the value of cooperation with foreign workers for international peace, and it was for this purpose that he led a band of English labor leaders to Paris in September, 1875, to stage a joint demonstration with their French colleagues.

The conditions were hardly favorable. Paris was still in a state of siege, and every public meeting had to be sanctioned by the authorities and its proceedings supervised by the police. The Paris workmen were still cowering in fear with the suppression of the Commune fresh in their minds; most of their leaders had been killed or transported. Consequently, only little more than a hundred Frenchmen assembled to greet the forty English Trade Unionists who came bearing the olive-leaf across the Channel. The French took little part in the discussion. Their chief speakers were moderate socialists, such as Desmoulins, the son-in-law of Pierre Leroux and friend of Kingsley and Maurice, and Limousin, propagator of "socialist opportunism",

⁸⁴ Loewenthal: *Geschichte*, pp.29-30, 36-44; *idem*: *Zur Internationalen Friedenspropaganda* (Berlin, 1874); Hetzel, *op. cit.*, p.71.

⁸⁵ Potonié to Miles, March 9, 1874. American Peace Society MSS. *Letters, Special, Foreign; E.-U.* (March 7, 1878).

⁸⁶ *Arbitrator* (Sept., 1874), no.32, p.3.

whom Cremer had known in the early days of the International in London. There were members of the bourgeois *Société des Amis de la Paix* in the audience, and the report of the meeting records applause after Limousin's protest against class war. The resolutions, prepared by the English, were conservative. The principle of arbitration was acclaimed, indignation was registered against the armed condition of Europe, and it was declared that the interests of the working-class were identical and that the laborers should work together for arbitration. The meeting was boycotted by the French Republican leaders, and it found little notice in the press. Cremer's plans to put on a similar congress in Berlin came to naught⁸⁷.

The experiment was repeated in 1878 with more success. This time public meetings were possible, and some two thousand persons crowded into a large hall to clap for arbitration and peace. Again the conservative spirit dominated and the resolutions passed were the same as before. The only radical note was a letter from Louis Blanc, who pointed out to "Citizen Cremer" that "the substitution of arbitration for war would be an excellent thing, but it will come only when people are cured of the malady of having masters". The meeting was presided over by Tolain, representative of the working-class in the French Senate, Lockroy, a radical deputy, spoke, and Victor Hugo sent his regards. The Republicans still opposed the venture; Gambetta's *République Française* refused to announce the meeting and treated it with contempt. But the aftermath was the formation of the *Société des Travailleurs, Amis de la Paix*, with Limousin as its chieftain. While the Workmen's Peace Association did not become the nucleus for the Second International, it did help in a vague way to promote the feeling of international solidarity of the working classes of England and France⁸⁸.

Cremer kept up relations with the French workers, but he had his hands full at home. The outbreak of the war between Russia and Turkey in 1877 resulted in the rise in England of a powerful movement for intervention in favor of the Turks, and Disraeli's government was inclined to take a strong stand against the Russians. The excitement was at its highest when the Russians came almost within sight of Constantinople. Popular passions were aroused, and the sort of patriotic excesses took place which were to become more common in 1899 and 1914. Peace meetings were stormed, Mr. Gladstone's windows were broken, and jingoism was christened. Peace men fought it as a phenomenon of the music-hall, and they failed to recognize the patriotic Dr. Jekyll in the jingoistic Mr. Hyde.

⁸⁷ *Arbitrator* (Sept., 1875), no.44, pp.3-8, (May, 1876), no.52, pp.4-6; Howard Evans: *Radical Fights of Forty Years* (London, 1913), pp. 114-115; Evans: *Cremer*, pp. 88-92; *J. d. Econ.* (1875), ser.3, XXXIX. 159-160, XL. 109-116.

⁸⁸ *Arbitrator* (Sept., Oct., 1878), no 80, pp.1-7, n°81, pp.3-4; *E.-U.* (August 29, 1878); Evans: *Cremer*, pp.93-94; *idem*: *Radical Fights*, pp.115-116.

The Peace Society worked hard for non-intervention, but it finally decided to abandon the idea of holding meetings, rather than to provoke the outbursts of rowdyism which greeted its attempts⁸⁹. Cremer was more of a fighter. He secured the signatures of three hundred officers of Trade Unions to a manifesto which was the most solidly based class appeal which he ever got up. It read:

What does war mean? To the landowners it means keeping up high rents which have lately shown a tendency to fall; to mercenary capitalists it means lending money at high rates for the purchase of murderous weapons, the interest on which the industry of the country will have to pay; to the sordid section of the Press it means coining gold out of human blood by increasing the largest circulations of the world. To military and naval officers it means employment, promotion, and gain. To the obstructives it means the arrest of reform and the paralysis of progress. But what does it mean to you?...⁹⁰

With the financial help of a wealthy Friend, Cremer organized a great meeting of Trade Union executives at the Memorial Hall in London on April 10, 1878. Almost five hundred representative workmen attended in an impressive demonstration of labor's solidarity in opposition to the Government's warlike policy. One speaker said that if Lord Beaconsfield sent one army abroad to fight Russia, he would need another one at home to prevent a rising of the people. Gladstone was present and was greeted with an ovation. Some days later the agricultural laborers held a similar conference in London, and these large gatherings were followed by anti-war assemblies in other towns. The campaign illustrated the machinery which the Workmen's Peace Association had at its disposal, and testified to the will for peace of at least the best elements of the working classes. The Eastern Question was finally liquidated by the diplomats at the Conference of Berlin, and peace was saved⁹¹.

The idea of interparliamentary activity for peace had first been put into practice by Henry Richard, and his efforts in 1869 and in 1873 to stimulate foreign deputies to joint action had had a measure of success. His plans to form a sort of select interparliamentary council were not generally known, but his example set others to thinking. For example, the failure of the campaign of 1869-70 to bring about disarmament convinced the editor of the *Berliner Volks-Zeitung* that a more complete agreement between the deputies was needed to force the governments to take action. In July, 1870, he proposed a union of French, German, Austrian, and Italian members of parliament for this purpose⁹². The next month Baron Walther von

⁸⁹ *H.P.* (June, 1877), XV. 246-247, (June, 1878), XVI. 79-80, 86.

⁹⁰ Evans: *Cremer*, pp.98-100.

⁹¹ *Arbitrator* (April, May 1878), no75, pp.2-16, no79, pp.3-5, (May 1879), no88, pp.5-6; Evans: *Cremer*, pp.97-104; *idem*: *Radical Fights*, pp.84-85; Bonner: *Bradlaugh*, II. 82-85.

⁹² *Friedensblatt* (July 15, 1870), I. 138-139.

Walterskirchen, an Austrian deputy, made a speech in which he also proposed an international organization of deputies to work for peace⁹³. Loewenthal expressed a similar idea in an article in his Berlin newspaper on July 20, 1873, and he reprinted this in the pamphlet, *Zur Internationalen Friedenspropaganda*, which came to the attention of friends of peace abroad⁹⁴.

The clearest formulation of the conception came from Dr. Adolphe Fischhof, a Liberal politician of Austria, in the articles which he published in the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna on September 26 and 28, 1875. He knew of Richard's work and of the earlier suggestion of Walterskirchen. It was still in terms of disarmament that the problem was considered. The title of Fischhof's article was: *On the Reduction of Continental Armies*. He declared that the reason for the growing armaments lay solely in "the isolation of Parliaments". If any question was of general European interest, he pointed out, it was the armament question, and a congress of parliamentary representatives should meet to consider it. Even if only unofficial, the meeting could not fail to exert influence. The congress would determine the quota to which the armies should be reduced and each member would then pledge himself to work in his own parliament for a declaration by his government of its willingness to act if the others did. This was no task for the diplomats, for they were "more keenly alive to the State's need for power than for economy". The conference should go on to discuss economic and social questions of common interest and some day it might become an organic body, the official bond between the peoples. Fischhof knew that this could not be done all in a day. He suggested as the first step a meeting in Vienna of deputies from all parliaments. There the plans could be discussed and a committee appointed to draw up a report⁹⁵.

Fischhof's articles provoked a good deal of comment. They were published in pamphlet form, and an English translation was soon printed. He put himself into touch with peace-minded parliamentarians abroad, and he received favorable replies. There was a group in Austria supporting him, and in Germany the Liberals Ducker and Zimmermann agreed to cooperate. Henry Richard was willing to do all he could: Fischhof even solicited and received a favorable letter from Garibaldi⁹⁶. And the idea came to rest elsewhere. In January, 1876, Thiaudière and Bellaire of the *Société des Amis de la Paix* proposed that all the peace societies invite the European parliaments to set up permanent committees of international affairs, elected annually, which

⁹³ F.-W. (1910), XII. 49-51, 90-92.

⁹⁴ Loewenthal: *Friedenspropaganda*, pp.4-6; idem: *Geschichte*, pp.28-31.

⁹⁵ Richard Charnatz: *Adolf Fischhof*. (Stuttgart, 1910), pp.401-404; Fischhof: *On the Reduction of Continental Armies* (London, 1875); F.-W. (1910), XII. 27-29.

⁹⁶ H.P. (1876), XV. 25-26, 33.

would meet together when war threatened⁹⁷. In May, 1876, the Central Committee of the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* proposed that there be summoned to Paris during the Exposition of 1878 a *Conférence parlementaire européenne*, composed of parliamentarians, pacifists, and other public men, which would discuss arbitration treaties as well as disarmament. A special committee was formed at Paris with this object, and many French deputies and senators promised their aid. The committee began a correspondence with Fischhof, with whose intentions it had previously been aware⁹⁸.

The idea evolved independently in yet another brain. In April, 1876, there arrived in Vienna with a similar plan the picturesque figure of the Spanish politician, Don Arturo de Marcoartu - "Don Quixote in a sleeping frock", *Kladderadatsch* called him⁹⁹. Marcoartu had constructed a scheme for an official international parliament which would codify international law and elect a High Court of Arbitration. But he saw no immediate prospect of its being put into practice, and so he proposed unofficial congresses of deputies as preliminaries. These were to discuss questions of international law, arbitration, and disarmament. At a meeting in Rome in March, 1876, Italian deputies had given Marcoartu encouragement, and now Fischhof's followers in Vienna gathered to hear his ideas. They found them good, and a committee was formed to plan the congress. Fischhof's original plan was altered to meet the suggestions of Marcoartu, and perhaps of Lemonnier's *Ligue*. For the congress was scheduled for 1878 in Paris, not Vienna, and the discussion was not to be limited to disarmament¹⁰⁰.

Preparations were progressing when the Russo-Turkish crisis and the advance of the Russian arms made all peace agitation impossible in Austria. The congress of 1878 turned out to be strictly a pacifist congress. The foreign peace men were anxious that the Austrians at least organize a peace society, and a committee was actually created for this purpose in 1879, headed by Dr. Beer and Walterskirchen. But the prevailing mood in Vienna prevented its formation. In 1880 the *Neue Freie Presse* took up the old idea once more. It maintained that Fischhof himself now believed disarmament unlikely, and it talked of a parliamentary conference to discuss

⁹⁷ *Bulletin* (February, 1876), p.261.

⁹⁸ *Assemblées de la Ligue... 1876, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.25-27; *Assemblées de la Ligue...1877, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.83-86.

⁹⁹ Hetzel, *op. cit.*, pp.249-250.

¹⁰⁰ Marcoartu: *Internationalism* (London, 1876), pp.17-19; *Congrès International des Sociétés des Amis de la Paix... 1878* (Paris, 1880), pp.116; *H.P.* (June, 1876), XV. 90-91; *E.-U.*(June 1,1876); Charmatz, *op. cit.*, pp.417-418.

other social, political, and economic questions. Lemonnier was much in favor of the plan, but nothing came of it¹⁰¹.

Despite the defection of Fischhof, disarmament was very much in the air at the end of the seventies. Lemonnier even suggested that the peace societies call a congress to discuss the matter, although he and his friends had a continual quarrel with the disarmament advocates on principle. The war scare of 1878 called forth many workers' demonstrations for peace in Italy, especially in Milan, where Moneta, editor of the *Secolo*, was wielding a powerful influence in favor of the gradual abolition of the standing army and the creation of a *nazione armata*. In 1879 a large assembly was held in Naples, at which Fischhof's ideas were vociferously applauded. On June 15, 1880, Henry Richard introduced a motion in the House of Commons providing that Great Britain open negotiations leading toward a general disarmament. Gladstone agreed in spirit, but he accepted the motion only when it was amended to permit the Government to choose its own time, and it was then carried¹⁰².

Persistent rumors had it that Bismarck himself was about to call a disarmament conference. They were totally unfounded. In March, 1879, Bühler, deputy from Wurtemberg, brought in a resolution in the Reichstag proposing that Bismarck take such a step. He defended his proposition in an able speech from any charge of Utopianism, and he had the support of the progressive elements and of the Catholic Center, but the vote went against him. Undaunted, Bühler made a personal appeal to the Chancellor, and this is the reply Bismarck sent him:

Only when you will have succeeded in winning our neighbors for your plans, only then could I or any other Chancellor assume the responsibility toward our ever defensive fatherland for such an attempt. Even then I fear that the reciprocal control of the nations over the state of armaments of their neighbors would still be difficult and that it would be difficult to create an agency to administer it effectively.

Bühler wrote to other statesmen proposing disarmament, and when Gambetta did not bother to respond, the German deputy concluded: "No answer is an answer". He could not know that it was Gambetta who requested Crispi in 1877 to broach the subject of disarmament to Bismarck. The Chancellor told Crispi that the whole matter had been gone into before 1870 with Napoleon III and that it had been proved "beyond a doubt" that the technical difficulties made disarmament impossible. He spoke of the difference in the types of military institutions in the various States, and

¹⁰¹ Charmatz, *op. cit.*, p.419; *H.P.* (July, 1877), XV. 265, (June, 1879), XVI. 261-262, (January, 1880), XVII. 10-11; *E.-U.* (July 24, 1879), (February 5, 1880).

¹⁰² *E.-U.* (March 11, June 14, 21, 1880); *H.P.* (Nov., 1879), XVI. 329-330, (July, 1880), XVII. 89-100, 102-103; Miall: *Richard*, p.321.

how, even after a disarmament it could not be determined whether conditions of offense and defense were equal. Bismarck concluded: "Let us leave this question to the Society of the Friends of Peace"¹⁰³

The year 1878 was a landmark in the history of the young peace movement. It witnessed the first international peace congress since those of the middle of the century. The pacifists were still weak and divided, but they were on their way. Already in 1875 Lemonnier discerned the coming into being of a real international movement. Each group sought peace in its own way, yet "these divergences only make appear all the clearer by contrast the reality, the formation, the existence, and tomorrow the action, of a European Peace Party"¹⁰⁴. The measure of disagreement and the measure of concord in the international movement were both illustrated by the attitude of the pacifists toward the Congress of Berlin of 1878. Lemonnier fulminated against the diplomats and declared the Congress to be incompetent to decide the Eastern Question for all Europe¹⁰⁵. On the other hand, Henry Richard sponsored a joint deputation of the friends of peace to ask favors of the statesmen at Berlin. He drew up a petition to Bismarck, which requested that a clause be placed in the new treaties providing for arbitration of all differences arising under them. It was signed by Pease, Richard, and Leone Levi of the London Peace Society; Passy, Franck, and Bellaire on the part of the *Société des Amis de la Paix*; van Eck and Belinfante from the *Nederlandsche Vredebond*; and Mancini and Couvreur. It was the first international manifesto of the peace men since the war which was of any consequence. Richard, Levi, and Passy presented the address at Berlin. They were received cordially by Corti, Lord Odo Russell, and Bülow, and Bülow took leave of them with the words: "May God bless you in your work". But the diplomats were opposed to any sort of obligatory arbitration, and the pacifist memorial received no more consideration than the other humanitarian petitions sent to Berlin, such as the pleas for free trade, religious liberty, and abolition of slavery¹⁰⁶.

The initiative for the peace congress in 1878 came from the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté*. When the original plans to include deputies and other men of affairs fell through, their Paris Committee, collaborating with members of the *Société des Amis de la Paix*, sent out invitations to all the sister societies. Fifteen responded favorably, and on their collective request, the French Government authorized the holding of a peace congress during the World Fair of

¹⁰³ E.-U. (March 13, 20, 1879); Wehberg: *Rüstungen*, pp.52-59; *Conférence Internationale... 1882: Procès-Verbal* (London, 1883), p.60; *Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Ed. by T. Palamenghi-Crispi (3 vols., London, 1912-1914), II. 36-37.

¹⁰⁴ E.-U. (Sept. 23, 1875).

¹⁰⁵ *Assemblées ... 1878, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.36-37, 43-45.

¹⁰⁶ Miall: *Richard*, pp.294-300; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.73-74; *H.P.* (August, 1878), XVI. 110-112.

1878. The last few years had been years of wars and rumors of wars; consequently the peace societies were enjoying relative prosperity. Even the Paris *Société* was gaining new members, and the *Ligue*, with fortunes improving, undertook a series of very successful public lectures at Paris and distributed its literature at the Exposition. The fifteen peace societies listed constituted all the organized peace forces of the time. Several appear to have been phantom groups. Such was the Austrian Parliamentary Committee, and such were several Italian associations on the list, which represented the recent anti-war agitation in the peninsula and which were soon to disappear. More permanent were the *Lega di Libertà, Fratellanza e Pace* of Milan and the masonic *Associazione Cosmico-Umanitaria* of Rome. Five of the societies represented were English: the Peace Society, with its Ladies Auxiliary and its Lancashire and Yorkshire Branch; the Peace Society of Liverpool, a group which was independent but which received its inspiration from the same sources as the Peace Society of London; and the Workmen's Peace Association. Two American organizations were recorded: the old American Peace Society, and the Universal Peace Union. These, as well as the Swedish Peace Society, also listed, sent no delegates to Paris. The other three societies were the *Ligue*, the *Société* of Paris, and the *Nederlandsche Vredesbond*. Such was the extent of the organized peace movement in 1878¹⁰⁷.

One hundred and fifty persons from twelve countries adhered to the congress. Only ten nations were actually represented at the assembly, and the attendance was small and preponderantly French. A preparatory meeting of the leaders settled the agenda and the rules of procedure and provided for a succession of presiding officers, so that all the outstanding pacifists should have a turn. This took care of Pease, Richard, Lemonnier, Dollfus, Franck, Garnier, van Eck, and Couvreur. These were wise moves, and when the congress began its sessions on September 26, the business was attended to with a measure of despatch. Politics was ruled out, and this helped make possible a general impression of harmony and concord. Occasional trouble-makers arose, but they were speedily hushed. As in the earlier congresses, speakers were prone to stray from the point and to utter moving protests against war. If they were notables, they were allowed to ramble on to their heart's content; if not, they were speedily called to order. The chairmen saw to it that the prepared resolutions were all passed. With the exception of Marcoartu and the Marquis de Pepoli, Murat's grandson who was representing the Italians, the foreigners took little part in the debate.

¹⁰⁷ E.-U. (May 11, 25, 1876); *Assemblées ... 1878, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.10-17, 28-29, 54-61; *Congrès International*, pp.1-2.

The watchword of the congress was "Let us be practical". It was in the name of practicality that Thiaudiere presented a memorandum on an international parliament, which was the development of the proposal he had made in 1876. If the legislatures refused to delegate representatives, then an unofficial congress of deputies to meet annually should be formed through the efforts of the pacifists. Marcoartu also advanced his favorite ideas on the subject. But it remained for Alexander Laya, a Swiss professor, to make the demand that the pacifists immediately leave the land of dreams by convoking for the very next year a true parliament, elected by all the peoples. Laya was eloquent, and the assembly was moved. Richard hurriedly passed a note to Passy, who had risen from a sick-bed to attend the sessions. It ran something like this: "For mercy's sake, fight that proposal. We shall cover ourselves with ridicule before the whole world". And Passy was equal to the occasion. Stressing the necessity of going slowly, he buried Laya's proposition beneath a flood of oratory, and the peace movement was saved¹⁰⁸.

The resolutions passed were those which had been decided upon in the preliminary council, where the debate was actually more lively than in the congress. The resolutions drawn up by Garnier served as a basis for discussion and were substantially those later adopted. His condemnation of war sanctioned defensive warfare and had to be rephrased at Richard's insistence, although the final solution was still ambiguous: "That offensive war is an international brigandage". The resolutions which Lemonnier introduced were all discarded save for a general approval of his plan for permanent arbitration treaties. Such principles as the inalienable right of self-determination, as well as the declaration that peace could come only through a federation of free peoples, met with no sympathy among the more conservative pacifists. It was Richard's influence in particular which served to throw out an endorsement of the use of force in the service of law. In the later congress Bellaire's attempt to introduce a discussion of sanctions of arbitral awards was blocked. The other resolutions paid the usual tribute to arbitration and disarmament. Codification was not very conspicuous. Then there were resolutions condemning intervention in the internal affairs of a civilized state, advocating an international convention to guarantee freedom of conscience, endorsing free trade, and assigning the task to education, the press, and religious preaching to combat "international hatreds and the glorification of conquest". The nearest which the congress got to politics was when, under the influence of the French, it declared that territory cannot be annexed without the consent of the inhabitants. The hallowed precept was once again laid down, the basis of much pacifist thinking about international relations, "that the same principles of justice and humanity which the

¹⁰⁸ *Congrès International*, pp.106-119. Passy was fond of repeating this incident as proof that pacifists are practical men. Cf. Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.76-78; *R.P.* (1905), X. 12-16, (1908), XIII. 75-76.

universal ethic has consecrated for private relations must be applied to international relations". The last of the seventeen resolutions declared for a universal federation of peace societies¹⁰⁹.

It was especially the Dutch who were pushing for this union of peace organizations, for they had long been aware of the impotence of a single society¹¹⁰. To many of the other friends of peace, federation appeared crucial at the time. Yet Lemonnier strongly opposed it. He had looked upon the congress as a mere "get-together" of the pacifists and had anticipated no unanimous votes. When he refused federation at the congress, he gave the excuse that he had no instructions to commit the *Ligue* to such a project, but the fact was that Lemonnier was too much convinced of the difference of his *Ligue* from the rest of the societies even to be willing to consider such a close alliance. The Paris *Société* had retained its suspicions of the Leaguers all along and in the *Bulletin* the program of the *Ligue* was referred to as "no longer either a program or a program of liberty"¹¹¹. At the peace assembly Lemonnier condescendingly told the other delegates that while the *Ligue* would aid the efforts for arbitration, he and his friends realized how impracticable arbitration was in the long run, just as long as there was not in Europe "a great political and social evolution". Lemonnier liked to call his *Ligue* the Left Wing of the peace movement. The conservatives willingly accepted the classification and announced that they were striving not for peace through liberty, but for liberty through peace¹¹².

Not only did the other delegates disapprove of Lemonnier's principles, but they seemed to regard his uncompromising stand upon the *Ligue's* doctrines as sheer unreasonableness. More as a rebuke to Lemonnier than for any other reason, they refused to consider his substitute proposal for an international peace bureau and went ahead to vote for federation. They did not bother to examine the question, and they had no idea just what such a firm bond would mean. In the closing session both Franck and Richard went out of their way to cast slurs upon the *Ligue*, forgetting all about the "principles of justice and humanity" which were supposed to regulate private relations. But in the sequel the *Ligue* had its satisfaction. When its Central Committee later received the statutes of the federation from the Paris organizing committee, it naturally refused to adhere, quite properly pointing out that the other societies disagreed with the principle which was the *Ligue's* very *raison d'être*. But then it turned out that the London Peace Society itself, which had been strong for the idea at first, refused to federate, and in backing out it used the same arguments as had

¹⁰⁹ *Congrès International*, pp.153-155, 123, 127; *Assemblées ... 1878, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.30-32.

¹¹⁰ *Bulletin* (April, 1872), pp.21-23.

¹¹¹ *Bulletin* (June, 1872), p.7.

¹¹² *Congrès International*, pp.66-71; *E.-U.* (Sept.26, Oct. 3, 1878); *Jaarboekje van het Nederlandsche Vredesbond...1879*, pp.44-45.

Lemonnier: that the peace movement was not yet well enough developed for federation; and especially that the rest of the societies were not in agreement with its own principles. In fact, few favorable responses were received by the organizers. The Dutch kept prodding the French committee to continue its efforts, but all to no avail. The federation voted at the Congress of 1878 never saw the light of day¹¹³.

The world paid scarcely any attention to the international peace congress of 1878¹¹⁴. As Franck prophesied, the public continued to regard peace congresses "with a certain benevolence which tends perhaps more to curiosity than to belief, and which is not completely free from irony". And this was "because it does not believe that Peace Congresses are efficacious, or even that they are useful. It is inclined to counsel the honest folk whom it sees in the congresses to make a better use of their time and their activity"¹¹⁵.

¹¹³ *Congrès International*, pp.29-31, 144-148; *E.-U.* (October 10, 1878; February 20, June 12, 1879); *Assemblées ... 1878*, *Bulletin Officiel*, pp.22-28; *Bulletin* (second semester, 1880), p.36; *Jaarboekje ... 1880*, pp.32, 43-47. Cf. the account of the congress by Belinfante in *Jaarboekje...1879*, pp.38-111.

¹¹⁴ *E.-U.* (December 19, 1878).

¹¹⁵ *Congrès International*, p.14.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MOVEMENT

THE ADVANCE IN THE EIGHTIES

The 1880's marked the final abandonment by the Great Powers of free-trade policies, with their overtones, however faint at times, of peace, and the turn to protection and imperialism. It was in this decade that the great race for colonies began. In 1881, for example, France sent an expedition to Tunis, and the work of Jules Ferry as the architect of France's new colonial empire had begun. The year 1882 was when the *Kolonialverein* was founded and the agitation for colonies begun in Germany. In 1883 appeared Sir John Seeley's epoch-making *Expansion of England*, which helped rouse Englishmen from their Manchester apathy to a "healthy consciousness" of the importance of the Empire. The European Powers started out upon vigorous policies of imperialistic aggression which meant the progressive extension of European rule over the "backward" peoples of the world. Whatever were the economic forces at work, the struggle for colonies fitted nicely in the old pattern of power politics, and the new economic appraisal of conquered lands only added to the stake of the game.

Colonial warfare became a common occurrence, while at the same time clashes between the policies of the Great Powers became more frequent. There developed an atmosphere of conflict in which war appeared as all the more inevitable. After an incident in far-off Afghanistan had brought England and Russia close to war in 1885, Bright talked to Chamberlain, who was later to be one of the chief exponents of the new imperialistic trend, and then noted in his diary that he had "no confidence in politicians, however liberal their profession, who regard war as one of the common accidents of political life, and consider bloodshed, if under the name of War, as not especially guilty"¹.

As the biological theories of Darwin, then so much in vogue, came to be applied to international relations, attitudes toward war such as Chamberlain's took on the divine sanctions of science. Struggle was accepted as the keynote of all existence, and nations and races, just as individuals, were held to be engaged in eternal conflict which only the fittest would survive. This "Social Darwinism" acted in the same way as the realistic conception of power relationships to remove international politics from the sphere of morality. In Germany the Darwinian theories were used to buttress the

current philosophical notions of the State as not amenable to ethical judgment; in England they served as a basis for scientific defense of imperialism. All over Europe they came to be held in ever-increasing circles and to act as a barrier to the advance of the pacifist ideals².

The air of tension meant steadily growing armament bills. The first duty of the State was to look out for its security, and in a world of mutual suspicion each State could only put its trust in cannons and keep its powder dry. It was only natural that the intensification of the undeclared war in Europe should stimulate anti-war efforts. The eighties saw the spread of the peace campaign to many countries, and by the end of the decade the first steps in the international organization of the peace movement had been made.

The venerable Peace Society of London was incapable of providing the leadership for the growing movement. In the first place, the Peace Society had the name of being a peace-at-any-price society. Richard was kept busy coming forward to deny this allegation and the first time that a representative of the Peace Society gained access to the pages of one of the high-class magazines for a discussion of the peace problem, he used his opportunity to defend the Peace Party against this most common charge. While on the one hand, Disraeli and the Conservatives inveighed against "the deleterious doctrine of the Peace-at-any-price party", the Liberals, on the other, were always careful to preface their pleas for Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform by the solemn announcement that they were not peace-at-any-price men³.

The mistake arose because the Peace Society was something of a cross between a missionary society and a politico-humanitarian organization. Its members attacked war as unjust, as great folly, and as bad business, and they opposed each individual war solely on grounds of expediency. But no matter what were the reasons they advanced against war, everybody recognized that the pacifists of the Peace Society were motivated by their religious belief that war was wrong. It was true that the Peace Society solicited the cooperation of all friends of peace, whether they acted from a sense of Christian duty or not, but every member of the Executive Committee had to subscribe to the principle that "war is inconsistent with the Spirit of Christianity and the true interests of mankind". When a demand arose within the society for a flat declaration that the members were not necessarily committed to the religious principle, Henry Richard and the other elders would not hear of it⁴.

¹ Mills: *Bright*, II. 283-284.

² Cf. William L. Langer: *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (2 vols., N.Y., 1935), I. 85-93 and references.

³ *H.P.* (October, 1882), pp.124-125, (July, 1883), p.254, (November, 1885), p. 304; Wm. Pollard: "The Peace-At-Any-Price Party", extract from *Fraser's Magazine* (October, 1880).

⁴ *H.P.* (June, 1881), pp.237-238.

The stern Puritans of the Peace Society knew no compromise when applying the rules of their faith; this attitude was reflected in the manner with which they were inclined to deal with those who differed from them. While pacifists were rarely entirely free from the tendency to treat the opposition with a certain air of impatience and intolerance, the Peace Society was one of the worst offenders in this respect. It was held in the *Herald of Peace* that there could be no discussion of first principles. War was obviously an evil, a great blot on humanity's escutcheon, and anyone who would not admit that was put down as a knave or a blockhead. Why, Henry Richard would ask, how could any sensible person justify the war system in the face of the futile armament race alone? A friendly critic complained to Richard, "We are apt to snuff all discussion by an allusion to the inherent superiority of our principles, and to stop our dissentients' mouths by an appeal to the sybilic oracles of ancient prophecy"⁵.

When the witty Scottish Radical, Sir Wilfred Lawson, spoke before the House of Commons on his motion for a reduction of the army, he said that he did not put the motion on the ground that war was wrong. He knew that belief had been held by the early Christians, but then, he naively added: "I am not addressing an assembly of early Christians"⁶. Too often the Peace Society wasted its time by speaking to the statesmen as if they were early Christians. And they were convinced that, as John Bright once put it, "the moral law was not written for men alone in their individual character, but it was written as well for nations, and for nations as great as this of which we are citizens. If nations reject and deride that moral law, there is a penalty which will inevitably follow"⁷. But there was no "hell fire" for nations and the Christian ethic actually had little place in international politics. Once Lord Kimberley answered a Peace Society deputation at the Colonial Office with the following words: "The last speaker appealed to the rules of Christian morality. I hope I felt myself as much bound by these as any other gentleman in this room; but unfortunately this question, like so many other political questions, cannot be determined solely and simply by rules of that kind"⁸.

When they demanded that the government adopt arbitration, it was not only because it was just and practicable policy, but because it was the ethical thing for the Government to do. And there was the same moral flavor to their advocacy of disarmament: a State taking the initiative for a general disarmament would win glory in the eyes of God and man. In general, as the pacifists of the Peace Society pictured them, the duties of States were passive. They desired to encourage in England a sense

⁵ *H.P.* (August, 1880), XVII. 110.

⁶ Geo. H. Dyer: "Sir Wilfred Lawson", in *Six Men of the People* (London, 1882), pp.12-13.

⁷ Geo. Macaulay Trevelyan: *Life of John Bright* (Boston, 1913), p.275.

of moral obligation toward other States, yet this was to be an obligation to do nothing. In company with the Manchester politicians they urged a policy of strict non-intervention. In certain respects their conception of international politics seems to be an application of the *laissez faire* doctrine to the relations between nations. Nations were regarded as units between which a predetermined harmony prevailed, and their interests, generally conceived in economic terms, were complementary. There was to be no interference in the internal affairs of another State. Each nation, being allowed to go its own way, would follow the dictates of the moral law, if only its citizens were sufficiently enlightened. Perhaps there was some notion that nations were fundamentally good which lay beneath the constantly expressed hope of the pacifists that if Great Britain would only take the lead in disarmament or arbitration, the other nations would surely follow. As international morality meant national self-interest, there was no need of any international agency to keep the peace. International consciousness with this school was represented by a sense of moral and economic solidarity among the nations, and it is notable that its members rarely bothered about schemes for international organization.

The members of the Peace Society, while most of them did so in their hearts, refrained from publicly drawing the consequences of their advocacy of strict non-intervention, but their opponents did it for them. "Peace principles", observed the *Times*, "are objectionable only when they mean, as in practice they have been known to mean, teaching the lamb to resign itself to being eaten"⁹. In replying to a deputation favoring neutrality, Lord Derby pointed out that "an absolute declaration of non-intervention under all circumstances is a declaration of international anarchy..."¹⁰.

Non-intervention had been a cardinal doctrine of the Liberals, and the tradition lasted long enough to help keep England out of continental wars in 1870-71 and 1877-78. But there were Liberals and Liberals. To those of the Mazzinian persuasion, non-intervention was absolutely immoral, for it meant shirking the duty to struggle against evil and fight for the triumph of good. Gladstone himself, although a strong peace man, understood moral duty to mean action, not inaction. Ties of all sorts with the Continent were increasing every day, the insular frame of mind was fast disappearing, and the demand was growing on every side that England should play a fitting role in the affairs of Europe. "We are no simple Peace Society", Frederic Harrison told the Positivist Society in 1880, "without a policy, appealing to mere repugnance to bloodshed and waste. Our policy has been an active one, a policy of effective

⁸ *H.P.* (February, 1881), p.179.

⁹ July 28, 1887, International Law Association newscuttings.

maintenance of peace. We have asked ... that England should play a great part and speak with authority in the councils of Europe"¹¹.

Thus the Peace Society failed to win any great influence over public opinion, although it continued to draw support from the non-conformist sources from whence it had sprung. The *Herald of Peace* reached about three thousand subscribers but it made no converts. The yearly income of the society ranged between ten thousand and fifteen thousand dollars, which was very little compared to the revenues of the great missionary societies. The Church Missionary Society, for example, took in annually over a million dollars, and three other important organizations to convert the infidels received sums of over half a million dollars each¹². The activities of the mother society and the various auxiliaries remained the same as they had for half a century; meetings were held, debates sponsored, tracts disseminated, religious organizations propagandized, appeals issued, and deputations to the government promoted¹³.

The presence of the secretary, Henry Richard, in the House of Commons helped to focus the society's attention upon political action. Richard was a Welsh Congregationalist clergyman, short, stocky, and very prosaic in appearance, but inside there burned the zeal of the crusader. Peace was to him "a cause which, in my innermost conviction, I believe to be the cause of truth, reason, justice, and humanity, the cause of religion, and I will venture to say, the cause of God". As Secretary of the Peace Society, he was the leader of the organized peace movement in England for over forty years, and during the last two decades before his death in 1888 he was the spokesman for the peace forces in the Commons. His opponents recognized Richard's honesty and sincerity, but they had no high opinion of his mental powers. What they thought of him we may gather from the following comments from *Vanity Fair*, which accompanied Spy's caricature of the peace apostle as a very cross and stubborn old gentleman:

Regarding the Powers of Europe as being in the main good little children, he appears honestly to believe it possible that when the intention is formed to do unlawful acts and the strength to do them is felt, the intention can be changed otherwise than by armed resistance. This belief is the measure of Mr. Richard's political capacity and the motive of most of his public acts. He has been in Parliament for twelve years and

¹⁰ July 14, 1876, quoted in George C. Thompson: *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield 1875-1880* (2 vols., London, 1886), II. 348. Cf. also *ibid.*, I. 44-45.

¹¹ Harrison: *National and Social Problems*, p.247. Harrison was a firm friend of peace. In 1910 he could say, "For fifty years I have sought to make known what I hold to be the essential axioms of international morality". *Idem: Autobiographic Memoirs* (2 vols., London, 1911), II. 118.

¹² Figures in *Arbitrator* (October, 1880), no.105, pp.4-5. Like those given elsewhere in this work, these figures are only meant to be relative.

¹³ Annual Reports, 1880-1898, printed in *H.P.* each June.

during that time he has provoked many a smile among the persons who manage the affairs of the world.¹⁴

If the Peace Society was uninfluential, still more was this true of England's other prominent peace organization, the Workmen's Peace Association. When the laboring classes were endowed with the vote, the peace men had high hopes that they would prove a solid influence in favor of a pacific foreign policy, but to their dismay, the workers turned out to be good imperialists. Cremer's Association continued to do what was possible on a small annual income of not over two thousand dollars. As a national association, it remained a skeleton organization. One thousand agents were enrolled, most of them men of influence among their fellow workmen, but they were all laborers themselves, and they had neither the leisure nor the resources at their disposal to undertake any sort of effective campaign. In time of emergency, such as before Richard's motion of 1873 and during the war scare of 1878, Cremer showed what he could do when he had the money, but meanwhile he was constrained to carry on solely through his own efforts and his own sacrifices¹⁵.

Friends of peace hailed Gladstone's advent to power in 1880 as the beginning of a new era. In his campaign he had made Disraeli's spirited foreign policy one of the big issues, and now the pacifists confidently expected the dove of peace to be installed at the Foreign Office. Disillusionment was not long in coming, for Gladstone was soon swept along in the tide of empire. The first indication of what was in the offing was when the Liberal government continued the Conservative policy toward the Transvaal instead of reversing it. A Transvaal Independence Committee was formed in 1880 to support the cause of the Boers, and it cooperated with the Peace Society in organizing a deputation of protest to the Colonial Office¹⁶.

More important was the founding of another peace society, which was presided over by the contemplative spirit of Herbert Spencer. In his philosophical works Spencer had much to say on the superiority of the industrial stage of human development over the militaristic, and he had often spoken to his friends about the advisability of taking some sort of action to oppose policies of colonial aggression. In the summer of 1881 Frederic Harrison brought up the subject again, and a small group of men gathered at the home of Lord Hobhouse to discuss the alarming symptoms

¹⁴ Miall: *Richard*, p.351; *The Vanity Fair Album* (1800), XII, Statesmen, no.337; cf. press comments on Richard's death in *H.P.* (Sept., 1888), pp.111-115; and the sympathetic article by Passy in the series "Ceux qu'il faut honorer", in *P.D.* (1910), XX, 596-599.

¹⁵ Annual Reports, 1880-1890, printed in *Arbitrator*; on the hopes for the workers cf.: Thomas Burt: "Working Men and War" in *Fortnightly Review* (Dec., 1882), XXXVIII, 718-727.

¹⁶ *H.P.* (February 1, 1881), p.177; Dr. G. B. Clark: "The Origins of the International Arbitration and Peace Association", in *Concord* (November-December, 1914), XXXI, 131-132; there are several

they saw in the Zulu and Transvaal Wars, the Borneo annexation, and other expeditions. Besides Spencer and Harrison, there were John Morley, Dillwyn, Leone Levi, Canon Freemantle, and several others. The private meetings were continued, and it was finally decided to arrange a public assembly at which an Anti-Aggression League would be established. Spencer drew up the address explaining the nature of the new association; its general idea was that "while the doctrine of non-resistance, on which the Peace Society take their stand, is quite untenable, the doctrine of non-aggression is tenable". In descending from the ivory tower, Spencer was disregarding the resolutions which he had made for himself that he would take part in no public movement, but he felt that once the society was begun, enough anti-war sentiment would develop among the workers and the dissenters to keep it going¹⁷.

On February 22, 1882, the public meeting was held, with John Morley as chairman and many distinguished Liberal M.P.s and publicists present. The object was declared to be to oppose British aggression in colonial affairs. It was specifically stated that there was no hostility toward the Gladstone government: there was merely the intention to recall it to its duty. Morley explained that the purpose of the new Anti-Aggression League was to foster the education of all citizens in matters of foreign policy; to increase the influence of Parliament itself over international and foreign affairs, in particular over unruly British agents abroad; to qualify the doctrine that the government was pledged to use force in defense of every British subject, wherever he went; and to further the practice of international arbitration¹⁸.

As constituted in March, 1882, the Anti-Aggression League had thirty-six members of Parliament and forty other well-known men of affairs on its council. By June the government had assumed an aggressive attitude in the Egyptian Crisis, and the League was left with few besides Spencer, Lord Hobhouse, Harrison, and Lawson. The others refused to oppose Gladstone on a major issue. "Alas!" wrote Harrison later, "the Anti-Aggression League was hardly formed when it melted away under the poisonous solvent of the party system". The sequel was, he declared, that "from that day we have known that no member of the Liberal party, whether politician or publicist, could be counted on to resist unjust war and Imperial expansion"¹⁹. What was left of the council convened a large meeting at Memorial Hall on June 26. Trade Union representatives were especially invited, and Harrison delivered a stirring protest against any armed intervention in Egypt. But it was the swan song of the

publications of the Transvaal Independence Committee at the British Museum in *Tracts Relating to South Africa* (8154. e. 5).

¹⁷ Herbert Spencer: *Autobiography* (2 vols., N.Y., 1904), II. 443-447; Harrison: *Memoirs*, II. 121ff.

¹⁸ Anti-Aggression League Pamphlets, number 1, *Report of Inaugural Meeting* (London, 1882); *E.-U.* (July 22, 1882).

¹⁹ Harrison: *Memoirs*, II, 122-123.

League, and nothing more was heard from it. Harrison's judgment was severe, and he forgot the courageous action of certain Liberals during the Boer War, but the fact remains that it was the British guns at Alexandria which blasted away the last remnants of Manchester foreign policy²⁰.

These were difficult times for the older peace organizations. But both the Peace Society and the Workmen's Peace Association stood their ground. It was the Peace Society which raised the first note of protest against the government's policy when the fleet was sent out in June. The agitation was kept up, and in the Commons Richard refused to vote the "blood-money" for the support of the Egyptian campaign. Among the handful of members of the old Peace Party who voted with him were Lawson and Illingworth, members of the Peace Society, and Burt, president of the Workmen's Peace Association. Cremer also opposed the government's policy from the very beginning. He claimed that it was for the benefit of a small section of the British people, the bondholders, and they ought to pay for it themselves. Both societies sent out addresses, drew up memorials, and circulated pamphlets. Both were attacked by their former Liberal sympathizers, and lost much support. The Egyptian Question remained to plague the friends of peace for several years. In that time nearly one-half of the material in the *Herald of Peace* had to do with that one topic alone. In Parliament Richard, Lawson, and Illingworth continued to speak out and even to vote against the government, and in 1885 Richard could say about the Soudan expedition: "I believe, if I may be forgiven the egotism, that I have written and spoken more against this war than any man living"²¹.

The Anti-Aggression League had been formed with the specific aim of opposing British imperialistic policy. When the Gladstone government became committed to such a policy, the politicians who composed the League heeded the call of party rather than of conscience, and the League collapsed. In politics it seems as though the practicable good must take precedence over the absolute good. It is the task of the idealists to see to it that the quest for the absolute is not forgotten in the concern for the practical. It so happened that at the same time that the politicians of the Anti-Aggression League were failing, a group of idealists were laying the foundations for a peace society which was to endure.

In August, 1880, a manifesto was circulated among Liberal and humanitarian circles which began as follows:

²⁰ Harrison: *Problems*, pp.187-224; Anti-Aggression League Pamphlets: number 2, *The Egyptian Crisis* (London, 1882).

²¹ *H.P.* (June, 1883), p.235, (June, 1884), p.61ff, (April, June, 1885), pp.201-202, 235ff.; Miall: *Richard*, pp.340-341, 346-347; Appleton: *Richard*, pp.188, 191-192; *Arbitrator* (March, 1883), no.134, pp.3-4; (February, 1884), no.145, p.3.

In the belief that a large and influential section of public opinion in Great Britain and on the Continent of Europe, whilst unable to accept the abstract doctrine that all war is wrong, is favorable to an International movement with the object of uniting all Friends of Peace in the advocacy and support of measures of a practicable and generally approved character, we invite your cooperation in the establishment of such an International association.

The circular went on to designate the present moment as opportune because public policy and public opinion in Great Britain favored peace, and all that was needed was to secure the support of the Continent, while the armament burden was everywhere equally pressing, and relief could only come from a disarmament which would have to follow the adoption of the principle and practice of International Arbitration. Thus arbitration was the practicable method, and the keynote of the new organization was that it would be "international in its aims, operations, and organization". It was to be called The International Arbitration and Peace Association²².

The initiative for the founding of the new society seems to have been taken by Lewis Appleton, who had been formerly associated with the Peace Society, and who came as close to being a professional pacifist as was possible at that epoch. He became a highly paid officer of the new association, but he proceeded to run it deeply into debt, and his services were willingly dispensed with several years later. Appleton's experience was useful, but he could have done very little without the aid of such men as William Phillips, who drew up the original manifesto, and Hodgson Pratt, who became the very soul of the association²³.

Hodgson Pratt had been a functionary in India, and now he was a retired gentleman of means, who was devoting all his time to humanitarian reform. Born a Unitarian, he had come under the influence of Kingsley and Maurice, and his whole life bore testimony to his firm conviction that, as he expressed it, "the great secret of existence is never found except in wise labour for the benefit of one's fellow-men"²⁴. Pratt's first humanitarian services were performed in behalf of the cooperative movement and workers' education, and he long remained among the leaders in these causes. He had already had some experience with the peace movement when he came forward to help found the International Arbitration and Peace Association. He had cooperated intermittently with both the Workmen's Peace Association and the *Ligue*

²² International Arbitration and Peace Association: *First Annual Report* (London, 1882), pp.11-12.

²³ *Journal of the International Arbitration and Peace Association* (June, 1886), II. 64-65. Appleton did not refrain from a bitter attack on the Association, which did no one any good, least of all himself. He later organized the British and Foreign Arbitration Association, a shadowy group, but was shunned by the pacifists and his credentials were refused at the later peace congresses.

²⁴ J. J. Dent: *Hodgson Pratt, Reformer* (Manchester, 1932), p.19.

Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté. But now he took his place in the vanguard of the movement, and he became one of the great heroes of the pre-war peace crusade. Although Pratt was always frail of health, and in his later days almost blind - he used to say that he was too busy to have the eye operation which he needed - for the twenty-seven years from 1880 until his death he never once laid down the great task he had taken upon himself. Today Pratt is almost completely forgotten. He was disregarded by the Nobel Committee, and today his picture looks down from the wall in an out-of-the-way corner of the National Portrait Gallery in London, unnoticed by the passerby on his way to inspect the profiles of the captains and kings. Yet this retiring, diffident little man did more than any other person to make the peace movement truly international.

Instead of welcoming the new society, as he had the Workmen's Peace Association, Henry Richard adopted an attitude of embittered hostility toward the newcomers. He deeply resented what he regarded as an attempt to take the work of peace out of his own hands by others who thought that they were more competent. He vigorously denied that the Peace Society based its action upon the doctrine that all war was wrong, as the manifesto of the new association had implied. He pointed out that the Peace Society had been the first to preach arbitration, and he referred to its continental efforts as proof that there already existed the international movement which Pratt and his friends wanted to bring into life. In fact, Henry Richard went so far as to declare that there was neither need nor room for another peace organization in England²⁵. In all fairness to him, it must be admitted that sixty years is a long time for any institution to go without a rival, and furthermore, Richard and his committee were only too much aware of the slender resources at the disposal of the friends of peace, which would be diverted by a new organization. Yet neither can the narrow-mindedness and intolerance of the man be denied. Despite all the efforts of Pratt to patch up the difference, Richard continued the feud. In the pages of the *Herald of Peace*, where usually all the news of the peace movement was to be found, Richard observed a conspicuous silence with regard to the labors of Pratt, and not an appeal, not a communication from the new society was printed. The only indications of its existence were in the innuendoes which found their way into Richard's editorials. Peace came at last to the peace societies when in 1886 Richard formally healed the rift by appearing at an annual meeting of the Association to wish the young society God-speed²⁶.

The promoters of the International Arbitration and Peace Association had no desire to offend Henry Richard, whom they highly respected. So confident had they

²⁵ *H.P.* (October, 1880), XVII. 134.

²⁶ *H.P.* (November, 1885), p.304; *Journal* (November, 1885), I. 187-188, (May, 1886), II. 53.

been that they were on new ground that they had even invited Richard to become the president of the Association before it was founded²⁷. They compared their position with regard to the Peace Society with that of the Temperance Societies with regard to the total-abstainers²⁸. Again and again Pratt tried to win the cooperation of the Peace Society. In 1884 he even succeeded in getting delegates appointed from both organizations to discuss the question of union, but after several meetings he found that it was no use. The Peace Society refused to abandon the religious principle, which was its inspiration, while the Association had come into existence precisely because the religious character of the Peace Society made its appeal too limited²⁹.

Pratt's justification was rather complete. To the circular of August 16, 1880, over seventeen hundred adhesions were secured, most of them from Liberals, including those of several peers, thirty-nine M. P.s, forty-three magistrates, thirty-six ministers of the Church of England and other denominations, and a variety of mayors, municipal authorities, professors, bankers, and men of commerce. The Earl of Shaftesbury, whose support could be obtained for any philanthropic enterprise, was named president, and the other personages of mark, among whom were the Bishop of Durham, John Bright, Sir John Lubbock, T. J. Lawrence, Lord Hobhouse, and Philip Stanhope (later Lord Weardale), all were made vice-presidents. Over the protest of Spencer, who wanted the support for his Anti-Agression League, the Council of the expiring Transvaal Independence Committee voted to bequeath its money and offices to the new Association, and Dr. G. B. Clark, its secretary, became vice-chairman of the Executive Committee. Many prominent members of the Peace Society saw no inconsistency in taking part also in the work of the International Arbitration and Peace Association, but in general, it can be said that in the response to its original manifesto the Association won the support of a class of people who never would have joined the Peace Society. Pratt spoke later of doubling the number of active disciples of peace, and without too much exaggeration. Yet it must not be forgotten that these were the days of the first flush of the enthusiasm evoked by Gladstone's new government, and before the wave of imperialism swept the country³⁰.

From the outset the Association made clear its distinction from the Peace Society in its attitude toward the use of force. The members of the Peace Society used to say that they believed in the policeman, but not the soldier. The founders of

²⁷ *Journal* (November, 1885), I. 187-188.

²⁸ *First Annual Report*, pp.23, 26, 28-29.

²⁹ *Fourth Annual Report*, p.24; Dr. G. B. Clark: "Origins", *loc. cit.*, XXI. 131-132.

³⁰ *Journal* (November, 1885), I. 187-188; Clark, *loc. cit.*: Dr. Clark's memory is at error in one or two particulars. There was no falling off in the revenues of the Peace Society in the year 1880-1881 (*H.P.* (June, 1881), p.252). Later in the eighties there was a decline, but this was due rather to the economic depression and to the unpopularity of the Peace Society's stand in the Egyptian Question, than through any diversion of funds to the new society.

the Association declared, in supporting the action of the Concert of Europe against Turkey:

The Committee of this Association recognise the influence of moral force with calm deliberation; but as in Civil so in International Affairs, there are occasions in which physical force, or its potential exercise, may be absolutely necessary against a recalcitrant State, such as Turkey, which has so long defied the moral and international law of nations³¹.

From the point of view of the Peace Society this was bad enough, but what was worse was Pratt's avowal that he saw a guarantee for peace "in having military and naval forces strong enough to hold our own, and compel foreign nations to do us justice, if at any time their Governments think they can keep peace and power at home by going to war with us"³². To Henry Richard and his friends armaments were always a great burden, an indication of the folly of the war system, never a potential instrument for justice. The Arbitration Association was always consistent in regarding disarmament as a consequence, and Pratt was too much of a realist to join what he termed the "futile" protest against England's mounting war budgets. He later declared that it was nonsense to suppose that there was no hostility toward Great Britain on the Continent. He felt that it was perfectly natural that it should be so, for Great Britain had been first in the colonial field and had grabbed the markets before the others could get them, and now others wanted them. "Moreover, these successes have filled us with arrogance and the assumption of seniority, even of a right to be supreme. In addition, Britishers pretend to be more honest, more Christian, and more capable than all others, and do not hesitate to boast of these virtues wherever they go"³³. All this was eminently wise. Few Englishmen diagnosed the causes of Anglophobia with as much justice as Pratt, while most of the English pacifists were inclined to deny its existence altogether.

The founders of the Arbitration Association had a grandiose scheme of a great international federation of peace societies for the prevention of war. In peace time the societies were to strive to dispel the national prejudices and on the beginning of a dispute between two countries, each national association would draw up a statement of facts relating to it and then send delegates to a joint meeting which would issue a declaration of the rights and wrongs in the case. This would be published and communicated to the governments, and the rest would be left to an enlightened public opinion³⁴.

³¹ *First Annual Report*, p.16.

³² *H.P.* (February, 1885), pp.173-174.

³³ *Concord* (February, 1895), X. 9-10.

³⁴ *First Annual Report*, pp.7-9.

Such a plan meant that the people would have to have a greater voice in the management of international relations. Indeed, nowhere before the Great War was there a more complete expression of the demand for democratic control of foreign affairs as a means of prevention of war than in the literature of the Arbitration Association. Richard and later Cremer represented the opinion in Parliament³⁵. In 1894 the Annual Report of the Association recorded that "this Association has, during the fourteen years of its existence, declared that there will be no remedy until the citizens of every country take the management of foreign affairs into their own hands, and abandon implicit reliance on Secret Diplomacy". Elsewhere the Association declared: "The control over declarations of war by every people is a fundamental principle to be achieved, and they can never exercise that control unless they know all the facts in any case of dispute, before it is too late"³⁶. It was the declared object of the Association to "undertake the special duty of correcting misstatements made in the public press, or by public men, regarding matters of international interest, which are calculated to provoke international suspicion, jealousy, or misapprehension". When the federation failed to materialize, Pratt tried to make of the existing peace societies similar centers of information to clear up international misunderstandings, but he was never successful, nor did his later plan of setting up in every capital a "Council of International Concord" have any better luck. The project was practical and might have worked out very well, but the continental pacifists were too intent on avoiding any meddling with politics to try it³⁷.

The international activities of the Arbitration Association began soon after its foundation. In the autumn of 1881 Pratt spent six weeks in Paris attempting to form an association similar to his own. He found French politicians strongly opposed to anything of the sort. They told him that the feeling against war was already very strong and that the result would be to indispose the people to serve in the army and thus prevent any reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. Moreover, he was always meeting with the objection that it was in Germany he should begin, not France, but finally Pratt got a representative group together, most of them Protestants. A public meeting was held with the deputy Casimir-Périer presiding, and the *Comité International de l'Arbitrage et de la Paix* was founded in November, 1881³⁸.

The next step was to call an international conference to form the proposed federation. A committee of the Association was formed at Brussels, and twelve

³⁵ Miall: *Richard*, pp.352-353, 322-323; *H.P.* (May, 1881), pp.222-225, 228-233.

³⁶ *Sixth Annual Report*, p.17; *Eleventh Annual Report*, p.16; *Fourteenth Annual Report*, p.26.

³⁷ *First Annual Report*, pp.7-9; *Proceedings of the Universal Peace Congress, London, 1890*, pp.152-153; Hodgson Pratt: *Councils of International Concord. A Proposal to the Seventh Peace Congress*.

³⁸ *First Annual Report*, pp.25-26; *E.-U.* (November 26, 1881).

thousand five hundred circulars were sent out convoking a conference there for October, 1882. Almost four hundred answers were received; from France alone came one hundred letters of support, many of them from deputies. Some prominent men came to Brussels, including Dr. Lasker, a leader of the German National Liberals, de Laveleye, Marcoartu, Hyacinthe Loyson (formerly Père Hyacinthe), the Alsatian Tachard, General Türr of Hungary, and Godin, founder of the *Familistère* of Guise. The Egyptian Crisis had dampened the ardor of the English Liberals for peace societies, and Pratt had to do without the active support of his countrymen. Nor did many of the older pacifists make the trip to Brussels. Pratt himself had had no experience in handling congresses of this sort, and the whole affair went off badly. Pratt's excellent analytical program for discussion was forgotten, the proceedings were more or less haphazard, and a good deal of time was spent on reading of papers instead of in serious debate. The resolution in favor of federation was finally voted, as well as the proposal for a new congress the next year. A sophisticated journal like *The Saturday Review* cast an amused glance across the Channel and commented: "Many - perhaps most - Congresses have imagined vain things: but the Peace Congress or conference may with modest confidence challenge a pre-eminence in vanity"³⁹.

Richard noted that the influential pacifists on the Continent regarded "a recent meeting" there as a fiasco⁴⁰. Apparently so they did, for the next conference, which Pratt held in Berne in August, 1884, attracted no more than seventy persons. Federation was once more resolved upon, and circulars were sent out for a meeting at Basle in September, 1885, which was to frame the constitution of the grand federation of Peace and Arbitration Associations. The meeting was held, but interest was lax, and no other Peace and Arbitration Associations had been formed to federate with the English. Pratt could see that if he wanted a federation of peace societies, he would have to found societies on the Continent himself⁴¹.

At home Pratt was handicapped by financial worries. The yearly income of the society reached its high point in the first few years at a figure of about \$5,000, less than half of the Peace Society, but it dropped off steadily until \$2,500 was the usual annual intake. The expenses kept mounting, and had not Andrew Carnegie happened to attend the annual meeting of 1895 and written off the whole debt with a check of \$3,000, the Association would have gone bankrupt. As it was, the debt soon began to grow again. These figures indicate the cooling of the first enthusiasms. Many of the

³⁹ *Procès-Verbal de la Conférence Internationale, Brussels, 1882* (London, 1883); *Saturday Review* (October 21, 1882), LI. 531-532.

⁴⁰ *H.P.* (June, 1884), pp.61, 62.

⁴¹ *E.-U.* (August 9, 1884); *Fourth Annual Report*, pp.13-14; *Fifth Annual Report*, p.12; *Journal* (1885), I. 172-173.

Liberal supporters fell away at the first impact of imperialism, and public opinion was becoming more and more impervious to ideals of internationalism. Had it not been for the extraordinary energy and devotion of Pratt, and the support given him by an intelligent and active little group on the Council, the young organization could hardly have managed to survive⁴².

When the Egyptian Question arose to embitter relations between France and England and made it highly desirable that a French peace society cooperate with the English Association and discuss the matter, Pratt was confronted with the fact that the *Comité* which he had founded in 1881 was no longer in existence. He went to Paris at the end of 1883 to establish another, but he found that anti-English sentiment was very strong, "even among Liberals and enlightened men". He was convinced that the only solution was to make the society a workmen's society⁴³. By that time the *Société des Travailleurs, Amis de la Paix* had already completed its life-span. This was the society formed after the Anglo-French labor demonstration of 1878. Its members had been moderate socialists and republicans who were under the influence of Lemonnier, although Desmoulins had been the author of the disarmament plank in the platform. After a bitter denunciation of England's intervention in Egypt, the society had come to grief on the rocks of France's own imperialist policy. It had broken up in 1883, chiefly because of a dispute over the French expedition to Tunis⁴⁴.

Pratt secured the aid of Malon, the prominent socialist journalist, and it was he who suggested Brissac, a former Communeard, for the post of secretary of the proposed workmen's society. Pratt engaged Brissac, and at the end of 1883 the provisional committee of the *Ligue des Travailleurs pour la Paix Internationale* came into being. It was predominantly socialist. A manifesto was issued declaring the society's aim to be the promotion of the idea of a European Republic and of international arbitration. Brissac continued to draw the salary which Pratt provided, but by 1885 the provisional committee had still not organized the society. Moreover, the socialist secretary refused to cooperate with the other French societies in sending an arbitration petition to the Chamber. He maintained that arbitration was effective only "sometimes", and he shared the distrust of other socialists for the Chamber of Deputies, which he called "odious and contemptible". After 1885 nothing more was heard from the *Ligue des Travailleurs*⁴⁵.

⁴² *Annual Reports, passim*.

⁴³ *Arbitrator* (January, 1884), no.144, pp.6-7.

⁴⁴ *E.-U.* (January 23, March 6, July 24, 1879), (July 29, August 12, 1882); *Arbitrator* (August, 1882), no.127, pp.4-5, (January, 1884), no.144, p.6.

⁴⁵ *Arbitrator* (January, February, 1884), no.144, pp.6-7, no.145, pp.7-8; *Third Report*, p.15; *Fourth Report*, pp.16-17; *E.-U.* (February 9, 1884), (August 1, 22, 1885); *Journal* (February, 1885), I. 72.

The reluctance of the French workers to join peace societies did not mean that they were opposed to the idea of peace. Godin, whose peace activities dated from 1884, formed in 1886 a peace organization among the workers of the *Familistère*, and by the next year over seven hundred members were enrolled⁴⁶. More important was the great Anglo-French workers' peace demonstration which Cremer organized in 1885, when French hostility toward England was at its height. Four thousand spectators, three thousand of them workers, applauded while the customary fraternal salutes were exchanged and approved the unusually strong English resolution: "On no account will the workers of the two countries fight against each other"⁴⁷.

In 1884 Pratt was able to create in Paris a peace society with a broader base. It was to be part of the federation which he was still planning, and he gave it the cumbersome title of *Le Comité de Paris de la Fédération Internationale de l'Arbitrage et de la Paix*. Desmoulins was secretary and Destrem, an eccentric newspaperman, became president. Advances were made to the *Société Française des Amis de la Paix* with an idea of fusion, but Passy was intent on retaining the independence of his own group. The *Comité* was never active, but it did give Pratt a chance to put into practice some of his plans for international cooperation between the peace societies. When in 1887, the French press was loud with complaints against the English and virulently Anglophobe, the English Arbitration Association and the Paris *Comité* exchanged numerous addresses and resolutions, endeavoring to clear the air. For example, when the rumor made headway in France that England had assured Bismarck of her neutrality even if Germany marched through Belgium, Pratt's Association made inquiries at the Foreign Office and reported back to the *Comité* that it could find no grounds for such an allegation⁴⁸.

The idea of scotching rumors which helped create international distrust was essentially sound, but Pratt never got the cooperation from other societies which he deserved. The peace societies had never formed the habit of working closely together. In 1885 when several of them were able to sign the same address, Lemonnier noted the phenomenon with enthusiasm. It was an appeal to the governments to avoid the Anglo-Russian conflict of that year by the neutralization of Afghanistan, and it was signed by officers of the Arbitration Association, the Paris *Comité*, Lemonnier's *Ligue*, and the *Ligue des Travailleurs pour la Paix Internationale*. The impetus came from Lemonnier who had begun to study neutralization in 1881, and who had come to believe that the extension of that principle could lay the foundation for the *juridiction internationale*. His *Ligue*

⁴⁶ *H.P.* (August 1, 1884), p.95, (April, 1887), p.208.

⁴⁷ *Arbitrator* (February-March, 1885), nos 157-158, pp.8-11; *E.-U.* (February 28, 1885); Evans: Cremer, pp.109-113; *idem: Political Fights*, pp.116-117.

advocated the neutralization of the future Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Scandinavian States, and the Congo, and in 1886 it sponsored an address from seven peace societies to the Great Powers, calling for the neutralization of Bulgaria. The Peace Society and Passy's Society refused to join the collective *démarches*. Richard thought that neutralization was no solution, while the French *Société* sent a separate address advocating arbitration rather than neutralization as a solution of the Afghan difficulty⁴⁹.

In France, as Pratt found, the way of the peacemakers was hard. More than a decade after *l'année terrible* Godin reported, "In France to speak of peace now would be to run the great risk of being called a poor citizen. Actually there are many people, who, not seeing to the bottom of things, consider the state of peace as a veritable abandonment of their rights .."⁵⁰ Pratt found this attitude especially characteristic of "the aristocratic and governing classes", while the working classes damned peace efforts by styling them "bourgeois"⁵¹. Desmoulins, an ardent peace man, owned that he continued to work with "only a faint hope of success", and he deplored such a state of affairs that "in France, in a country where everybody wishes peace and fears war, no one has the moral courage to aid us in our war on war"⁵².

The *Société Française des Amis de la Paix* enjoyed a brief spell of relative prosperity after the Peace Congress of 1878. It was authorized by the government, and names of six hundred persons adorned the membership rolls, with several hundred more listed as adherents. Actually only a dozen men of the executive council of thirty-six were really active, and their activity consisted in participation in the private study sessions continued through these years. Peace with them was rather an academic question than a fighting faith. Public meetings were still deemed inadvisable in view of the public mood, and the only public signs of life given by the society were the almanac which appeared in 1881 and several pale election manifestos. Funds were low, and the society was kept going only through the support of certain rich bankers and industrialists of the Cobdenite School, such as Jean Dollfus, Count Mazewski, Menier, de Gasté, and Chaix, the publisher, who printed the *Bulletin* which appeared at erratic intervals.

Members were recruited among the upper middle-classes and the intellectuals, not by public propaganda, but through the personal efforts of the officers. President

⁴⁸ *Bulletin* (Jan.-Feb., 1884), p.3; *Journal* (1887), III. 25-26, 48, 50-51, *passim*.

⁴⁹ *E.-U.* (May 13, 1882), (May 2, April 18, 1885), (Oct. 2, 1886); *Journal* (March, 1886), II. 35; *Bulletin* (May, July, 1885), pp.186-7, 196-206.

⁵⁰ *Conférence Internationale, 1882*, p.42.

⁵¹ *H.P.* (February, 1887), p.168.

⁵² *H.P.* (Aug., 1884), pp.91-92; Desmoulins to Bajer, Jan. 16, 1888. Bajer MSS.

Franck was especially adept at this technique. Yet despite all efforts, the society remained static for several years and then entered upon a decline. Passy, president after Franck, liked to blame it upon the economic depression, and there is no doubt that this played its part. But the truth was that the free-trade theories, from which the society drew its chief ideological sustenance, were yielding position after position to the advancing ideas of protectionism. There came a time when Passy himself, staunch free-trader and disciple of Bastiat that he was, became willing to compromise his old economic principles for the sake of his peace ideals and to deny the solidarity between the free-traders and the pacifists⁵³.

Arbitration remained the watchword. As Emile Beaussire, publicist and member of the *Institut*, declared at one of the meetings, "The friends of peace have only one principle in which they can put all their trust: it is arbitration. *L'arbitrage partout, l'arbitrage toujours, voilà notre devise*. Everything else, whatever its value, is subordinated to that single principle."⁵⁴ While agreeing that arbitration was the only path to follow, the members of the society never went into the matter exhaustively, as did Lemonnier. They talked about an international tribunal and a code of law, but they were not clear on the means by which these were to be established, and they were not at all sure about sanctions. The majority seemed to prefer moral sanctions, although they distrusted the governments and feared public opinion was not powerful enough yet. Franck followed the same reasoning as Lemonnier in seeing that in order for the tribunal's judgments to be sanctioned by force, a federation of states was necessary, but Franck declared such a federation to be a Utopia: "The United States of Europe, and much more so the United States of the whole world, is an absolute chimera"⁵⁵.

As a group the members of the society did not meet squarely the issue which arose from France's imperialist ventures in the early eighties. Lemonnier's *Ligue* roundly condemned Ferry's colonial policy,⁵⁶ and Passy, now a deputy, rose in the Chamber to demand arbitration. In the discussions in the society it was agreed that superior peoples have the duty "to bring law to lawless savages, and to open up the natural resources which they hold inaccessible". Certain of the members held the use of force to be justifiable in such cases; the majority voted that the civilizing mission should be exercised by peaceful means. But on the plea that politics was foreign to the society, no public protest was raised against the colonial expeditions. The only

⁵³ *Bulletin* (July, 1885), pp.207-208.

⁵⁴ *Bulletin* (July, 1885), pp.202-203, 205-206.

⁵⁵ *Bulletin* (August, 1882), p.84, (July, 1884), pp.69-83, (February, 1885), p.130, (July, 1885), pp.202-203.

⁵⁶ *Assemblées ... 1881, Bulletin Officiel*, Resolutions; Andrup to Bajer, Nov. 5, 1884. Bajer MSS.; Goyau: *L'Idée de Patrie*, pp.267-273.

action taken was the despatch of addresses to French and Italian editors to soothe the ruffled feelings which resulted from France's high-handed action in Tunis. By its silence the society acquiesced in the aggressive policies which netted the French colonial empire Tunis and Tongking. Imperialism had clashed with pacifism, and the outcome was significant⁵⁷.

In the later eighties fewer and fewer members came to the assemblies. Dr. Richet, one of the faithful, wrote later about them: "Our monthly meetings were not tumultuous, alas! for often there were only Frédéric Passy, Thiaudière, and myself"⁵⁸.

More than once the members were on the point of ending the society's labors altogether, but Passy and his few trusty friends were able to plead with the others to hold on, at least until the festival year 1889. They felt that it was their bounden duty to keep alive the sacred fire. In 1887, at the annual meeting, when the president was accustomed to recount the deeds of the year for the gratification of his auditors, all Passy could say was: "We have lived, and that is something"⁵⁹.

In the last months of 1888 Hodgson Pratt once again began his campaign to form at Paris one great peace society out of the existing associations, and this time the *Société Française des Amis de la Paix*, although it had held out in 1884, was unable to resist. A meeting of the French pacifists engineered by Pratt took place in December, 1888, at which it was decided to form one society out of Passy's organization and the Paris *Comite* of the English Arbitration Association. The new association, the *Société Française pour l'Arbitrage entre Nations*, was officially constituted on January 9, 1889. Its announced aim was: "to defend and to spread the principle of the independence of Nations and of International Justice, a principle whose practical sanction is found in the substitution for the violence of war of arbitration and all other conventional and legal ways". Pratt's influence was most apparent in the secondary aim, which was to cooperate with other societies, especially by spreading more exact information and dispelling international animosities. Passy was named president, Destrem and Siegfried were made vice presidents, Dr. Richet became secretary-general, and the forty persons who formed the council comprised practically all the active pacifists in Paris. Add a few members of the Paris section of Lemonnier's *Ligue*, the active members of Godin's workers' peace society at Guise, the small group of young men beginning peace work at Nîmes, the members of the *Groupe des Amis de la Paix* at Puy-de-Dôme, and several pacifists scattered here and

⁵⁷ *Bulletin* (Nov., 1881), p.146; (March, 1882), pp.18-21, (April-May, 1883), pp.188-190, (Jan.-Feb., 1884), pp.8-14.

⁵⁸ *P.D.* (December, 1930), XL. 479.

⁵⁹ *Bulletin* (June, 1886), pp.238-268; (May, 1887), p.295; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, p.69. [The date of the incident related here was February, 1887, not 1888.]

there in the departments, and the result would be the sum total of peace workers in France in 1889, a number probably not far exceeding one hundred⁶⁰.

The origins of the Nîmes peace society are to be found in the little English town of Wisbech, where the gentle Quakeress, Priscilla Hannah Peckover, was actively working for peace. Like others of her faith who are unswervingly loyal to the spirit of its founders, Miss Peckover's earthly mission was prescribed by the Bible. Through her great devotion to the cause of peace, her capacity to sympathize with and inspire other peace workers who differed from her fundamentally on principles, and through the liberal funds which she was able to put at their disposal, Miss Peckover became an important influence on the peace movement. In the seventies there was a change in the Book of Discipline of the Friends. Henceforth, to women as well as to men was to be put the question: "Are you faithful in bearing Christian testimony against war?" It was in order to be able to answer this question honorably that Miss Peckover entered the peace movement in 1879. She was shocked to find that there were only one hundred and twenty members of the Women's Auxiliary of the Peace Society, and she determined to win more of her sex for the cause. Adapting the technique which she had learned as a temperance reformer, she began to collect signatures to the declaration: "I believe all war to be contrary to the mind of Christ ... and am desirous to do what I can to further the cause of Peace". Starting with a house-to-house canvass, she soon obtained so many names, from men as well as from women, that a committee was formed and the Wisbech Local Peace Association was established. Her success among Free Church groups, such as the Friends, the Primitive Methodists, the Free Methodists, the Baptists, and the Congregationalists, was remarkable. In 1882, when the first annual meeting was held, there were eighteen hundred members, and the society was still growing. Its activity consisted chiefly in spreading the tracts of the Peace Society, arranging peace meetings, and soliciting more members⁶¹.

At one Miss Peckover's meetings a young French Protestant, Louis Barnier, was present, and his Christian conscience was so deeply moved that he returned to France determined to do something for the cause of peace. He entered into correspondence with Miss Peckover, who was astonished to find her influence spread abroad, and with her financial support Barnier and the pastor Cassignard began in 1885 to distribute peace tracts. When Barnier entered the lycée at Nîmes he made converts of a small group of serious young students, most of them Protestants, and on

⁶⁰ Lemonnier MSS. Notebook, Sept. 30, 1888. (Note on Pratt's proposal); Lemonnier to Julie Toussaint, Oct. 3, 1888; *Journal* (Jan., 1887), III. 4-5; *Concord* (Dec., 1888), III. 295; *L'Arbitre* (Feb., 1889), pp.211-215; *J. d. Econ.* (March, 1889), ser. 4, XLV. 447-450.

⁶¹ P.H. Peckover: *Incidents in the Rise and Progress of the Wisbech Peace Association* (Wisbech, 1906), pp.1-7, 14-17; *H.P.* (June, 1883), p.238, (February., 1885), p.173.

April 7, 1887, six of them signed the appeal which gave birth to the society *Les Jeunes Amis de la Paix*. The aim of these enthusiastic youngsters, all, save Barnier, still in their teens, was nothing less than the abolition of standing armies and the establishment of an arbitral tribunal. This they announced to the world in an address subsidized by Miss Peckover, who became the fairy godmother of the young society⁶².

It was no accident that the scene for these events was the old Roman town of Nîmes. Nîmes had long been a center of Christian reform, and it was there that the Rochdale cooperative experiment was being attempted in France. Before a fortnight had elapsed eighty young men had joined the new society, and there were fifty more by the end of the first month⁶³. But public opinion was not favorable. It was felt that adolescents had no business with such questions as peace and war, and that it was highly unpatriotic and even revolutionary for them to be talking about disarmament just at the time when they should be preparing to do their military service. The name, which had been chosen so as not to offend Passy's *Société des Amis de la Paix*, was scoffed at. "What you want, *Jeunes Amis de la Paix*", observed Paul Desjardins in the *Journal des Débats*, "is justice - is it not? - and not repose". Despite the support given the young men by the chiefs of the cooperative school, in particular by Gide, even the liberal bourgeoisie of Nîmes looked upon the venture with a suspicious and unfriendly eye⁶⁴.

Elder pacifists gave the youngsters encouragement, but they gave them advice as well. Passy pointed out that their first aim, disarmament, could be realized only as a result of their second, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal. When the unrestrained enthusiasm of the first hour wore off and the young men began to take stock of themselves and of the world, they realized that they had been, perhaps, a little too ambitious. First they changed their demand for abolition of standing armies to one for "simultaneous and progressive disarmament". Then, in an important meeting on October 24, 1890, they gave an entirely new turn to the statutes. Disarmament was dropped altogether, and even the plea for an arbitral tribunal was altered. More humble with the years, the *Jeunes Amis* began to feel that it was not for them to point out for the statesmen the path to follow. "Arbitration! that is the word which contains the key to the international problem; but we are only able to proclaim the principle, to study it, and make known the historical applications." It was up to the statesmen to

⁶² Peckover Album. Letters from Barnier and Cassignard; Peckover, *op.cit.*, pp. 8-10, 21-22; "Les Origines de la Paix par le Droit", articles by E. Roussel, Jacques Dumas, Henri Babut, and Jules Prudhommeaux, in *P.O.* (1928), XXXVIII. 10-15, 105-112, 168-175, 513-518; *H.P.* (May, 1889), pp.218-219. A facsimile of the original signed program is printed in *P.D.* (May, 1927), XXXVII. 428.

⁶³ Barnier to Bajer, April 18, May 6, 1887. Bajer MSS.

⁶⁴ "Origines", *loc. cit.*, XXXVIII. 106-107, 175; *Concord* (1889), IV. 132.

apply it in specific cases, as they thought best. So the slogan of the association became simply: "the substitution of arbitration for war in international relations". Similarly, the earlier intention - "to work by all methods for the establishment of universal and permanent peace" - seemed a bit Utopian. The special function of the society was now declared to be: "to popularize, by studying them, the legal solutions of international conflicts, and especially to win for that propaganda the activity of young people". So that the society's patriotism should not be doubted, it was specifically stated that the members accepted the moral obligation to submit to the military laws of their country. The society had not become what Barnier had anticipated. And there was no one to follow his example when, in 1889, he fled to voluntary exile in England rather than perform his military service⁶⁵.

The reunion of 1890 was important in other respects. It marked the break-up of the group at the lycée and the dispersal of its members all over France. The society had become national. A *Bulletin* was now begun to keep the scattered members informed of the progress of the work, and the committee kept in touch with one another through a circular letter which went the rounds of France every eighteen days. The young men of Nîmes were growing up, and so the age limit which had been set at twenty-five was raised to thirty and eventually removed altogether. The biggest success of the early years was the publication of the yearly *Almanach de la Paix*. In 1888 one of the *Jeunes Amis* wrote to Miss Peckover telling of the idea they had had of taking advantage of the exposition year by putting out an almanac on the style of the ones Passy had once published. All they needed was the money. What would Miss Peckover advise them to do?⁶⁶ Miss Peckover supplied the necessary funds, and the first *Almanach* appeared in 1889. It proved a grand success and the publication was repeated every year until 1913. First six thousand copies were issued, then ten thousand, and finally twenty thousand. Under the able editorship of Jacques Dumas, the almanacs were made attractive little brochures of about a hundred pages each, filled with cartoons and pictures, and containing contributions from all the eminent pacifists. Jules Simon wrote the prefaces until his death, Sorel and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu contributed, and even Gladstone was once asked for an article. After 1900 the *Almanach* lost some of its early enterprise. It was in its first years that it was most important for the peace movement; for then it was practically the only literary rendezvous of the pacifists of the different countries⁶⁷.

The leaders of the *Jeunes Amis* were no ordinary young men. Those of 1887, like Jules Prudhommeaux, still the secretary today, and Jacques Dumas, were

⁶⁵ *Bulletin Trimestriel* (1890), I.1-3; Peckover to Bajer, November 4, 27, December 17, 1889. Bajer MSS.

⁶⁶ Henri Babut to Peckover, June 19, 1888. Peckover Album.

talented, sincere, and devoted peace workers, and they were to be heard from in later years, while recruits of the nineties, like Charles Brunet and Théodore Ruysen, the present president, were also men of great promise. The membership continued to grow, and less hostility was encountered in the press. In 1892 the *Bulletin* became a review, and from January, 1893, it has borne the name, *La Paix par le Droit*, a happy phrase which gives the key to much of the history of the French peace movement. The sprightly contents of the new journal had all the vigor and freshness of youth symbolized by its green covers. More than once the editors slyly fostered disputes among the pacifists in its pages. It was maintained as a review rather than as a weapon of propaganda, and the columns were open to all. For years it was the best edited and most widely circulated of peace periodicals in French. In 1895 the society itself took the name, *l'Association de la Paix par le Droit*, by which it is still known.

Germany remained forbidden ground to the pacifists. Pitched in the center of Europe with both flanks exposed to the invader, a nation forged in the fires of war, Germany seemed to have sold her soul to militarism for national independence and a promise of security. Germans were always standing their watch on the Rhine, ever prepared for the war of defense. In no other country did militarism have so firm a hold. To talk disarmament was out of the question; the ideal of peace itself had little appeal to the ruling classes. They felt with Moltke that "eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, and war is a part of God's world order ... Without war the world would be swallowed up in materialism."⁶⁸

Dr. Lasker defended Germany at Pratt's conference of 1882 from the common charge that she was the most militaristic of nations, and he declared that Moltke's words were not representative of German public opinion⁶⁹. It was quite true that Moltke spoke for only a part of German public opinion, but it was a very influential part, and what has been called "the hypnotism of the defense" had all Germany in its spell. To the same congress Holtzendorff sent a letter admitting that the necessary terrain was lacking in his country for the development of peace associations, and explaining that this was due to the general feeling that the Germans had to be ready for a defensive war which was always possible⁷⁰. Similarly, Bühler explained to fellow peace workers abroad: "The German nation is, on the faith of old memories and sad experiences, dominated by the deep-rooted conviction that France is a dangerous neighbor"⁷¹.

⁶⁷ *Almanachs de la Paix*, 1889-1913, *passim*.

⁶⁸ This is the well-known letter to Bluntschli, quoted in Max Jähns: *Feldmarschall Moltke* (Berlin, 1884-1900), p.620.

⁶⁹ *Conférence Internationale*, 1882, pp.134-136.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.129.

⁷¹ *Bulletin* (February, 1881), p.5.

Foreign pacifists who did get to Germany returned with discouraging reports. After a tour of the Continent in 1883, William Jones, agent of the Peace Society, declared: "On the whole, the interviews at Berlin were the least satisfactory of any place I have visited. Even those who are in sympathy with our movement talk like men under some incubus which paralyzes the energies."⁷² Another agent of the Peace Society found several years later that "if, occasionally, some English partisan of the cause succeeded in gathering a few hearers around him in Berlin, he finds that they are so much in dread of the all-pervading military authorities that even their courteous reception of the visitor is expressed almost in whispers and as if with 'bated breath!'"⁷³

Pratt was under no illusions as to the conditions with which he would be faced when he set out for Germany in the summer of 1884, but he was thoroughly aware of the necessity of building an international peace movement, and he was not one to be daunted by fear of failure. As Bühler was the only peace man whom he knew, Pratt first visited him in Stuttgart. Bühler was pessimistic about the prospects for peace work in Germany, but he gave the English peace apostle a list of the leading names in the local *Freisinnige* party. For three weeks Pratt tramped from house to house, "up many a dark and weary staircase". By the end of that time twenty-one persons had agreed to attend a provisional meeting for the formation of a society. The provisional committee was formed, and Pratt "went to bed with a joyful heart". But as soon as he left, the committee vanished into thin air. When he returned, in October, 1885, Pratt found that his mistake had been to give the movement a party character. So once again he took up his laborious rounds. This time first thirty gentlemen were persuaded to come together; then sixty at a second meeting appointed a provisional committee. Pratt met with distrust on the part of the local authorities, and only when he assured them that his object was not at all political was he permitted to go ahead and plan the public meeting which was to found the Stuttgart society⁷⁴.

Six hundred attended the gathering and the *Oberbürgermeister* presided. The speakers were men of different parties, and each made a little declaration of his political as well as his patriotic faith. One asserted that although the new society was to be the branch of an international association, "never will any one of its acts give anyone occasion to doubt its devotion to the German fatherland". Another announced that he entered with the reserve that there was to be no disarmament as long as the political situation remained the same. Similarly, Karl Mayer, a Progressivist deputy, a resigned member of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*, informed the assembly that

⁷² *H.P.* (September, 1883), p.280.

⁷³ *H.P.* (August, 1889), p.264.

⁷⁴ *Journal* (July, 1885), I. 138, (June, 1886), II. 10-11.

"his political friends support peace as a duty, but on the condition that all proposals of disarmament are discarded, and above all, that the society is based upon the sentiment of patriotism". To *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe*, which viewed Pratt's efforts in Germany with much scepticism, these curious proceedings were proof that "the iron hand of Herr von Bismarck holds the minds and hearts paralyzed"⁷⁵.

Pratt followed similar tactics in forming a society in Darmstadt at the same time. Best known of the one hundred and thirty members was Ludwig Büchner, the materialist philosopher. Following the example of the Stuttgart group, the Darmstadt society made the following declaration: "In order to put a stop to a generally prevalent misunderstanding, especial attention is requested to the fact, that as a truly patriotic and national organization, the Peace Association unites with every true German respecting the necessity of upholding the powerful position of the Fatherland"⁷⁶.

In the summer of 1885 Pratt succeeded in forming a provisional committee at Frankfort. But everywhere he was told that the peace cause could make no progress until a society was founded at Berlin. So to the capital went the indomitable drummer of peace. After much difficulty he was able to convoke a meeting on February 13, 1886, over which Virchow presided, and at which were present deputies of the Center as well as those of the radical parties. Again a provisional committee was formed, but it never existed except on paper. Moscheles, a colleague of Pratt, could find no trace of it when he visited Berlin several years later. One of the members, Dr. Bamberger, wrote to him as follows:

With us that cause is a tender plant, too fragile to thrive without support. You see, here the military rule reigns supreme, and what is worst, one cannot overlook the fact that there is justification for its existence, as long as the first thought that thrusts itself on us as we waken to every new day is, How soon may Franco-Russian barbarism break in upon us!⁷⁷.

The three societies in the southwest, Stuttgart, Darmstadt, and Frankfort, were realities, even if not very active. In September, 1886, Pratt sent Bajer, the Danish pacifist, on a visit to the groups, hoping to stir up a little interest. One result was that the provisional committee at Frankfort definitely constituted the *Frankfurter Friedensverein* in October. On Pratt's suggestion delegates from the three associations met in Darmstadt in January, 1887, and decided to have the Darmstadt society carry

⁷⁵ *E.-U.* (December 19, 1885).

⁷⁶ *Journal* (February, 1886), II. 15-16.

⁷⁷ *Journal* (1885), I. 178, 182-183, (1886), II. 10-11, 18; *Arbitrator* (Feb., 1886), no. 168, p.3; Alexander Dietz: *Franz Wirth und der Frankfurter Friedensverein* (Frankfort-on-the Main, 1911), pp.20-22; *Concord* (1891), VI. 117-118.

on the foreign relations for all of them. It was the Frankfort society which was to prove the strongest of the three. Frankfort, after all, was a cosmopolitan trade city, with important connections in the international world of high finance, and moreover, Frankfort had a democratic and an anti-Prussian tradition behind her. The president of the *Frankfurter Friedensverein* was old Franz Wirth, whose father had played a leading part in the democratic movement earlier in the century. The members of the society, of whom there were fifty in 1887 and only seventy-one four years later, all came from the commercial classes, and there as a liberal sprinkling of Jews⁷⁸.

The inauguration of the peace societies was not well received by the public. When noticed at all, the friends of peace were regarded as either Utopian fools or unpatriotic men of suspicious political leanings. It was discovered that many people refused to enter the *Frankfurter Friedensverein* because they feared that they would compromise themselves. Despite this society's declaration that it was non-political, it was treated by the authorities as if it were a political organization. Its members had to register with the police, permission had to be obtained to hold assemblies, and these meetings were watched over by police officers. Such treatment continued for ten years⁷⁹.

Lemonnier followed Pratt's activities with but little sympathy. To begin with, he had deep prejudices against all English pacifists. As he wrote Bajer, he felt that the Arbitration Association and the Peace Society were "essentially Christian and monarchical, above all, they are British, they want peace and arbitration and they think only of peace, not much about liberty and justice; peace! peace! For my part, I am deeply attached to the cause of peace, but peace can be founded only by liberty and on justice." In answer to Bajer's approval of the German peace societies Lemonnier posed the gentle rejoinder: "Have you not seen, *cher ami*, that the founding of these societies means the sanction of the *status quo*, i.e., ... [unclear] ... for the loss of Danish Schleswig and of Alsace Lorraine?"⁸⁰.

When Limousin attempted to bring up the Alsace-Lorraine Question at Pratt's Berne Conference of 1884, he was balked by the determined opposition of the Germans, who said that it would disturb the peace. At the same conference Bühler protested Germany's love of peace and presented the adhesions of fifty German deputies to the assembly. The correspondent of *Les Etats-Unis* reported the incident with the comment that Germany could very well talk of peace, after having conquered

⁷⁸ Dietz, *op. cit.*, pp.23-29; *Journal* (1887), III. 6.

⁷⁹ Dietz, *op. cit.*, pp.18-19, 29-30; *H.P.* (October, 1891), p. 303.

⁸⁰ Lemonnier to Bajer, June 19, July 20, 1886. Bajer MSS.

Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, etc., etc.⁸¹. Bühler had already had some enlightening experiences with the French pacifists. In 1880 he wrote to the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*, naïvely asking that it provoke some sort of demonstration that French public opinion was pacific and willing to renounce Alsace-Lorraine. He was rebuked by Lemonnier in fitting terms and made aware of the *Ligue's* doctrines. Thinking to confront his opponents with a *reductio ad absurdum*, Bühler replied that, to be consistent, the *Ligue* must support the right of self-determination for Poland, Ireland, Schleswig, etc. Lemonnier answered: "*Assurément, cher Monsieur, pouvez-vous en douter?*" And the German deputy found no more understanding when he applied to the *Société des Amis de la Paix* with the same request⁸².

In view of the fact that the question had been side-tracked at the Berne assembly, Lemonnier's Central Committee put it on the agenda for the annual meeting of the *Ligue* in 1884. The decision was not taken unanimously, and one member even resigned. Pratt attended the gathering and asked for some compromise declaration, which would not antagonize the Germans. But Lemonnier would not hear of it. It was his firm belief that the Treaty of Frankfurt was not binding, because the people of Alsace-Lorraine had not been allowed to decide their own destiny. Now the *Ligue* unanimously voted that the Alsace-Lorrainers should be free to choose whether they wished to belong to Germany, to France, or to be independent⁸³.

Pratt had not wanted to avoid the subject; his program consisted in working to remove the danger spots which could lead to war, and the Alsace-Lorraine Question stood out like a sore thumb. Pratt felt that such issues could be settled by frank round-table discussions, somewhat in the English manner. The *Journal* of the Association was supposed to be an "Open Council", where views of all kinds were heard. In accordance with this policy, an anonymous article appeared in the number for January, 1884, opening a discussion on the crucial question. It advocated as a solution that Alsace-Lorraine be neutralized under the guarantee of Europe. Immediately Buchanan, treasurer and liberal benefactor of the Association, wrote in to protest, repeating all the German arguments and maintaining that it was France's desire for *revanche* which was the great threat to peace. This evoked a vigorous denial from Limousin, who warned: "It would take very few more of such articles to utterly destroy for the future the connexion between French and English Peace Societies". An embittered discussion took place, with the French correspondents convinced of the justice of their demands, and the Germans just as persuaded that there was no question of Alsace-Lorraine at all. Pratt's idea of effecting international

⁸¹ *Journal* (July, 1886), II. 83; *E.-U.* (August 23, 1884).

⁸² *E.-U.* (Aug. 21, Sept. 4, 1880); *Bulletin* (Feb., 1881), pp.3-7.

⁸³ *Assemblées ... 1884, Bulletin Officiel*, pp. 102-116, 154-161; *Bulletin* (February, 1885), pp.139-140.

harmony by placing "opposite views in juxtaposition" was not working out. Finally the editors closed the debate. But the damage had been done. The peace societies of Darmstadt and Stuttgart first broke off relations with the English Association and then dissolved. And when the Association officially committed itself to the solution of neutralization in March, 1888, several important members were lost, including Buchanan and Karl Blind, a German émigré; even the Paris *Comité* refused to follow the parent organization on this issue⁸⁴.

Undismayed by the fate of his German creations, Pratt attempted to carry the white banner into Austria-Hungary in 1888. There Fischhof's dreams had been long forgotten, and a later attempt in 1883 to found an Austrian peace society had dismally failed⁸⁵. Pratt found conditions even worse than he had expected. Nothing could be done with the upper classes, there was no political life such as he knew it in England, and even the business men were inclined to feel that war itself would be better than the existing international tension. In the final analysis, it was the universal concern about Russia, and the fear that peace work in Vienna and Budapest would be misunderstood in St. Petersburg that made Pratt's efforts hopeless⁸⁶.

In Italy there was already in existence a peace society, the *Lega di Libertà, Fratellanza e Pace*. It was formed in Milan in September, 1878, as part of the anti-war campaign in Italy which resulted from the fear that the Russo-Turkish clash would plunge all Europe into war. Republican intellectuals and workers, led by Carlo Romussi, organized the society; Moneta, editor of the *Secolo*, supported them; and the whole Italian democracy and masonic world warmly adhered. The program called for the securing of peace by the "establishment of the reign of justice on the earth". Other republican doctrines dear to the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* were proclaimed, and Lemonnier was enthusiastically received at a large demonstration organized by the *Lega* in Milan in 1879. The Italian group, however, refused all invitations to unite with the *Ligue* and it maintained its independence⁸⁷.

In the succeeding years the *Lega* was heard from very little. But the idea was not dead. In 1885 the masonic lodge *Umanitaria* of Milan sent the Arbitration Association a declaration of support through the venerable Vignano, organizer of the cooperative banks of Italy. Later Vignano wrote a personal letter to Pratt, telling him of the peace forces already present in Milan and urging him to come and organize

⁸⁴ *Journal* (1887), III, 2, 6-7, 14-15, 29-30, 31, 44; *Concord* (1888), III, 25-251, 265-266; Pratt to Bajer, June 23, 1887, August 29, 1889. Bajer MSS; Dietz: *Wirth*, p.21; Letter, Blind to Bertha von Suttner, March 19, 1896, quoted in *Die Waffen Nieder* (1896), V, 172-4. [Hereafter cited as *D.W.N.*]

⁸⁵ *H.P.* (February, 1883), pp.161-162, 185.

⁸⁶ *Concord* (1888), III, 151-153, 164-165; Pratt to Bajer, Budapest, January 27, 1888. Bajer MSS.

them into one large society. Pratt answered the call of duty and went to work in the spring of 1887. He addressed meetings, carried on a long series of personal interviews, and on April 3, 1887, he convoked an assembly of delegates from the old *Lega*, the masonic lodge, and the local *Consolato Operaio*, the workmen's association. The meeting formed a federation, called the *Unione Lombarda per la Pace e l'Arbitrata Internazionale*, with Vignano as president, Mazzoleni as secretary, and Romussi as treasurer⁸⁸.

His work done in Milan, Pratt went on to Rome. The *Unione Lombarda* was a republican society, but Pratt was able to organize a Rome Committee of the Arbitration Association which was free from political partisanship. Bonghi, a prominent member of the Right, became the president, several senators adhered, eleven deputies, including Mancini and Pandolfi, and a number of professors and lawyers, conservatives and liberals⁸⁹.

The *Unione Lombarda* almost immediately showed vigorous signs of life. The energetic Moneta exhorted the society to spread peace principles "not by declaration or intermittent agitation, but by continuous and serious labor, and by methods carefully considered and adopted". He threw to the society the invaluable support of his paper, *Il Secolo*, which had a daily circulation of one hundred and fifty thousand. Large public meetings were held, addresses drawn up, and to arouse interest Moneta himself offered a large sum of money for a prize essay. An important impetus was given the work of the *Unione Lombarda* at the time of the Franco-Italian crisis of 1888-1889. The Francophile republicans raised a great uproar against Crispi's pro-German policy, and Moneta was one of the chief agitators. He helped form at Milan the *Comitato Permanente di Vigilanza per la Libertà e la Pace*, composed of workers and former comrades-in-arms of Garibaldi. The manifesto condemned armaments, tariff wars, Crispi's policy of adventure, and above all, any thought of war with France. Most of the action took place in the north, but meetings were held all over Italy, and everywhere Garibaldi Societies sent their adhesions to Milan. So serious did the agitation become, that Bismarck expelled the correspondent of the *Secolo* from Berlin and in Italy Crispi was forced to suspend the right of public meeting. On the very day of King Humbert's arrival in Berlin, which was to symbolize Italo-German solidarity, hundreds of democratic groups sent telegrams to the President of the French Republic, to Frédéric Passy, president of the committee of organization of the coming peace congress, and to other Frenchmen. Passy tells in his

⁸⁷ *Libertà, Fratellanza e Pace. Atti della Lega Italiana* (Milan, 1880); *E.-U.* (September 12, 19, 1878), (May 15, 1879).

⁸⁸ *Relazione all'Assemblea Generale dell'Unione Lombarda* (Milan, 1888); *Journal* (1887), III. 42-43; *Concord* (1887), III. 90-91.

⁸⁹ *Journal* (1887), III. 64-65; *Concord* (1887), III. 91.

memoirs how an avalanche of telegrams from Italy suddenly descended upon him at his seat in the Chamber of Deputies. His sceptical neighbor, Ribot, on being assured that they were sent spontaneously, asked wonderingly, "Then it is serious, this movement of peoples in favor of peace?"⁹⁰

The Italian peace campaign was led by the republicans, but there was some support from monarchists. It was Bonghi who called together a congress of all the Italian societies in May, 1889. Ninety delegates attended, representing thirty-seven peace groups and committees. Most were deputies, senators, and lawyers; Moneta, Pandolfi, and Vilfredo Pareto were among those present. Out of deference to the conservatives the resolutions were rather tame, and even Moneta's favorite theme of the "armed nation" was toned down⁹¹. But the result was satisfactory. Later in the year Moneta reported to Miss Peckover, who was sending liberal aid to him: "I have found everywhere a public that does not shut its ears to the voice of good sense and of the heart In fact there does not exist among us a war party. It is only the Court who for fear of republican ideas would gladly see the French Republic crushed by a new European coalition"⁹². There was anti-war sentiment in Italy in 1889, but it was mostly anti-Crispi and anti-monarchical feeling and opposition to a war against France. It was not the stuff out of which a strong peace movement could be fashioned.

Nor was the response from France very satisfactory. A *Ligue Franco-Italienne* was formed at Paris, which prospered during the crisis, and one hundred and fifty French deputies sent an address to Milan. But when some Italian members of parliament went to Paris to attend the peace congress, they were deeply impressed by the hostility toward Italy which they found in all classes of Frenchmen. Even the deputies who had signed the address avoided the Italians in public, fearing that they might weaken their chances of re-election⁹³.

Pratt's work found some echo in Scandinavia, where the tremendous growth of the armaments of the Great Powers was producing a sense of insecurity. It was at this time that the first gropings toward international organization were beginning to find definite form in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Fredrik Bajer, ex-army officer and progressive politician, was the great champion of the cause in Denmark. He had been active as early as 1867 trying to form a peace society on the model of the French

⁹⁰ *Concord* (1889), IV. 4-5, 9, 19-20; *H.P.* (Feb., 1888), pp.19-20, (Dec., 1888), p.155, (Dec., 1889), pp.314-315; *E.-U.* (Jan. 9, June 1, 1889); Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.101-102.

⁹¹ *Atti del Congresso di Roma ... 1889* (Città di Castello).

⁹² Moneta to Peckover, October 9, 1889. Peckover Album.

society of Passy, with whom he was in correspondence, but nothing had come of the attempt. Bajer kept in touch with the French pacifists, and in the early eighties his republican ideas qualified him for membership in the Central Committee of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*. From 1872 on he was a member of the Danish parliament, and his influence correspondingly grew, but it was not until 1882 that he was able to form the first Danish peace society, which, in accordance with its chief aim, took the name: Association for the Neutralization of Denmark. Twenty-six members of the Folketing took part in the founding of the society, and it met with a favorable public reception. All along Bajer received encouragement from both groups of English peace men, and Pratt even rendered financial assistance⁹⁴.

In Sweden likewise the peace efforts began with the politicians, rather than with private individuals. The Swedish legislature had heard motions for disarmament (1869), arbitration (1874), and the neutralization of Sweden (1883) before the peace movement became a reality in the country. In 1883 the deputies Hedlund and Arnoldson formed the Peace and Arbitration Society of Sweden. Hedlund's name appears on the rolls of the old French Peace Society before the Franco-Prussian War, but as the name of the new association indicated, it was from Pratt that the founders drew their inspiration. In the first years the membership grew by leaps and bounds, expanding from five hundred to eight thousand, but the society then languished until the Norwegian crisis of the late nineties⁹⁵.

The movement spread to Norway, where a Norwegian Union Against War was formed in 1883. Its promoters entered into relations with Pratt, but the society did not last, and it was not until 1890 that with the organization of an Interparliamentary Committee in the Storting the peace movement in Norway may be said to have begun⁹⁶.

Yet in 1885 the northern peace movement was far enough along for Wavrinsky, later a Socialist member of the Swedish Diet, to organize the first Scandinavian Peace Congress. Some two hundred delegates attended, including members of the Danish and Swedish legislatures. This was the first of the series of

⁹³ *Memoirs of Crispi*, II. 409. Crispi's friend Cucchi had these facts from Mazzoleni, whom he called "a candid, Christ-like individual, who, even at the present time, takes the mission of preaching 'peace on earth, good-will to men' quite seriously".

⁹⁴ Letters to Bajer from Bellaire, Appleton, Lemonnier. Bajer MSS; Bajer to Suttner, Dec. 26, 1904. Suttner MSS; *H.P.* (Feb., 1883), p. 177, (Jan., 1890), p.9.

⁹⁵ Arnoldson's account in *Journal* (Feb., 1886), II. 21; *H.P.* (July, 1886), p.87, (June, 1887), p.229; Arvid Grundel: *La Suède et les Mouvements Pacifistes*, (Stockholm, 1910).

⁹⁶ Halvdan Koht: *Histoire du Mouvement de la Paix en Norvège* (Christiania, 1900); R. Moe: *Le Prix Nobel de la Paix* (vol. I, Oslo, 1932), I. 59-63.

Scandinavian peace assemblies, which were held in 1890, in 1895, and more or less regularly after 1901.

While Pratt was dreaming of a great international federation of peace societies which were to serve as oases of reason in the international desert of distrust, Lemonnier was attempting a different type of collaboration between the peace organizations: joint lobbying for arbitration treaties. His vision of a federation of free peoples had never grown dim, but in the seventies circumstances had brought him to espouse the cause of arbitration as a makeshift, and at the end of his life federation seemed as far off as ever. In March, 1889, Lemonnier admitted that he did not believe federation possible at the moment, either in Europe or even in America. At the *Ligue* assembly of that year, the last which the old warrior of peace was to attend, his disappointment took shape in a resolution sanctioning the permanent arbitration treaty as the best way for Europe to leave the armed truce, "considering that in the present state of international relations, the formation of a European Federation and the creation of an International High Court are not immediately realizable"⁹⁷.

It was in 1879 that Lemonnier took up practical work for the conclusion of a permanent treaty of arbitration. The logical line of least resistance was the United States. America stood clear of the Old World imbroglio and there could be no suspicion of ulterior motives if an initiative came from Washington; furthermore, President Hayes was known to be sympathetic to the peace cause. Alfred Love, president of the Universal Peace Union, secured from Hayes semi-official powers for Lemonnier to aid the American minister at Paris in negotiating an arbitration treaty between the two republics. Freycinet, the French foreign minister, was cold to the idea, although his successors listened more attentively to Lemonnier. Hayes was very interested, and one of his last acts as president was to send a letter, dated March 3, 1881, to General Noyes, the American minister at Paris, expressing his hopes that the arbitration treaty could be arranged. But for the time the matter ended there⁹⁸.

In the same year Lemonnier began to press for the inclusion of arbitration clauses in commercial treaties. This was an old aim of the pacifists, and one which was to be realized by Mancini, when he became Italy's foreign minister. In 1881 Lemonnier cooperated with the Dutch Peace Society in urging that a clause be included in the Franco-Dutch Trade Treaty providing that all differences which arose

⁹⁷ *E.-U.* (July-August, 1889), p.6, (October, 1889), p.2; Michel Revon: *L'Arbitrage International* (Paris, 1892), p. 378.

⁹⁸ *E.-U.* (August 4, 1883); *Assemblées ... 1880, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.21-22; *Assemblées ... 1881, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.33-36.

under it should be arbitrated. Holland's foreign minister answered van Eck; a sub-secretary at the Quai d'Orsay replied to Lemonnier. Both said it was impossible⁹⁹.

More was accomplished when Lemonnier turned to Switzerland. President of the Swiss Federal Council was Ruchonnet, a member of the *Ligue*. He immediately fell into line with Lemonnier's ideas for a Swiss-American treaty of arbitration, and the preliminary steps were taken in April, 1883. President Arthur and Secretary Frelinghuysen seemed favorable, and the Swiss were asked to draw up a project for the treaty. Their draft, based upon Lemonnier's model, provided for the compulsory submission of all disputes to arbitration. But although the American pacifists kept after the State Department, the treaty was never concluded¹⁰⁰.

In the Chamber of Deputies, to which he had been elected in 1881, Frédéric Passy was waging a long up-hill battle in favor of arbitration. In the beginning he was the only deputy to preach peace and arbitration, and he was regarded, he tells us, with "a certain distrust". He had to go slowly and cautiously, but before he lost his seat in 1889 some important victories had been won for the cause. After his election, Passy promised his friends of the peace society that he would raise his voice for arbitration in the Chamber just as soon as he found some support for his ideas. But it was not until several years later that he redeemed his pledge, and then it was that his conscience bade him speak out against Ferry's ruthless Tongking policy. For the first time arbitration made its appearance in the French Chamber, and nowhere did it meet with such a crushing repulse. When Passy rose on October 31, 1883, to ask that the dispute between China and France be arbitrated, such a mighty clamor of opposition was set up that he could scarcely make himself heard. He left the Chamber so visibly shattered that days afterwards its president, Brisson, sent around to inquire after his health. And when a month later the young deputy, Gaillard, presented a request for arbitration signed by himself and seven colleagues of the extreme Left, including Barodet, Laisant, and Beauquier, all members of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*, the racket was even worse¹⁰¹.

Ferry's colonial policy had the support of the Center and all of the Left save the extremists. Passy himself was nominally a republican of the Left Center, but he was never a party man; he voted according to his convictions, whether it meant supporting the Left, Right, or the Center. Now, together with the radical republicans,

⁹⁹ *E.-U.* (December 24, 1881).

¹⁰⁰ *Assemblées...1883, Bulletin Officiel*, pp. 46-47; Curti: *Peace or War*, p.150; Revon: *L'Arbitrage*, pp.281-282.

¹⁰¹ *Bulletin* (August, 1882), p.94, (Jan.-Feb., May, 1884), pp.23-29, 42-44; *E.-U.* (Dec. 1, 1883); Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.80-81; Bertha von Suttner: *Der Kampf um die Vermeidung des Weltkriegs* (2 vols., Zurich, 1917), II. 221-222.

he threw all his forces into the struggle against Ferry's imperialism. On August 15, 1884, during the discussion of credits for the Tongking expedition, Passy returned to the attack with a deadly dissection of the minister's whole Tongking policy. He gained the confidence of the Chamber by his mastery of the facts and his skill in debate, and this time he had an attentive audience. But when he ended with a plea for arbitration, he carried with him only the extreme Left. When Gaillard repeated the demand for arbitration, declaring that he spoke in the name of France's true republicanism, he was drowned out once more, although he now secured fifty votes for his proposal that the difficulties be submitted to arbitration¹⁰².

That Passy's Manchester economics was partly responsible for his anti-colonialism there is no doubt. But there were higher issues at stake. It was not in terms of francs and centimes but in the name of ideals which all France held sacred that he delivered his most eloquent indictment of French imperialism in a speech before the Chamber on December 22, 1885. It was the *chef d'oeuvre* of a great orator. Passy appealed to his countrymen to stop these colonial expeditions and to remain faithful to France's great tradition:

And when you protest so resolutely and so energetically, in the name of your French and Alsatian heart, against the crimes and blunders of conquest in Europe; when you refuse to recognize that any power in Europe has the right to carry off from another a fragment of its territory, that is, from its *chair nationale*...(warm applause on extreme left and right), you claim not only to have the right, but the duty, to dominate, to enslave, to exploit other peoples, who are perhaps less advanced than we in civilization, but who have no less their personality, their nationality as we, and are no less devoted to their independence and to their native land .. It is their Alsace for them, it is their Lorraine for them. For them, and before humanity as before God, they are worth as much as ours.

Such appeals by Passy and the extreme republicans to the principles of 1789 were simply dismissed by Ferry as "*la métaphysique politique*"¹⁰³.

In his unflinching attack of French colonial expansion from this high ground Passy was joined by Lemonnier and the radicals of the *Ligue*, but by few other French pacifists, and he found little sympathy in the Chamber. The cause of arbitration made better progress when it was not mixed up with imperialistic politics. On April 20, 1886, Passy presented a proposal, which was signed by fifty deputies, that the conflict which had broken out between Turkey and Greece should be settled by arbitration. Freycinet, premier and foreign minister, declared, "On the question of principle, I can

¹⁰² *Bulletin* (Feb., 1885), pp.109-127, (May, 1885), pp.167-168.

¹⁰³ Paul Passy: *La vie de Frédéric Passy* (Paris, 1927), pp.42-46; Goyau, *op. cit.*, p.272.

only be in accord with the honorable M. Frédéric Passy, and, I believe, also with all the Chamber. It is most desirable, assuredly, that the voice of reason, of humanity, and of law should be substituted in international differences for the brutal language of the cannon." But in the case at hand, Freycinet pointed out, any such initiative for France was out of the question. Such a declaration by a prominent statesman was enough of a rarity in those days for the pacifists to greet it as an important triumph. In the succeeding years such speeches became more common, but too often the application of the high principles professed was judged as out of the question for the immediate problem¹⁰⁴.

On January 21, 1887, Passy presented to the Chamber a proposal for a resolution on the style of Henry Richard's motion of 1873, asking the government "to take advantage of all favorable occasions to enter into negotiations with the other governments" to promote the practice of arbitration and mediation. The names signed to the proposal were mainly those of advanced republicans, yet Passy had succeeded in cutting across party lines in assembling his group of supporters. His moderation and caution had won for him and his ideas a more respectful attention than had been accorded at first. In 1888 the Paris *Matin* remarked, "Every intelligent Parisian knows this robust and vigorous old gentleman [sixty-six years of age in 1888, Passy lived until 1912] who has made economic and social problems the passion of his life. His colleagues, in the Chamber of Deputies, always listen with respect to his discreet and honest utterances, and even when they cannot share the convictions which he supports with a fervor resembling that of youth"¹⁰⁵.

In England the cause of arbitration appeared to be taking mighty strides, chiefly through the efforts of William Randal Cremer. Cremer came to the House of Commons in 1885 as the member for Haggerston; when death called him away in 1908, he had become "Member for Arbitration". He was a man who never thought of ends but in terms of means. Once convinced that the secret of peace lay in the principle of arbitration, he never bothered to think beyond, and the rest of his life he spent in relentless pursuit of this one ideal. He had all the perseverance of a bulldog, and all the stubbornness as well. While he could organize men as few of his contemporaries were able to, he could not inspire them, save by the example of his own selfless devotion to the cause. Yet he was a fighter, if not a leader, and he was capable of showing warmth toward his few personal friends. He was always keenly conscious of his class origin. He was forever suspecting fellow workers of jealousy, and all others of class pride in their relations with him, and it became more and more

¹⁰⁴ Passy: *Pour la paix*, pp.82-86.

difficult for anyone to work with him as he became even gruffer and more intolerant with the years. "He is a man of strong personality", said Pratt, "and of *very* decided opinions, which he prefers to the opinions of all other men"¹⁰⁶. So thoroughly did Cremer come to identify himself with the cause of peace that he was incensed at his country for the Boer War, which undid so much of what he had built. One who knew him well, after long wondering just what Cremer's reaction would have been on the outbreak of the World War, finally decided that he would have taken it as a personal insult!¹⁰⁷

In 1887 Cremer set about achieving a permanent arbitration treaty between England and the United States. The idea was not new. In 1881 Henry Richard had opened up a correspondence with American pacifists with such a thought in mind, and he had received some encouragement¹⁰⁸. In the summer of 1886 Pratt's American friends informed him that the moment was propitious, and the committee of the Arbitration Association drew up a petition to Parliament in favor of the establishment of a tribunal for the settlement of all Anglo-American disputes¹⁰⁹. Cremer himself had had such an idea ever since the foundation of the Workmen's Peace Association, and now, as a member of parliament, he was finally in a position to do something about it. In October, 1886, independently of Pratt, he laid plans for promoting a memorial from members of the House of Commons to President Cleveland, which pledged the support of the signers for any initiative from the other side of the water for an Anglo-American treaty of arbitration. By June, 1887, one hundred M. P.s had signed. A conference was held with Andrew Carnegie, and with his advice, ambitious plans were made to send a deputation to Washington to present the memorial. Cremer now redoubled his efforts, and before long he had filled the lists with 232 names, representing one third of the total membership of the House of Commons. Cooperating were 175 Liberals, 44 Liberal Unionists, and 13 Conservatives. It was decided that ten of them, one peer, and three representatives of the Trades-Union Congress would make the trip to Washington¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁵ *Bulletin* (March, 1887), p.286; *H.P.* (April, 1887), pp.193, 194, (August, 1888), p.105; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.222-3; Christian L. Lange ed.: *Histoire Documentaire de l'Union Interparlementaire* (Brussels -1915 -), pp.13-29.

¹⁰⁶ Pratt to Ducommun, July 21, 1895. B.I.P. VI. B. 2; also Pratt to Passy, April 17, 1903. Passy MSS.

¹⁰⁷ Mr. E. G. Smith, private secretary to Cremer in the years before his death, in a conversation with the author, February 10, 1937.

¹⁰⁸ Henry Richard: "Further Progress of International Arbitration (Paper read at the Thirteenth Conference of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, 1887, *Report*, pp.91-101), pp.100-101; Curti: *Peace or War*, p.154.

¹⁰⁹ *Journal* (1887), III. 3-4; *Sixth Annual Report*, pp.14-15.

¹¹⁰ Evans: *Cremer*, pp.124-7; *Arbitrator* (March, 1887), no. 181, pp.5-6, (March, 1888), no. 193, pp.8-9.

Cremer was able to get resolutions of support from such bodies as the Trades-Union Congress, the Associated British Chambers of Commerce, and the Congregational Union. Even *The Times* had a kind word for the plan. In America, William Jones, Richard's successor as secretary of the Peace Society, prepared the way for the deputation. He saw Cleveland and apprised him of what was coming, and he appeared at various peace meetings held in support of the project. In November, 1887, when the Englishmen arrived in Washington, they were very well received. Carnegie introduced the delegation, and Cleveland spoke sincere words of peace. Congressmen were interviewed, and a series of great peace assemblies were held in the large cities of the east, at which the American public welcomed the messengers of peace. First fruits of the expedition were apparent in the Sherman resolution, which passed both houses, requesting the president to begin negotiations, when he saw fit, for arbitration treaties with other nations. Later Senator Allison introduced a resolution calling for arbitration treaties with France and England. The pacifists also looked upon the Pan-American Conference of 1889-90, which they celebrated with undue enthusiasm, as partly the result of the English mission of 1887¹¹¹.

Signs of the times such as Cremer's deputation and the Sherman and Allison resolutions encouraged the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* to take up once the campaign for a Franco-American treaty. The Paris section of the Ligue lined up the five peace societies of Paris. One of its members, Barodet, circulated a petition in the Chamber, while Couturier and Jean Macé took upon themselves the same task in the Senate. After six months, several thousand signatures were obtained in the country, and those of twenty senators and one hundred and twelve deputies were included when Passy made the formal presentation of the address to Goblet, the foreign minister. Goblet was courteous, but his thinking was conditioned by the responsibilities of his position as he saw them. "It is not for us, the vanquished power, to make advances", he told Passy. When reminded that it was not to the victor nation, but to a sister republic that he was asked to address himself, Goblet still objected, fearing that he would earn for himself only a rebuff for his efforts¹¹².

Once again Love secured semi-official letters for Lemonnier to aid the American minister in Paris, but this diplomat received no further authorization from Washington to open negotiations. The State Department felt that the Sherman resolution was evidence enough that the United States was willing. In April, 1888, Passy and forty of his colleagues renewed the resolution of the year before, adding a

¹¹¹ *Arbitrator* (Sept.-Oct., 1887), nos 187-8, pp.4-5 (Nov.,1887 - Feb.,1888) nos 189-192, pp.5-33; Wm. Jones: *Quaker Campaigns in Peace and War* (London, 1899), pp.262-295; Evans: *Cremer*, pp.127-133; Curti: *Peace or War*, pp.154-5, 183-7.

¹¹² *Assemblées ... 1888, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.10, 12-16; Andrup to Bajer, Dec.1, 1887. Bajer MSS; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp. 89-90, 220-230.

request for the Franco-American arbitration treaty. In June the Chamber adopted a report which was favorable. In July, 1889, the American pacifist Belva Lockwood called together in conference at Paris the American minister, Senator Sherman, and several French deputies, in order to discuss methods of action. In both Paris and Washington the pacifists continued their lobbying for the treaty. Belva Lockwood tackled the State Department, while Lemonnier kept at the Quai d'Orsay. President Harrison and Secretary Blaine were favorable, and Lemonnier noticed a perceptible change for the better in French statesmen like Spuller, Ribot, and Carnot. Spuller agreed that such arbitration treaties were possible outside Europe, with the United States and the Argentine Republic, perhaps, but not between the European powers. However, nothing came of all these efforts. As the peace men seemed to realize themselves, each side had little to gain and much to risk in initiating negotiations. There was little chance of France and the United States becoming involved in a conflict anyway, and as the French foreign minister objected: what if Germany looked upon France's initiative in the matter as an underhand means of casting about for a new ally?¹¹³.

Cremer watched the French movement with great interest. He wrote to Passy suggesting that a meeting between French and English deputies to discuss peace and arbitration would be worth while, and he said that if Passy would get some of his colleagues in the Chamber to issue an invitation, he would bring to Paris two hundred British parliamentarians. Passy sounded out some of his friends, and he was able to reply that the French would do their part. He added that if Cremer brought only a half dozen, it would be a great event, and he proposed that Cremer come to Paris to see for himself that the French were ready to support him. Cremer came in June, 1888, and a little group of French deputies met with him at the home of Jules Gaillard. It was decided there that the French would issue an invitation to all the British M.P.s who had signed the address to Cleveland, inviting them to a conference at Paris to discuss what measures should be taken to secure Anglo-American and Anglo-French treaties of arbitration. Cremer interviewed Goblet and found him not unfavorable, and then he returned to England to prepare the way for the French invitation. It was finally issued on August 6¹¹⁴.

Cremer was now becoming conscious of his special mission. Already he had taken the first steps in transforming the Workmen's Peace Association into the International Arbitration League. Arbitration was recognized as the primary object of this association, and it was no longer exclusively a workers' group. Cremer made a

¹¹³ Lemonnier Notebook. Entries of May 25, August 3, 1888, July 9, 1889, February 10, 11, April 3, 1890; *E.-U.* (Oct. 6, 1890); Curti: *Peace or War*, pp.151-152; Passy, *Pour la Paix*, p.81, 87-88.

concerted effort to win M.P.s under the new banner, and whereas only seven had taken part in the old Workmen's Peace Association, upwards of one hundred now joined the International Arbitration League, and they were all made honorary vice-presidents. Pratt was the first to feel the consequences of Cremer's action. Always on the look-out for closer cooperation with other societies, he proposed that Cremer's association, now that it rested on a broader base, unite with the Arbitration Association. First Cremer assented: then he decided against it. It was the beginning of the stand-offish attitude with which Cremer came to regard the other peace societies. He forgot his early tutelage as a dependent of the Peace Society, and he came to feel that his own work, carried on as it was in the realm of practical politics, was the only really effective effort for the cause of peace¹¹⁵.

The meeting of the French and English deputies took place on Sunday morning, October 31, 1888, at the Grand-Hôtel in Paris. Accompanying Cremer were not two hundred, but only eight M.P.s, including Sir George Campbell, Fenwick, and Sir Charles Schwann. Passy provided twenty-four deputies, including Barodet, Antide Boyer, Fernand Faure, Gaillard, Georges Perrin, Jules Siegfried, and Yves Guyot, and one senator, Jules Simon. Clemenceau and other radical politicians sent excuses. Passy, who presided, had prepared the resolutions and secured Cremer's approval, and the proceedings went off smoothly. There were no long speeches, the resolutions were passed without a dissent, and the session was over in less than an hour. The parliamentarians declared their purpose was "to assure the maintenance of peaceful relations between Great Britain, the United States, and France, by working for the preparation of treaties of arbitration between these three nations". They discussed the prospects of success of this effort and took the usual pledges to support one another. One resolution provided for the holding of a similar conference in the next year, to which deputies from other parliaments would be invited. It meant the founding of the Interparliamentary Union¹¹⁶.

With the meeting at Paris on June 29 and 30, 1889, of ninety-six deputies, representing nine countries, the international association of deputies became a fact. They had not come together to lighten the disarmament burdens of the world, as Fischhof had wanted, nor had they assembled to give the world a code of law and an international tribunal, as other peacemakers had desired. The meeting arose as the direct result of parliamentary action for arbitration in the legislatures of Great Britain, the United States, and France. Arbitration remained the chief concern of the deputies,

¹¹⁴ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.90-92; *Arbitrator* (June-July, 1888), nos 196-7, pp.4-5, (March-April, 1889), nos. 205-6, pp.4-6.

¹¹⁵ *Arbitrator* (June-July, 1888), nos 196-7; International Arbitration League: *Minutes of the Council*. Report of Sub-committee, August 15, 1888; Council Meeting, May 30, 1889.

¹¹⁶ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.92-3, 231-53; *Arbitrator* (Nov., 1888), no.201, pp.4-7.

and the organization which they formed at the reunion of 1889 took the name of the Interparliamentary Conference for International Arbitration. Only later were other subjects introduced, and it was not until 1899 that the Conference became the Interparliamentary Union, under which name it exists today.

In the very first conference at Paris the association showed a spirit of caution which characterized its activity all along. The French wanted resolutions which would call for cooperative action in the different parliaments, but all that was agreed upon were *vœux*. The most important wish was that governments should conclude treaties by which they would agree to submit all difficulties to arbitration, without, however, "impairing their independence and without admitting any interference in anything concerning their internal constitution". The parliamentarians also made the wish that the governments would insert arbitration clauses in such contractual engagements as commercial treaties, and they called upon the electors of each country "to direct by their choice the policy of their country in the sense of justice, of law, and of fraternity of peoples". The English were authorized to organize the next meeting at London in 1890¹¹⁷.

It was long a subject of controversy among the pacifists as to just who was the father of the Interparliamentary Union. Early in the sequence of events which led to the founding Cremer gave evidence of his jealous nature, which was to cause much of the later discord. In August, 1887, when his deputation to America seemed certain of success, Cremer published an article in the *Arbitrator*, entitled: "Who Began It?" Here he stated: "We have lately observed with great regret a tendency in certain quarters to deprive us of the honour which we may fairly claim in this matter". He meant Pratt's Association, which had begun to circulate its petition in favor of an Anglo-American tribunal before Cremer began to collect signatures for his memorial to Cleveland. Pratt answered the baseless charge by declaring that nobody would think of depriving Cremer of the honor which he claimed¹¹⁸.

Passy was ready to give Cremer even more than his due. When at the Conference of 1894 he was toasted as "the father of the Interparliamentary Conference", he graciously responded that he was only the second father, that Cremer was the first. But when in 1896 at the Budapest Conference Count Apponyi pushed his fine French to great limits in eulogizing Passy, even though he did not mention the founding of the Conference, the Council of the International Arbitration League saw

¹¹⁷ *Arbitrator* (July-August, 1889), nos 209-210, pp.4-9; A. Gobat: "L'Union Interparlementaire, Son Histoire", in *Conférence Interparlementaire* (1893-94), pp.64-68; Christian L. Lange, ed.: *Union Interparlementaire. Résolutions des Conférences* (2nd ed., Brussels, 1911), pp.33-35; Evans: *Cremer*, pp.136-138.

¹¹⁸ *Concord* (1887), III. 105.

fit to issue a circular establishing Cremer's claims to the paternity of the body. The fact was insisted upon that the League had paid the costs of the two conferences of 1889 and 1890. Passy wrote a cordial note to Cremer diplomatically regretting that he, Cremer, had not been shown the circular before it was sent out. He went on to give Cremer a little lecture. Passy asserted that he himself had no idea how much his sacrifices for the cause had cost him, nor did he want to know. He continued:

None of us should, in any form, undertake to present his bill for public acknowledgement, still less to compare his services with those of his collaborators ... It is not only because mutual goodwill must be the first sentiment of those who preach concord to men and to nations. It is because we form, before a public opinion still hesitant and suspicious, a body whose union is its force, and all of the members of which should hold closely together, as a battalion of soldiers does before the enemy.

Passy was much disturbed by Cremer's tactics, and he wrote to his colleague Ducommun: "We should not shoot at one another in public like this"¹¹⁹.

Cremer did not listen to these wise words, and he again raised the question in 1903, after the Nobel Prize had been instituted. Pratt, one of the most fair-minded of all men, wrote sadly to Passy: "It is indeed deplorable when men who are willing and able to promote great reforms in human society spoil their work by immoderate egotism! This sad tendency has been too often seen in Cremer; and it has greatly weakened his usefulness; and men shrink from close relations with him"¹²⁰. There was nothing mercenary about Cremer's action - when he did receive the Nobel award in 1903, he used it to endow liberally the International Arbitration League, and he went on living as simply as before - it was solely his sensitive pride which was to blame.

Several years later Thiaudière and Loewenthal came forward with their claims to the title of Father of the Interparliamentary Union, and there was war in the ranks of the friends of peace¹²¹. It was true that they had proposed something similar in the seventies, but then so had Walterskirchen, Fischhof, Marcoartu, and others. It was Henry Richard who first demonstrated effectively the advantages of interparliamentary cooperation, first in 1869 and then in 1873, and he was the first to take steps for the formation of an interparliamentary council. In 1882 Richard took up the idea again. He suggested to Passy a meeting of deputies from the different parliaments, and he asked if the French could be counted upon. The plan was then

¹¹⁹ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.116-128; Passy to Ducommun, B.I.P. MSS., V, B, 1.

¹²⁰ Pratt to Passy, April 17, 1903. Passy MSS.

¹²¹ *R.P.* (1909), XIV. 338-9, 368-373; *P.D.* (1910), XX. 115-6, 153-8, 213-7.

dropped until March, 1884, when Passy returned to the idea in a speech at the annual assembly of the *Société des Amis de la Paix*. He wrote Richard about it, and the English peace apostle replied that he had been thinking about the scheme himself. But again nothing came of it¹²².

Hodgson Pratt had just as valid a claim as some of the others, but he never presented it. It was the same modesty which caused him in later years absolutely to forbid his friends to propose him for the Nobel Prize. In fact, he himself pushed Cremer's candidacy in an effort to soothe the feelings of that irritable friend of peace, who was beginning to feel that an injustice had been done him when he was passed over for the first two years¹²³. In 1887 and again in 1888 Pratt suggested to certain English and French deputies that they meet for a private discussion of European problems, especially Anglo-French relations. He received encouragement from those whom he approached. Jules Siegfried being especially willing to aid. But it so happened that Pratt was never able to arrange a convenient date for the meeting. When he later learned of what Cremer and Passy were planning, Pratt magnanimously wrote in *Concord*, in August, 1888: "It does not much matter who carries out such a great work as this, and our hope is that the good idea may bear good fruit". In 1889 he declared in a private letter: "Cremer is hardly the inventor of the Interparliamentary Committee"; and he told how he himself had for a long time supported the idea in *Concord* and in speeches at Paris and Vienna. But never did he refer to these facts in public. Pratt, like Passy, was a peacemaker worthy of the name¹²⁴.

Often it does not matter so much who has the idea, but what the idea is and what is done with it. As Passy wrote: "It is not enough to have a good idea, it is still essential that it come at the right hour and that one knows how to set about it and to have it accepted. That was the good fortune and the merit of Cremer. Mine was to understand it and to support it."¹²⁵

The founding of the Interparliamentary Conference was but another sign of the quickening of pacifist activity at the end of the eighties. Arbitration had gained entrance to the parliaments of the world, and even the sedate House of Lords had heard a plea for its use¹²⁶. In 1888 the *Institut* of France offered a prize for the best work on international arbitration. More and more commercial treaties were drawn up with arbitration clauses included. As early as 1883 the Foreign Office gave Richard

¹²² *Bulletin* (May, 1884), pp.49-50; Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.94-5; *idem*: "L'Interparlementarisme", in *R.P.* (1905), X. 12-16.

¹²³ Pratt to Passy, April 17, November 24, 1903. Passy MSS.

¹²⁴ *Concord* (July, August, 1888), III. 228, 251-2; Pratt to Bajer, September 27, December 7, 1889. Bajer MSS.

¹²⁵ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, p.98; Passy to Ducommun, July 28, 189-. B.I.P. MSS. V, 3, 1.

special notification of such a clause in the Anglo-Italian trade treaty, saying that this was done in deference "to your long services and great interest in the cause of the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations"¹²⁷. At this time most of the other governments did not reply at all when addressed by the peace societies. But the attitude was changing. When Passy, as was his custom, left his circulars with the foreign embassies in Paris, they began to acknowledge them. In 1887 such an address sent to all the foreign governments was acknowledged by eight of them¹²⁸. Meanwhile, the peace movement was spreading. By the end of the eighties the non-sectarian movement, led by Pratt, had been founded in England, there was new activity in France, the Scandinavian peace movement had begun, some small beginnings had been made in Germany, and the movement was apparently off to a good start in Italy. The climax came at the end of the decade when the international peace congresses were begun by a congress at Paris in the centenary year of 1889.

The peace congress was organized by Lemonnier with the support of Passy and the active aid of Pratt. As in 1878, the initiative had come from Lemonnier, this time as early as 1886, and the preliminary steps had been taken under his supervision. The entries in his notebook and some of his letters which have been preserved tell of his tireless labors in arranging the festival of peace. Even the indomitable reformer Hodgson Pratt knew discouragement at times, but Lemonnier was of a faith unshaken, and there is a note in his diary about an interview in which he inspired Pratt with new courage. The government's authorization was secured, and the call for the congress was finally sent out at the beginning of 1889¹²⁹.

Over three hundred delegates were present when Passy called the congress to order on June 23, 1889. Two-thirds of them were French, but one hundred and thirty-five persons had come from foreign lands to do their bit for peace and visit the Exposition. On either side of Passy on the platform sat the prominent pacifists, many of whom met one another now for the first time. The opening speeches by Franck and Passy were of high order. Lemonnier was never more eloquent than when he gave what he seemed to realize was his last public profession of faith in the ideals of liberty, justice, and peace. The discussion during the debates became spirited at times, and the English never did become accustomed to the continental habit of several orators all talking at the same time and trying to drown one another out. However, the resolutions were passed without any difficulty. Besides the usual

¹²⁶ Motion of the Marquis of Bristol, July 25, 1887. Revon: *L'Arbitrage*, pp.240-241.

¹²⁷ *H.P.* (October, 1883), p.285.

¹²⁸ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp.152-6; *Bulletin* (March, 1887), pp.282-5, 290.

¹²⁹ Lemonnier Notebook. Entries for August 30, 1888; June 10, 1889, and *passim*, and letters from Julie Toussaint to Lemonnier, 1888-89; *Assemblées ... 1887, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.137-138; *Assemblées ... 1888, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.18-20; *Concord* (1888), III. 291, 295.

adoration of arbitration, resolutions were passed, under Lemonnier's influence, advocating the principles of federation and neutralization. Lemonnier's hand is also to be seen in the resolution which declared that the same moral obligations which civilized peoples observed toward one another should also govern their relations with uncivilized peoples. The peacemakers returned home satisfied with their work and fortified by the conviction that they had comrades in other lands. The international movement was becoming a reality¹³⁰.

¹³⁰ *Bulletin du Ier Congrès Universel de la Paix* (Berne, 1901). This is a very meager account. There were also reports in *E.-U.* (Sept., 1889), and *Peace and Goodwill* (1889), II. 210-213, 227-229.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONAL PEACE MOVEMENTS IN THE NINETIES

The last years of the dying century gave little promise that the dawn of the new would usher in the millennium so devoutly wished by the pacifists. From all over the world sounded the clash of arms, while in Europe the armament race took on new impetus from the growing naval rivalries. In the Far East Japan practiced on a hapless China the arts she had learned in the school of occidental militarism. In the west Great Britain and the United States came uncomfortably close to war over the Venezuela controversy. The Cuban insurrection was drowned in blood, while at the other end of the world the Turks were massacring the Armenians. France sent an expedition to Madagascar, Great Britain's soldiers saw action on her far-flung battle-line, and Italy fought the First Abyssinian Campaign. Greece came to grips with Turkey. Great Britain and France came near to blows at Fashoda. The United States fought Spain in a major war. And the century ended with the Boer War in South Africa and the Boxer Uprising in China.

Peace was far off, but the peacemakers only redoubled their efforts. It was in the nineties that the international peace movement became a fact. Almost every year the pacifists assembled in their international congresses, while the parliamentarians came together to deliberate in annual conferences. By 1892 each group had established a permanent bureau at Berne to coordinate its activities. The pacifists saw the peace movement making slow but undeniable progress, and what was most important of all, what made the movement really international, was that at last the white flag of peace was firmly planted in the heart of Central Europe.

Austria and Germany

That a Germanic peace movement came to life in the nineties in the way it did was due chiefly to the influence of a remarkable woman, Baroness Bertha von Suttner, and a book, her novel, *Die Waffen Nieder*, one of the most powerful pieces of anti-war propaganda ever written. This new support for the cause came from Austria, but from a quarter where Hodgson Pratt had never looked when he had come to Vienna in search of peace disciples. Baroness von Suttner was a member of the aristocratic soldier-family of Kinsky. She first became an opponent of war, she tells us in her *Memoirs*, through the influence of Spencer, Buckle, and other intellectuals. Yet it was not until she began to pore over documents and accounts of past wars in preparation for a novel on the subject that she realized its true horror and came to hate

it with every fiber of her being. The Suttners were joyously happy together, and it was because she knew so well what life and beauty could mean that Baroness von Suttner became such a passionate enemy of the greatest destroyer of life and beauty. She wrote *Die Waffen Nieder*, she said, "to give expression to the pain which the image of war burned into my soul"¹.

The novel tells the story in autobiographical form of a young Austrian woman whose life is wrecked by the wars of the sixties. Into her sentimental tale the authoress weaves all the usual philosophical and rational arguments against war, and there are some gruesome war scenes which rival any to be found in the post-war literature of a later era. But the main appeal is ethical, and it was especially as a great moral force that Bertha von Suttner was to infuse the peace movement with new vitality. The whole novel is one mighty plea for the recognition of the sacred rights of the individual as superior to any claims of the State. And it was such an effective one that the magazine editors of Germany, who had been begging Bertha von Suttner to send manuscripts, refused to handle the work. As one admitted: "It is quite out of the question to publish the novel in a military country"². At last her regular publisher was persuaded to bring it out in book form, and as such *Die Waffen Nieder* appeared in 1890. Its success was phenomenal. In the course of years it ran into a number of editions, was translated into sixteen languages, and hundreds of thousands of copies found a market. It testified to the inarticulate yearnings of the masses for peace, feelings which were not strong enough for the pacifists to organize effectively, sentiments which were to be overthrown by other psychological forces pushing toward war, yet which must have been present for such a book to enjoy the enormous popularity which it did.

Just as it did for many others, it was the novel which brought Bertha von Suttner into the peace movement. She had not known that an organized anti-war movement existed until 1887, when Pratt's Association was brought to her notice. After the publication of *Die Waffen Nieder*, appreciations from the pacifists came to her from near and far, and it was through a connection of this sort that she became active in peace work for the first time. Fifteen months after the appearance of the novel, the Suttners were wintering in Venice. One day a dapper elderly gentleman called to pay his respects to the authoress of *Die Waffen Nieder* and to express his sympathies for the misfortunes which she had suffered. No better proof could be offered of the overwhelming impressions with which this novel left the reader.

¹ Bertha von Suttner: *Memoirs* (2 vols., Boston, 1910), I. 294; cf. C. E. Playne: *Bertha von Suttner* (London, 1936).

² Bertha von Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 296.

The gentleman was Felix Moscheles, one of the most engaging figures among the little band of pre-war pacifists. Since 1882 he had sat upon the Committee of the Peace Society, yet his pacifism was cosmopolitanism flavored with a pinch of socialism rather than the regular Christian variety. He was more in his element in the Arbitration Association, to the presidency of which he later succeeded Pratt. Moscheles was of German-Jewish descent, the baptized son of a baptized father, and he was equally at home in Germany, where he spent his school-days, in France, where he studied art and romped with Du Maurier as a youth, and in England, where he was naturalized and where he settled down. He served the cause of peace in many ways. He was one of the few anti-war painters of his day, although it must be admitted that his over-sentimentalized "Pictures with a Purpose", even if in the best Victorian manner, do not begin to carry the conviction of the realistic canvasses of Verestchagin, his better-known Russian contemporary³. His specialty was personal propaganda. He used to boast: "I firmly believe and I fearlessly assert that I can divert the course of conversation from any given subject to that treating of International Peace and Arbitration more rapidly than anyone who would attempt to compete with me"⁴. And if he had ever found that "after-dinner millionaire", for whom he was always looking to endow the peace movement, he would have been irresistible. He carried his serious convictions as lightly as did that other gay reformer, Sir Wilfred Lawson, and his columns in *Concord* sparkle with wit and playfulness. Rarely did the pacifists of this period say anything that had not been said before, but Moscheles knew how to deck out the old ideas in the newest and most fetching trappings⁵.

When Moscheles met the Suttners in Venice in 1891, he was vainly trying to "rouse the somewhat somnolent Venetians" and form a peace society. Now with the aid of Baroness von Suttner he was able to do something. She was a girlhood friend of the wife of the Marquis of Pandolfi, who was already interested in the cause, and it was he who called together a meeting of society leaders and public men and formed a Venetian branch of the Arbitration Association of London. Pandolfi was careful to make the public declaration: "I always oppose myself to disarmament, and still retain my honorable position in the Italian army". Several thousand members joined the new association, and it was the social event of the season. But, in the words of Moscheles, "the new society soon ceased to show signs of life, and the best of

³ The "Pictures with a Purpose" are now in the Board Room of Unity House, in London, the headquarters of the National Union of Railwaymen. Some of Verestchagin's anti-militarist pictures are in the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow.

⁴ *Concord* (1907), XXIII. 15.

⁵ Cf. Felix Moscheles: *In Bohemia with Du Maurier* (London, [1896]); *idem: Fragments of an Autobiography* (London, 1899); David Starr Jordan: *The Days of a Man* (2 vols., N.Y., 1922), II. 464ff.; *F.-W.* (1918), XX. 25-26.

Venetians seemed to find more satisfaction in gondololling than in attending committee meetings convened by a few enthusiasts". It was the same old story⁶.

Pandolfi went to Rome where he worked zealously to complete the organization of the Italian group of the Interparliamentary Conference and to prepare the coming conference in the Italian capital. It was on Pandolfi's urging that Baroness von Suttner attempted to bring about the formation of an Austrian interparliamentary committee. The first politician whom she approached was Dr. Kübeck, Liberal and member of the Cobden Club. He was too concerned about the danger from France and Russia, and the others whom he sounded out agreed that the moment was inopportune. But Bertha von Suttner had a faculty of enlisting the support of many who did not share her convictions but deeply respected her lofty motives. Time and time again she received aid from persons who acted out of personal sympathy for the great lady and who considered it an honor to serve her. Kübeck, though sceptical, continued his efforts, and he finally put her in touch with Baron Pirquet. Here was a man possessed of a firmer faith, and it was he who organized the Austrian committee and remained its capable head for many years⁷.

Now that Austrian representation in the Interparliamentary Conference at Rome was assured, Baroness von Suttner set out to make certain that her country would not be unrepresented in the international peace congress, which was also to be held there. On September 3, 1891, the *Neue Freie Presse* printed with approval her appeal for the establishment of an Austrian peace society. Just a few years before Pratt had sought in vain to scare up a little interest in the cause. But so great was the influence of the name of Bertha von Suttner that almost immediately she was deluged with hundreds of enthusiastic letters promising support. The society was formed first as a section of Pratt's arbitration Association, and then officially constituted independently as the *Österreichische Friedensgesellschaft* in October, 1891, with the authorization of the government. It was emphatically stated that the society was non-political, that its work was purely humanitarian, and that "its tendencies are thoroughly patriotic"⁸.

In the beginning the chief support came from the Viennese intelligentsia, from Liberal industrialists and politicians, and from certain high-minded members of the nobility who were personal conquests of the Baroness von Suttner. While the dues were kept small, the society never gained the support of the masses. Over two

⁶ Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 315-320; *Concord* (1908), XXIV. 134, (1914), XXXI. 119-120; *H.P.* (1891), pp.233-4, 295; statement of Moscheles at the assembly of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*, in *E.-U.* (August-September, 1891).

⁷ Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 326-334.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I. 335-347.

thousand members were enrolled in the first burst of enthusiasm, but many soon dropped out. In 1893 there were three hundred, and by 1898 there were over one thousand, most of them of the middle-classes. The society was never very active. Meetings were held in Vienna, good speeches were made, and publications were distributed. The type of society which it was is indicated by the report of a meeting of 1892, at which the poet Rosegger spoke, a well-known court actress recited a war fantasy, and Bertha von Suttner read a short story which she had composed for the evening. Two daughter societies were formed, a small group at the University of Vienna under the patronage of Professor Krafft-Ebing, and *Literarisch-Künstlerischer Verein*, neither of which flourished. But the idea persisted, and that a peace society should exist at all at the center of the Hapsburg Monarchy was just cause for the pacifists to rejoice⁹.

Still more were they to rejoice when a peace society was founded in Berlin at the beginning of the nineties, and the German peace movement finally began to take shape. In 1891 the peace forces in Germany were scattered. In the southwest the Darmstadt and Stuttgart societies were no more, and the Frankfort association was slumbering. The Pforzheim (Baden) industrialist, Dr. Adolf Richter, had long been active in the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*, but he was the only German pacifist known abroad. Several deputies from the Reichstag attended the Interparliamentary Conference at Rome, and on their return a parliamentary committee was set up, with the cooperation of Baumbach, vice-president of the Reichstag, Dr. Max Hirsch, co-founder of the Hirsch-Duncker labor unions, and Dr. Theodor Barth, editor of *Die Nation*. There was talk of founding a peace society, but the committee itself hardly existed in more than name¹⁰.

On November 4, 1891, in the Kaiserhof Café in Berlin a young man sat reading the newspapers. It was Alfred Hermann Fried, then not quite twenty-seven years of age, a Viennese Jew who had come to Berlin to make his fortune as a book-publisher. He was struggling to make both ends meet, and he knew what it was to go hungry. He had educated himself, and as was not unnatural for a man in his circumstances, he had learned to despise conservatism and nationalism, and he had come under the influence of socialist ideas. Ten years before he had seen the pictures of Verestchagin, and they had made him a confirmed foe of war. Yet Fried had always felt very much alone in his thinking. Now on that day in the Kaiserhof Café his eyes fell upon a report in the newspaper that a peace society had just been founded in Vienna by Bertha von Suttner. All at once he realized that there were others who

⁹ *D.W.N.* (1892), I. 15-18, 38, (1893), II. 34-6, 133-5 (1894), III. 259-260, (1895), IV. 11-14, (1896), V. 16, 357; *Österreichische Gesellschaft: Jahresbericht*. 1894, 1895, 1898.

¹⁰ Barth to Bajer, Jan. 28, 1891. Bajer MSS; *D.W.N.* (Feb., 1892), I. 27-28.

thought as he did about war. On the very same day he dashed off an impulsive note to Baroness von Suttner proposing the establishment of a peace journal which he would publish and of which she would be the editor. The great authoress had never heard of the young publisher, but the earnestness and the enthusiasm of his letter quite won her, and she immediately consented. A monthly, named *Die Waffen Nieder*, was begun in January, 1892. It was the beginning of a close cooperation between Fried and Baroness von Suttner which lasted the twenty years until her death, and Fried, who thus entered the peace army as a "*Gefühlspazifist*", as he called it, became its greatest journalist and the founder of "scientific pacifism"¹¹.

In their letters to one another Bertha von Suttner and Fried often discussed the possibility of forming a peace society at Berlin. In March, 1892, Fried managed to have her invited there by the Berlin Press Society for a public reading of her work. There was a banquet afterwards, and the occasion was utilized to stir up interest in the founding of a peace society. There were unfriendly words in some of the newspapers which reported the affair, but many were favorable, especially the *Berliner Tageblatt*, whose editor, Arthur Levysohn, had been present at the banquet. Friends of peace themselves were not immune from the poisons of international distrust. Passy had sent a letter to Bertha von Suttner in honor of the occasion, and in printing it Levysohn declared: "If there were never any but such voices sounding over the Vosges from France, the cause of peace, of humanity, of the higher civilization would soon have the victory". No peace society materialized immediately, but the affair was considered a success. Foreign pacifists looked on delighted. Wrote Bonghi to Bertha von Suttner: "You have had the audacity to go and plant your flag at Berlin, in the very fortress of our enemies"¹².

The time was not especially favorable for the beginning of organized peace work in Berlin. As Levysohn's editorial would indicate, the excitement over the Boulanger episode had not yet completely subsided, while the Caprivi Military Bill was in the offing. Moreover, the Ethical Culture movement was just getting under way, and it was taking up the energies of many of the humanitarians. Yet Fried began the work of collecting names, and Bertha von Suttner wrote covering letters to back him up. In August, 1892, on the occasion of the Fourth International Peace Congress at Berne, three Germans, Richter, Wirth of Frankfort, and Frau Fischer-Lette, sent out an appeal for the founding of a German peace society. In September, Fried visited

¹¹ A. H. Fried: *Autobiographic Sketch* (unpublished); this has been used by E. Friedrichs for his contribution to A. H. Fried: *Eine Sammlung von Gedankblättern*. Ed. by R. Goldscheid, et al. (Leipzig, 1922); information from Herr Otto Fried, brother of A. H. Fried; Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 372-3.

¹² Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 289-396, 440-1; Fried MSS: Letters from Bertha von Suttner, Nov. 5, 1891, and Dec., 1891, March, 1892, *passim*. (The important letters dealing with the founding of the peace society

Bertha von Suttner at the family castle near Vienna, and he returned to Berlin with new courage. He turned first to Eugen Schlieff, a Dresden jurist, who had just published a volume, entitled *Der Friede in Europa*, in which he attempted to show scientifically that peace could be established by the formation of a "*Staatensystem*". This was to be a weak type of federation which would provide a tribunal and a system of mutual territorial guarantees, not excluding, however, a modification of the *status quo*. Schlieff fell in with Fried's ideas that a peace organization should be formed, but he wanted to make it a political society. It would be a shame, he said, "to fall back again into the old litany of those peace apostles who were, to be sure, very good men, but *in politicis* thoroughly bad musicians". When he found that the projected society would be non-political, Schlieff withdrew from active collaboration. But his theories had greatly impressed Fried, who wrote to Bertha von Suttner: "While you, gracious lady, with your style of attack represent the South, Herr Dr. Schlieff represents the North. Heart and intellect, as if one or the other could work alone"¹³.

Fried continued his labors, while Bertha von Suttner kept writing the follow-up letters to kindle enthusiasm in the men whom he visited. Her letters to Fried are full of instructions and advice as to how he was to proceed. She told him what technique to use in going after "the big fish"; she warned him not to have too many Jews on the committee, lest the society become classified; she vetoed Schlieff's idea of a political organization. Fried was also fortunate in gaining the cooperation of Richard Grelling, a lawyer. On November 9, 1892, a provisional committee was finally organized. Its members belonged rather to the intelligentsia than to the political world, where Fried had first looked for supporters. The first general meeting was held on December 21, 1892. A committee was appointed to issue a public appeal, and this is the date usually taken as the birthday of the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*. Bertha von Suttner rejoiced. She wrote Fried: "What we owe to you in this matter is incalculable; if you had not kept tirelessly at work, nothing would have been effected - at least not for a long time". The news was made known to all the friends of peace through the International Peace Bureau, and the pacifist community was jubilant¹⁴.

The exultation was a little premature. Men who had been counted upon, like Professors Köhler and Philippson, resigned, while others, such as Spielhagen, the novelist, and old Professor Förster, head of the Berlin Observatory, took only passive

have been published in her *Memoirs*); *D.W.N.* (1892), I. 39-43; Bonghi to Suttner, April 16, 1892. Suttner MSS.

¹³ Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 441-3; *F.-W.* (1912), XIV. 54-56, 361-363; *D.W.N.* (1893), II. 450-2, (1894), III. 62-63, 69-70; Eugen Schlieff: *Der Friede in Europa* (Leipzig, 1892); Hans Wehberg: *Die Führer der Deutschen Friedensbewegung* (Leipzig, n.d.), pp.16-19.

roles. The worst blow was yet to come. The other members came to feel that Fried had certain personal disqualifications, and rather than risk the destruction of all his work by creating dissension in the group, he withdrew, on the advice of Bertha von Suttner¹⁵. With Fried gone, the whole thing languished. A meeting was held on March 10, 1895, with Pastor Hetzel in the chair, but it was not until October that the "Appeal to the German People" was issued, and not until December that a general assembly was convened. Grelling, who had taken on most of the work of organization, announced that over two hundred persons from all over Germany had sent in their adhesions to the Berlin society, and that sections had been formed in six cities¹⁶.

The statutes, which were written by Max Hirsch and formally approved several years later, declared: "War is in contradiction with the present degree of culture of civilized nations". They went on to say that it was not only a humanitarian but a patriotic duty to work for its removal. Its roots lay in the prejudices and passions which were a legacy from the old barbaric hatred of the foreigner, whereas actually all the peoples were members of humanity as a whole, and their interests were identical. It was the purpose of the *Friedensgesellschaft* to spread this sentiment and to foster the idea of peaceful understanding between the peoples, especially by promoting the practice of international arbitration. The reduction of armaments would come only when peace was assured at home and abroad¹⁷.

After the establishment of the central society at Berlin, the numerical growth of the German peace movement was rapid. By 1894 there were thirteen peace societies with about two thousand members. The number of sections doubled each year for the next two years, and in 1897 there were fifty-five peace groups. The high point was reached during the propaganda campaign in favor of the Hague Peace Conference; in November, 1898, there were seventy-four sections with approximately eight thousand members¹⁸. General assemblies of delegates from the local groups met each year and served to hold the movement together. The publication of *Die Waffen Nieder* each month brought the peace cause to the public notice, and another journal was started as organ of the society, the *Monatliche Friedenskorrespondenz*, published first by Wirth at Frankfort, and later at Berlin. Two political parties, the *Freisinnige*

¹⁴ Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 442-8; Grelling's article in Fried: *Gedankblättern*; *D.W.N.* (Nov., 1892), p.36, (Dec., 1892), p.35; *Correspondance Autographiée*, no.1 (Dec. 9, 1892), p.2.

¹⁵ Suttner to Fried, Dec. 27, 29, 31, 1892. Fried MSS. In these letters she tried gently to soothe his wounded pride. Fried was always very sensitive, and this experience was one of the reasons why he never joined a peace society again.

¹⁶ *D.W.N.* (1893), II. 34, 136, 402-3, (1894), III. 29-30; *Corr. Autogr.*, no.3 (Jan.14, 1893), no.17 (Oct., 1893), no.21 (Jan., 1894); cf. the articles by Dr. Quidde in *F.-W.* (1928), XXVIII. 7-8, (1932), XXXII. 338-41.

¹⁷ *D.W.N.* (1899), VIII. 59-60.

and the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, officially went on record in their programs as approving all efforts for international peace and arbitration, while the Social Democrats, although standing apart from the peace movement, declared for arbitration of all international disputes¹⁹.

Apparently the German peace movement had made mighty strides, and this is what the German pacifists told their foreign colleagues. A closer examination of the situation reveals a different picture. In 1902, after the agitation over the Hague Conference had subsided and the peace movement had returned to normal, Germany had sixty-one peace groups with six thousand members. This number was little larger than that in 1896. Of the sixty-one, only nine were in north and east Germany; of these nine, only the Hamburg and Berlin sections were at all active. The rest of the sections, of which only about four did very much, were located in the south, centered especially in Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse, and the region of the Main. All of thirty-three of these were founded through the personal influence of one man, old Franz Wirth. In fact, the German peace movement, in so far as it was not just a long list of societies on a piece of paper, existed mainly in the efforts of a small group of devoted workers, including Wirth, Richter, Richard Reuter, a journalist, Heilberg, a lawyer, Feldhaus, a former actor, and later Pastor Umfrid and Professor Quidde. These were the men upon whom the whole burden of the organized movement in Germany rested. They toured all Germany, giving lectures, stirring up interest in the cause, and founding sections of the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft* wherever possible. Feldhaus, in particular, was known for his itinerant wanderings from one end of Germany to the other as a preacher of peace. Up to 1914 he had given over six hundred talks, Fried used to call him "a second Peter of Amiens"²⁰.

Wirth's formula for starting up a new peace group was very simple. First he would select a likely city. Then he would enter into communication with individuals there by means of a form letter which he had prepared. If he found a man with influence and leisure, he would have him arrange a meeting of some ten or twelve interested persons. Then, when all was in readiness, Wirth would come and address the group, and a society or perhaps just a committee would be formed. In explaining his technique, Wirth remarked: "It is not necessary that the society have many members right away; one can begin with ten to fifteen. It is of the greatest importance, however, especially with regard to foreign countries, that we in Germany

¹⁸ *Concord* (1894), IX. 108-9; *D.W.N.* (1899), VIII. 32; Wehberg: *Führer*, p. 14.

¹⁹ A.H. Fried: *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (Vienna, 1905), pp.293-4; Bertha von Suttner: "Chronik der Friedensbewegung von 1892-1896", in K. P. Arnoldson: *Pax Mundi* (Stuttgart, 1896), pp.177, 186, 193.

have a large number of societies. Abroad they set the greatest value upon this and they have often said so." He explained further that the group did not have to be very active: it was only necessary to arrange several speeches, have a few reunions, and send delegates to the national congress²¹.

The Central Society at Berlin did practically nothing. The letters of Wirth and Richter are filled with complaints about its inactivity²². In 1895 Fried proposed that the seat of the *Friedensgesellschaft* be moved from Berlin to Frankfurt. This was vetoed by the Executive Committee of the Berlin association, Bertha von Suttner concurring, on the ground that it was necessary to save appearances in the presence of the foreign peace movement, for the capital of the empire had to remain the capital of the peace movement²³. All the Berlin society seemed able to do was to run up a debt for the publication of the *Friedenskorrespondenz*, which the local groups received but did not pay for²⁴. It was the Frankfurt society which did all the work, and it even had to make good some of the Berlin society's debts. There was a feud between Wirth and Grelling which was only one of a number of petty internal conflicts which seriously weakened the movement. In 1895 Loewenthal re-established at Berlin his old *Deutscher Verein für Internationale Friedenspropaganda*. Fried joined forces with him and together they waged a competition with the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*. Loewenthal's *idée fixe* was compulsory arbitration, and he publicly attacked the rest of the peace movement for failing to agree with him. Fried soon withdrew from cooperation with him, convinced that the man was a "*Querkopf*", and fearing that he would do the others harm with his "patented peace movement"²⁵.

Fried himself was no easy man to get along with. His colleagues paid tribute to his ability, but he was never very popular among them. The Frenchman, Moch, admitted to Bertha von Suttner: "The good Fried appears to me often to lack moderation, as well as tolerance"²⁶. Richter regretted that "M. Fried is always very active and zealous enough, but *hélas!* he has such disagreeable qualities that he cannot

²⁰ A.H. Fried: *Die Ausgestaltung der Friedensaktion in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1903); Hans Wehberg: "Les Vingt Premières Années du Mouvement Pacifiste en Allemagne", in *P.D.* (1913), XXIII. 233-240; cf. Wehberg's short sketches of the early leaders in his *Führer*.

²¹ Franz Wirth: "Die Gründung von Friedens-Ortsgruppen", in *D.W.N.* (1895), IV. 94-95; Dietz: *Wirth*, pp.36-7, and *passim*.

²² *Ibid.*, pp.33-5, 38-9; Richter to Bajer, July 1, 1895. Bajer MSS.

²³ Suttner to Fried, Jan. 8, 1895. Fried MSS; Dietz: *Wirth*, pp.34-5.

²⁴ *Concord* (1897), XII. 67.

²⁵ Richter to Bajer, Dec. 26, 1895; Fried to Bajer, Feb. 20, 1902. Bajer MSS; Fried to Ducommun, April 17, 1896. B.I.P. MSS., V, B, 6; *D.W.N.* (1895), IV. 423, (1896), V. 423-4, (1897), VI. 236, 267-8, (1898), VII. 452-3.

²⁶ Moch to Suttner, Dec.22, 1896. Suttner MSS. Fried was the one who attacked Moch when this ex-army officer fought a duel in 1901, while Moch, who was not noted for tolerance himself, assailed Fried after the Great War, charging him with acquiescence in the German violation of Belgium.

win friends among us"²⁷. In 1899 Richter was complaining to Bajer: "There are always quarrels at Berlin, and now they have had a falling out with our friend Fried, who has done such stupid things"²⁸. Fried had made an issue out of some slight which he received. The dispute dragged along until it was settled by an arbitral tribunal, which was chosen by the two sides. So the affair ended in the triumph of arbitration, but there was in evidence very little of that "mutual goodwill", which Passy declared "must be the first sentiment of those who preach concord to men and to nations"²⁹.

In January, 1898, Fried wrote to Haberland, head of the Executive Committee of the Berlin Peace Society, proposing that the society arrange for a lecture by Bertha von Suttner in Berlin. Haberland answered that he would call together his committee, but he did not think that it could be done. Fried was indignant. He thought of how hard he had worked to found the society and what little remained to show for it. Better than anything else his letter reveals the true state of affairs. Here is what the founder of the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft* wrote in January, 1898:

Your letter has aroused in me feelings of pensive melancholy, for it proves to me once again what you have even admitted, that the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*, which was founded in 1891 with so much effort and so much enthusiasm, now carries on only an illusionary existence - a society whose decaying fragments even hinder the free development of the Idea and the end of whose existence, in the interest of the good cause, would unfortunately be welcomed more joyfully than its continued existence. You write me that you will call together the Executive Committee to submit the affair to them. These three or four ladies and gentlemen who will answer your call will, in their comfortable office, say Yes with serious mien to everything which will be presented to them, and this elaborate transaction will then pass in the world for the consequence of the will of a society which claims to have over one thousand members in Berlin and which tells itself that it represents ideas which move worlds....

What good does it do to boast of the great expansion of the Berlin peace society at general assemblies and at congresses and to trumpet it forth to the world with the deep tone of conviction ... One must be honest and always recognize that history is not made by boasting.

You will admit to me, dear Herr Haberland, that the Berlin peace society - for someone who knows the situation as well as I - cannot be regarded as a living society, and that consequently, in arranging peace demonstrations, it is better to make a detour

²⁷ Richter to Ducommun, May, 1904. B.I.P. MSS., V, B, 6.

²⁸ Richter to Bajer, July 7, 1899. Bajer MSS.

²⁹ *F.-W.* (July 10, 1899), I. 14. The story is to be pieced together from the note of Bertha von Suttner in *D.W.N.* (1899), VIII. 321, and in Fried's comments in the Editor's Letter-Box of *F.-W.* (1899), I. 32, 80, 111, and Nov., 1899.

around this cadaver. I shall arrange the Suttner evening myself. I am just as much a peace society as the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*, with just the slight difference that I am filled with understanding and interest for the cause³⁰.

It must be admitted that Fried's letter represented things as they were. The central society was, as he later called it, "a club of harmless people"³¹. And despite the long list of local groups which was constructed, the movement remained confined to a small group of hard-working but uninfluential idealists. One of them, Reuter, wrote before his death in 1904: "Germany has from the beginning taken up an unfriendly stand toward the peace movement - it can be said quite frankly - people and government taken together, the most unfavorable of all civilized States". And Reuter had entered the peace movement ten years before with the conviction that France was the chief menace to European peace³².

At first the German newspapers refused to take the peace movement seriously. In 1892 this doggerel verse of Felix Dahn was going the rounds:

An die weiblichen und männlichen Waffenscheuen

*Die Waffen Hoch! Das Schwert ist Mannes eigen,
Wo Männer fechten, hat das Weib zu schweigen,
Doch freilich, Männer gibt's in diesen Tagen,
Die sollten lieber Unterröcke tragen*³³.

And in 1893, when the boxing kangaroo arrived in Berlin and refused to box, a Vienna newspaper remarked that it had received a laurel wreath from Bertha von Suttner and had been made a member of the *Österreichische Friedensgesellschaft*³⁴. In 1894 there came a change. The title of the column in *Die Waffen Nieder* in which Bertha von Suttner gave space to adverse opinions was changed from "Pro-War" to "Anti-Peace Movement". The movement had become important enough to draw serious attacks. Pacifists always welcomed them. "Certainly such attacks do not injure popularity!" wrote Bertha von Suttner. "The more the idea is combated, the stronger it will become"³⁵. One reason for the change was the notice given the cause by the publication of Bertha von Suttner's magazine, which was not a journal or propaganda, but a high-class literary periodical, in which some of the best German authors were induced to discuss the question of war and peace. Another factor was

³⁰ Haberland to Fried, Jan. 10, 1898; copy, Fried to Haberland, Jan. 11, 1898. Fried MSS.

³¹ Copy, Fried to Selenka, Feb. 12, 1899, Fried MSS.

³² Quoted in Wehberg: *Führer*, p.24. Wehberg, who has an unrivalled knowledge of the peace movement, agrees with Reuter's statement.

³³ *D.W.N.* (1892), I. 47; reprinted in Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 300.

³⁴ *Concord* (July, 1893), VIII.

the publicity won for the peace movement by Fried, who took it as his self-appointed task to pierce the walls of indifference which had hitherto kept the peace movement out of the newspapers. And it happened that 1893 was an unusually active year for the friends of peace in Germany³⁶.

It is possible to obtain from the "Anti-Peace Movement" column and other notices in *Die Waffen Nieder* a fair sampling of German newspaper opinion on the peace crusade. The entire conservative and anti-Semitic press, led by the authoritative *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *Junker Kreuzzeitung*, and the *Kölnische Zeitung*, was hostile, while such liberal journals as the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the *Nation*, and the *Neue Freie Presse*, were, on the whole, more sympathetic. For its opponents the whole peace movement was symbolized in the person of Baroness von Suttner, and it was at "*Friedens-Bertha*" and "*Friedens-Furie*", that they levelled all their attacks. They repeated all the old arguments about the inevitability of war, quoting Moltke's solemn pronouncement on eternal peace and justifying it by the theories of "Social Darwinism". They seized upon the number of Jews in both the Austrian and the German movement and stamped the societies as "Jewish-international". Bertha von Suttner was often caricatured in the Austrian comic papers as leading a troop of Polish Jews. Despite all attempts to keep the societies free from political partisanship, their members were for the most part drawn from the ranks of the democrats, while what progress was made was restricted to the more liberal southwest. Consequently, the conservatives attacked the friends of peace as anti-monarchists.

The chief contention was that the activities of the pacifists constituted a danger to Germany. Some opponents claimed that the pacifists were playing the game of the socialists by working for a disarmament which would leave an unarmed nation easy prey to the socialist revolution. Actually the German peace workers did not preach disarmament at all. Other opponents accused the pacifists of being Francophile. This was not true, but the fact was that the German pacifists, in league with foreign peace men, were attacking the evils of militarism, and Germany happened to be the most militaristic of all the nations. The most serious charge against the pacifists was that, by spreading cosmopolitan ideals, they were weakening the sense of patriotism, and so weakening the German nation. How their opponents reasoned may be indicated by the account of some events of 1898. In January of that year there was discussed in the Baden Chamber a petition sponsored by the Baden section of the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*, which asked the government to correct errors in the history

³⁵ Suttner to Fried, July 7, 1892. Fried MSS.

³⁶ Statement of Wirth at the International Peace Congress of 1894, *Bulletin*, p.71; *D.W.N.* (1894), III. 20.

books and in the schools. The government opposed the motion which was made in support of the petition, but it was passed by a majority of one. Immediately the conservative press all over Germany stormed at the "simple" Baden parliamentarians. Authoritative was the voice of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which exclaimed:

With the disappearance of the soldier who is ready at any moment to give his life for his fatherland, the State disappears; with the State disappears discipline, order, morality; therefore also Christianity.... With the German State would disappear the German *Kultur*. The naïve peacemakers of Pforzheim and Lönach want "*Kulturgeschichte*" in the elementary schools; in actually they are serving the ends of the sworn irreconcilable foes of our nationality and of our German *Kultur*³⁷.

The peace movement had a smaller degree of success in Germany than in any of the other large countries in which it was established. Conservatives and National Liberals stood in strong opposition, the Catholics took no part, and the members of the working class, if they read Bertha von Suttner's novel and wanted to protest against the order of things, did so not by joining the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft*, but by joining the Social Democratic Party, which looked with scorn on the bourgeois peace movement. Only among a small section of the more advanced Liberals was the cause of peace taken up actively, and the apostles of peace were few and their influence small. It could not have been otherwise. They had to buck a militaristic spirit which seemed deeply rooted in the German soul. The rulers of Germany thought of the army not as a burden upon the people, but as an instrument of progress, while, according to the commonly held doctrine of Treitschke, war was no evil, but a glorious opportunity for the true patriot to lay down his life on the battle-field as the supreme sacrifice to the fatherland. It was not that the Germans wanted war. They were probably no less peace-loving than the rest of the Europeans. But they had won national unity through the sword, and the belief was more widespread in Germany than anywhere else that peace itself could be best maintained by the sword. This philosophy of force was espoused even by Liberals like Friedrich Naumann, who wrote in his very popular *Demokratie und Kaisertum*: "*Nothing, nothing in universal history can help culture, civilization, morals, if they are not guarded and sustained by force. All history teaches that, and the more educated a people is, the more certain will it be of this ... He who wants to live must fight.*"³⁸

³⁷ *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 89-100; cf. also *ibid.*, (1896), V. 59-65.

³⁸ Friedrich Naumann: *Demokratie und Kaisertum. Ein Handbuch für Innere Politik* (4th ed., Berlin, 1905), pp.205-207.

France

In France the peace movement did not meet the opposition which it encountered in Germany, nor did it have the measure of success which it had in England. The new generation coming to manhood in the nineties had not undergone the emotional experiences of those terrible years of 1870 and 1871. Yet, while the thought of military revenge was farther than ever from the minds of the French people, and while they wanted peace with all their hearts, it was still not deemed prudent to preach it. As Goblet told Passy, it was not for the vanquished nation to talk of peace. And any demand for peace seemed to carry with it an acquiescence in the *status quo*, which meant an unpardonable renunciation of the lost provinces.

In the nineties the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* underwent its final metamorphosis. Much of the history of the *Ligue* is summed up in the despairing telegram which Marie Goegg sent to Elie Ducommun on December 4, 1891: "*Lemonnier mort quoi faire*". These two and Angelo Umilta, an exiled Italian republican who died soon after, were the only ones left of the little band who had helped Lemonnier found the *Ligue* in the days before the Franco-Prussian War and had remained faithful ever since. With Lemonnier's death the great driving force which had carried the *Ligue* along for twenty-five years was gone. But his noble spirit had made other conquests in the seventies and eighties, and there were now younger disciples to carry on. Most prominent among them were Léon de Montluc, a jurist, Michel Revon, the president of the *Ligue* today, and Emile Arnaud, who succeeded Lemonnier as president when Ducommun's duties as Secretary of the International Peace Bureau made it impossible for him to accept the office. It was in the spirit of the founder of the *Ligue* and in devotion to his revered memory that these men remained true to the *Ligue* and kept it from sharing the fate of many of the other old peace societies which did not survive the Great War.

Before he died, Lemonnier realized that with the beginning of an international peace movement the function of the *Ligue* had changed. As he told Ducommun, the role of the *Ligue* henceforth would be to impregnate the international peace movement with its own principles. This was to be done by the delegates of the *Ligue* at the International Peace Congresses and primarily through the Swiss deputies, many of them members of the *Ligue*, at the Interparliamentary Conferences. He early recognized the necessity for giving the international peace movement some coordination, and without the invaluable aid and counsel of Lemonnier, who put the

resources of the *Ligue* at his disposal, Bajer would have had a difficult time in founding the International Peace Bureau³⁹.

After the organization of the peace movement internationally, the work of the *Ligue* became in some respects superfluous. Yearly assemblies were still held, but the development of doctrine ceased with the death of Lemonnier, and the *Ligue's* meetings served only to act as a sort of filter for the problems discussed at the International Peace Congresses. As the custodian of the principles of the French Revolution, the *Ligue* had always been pro-French, and now this orientation became more pronounced. Lemonnier had attacked Bismarck's policy at every opportunity, and he had been of the firm conviction that the German Chancellor had formed the Triple Alliance with the specific purpose of waging a preventive war against France⁴⁰. Arnaud looked upon the Franco-Prussian rapprochement as merely a counterweight, preventing the aggression of the Triple Alliance. In fact, Arnaud's Russophilism almost resulted in the withdrawal of the few Germans who still remained in the Central Committee of the *Ligue*, Richter, and Karl Dennig, his father-in-law⁴¹. New sections were formed in France and Switzerland, and the *Ligue* became a Franco-Swiss association, with the French influence predominant. An effort was made to recapture the old international character when most of the well-known pacifists were named to the Central Committee, but this only had the effect of weakening some of the old principles. For example, Hodgson Pratt, who thirty years before had been unable and unwilling to join the Committee because of his monarchism, became a member after 1900. In general, the young president Arnaud, "the Benjamin of the peace movement", as he was called, remained faithful to the tradition of the *Ligue*, and he edited *Les Etats-Unis* in a sense loyal to the wishes of Lemonnier, even if in his vigorous and energetic manner he behaved toward his colleagues in the *Ligue* in a way which was utterly foreign to the kind and respectful consideration which Lemonnier had always shown his fellow workers⁴².

In France the *Société Française pour l'Arbitrage entre Nations* lost where the *Association de la Paix par le Droit* gained. In 1890, after the merger of the two older societies, the *Société* numbered about one thousand members and adherents; in 1895 there were only about one hundred and fifty paid-up members. The society still retained its conservative character. In 1899, for example, the monarchist Count de Chambrun was numbered among the contributors⁴³. A journal was begun in 1899, *La Revue de l'Arbitrage entre Nations*, but only six hundred copies were printed, whereas

³⁹ Letters of Lemonnier to Ducommun, 1889-1891. B.I.P. MSS., VIII, A, 2.

⁴⁰ *E.-U.* (January 1, 1880).

⁴¹ Richter to Bajer, (Dec. 28, 1894); *E.-U.* (August-September, 1891).

⁴² *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* file. B.I.P. MSS., VIII, A, 2.

⁴³ *L'Arbitrage* (1899), III. 24.

five times as many copies of *La Paix par le Droit* were published. As usual there were some good names on the council, including Professor Bréal, the philologist, Sully-Prudhomme of the French Academy, and Senator Trarieux; but as before, the main activity consisted in the literary and oratorical efforts of Passy, Richet, and Thiaudière. Both the *Société* and the *Association de la Paix par le Droit* had to work with a capital of not more than about five hundred dollars. The younger organization carried on a more active propaganda, and by 1902 there were twelve hundred members, three hundred of them university students. Sections were founded in the departments, lectures held in Paris, and members were recruited by personal propaganda, but the best energies of the leaders went into the *Almanach de la Paix* and the journal, *La Paix par le Droit*, by means of which a larger public was reached⁴⁴.

In 1889 the London Peace Society resolved to begin work in earnest among the French Protestants. With the help of Passy (who was not a protestant, but a Liberal Catholic), Darby, Secretary of the Peace Society, convened a meeting of Protestants at Paris in November of that year, with the idea of inducing them to take up active work for peace and arbitration. Darby was new to the game, having just been appointed, and the reunion must have been a revelation to him. He had not expected to find such reluctance to accept his ideas. The meeting finally approved the extension of the principle of arbitration, but as the *Matin* was glad to point out, "They were unanimous in their resolve to maintain, under all circumstances, and by all means, our claim for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine". It was without any effective aid from French Protestant bodies that the Peace Society continued to distribute its tracts in France. In 1890 it established a permanent bureau at Paris for this purpose⁴⁵.

Although the Peace Society did not find any great degree of cooperation, there were many Protestants already active in the cause of peace in France. In fact, the French peace movement was in the hands of the Protestants and the freethinkers. Despite all the efforts of Passy, Catholic prelates had always refused to aid the peace movement, holding that there could be no confusion of truth with error, no cooperation of Catholics with heretics in this matter, as peace would come when the principles of Christianity, as understood by Rome, were practiced on the earth. A change was noticed in the nineties. Leo XIII made several public pronouncements in favor of disarmament, and in 1896 several English and American cardinals issued a pastoral letter commending the current efforts for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, while Cardinal Rampolla, the Papal Secretary of State, also publicly blessed

⁴⁴ *Bulletin de la Société Française pour l'Arbitrage entre Nations* (Jan.-June, 1890); P.D. and L'Arbitrage, *passim*; cf. the report on French peace societies by Langlade (*Premier Congrès National des Sociétés Françaises de la Paix, 1902. Compte Rendu* (Toulouse, 1903), pp.30-62), pp.38-9, 42-5.

the undertaking. In the same year he most cordially answered an address from the International Peace Congress of Budapest. Yet in France, apart from the activity of a few priests like the Abbé Pichot, there was no general Catholic participation in the peace movement in the nineties. Not until 1899 was there founded a Catholic peace society, appropriately named *La Société Gratry de la Paix*. It was significant that when in 1900 the English Friends were distributing in many lands translations of their tract, *Christianity and War*, they decided, after long deliberation, not to bother to distribute any copies to the Roman Catholics of France⁴⁶.

It was in the nineties that French women began to take a more prominent part in the peace movement. Peace congresses had not failed to exhort the women of the world to unite for peace, and appeals had been made by individuals, such as Frederika Bremer, the Swedish novelist, Marie Goegg, the friend of Lemonnier, Mathilde Bajer, and Julia Ward Howe. Mrs. Howe had even attempted to organize a Women's International Peace Association after the Franco-Prussian War⁴⁷. In 1890, when the Second International Peace Congress again sent out the appeal for women to help the cause, the only women's peace societies in Europe were the Ladies' Auxiliaries of the English organizations. But the active interest of women in peace work was increasing with the growing feminist movement. In 1895 there was founded at Washington the International Council of Women, which was committed to peace as well as to other aims. In April, 1895, Miss Ellen Robinson, an English Friend and peace worker, drew up an appeal for peace and arbitration from "The Women of England to their Sisters of France". It was signed by all the prominent English women reformers and suffragists. Mme Eugénie Potonié-Pierre, a leader in the struggle for women's rights in France, succeeded in gaining the adhesions of prominent French feminists and peace workers, and by calling upon her friends in other lands she was able to establish a Women's International Peace Union. "If these ladies send delegates to the Governments", suggested a friendly journalist in *Figaro*, "let them not overlook the prettiest among them"⁴⁸.

The Union did not last, but the idea was in the air, and in 1896 Princess Wiszniewska founded at Paris the *Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour le Désarmement Général*. Each member had to pledge herself "to fight against war in

⁴⁵ *H.P.* (Sept.-Dec., 1899), pp.279, 303, 309-310, 317, (May, 1890), p.57, (June, 1894), p.74.

⁴⁶ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp. 109-110; Fried: *Handbuch* (1905), pp. 290-1; *Revue de Droit International Public* (1896), III. 334-5; Langlade, *op.cit.*, pp.48-9; Friends Peace Committee. Minutes, October 4, 1900.

⁴⁷ Curti: *Peace or War*, pp. 115-16; Conway, *op. cit.*, II. 283-4.

⁴⁸ *Proceedings of the Universal Peace Congress, London, 1890*, p. 162; *Les Femmes d'Angleterre à leurs Soeurs de France, Londres, le 28 Avril, 1895*; Eugénie Potonié-Pierre: "L'Union Internationale des Femmes pour la Paix" in *P.D.* (1895), V. 232-8; *Peace and Goodwill* (1895), IV. 98-99; *ibid.* (1895), VI. 145.

all its forms" and "to defend everywhere the general disarmament". The association weathered some early crises, which were caused by dissensions among the founders, and by 1902 the Women's Universal Alliance for Peace by Education, as it was now called, had received five million adhesions, individual and collective, and there were national committees in many countries⁴⁹.

The founding of the women's societies was just another indication of the growth of the French peace movement. By 1896 there were fifteen independent peace societies, publishing nine different periodicals, while there were seven other journals devoted to the cause of peace, including the Paris daily, *La Paix*, and the monthly, *La Revue Libérale*. One of the leaders, Gaston Moch, analysed the situation in an article in *La Paix par le Droit*, in which he pointed out the needless duplication of effort. "Enough distinct societies", he cried, "enough independent journals, or we shall rightly perish from excess of zeal". He showed how the movement was centralized in other countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, and he proposed that the French societies send delegates to an assembly with the purpose of founding a federation. The meeting was held on November 28, 1896. Federation was considered too strong, and instead the delegates charged Moch with the organization of a Peace Bureau, which was to serve as an intermediary between the different French societies, as well as between the French societies and the International Peace Bureau at Berne. Of the thirteen societies represented at this gathering, only eight approved this move; Passy's *Société* in particular was opposed to any action which might mean that it would be subordinated or absorbed. Nor did the other societies give Moch their wholehearted cooperation. After several years he had to report to Berne that the *Bureau Français de la Paix* was no more⁵⁰.

Besides writing and lecturing for peace, the French pacifists began to keep after election candidates to secure peace pledges. Passy's resolution for a Franco-American treaty of arbitration had been side-tracked when he failed to be reelected in 1889, but in 1895 Barodet introduced a similar motion, and it was passed unanimously and without debate⁵¹. At the same time Passy interviewed the foreign minister, but kind words were all that he could obtain⁵². This was the only type of political activity in which the French pacifists indulged; when Jacques Dumas appealed to them in 1894 to leave the realm of philosophical inquiry and become a

⁴⁹ *Le Désarmement Général* (Première Année, no.1, July, 1896). Apparently no more issues were published; *P.D.* (1898), VIII. 26; Langlade, *op. cit.*, pp.47-8; Moch to Suttner, October 22, 1897. Suttner MSS.

⁵⁰ *P.D.* (1896), VI. 229-241, (1897), VII. 19-21; letters from Moch to Ducommun, 1896-1901. B.I.P. MSS. V,B,1; *Bureau Français de la Paix. Compte Rendu*, 1897, 1898.

⁵¹ *E.-U.* (August, 1895).

⁵² Passy to Ducommun, Oct. 25, 28, 1895. B.I.P. MSS., V,B,1.

party, there was no response⁵³. Pratt's plan to remove Anglo-French friction through a round-table discussion of the moot points was always balked by the hesitancy of the French⁵⁴.

When the agitation arose in France over the Dreyfus Case, the peace societies, for the most part, remained perfectly quiet. Passy, Yves Guyot, and Trarieux were among the first to come forward in support of Zola, but they did so as individuals. All France was torn in two, and the peace societies were no exception. Passy wrote Ducommun: "Minds are so excited, and the division is such that in the council of the *Société Française* itself we can find no agreement on these sad affairs". Baroness von Suttner, Moneta, and other foreign pacifists had assumed that the International Peace Bureau would immediately raise its voice in protest against the injustice, but the French insisted that the Bureau remain neutral, and they opposed any manifestations among the pacifists⁵⁵.

Arnaud in *Les Etats-Unis* took sides and did not fail to point out that the whole disgraceful business only went to show what was possible under the armed truce in which Europe lived. But the two chief peace periodicals in France, *L'Arbitrage entre Nations* and *La Paix par le Droit*, remained silent on the issue, except for one restrained article by Ruysen in the latter journal. He was even criticized for that on the ground that the journal was supposed to be non-political. One subscriber wrote in afterwards to charge that the pacifists were entirely too timid, that they should have joined the socialists and taken advantage of the anti-militarism which arose as a result of the Dreyfus Case. But you want to be anti-nothing, taunted the critic, "You want to make a revolution, the most difficult of all, and you do not want to be revolutionaries"⁵⁶.

Most certainly the pacifists did not want to be revolutionaries. Far from associating themselves with the general attack on the army, the *Association de la Paix par le Droit* made a point of having one of its members assure the premier that "as for the national army, we have the firm desire to maintain it, in the present state of Europe. All of us are soldiers, or reserve officers. If we were deputies we would vote the war budget ... *Et nous sommes pour les armées permanentes, mais nous ne sommes pas pour les armées ... éternelles*"⁵⁷. The French peace men were always good patriots. As Trarieux explained it:

⁵³ *P.D.* (1894), IV. 1-4.

⁵⁴ *L'Arbitrage* (1898), II. 286.

⁵⁵ Passy to Ducommun, Feb. 28, Suttner to Ducommun, Jan. 21, Ducommun to Suttner, Jan. 28, 1898. B.I.P. MSS., V,B,1,7; Ducommun to Suttner, March 14, 1898. Suttner MSS; *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 71.

⁵⁶ *E.-U.* (Jan.-Feb., 1898); *P.D.* (1897), VII. 279-281, (1898), VIII. 18, (1899), IX. 473-5.

⁵⁷ *P.D.* (1898), VIII. 320-1.

We are not internationalists like certain Socialists who deny the idea of the fatherland; and for myself, even if I have a vision of great advances for humanity to make, and if the pacification of Europe is one of the greatest causes which can inspire us, I am forgetting nothing that concerns the honor and the greatness of my country, to which, above all, my heart and my thought belong⁵⁸.

In 1904, at the Second National Peace Congress, the French pacifists came out flatly against the anti-militarists in the following words:

Whereas the duty toward the fatherland is the first and most concrete of duties toward humanity, the Congress exhorts all the educators of youth to neglect nothing to inspire their pupils with the concern to fulfil faithfully and courageously the obligation which the military law imposes upon them⁵⁹.

The French pacifists were not favored with such a chorus of newspaper attacks as were their colleagues across the Rhine, yet neither did they meet with any great degree of encouragement or even comprehension. Passy was forever complaining that the accounts of peace conferences and peace congresses were inadequate and inexact. And he had his troubles when he endeavored to correct them. It was one of the ambitions of Passy's life to win enough respect so that whenever he had anything to say, the columns of the press would stand open to him. He never saw that ambition realized. Except for some years when Yves Guyot and Lanessan were editing the *Siècle*, Passy had no credit with any of the important journals. He was always unsuccessful when he knocked at the inhospitable doors of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and after 1867 he had no more luck with the *Temps*. He did not bother its editors with articles; he merely tried to secure publicity, by furnishing information on the peace movement, by correcting inexact or incomplete accounts, and by sending international documents. All the notice he received was the ironic mention, from time to time, of "the deceptive illusions of the Utopian successors to the honest Abbé de Saint Pierre". When, during the Fashoda crisis, Passy wrote to the editor of the *Temps*, appealing to him to remind the governments that they had at their disposal the resources of arbitration, he was not even granted an answer. He happened to mention the incident to an influential colleague at the Society of Political Economy, who was astounded at the breach of etiquette. The next day Passy received a letter from the editor of the *Temps*, telling him that it was impossible for France to suggest arbitration, as a refusal would be a humiliation. And the editor promised Passy more consideration in the future, but he never got it⁶⁰.

⁵⁸ Interview in *L'Eclair*, Nov. 4, 1893. Guébin Collection.

⁵⁹ E. Arnaud: *Pacifisme et ses Détracteurs* (Paris, 1906), p. 27.

⁶⁰ Passy: *Notes Autobiographiques*, pp. 106-113, 114-186.

In 1891 the *Revue des Revues*, which generally gave space to the affairs of peace, invited opinions about the International Peace Congress about to open. Melchior de Vogué, member of the French Academy, appealed to the authority of Joseph de Maistre and Darwin to support his contention that

the certainty of peace - I do not say *peace*, I say *the absolute certainty of peace* - would engender before half a century a corruption and a decadence more destructive of man than the worst of wars. ... But the whole experience of history teaches us that they cannot be abolished as long as there remain on the earth two men, a loaf of bread, some money, and a woman between them.

Thus spake the clever *fin de siècle* intellectual. Jules Claretie, another well-known writer, gave what was the more common opinion of the day. He said that of course he believed in peace -

Only, ah only! As the philosophers and the benefactors of humanity are not the masters, it is well that our soldiers watch on the frontiers and at home, and their arms, well carried and well handled, are perhaps the surest guarantee of that peace which we all love⁶¹.

Out-and-out opponents of the peace movement were in the minority in France at this time, but they were not unheard from. The pacifists called them the "chauvinists", and this is the picture which Lavissee has given us of chauvinism:

To it every international manifestation is suspect. It sees with horror congresses outside the frontiers, the colloquies which are engaged in between diverse fatherlands, the *rapprochements* of the workers and the thinkers of Europe to solve in common the difficulties common to the several provinces of civilized humanity; and in the eyes of chauvinism it is a crime of treason to the fatherland to call oneself European and to dream of international duties...If you recall that you are a man, that there are no frontiers for reason and science, the chauvinists cry out that you are forgetting Alsace and Lorraine⁶².

Mystical nationalists liked to paint the pacifists as sordid creatures, who were thinking only of their own skins or of the economic waste of war. Brunetière, editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, said that the pacifists might claim to be patriots, but "patriotism and *business* are for them only the same thing; the true fatherland is where one does the best business; national honor is measured in figures of foreign trade". Moreover, it was dangerous, he said, when war was inevitable, "a condition of

⁶¹ Extract, *Revue des Revues* (Paris, 1891), II. 76-87.

humanity", for the pacifists to teach people that they could avoid it. "Peace is good; but other things are also good ..." When Passy answered one charge by explaining that the pacifists preached not disarmament, but "*l'esprit de désarmement*", Brunetière replied that the pacifists could not reconcile what would be forever incompatible: "*l'esprit de patriotisme et l'esprit de désarmement*"⁶³.

The whole French attitude on the peace movement may be summed up by the statement of d'Estournelles de Constant, a prominent pacifist after 1900, who condensed into the following words what he asserted had been said to him a thousand times:

Nothing is more praiseworthy than a campaign in favor of arbitration and the limitation of armaments, but is it in France that it should commence? Is it fitting for conquered and mutilated France to preach peace? Address yourselves first to her conquerors, if you can secure a hearing. Take care, however, in the interests of justice and liberty themselves, not to weaken in France the energy indispensable for the defence of your principles ... Take care lest you make of France not an example but a prey, and thus let loose upon the world a universal war⁶⁴.

There was internationalism as well nationalism in the French tradition, but the one emerged weak and limp from the French Revolutionary Wars, while the other had grown strong and fierce. The events of the Nineteenth Century served to continue the process. After 1870 the average Frenchman's mental horizon was darkened by the shadow of war, and there could be little clear comprehension of the questions of internationalism and world peace. There was a little of Brunetière in almost every Frenchman, and although it took a war to make such sentiments universally articulate, the general feeling that pacifism might weaken France in the long run hindered the development of the peace movement at every step. The French pacifists were all good patriots, and they never saw any contradiction between the two ideals. They themselves were practicing a form of *revanche* when after the Franco-Prussian War they pictured France as the champion of right, nor was it an historical accident that the hereditary enemy should become the champion of force. The French pacifists went into the battle for Peace by Justice with the determination to force Germany to make reparation for her injustice to France by returning the conquered provinces. They helped identify their country in the role which *la belle France* knew so well how to play after 1914, to the eternal mortification of the chiefs of German propaganda. Just as German nationalism made the development of a real German peace movement

⁶² *E.-U.* (April-May, 1893).

⁶³ Ferdinand Brunetière: "Le Mensonge du Pacifisme", in *Rev. d. Deux Mondes* (July, 1905), XXVIII. 278-295, and controversy, pp.908-934.

most unlikely, so, in the last analysis, was it French nationalism which determined the extent and the limits of the influence of French pacifism.

England

On the Continent the peace movement was purely a secular movement; in England there were two currents, often intermingled and indistinguishable, and both flowing in the same direction, toward peace by political action. There was the pacifism of the Peace Society, inspired by the religious conviction that war was a sin; and there was the pacifism of the Arbitration Association and the International Arbitration League, inspired by the more rational conviction that war was a calamity which could be avoided.

In 1893 the London Peace Society was still one of the world's largest peace organizations. Its thirty-seven auxiliary and affiliated societies stretched out over England, and its agents were addressing over four hundred meetings a year⁶⁵. Very early in its history the Peace Society had descended from the lofty ground of the Gospel, and, in company with other humanitarian societies, sought to convert its contemporaries by reasons of expediency. While those who ran the Peace Society did not depart from first principles themselves, they placed less and less emphasis upon Christian propaganda as time went on. The Peace Society continued to work through the Free Churches, but the Committee seemed to assume that a religious appeal alone was not enough, that in order to reach the majority of the people it was necessary to supplement the tracts demonstrating that war was incompatible with Christianity with tracts demonstrating that war was less profitable than peace, that war was horrible, that its consequence, the military system, was unprofitable and horrible too, and that there was the better way of arbitration. Of the thirty-five pamphlets distributed in 1893, twenty-four were on general subjects, eight were concerned with the election, and, judging from their titles, only three had to do with the religious aspect of the question. Out of the grand total of approximately five hundred thousand copies of peace literature sent out, less than fifty thousand were at all concerned with the problem of Christianity and war⁶⁶.

One fourth of these fifty thousand were circulars sent to ministers inviting them to observe Peace Sunday. It was in the promotion of this institution that the Peace Society reached the most Christians. Darby took over the idea from the

⁶⁴ Baron d'Estournelles de Constant: *Report on the Limitation of Armaments. Inter-Parliamentary Union, London Conference, 1906* (London, 1906), p.10.

⁶⁵ *H.P.* (June, 1898), p.67.

Wisbech Peace Association and with his customary energy made a great thing of it. The last Sunday before Christmas was designated as Peace Sunday, and ministers were asked to preach a sermon of peace on that day. In the first year, 1889, three thousand eight hundred circulars were sent out, and eight hundred replies were received promising aid. Every year more pastors joined in the observance of the day, and the high point was reached in 1898, the year of the call for the First Hague Peace Conference, when invitations went out to every minister in charge of a congregation, thirty-five thousand in all, and five thousand of them promised to participate. The custom spread to America, and Darby even enlisted the support of certain Protestant pastors on the Continent. In 1897 the Peace Society memorialized the German Emperor, asking him to approve an attempt to institute Peace Sunday in Germany. The request was "courteously but categorically refused"⁶⁷.

The success of Peace Sunday was an indication of the awakening of the Churches to the peace cause. Formerly the Peace Society had always to bemoan the fact that from the majority of Christian Churches it received no help. "The great bulk of them, seeing the struggles of the comparatively small body of the Friends of Peace, in the face of enormous odds, pass by on the other side, without a sign of sympathy or encouragement"⁶⁸. Only the Society of Friends took official action. In 1888 the London Meeting for Sufferings appointed a Peace Committee, which became very active in the succeeding years. The Friends were not averse to political action. It was they who had organized the deputation to the Tsar on the eve of the Crimean War, and again in 1887, during the Boulanger crisis, certain members of the Society formed a delegation to speak words of peace to the statesmen of France and Germany. The French received them cordially, and the President and the Foreign Minister of France assured the deputation of their firm desire for peace. On the other hand, in Berlin the English peacemakers found it impossible to obtain an interview with Crown Prince Frederick, Bismarck, or any member of the government⁶⁹.

Soon other Churches showed interest. Early in the nineties such bodies as the International Congregational Council and the Oecumenical Methodist Conference began to include arbitration in their discussions. The most important sign of progress was the development of the Arbitration Alliance of British Christians. It originated in appeal from the Presbyterian Churches of the United States to all other organized Churches to form a union for the promotion of arbitration. In 1893, at the

⁶⁶ *H.P.* (June, 1893), p.249.

⁶⁷ Wm. Evans Darby: *The Institution of Peace Sunday* (pamphlet, London, 1905) ; *H.P.* (June, 1897), pp.249ff.

⁶⁸ *H.P.* (June, 1885), p. 241; Beales: *History of Peace*, pp. 184ff.

⁶⁹ Horace G. Alexander: *Joseph Gundry Alexander* (London, n. d.), pp.100-102; *H.P.*(June, 1887), p.229.

International Peace Congress at Chicago, committees were set up for the various countries whose function it was to have a petition on arbitration endorsed by the Churches and presented to the governments of all the world. In 1894 the Friends convoked a conference of all the Protestant Churches of Great Britain, and it was this conference which established a committee entitled, "The Arbitration Alliance". Its work was to promote the completion of the American petition, to secure resolutions in favor of disarmament and arbitration in the annual assemblies of Church bodies, and to organize a national memorial to the government. The memorial proposed that Great Britain suggest to the other governments an armament truce until the end of the century, an idea very popular among the friends of peace at the time. Before signatures were collected, the promoters made discreet inquiries in order to be certain that the statesmen had no objections. It was learned that Rosebery, Salisbury, and Balfour were in "hearty sympathy"⁷⁰.

Darby was Secretary of the Alliance, and on the Committee sat the Bishop of Durham, the Archbishop of Dublin, the Deans of Canterbury and Winchester, Sir Joseph Pease, the distinguished Friend, Canon Freemantle, W.T. Stead, and others. Cardinal Vaughan and most of the Catholic bishops gave their adhesion. Yet the support from the Established Church left much to be desired. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York refused to sign the memorial and most of the bishops followed their example. Dr. Westcott, Bishop of Durham, was the only one of the important prelates of the Church of England who took an active part in the peace movement, and he became a correct Erastian during the Boer War with talk of "our imperial obligations"⁷¹.

When thirty-five thousand signatures were collected, the memorial was sent to Rosebery. Darby, upon whom most of the work of the Alliance had fallen, now turned his attention to the Continent, where the national committees, which had been formed to promote the arbitration petition to the rulers, had done nothing. He learned that the Catholics of France would not help, while the French Protestants feared that if they cooperated with the English, it would be regarded as unpatriotic. A way out was found by letting the *Société pour l'Arbitrage* handle the petition. In Germany Darby found the atmosphere, as far as peace and arbitration were concerned, "decidedly wintry". Some of the pastors whom he visited even entered into violent arguments with him, justifying war on theological grounds. Elsewhere the idea met a more favorable reception, and in 1896 the completed petition contained one hundred and

⁷⁰ *H.P.* (June, 1892), p.65, (May-July, 1894), pp.53, 83, 93, 100, (Sept. - Oct., 1894), pp. 108-110, 127-9.

⁷¹ *Concord* (1894), IX. 104; Arthur Westcott: *Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott* (2 vols., London, 1903), I. 16-24; D. O. Wagner: *The Church of England and Social Reform Since 1854* (N.Y., 1930), p.283.

sixty-five signatures, representing ecclesiastical bodies in Great Britain, the United States, Australia, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. Baroness von Suttner presented a copy to Emperor Franz Josef of Austria, Ducommun to the President of the Swiss Confederation, and prominent pacifists made the other presentations. It was an imposing gesture, although it received little publicity at the time. An American pacifist called it "The most united expression of Christendom ever given on the subject". What it meant was that the peace-conscious section of Christendom represented was seeking peace through the principle of arbitration rather than through the principles of Christ⁷².

Heading the secular movement in England were Pratt's Arbitration Association and Cremer's Arbitration League, both with the panacea of the pacifists enshrined in their titles. Of course, Pratt attempted to get beyond arbitration. It was his contention that "in order to prevent war we must remove its causes". The causes which he was primarily interested in removing were international suspicions and the political danger spots which could lead to war. He had his Association more involved in politics than any other peace society of the time. It kept a sharp eye upon the Foreign Office, and it never ceased demanding information, urging arbitration of certain disputes before they reached the serious stage, and passing resolutions of pleasure or displeasure at every move which British foreign policy took. For years Pratt harped on the injustice of England's Egyptian policy and incessantly called for the withdrawal of the English troops. Finally even the Council of the Association thought it was time to stop, and in 1896 it vetoed his proposal to petition Parliament for the evacuation of Egypt. Pratt thought of resigning, but Ducommun advised him not to. "Mind you don't leave the presidency of your society", he wrote. "It would be, in my opinion, a great mistake ... You are the head of the English group whose incentives are more humanitarian than religious or confessional, and your resignation would be considered by our friends as a check to our collective efforts." Pratt realized then that resignation would imply discouragement, and he found that if he withdrew, the society would break up so, he remained⁷³.

Despite the fact that it did not avoid questions of the day, the Arbitration Association was still able to win the patronage of eminent men, if only on one occasion a year, the annual meeting. At these assemblies appeared at one time or another men like the Marquis of Bristol, Lord Hobhouse, Leonard Courtney, James Stansfield, and Cardinal Manning. The influence of the Association was never very great, and to judge from its slender finances, even its friends did not expect too much.

⁷² *Bulletin du VIII^e Congrès Universel de la Paix*, pp.55-7; *H.P.* (July, 1893, pp.227-9, (Dec. 1895), pp. 302-5, (July, 1896), pp.89-91, (July, 1897), pp.267-9.

⁷³ Pratt to Ducommun, April 2, 5, 1896; Ducommun to Pratt, April 4, 1896. B.I.P. MSS., VIII, B, 2.

Yet it served as a training ground for peace workers of the next decades, and its influence was apparent in the unification of the English movement in 1904-1905. The development of the secular peace movement in England seems to run in an unbroken line from the Arbitration Association through such later organizations as the Union for Democratic Control down to the associations of the present day.

Of more immediate importance was the work of Cremer and his International Arbitration League. To him more than to anyone else was due the inspiration for the supreme effort of the Anglo-American peace crusade in the nineties, the campaign for the arbitration treaty between Great Britain and the United States. After partaking of the cup of internationalism at the Rome Interparliamentary Conference of 1891, Cremer returned home burning with new zeal for the cause, and he immediately gave notice in the House of Commons of a motion expressing the hope that Great Britain would negotiate a treaty of arbitration with the United States. It was not easy for a private member to secure time in the House, and it was not until June 16, 1893, that Cremer found opportunity to bring his motion. In the meantime the peace societies had mobilized their autograph collectors with the usual petitions, and from the lists filled up by individuals and representatives of organizations Cremer could claim that he had one and a half million persons behind him. In his speech Cremer promised Gladstone "the gratitude of the toiling millions" and a great name in history, if he took the desired initiative. Sir John Lubbock seconded, and Gladstone gave a sympathetic speech in which he pointed out the need for "a central tribunal in Europe", some sort of a "Central Authority" or Council of the Great Powers, where rival selfishness would be neutralized and impartial authority obtained for the settlement of disputes. He modified Cremer's original wording to call for "cooperation" with the United States, rather than for Great Britain to open up negotiations, and the resolution was unanimously passed. Arbitration had come a long way since Henry Richard had just managed to squeeze out a majority of a few votes for his motion of 1873⁷⁴.

Cremer's next step was to arrange for another memorial to President Cleveland, inviting the United States to start the ball rolling for the conclusion of the treaty. This time three hundred and fifty-four members of the House signed the address, which Cremer himself presented in 1894. Once again Cleveland was obliging and congressmen were cordial. But the next year the peace men discovered that arbitration was not always an instrument of peace. Taking up an old boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, President Cleveland invoked the Monroe Doctrine and presented Great Britain with what amounted to an ultimatum, demanding that the quarrel be arbitrated. Feeling was running high in the United

⁷⁴ Evans: *Cremer*, pp.156-7; W. R. Cremer: "Parliamentary and Interparliamentary Reminiscences" (Hayne Davis, ed.: *Among the World's Peacemakers* (N.Y., [1907], pp. 210-229), p. 224.

States, while the English were astounded and indignant at what seemed to be an unjustified attempt to dictate to them. Peace forces sprang into action on both sides of the Atlantic; the usual meetings were called and the usual speeches were heard. Neither government wanted war, and diplomatic efforts for appeasement of the difficulty were soon begun, aided by the pacifists. Then the Jameson Raid and the Kaiser's Kruger telegram turned Englishmen's minds away from the American crisis and indicated the direction in which their stored-up pugnacious energies were to find an outlet⁷⁵.

To the artisans of peace the Venezuela crisis only served to underline the need for an arbitration treaty between the two great sister nations. They continued their work with new ardor, and they were aided by the powerful support of W.T. Stead, the apostle of Anglo-Saxon brotherhood. Stead was an amazing combination, Puritan and Russophil, pacifist and imperialist. His contemporaries were inclined to put him down for slightly deranged, but they had to admit that he was a great journalist. When he took up a cause, he made a crusade of it, and now he threw all his energies into the renewed campaign for arbitration with America. Stead put his mighty pen to work and pleaded the case in his monthly *Review of Reviews* and in the plain-spoken pamphlet entitled, *Always Arbitrate Before You Fight*. Meanwhile, Pratt went to America and propagandized Cleveland and Secretary Olney. Pauncefoot, Britain's ambassador, who had his heart set on the conclusion of the treaty, told Pratt that his visit had been "very useful"⁷⁶.

For all the sound and fury of the pacifist campaign, there is reason to suspect that when Salisbury finally did open up negotiations for the arbitration treaty in 1896, it was primarily with considerations of *Realpolitik* in mind. The old-school statesman had his eye on Europe and South Africa, and he saw the necessity of conciliating America. Salisbury was not one to pay much attention to public opinion⁷⁷. The treaty was concluded, but it failed of ratification in the United States Senate, chiefly because of that body's jealous maintenance of its prerogatives in the control of foreign policy⁷⁸. Even so, America was conciliated, and there can be seen in these days a growing feeling of Anglo-American solidarity which was to increase with the years. The whole episode belongs as much to the history of cultural and political relations between Great Britain and the United States as to the history of the peace movement. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that there were many people in both countries

⁷⁵ Evans: *Cremer*, pp. 160-166; Curti: *Peace or War*, pp. 155, 158-161; Frederic Whyte: *The Life of W. T. Stead* (2 vols, N.Y., n.d.), II. 78-84.

⁷⁶ Whyte: *Stead*, II.84-87; Pratt to Ducommun, July 17, 1896. B.I.P. MSS., V, B, 2.

⁷⁷ Wolfgang Mommsen: *Die letzte Phase des britischen Imperialismus auf den amerikanischen Kontinenten 1880-1896* (Leipzig, 1933), pp.104-131.

⁷⁸ Curti: *Peace or War*, pp.156-7.

supporting Anglo-American arbitration who were thinking more in terms of power than in terms of international organization and world peace.

New peace foundations grew up in England as elsewhere in the nineties, but when the International Peace Bureau undertook in 1894 to compile a list of the world's peace societies, nowhere did it run into as much difficulty as in England. Not only were many of the local societies completely out of touch with one another, but even the Peace Society itself could not report in detail about its own branches. Miss Peckover had to explain to Ducommun, who was accustomed to a more highly organized scheme of things: "We have a way in our country of setting to work independently and then finding out by degrees what others are doing"⁷⁹.

That peace societies should spring up spontaneously was an indication of the strength of the idea in England. It was in striking contrast to the development which the movement took in Germany, where the incentive came from above. Yet this independence was a source of weakness as well. In 1897 one of the new associations, the Increased Armament Protest Committee, took the initiative in an attempt to give the movement more cohesion. At a conference in November, 1897, it was decided that the societies should take joint action in urgent matters. First fruits of the new spirit was the joint manifesto drawn up protesting against army and navy increases. The armament burden was pressing so heavily upon the nation of shopkeepers that even Pratt's Association had changed its position on disarmament, claiming now that Britain was arming no longer for defense, but in order to pursue a policy of imperialistic "land-grabbing". But Cremer's League was unwilling to sign the address, and the project had to be dropped. The English peace societies were to demonstrate the effectiveness of collaboration in support of Stead's Peace Crusade of 1899, but they were unable to organize nationally until after 1904⁸⁰.

England was the natural home of European pacifism. Humanitarianism was the product of forces of religion and utilitarianism which had deep roots in the national tradition, and the English, who had already carved out most of their empire and enjoyed relative security behind their sea wall, could more easily afford to let themselves be influenced by humanitarian sentiments than peoples who were less fortunate. The English even justified their imperialism with humanitarian arguments, and they really believed in them, although the continental peoples could see nothing

⁷⁹ Peckover to Ducommun, Oct. 9, 1894. B.I.P. MSS., VIII, A, 1; *H.P.* (Nov., 1891), p.320.

⁸⁰ Friends Peace Committee: Minute Books, 1897-1898, *passim*. The Increased Armaments Protest Committee was formed in opposition to the policy of "expansion for expansion's sake" and the Two-Power Standard set in naval building. Spence Watson and Sir Wilfrid Lawson sat on the Committee, which expired in 1898 at the age of two. Cf. the Committee's Tract: *Empire, Trade, Armaments* (London, 1896).

but hypocrisy in such an attitude. To be sure, Bismarck was more just when he recognized Clarendon's humanitarian gesture in 1870 as perfectly sincere. There was always the possibility that this philanthropic spirit would crop out in British policy, but generally the limits of its influence on the British statesmen were prescribed by the realities of international politics. Similarly, while the English pacifists were more favorably regarded by their countrymen than were their foreign colleagues, and while their deputations were generally kindly received by the statesmen of both parties, who often shared their sentiments, their actual influence on the conduct of foreign affairs was very slight.

The friends of peace in England did not generally find their opponents glorifying war, as was the case in Germany, nor were their activities denounced as a danger to the fatherland, which was the common form of excommunication on the Continent. They suffered a fate which was, perhaps, just as hard for Englishmen to bear - they were simply dismissed with more or less good-humored tolerance as unpractical dreamers, and that was an end to it. Wrote the conservative *St. James Gazette* on the occasion of the World Peace Congress of 1896: "The good men who have met on the initiative of a most excellent lady, the Baroness von Suttner, author of 'Down with Arms', represent the fine flower of all that vaguely well-meaning, emotional, and unpractical class of persons which is to be found in most countries, and nowhere in finer feather than among ourselves"⁸¹.

In the later nineties in England men were hardly in the mood for peace. There was a brutal spirit abroad in the land. The masses had learned to read, but not to understand; they turned with grateful relief from the monotonous tasks of the workshop to the cheap sensationalism of the yellow press or the blood-stained pages of a Rudyard Kipling. Gentler ideals of the past were ridiculed as sentimentality, and in their stead brute force was placed high on a pedestal. Athletic competition was no longer ungentlemanly. This was the epoch when the virile sports of boxing and football began to flourish, when "the strenuous life" was the ideal. In the games which they played, the literature which they read, and the feelings which they expressed, the English showed clearly that they were spoiling for a fight, and when the opportunity presented itself in South Africa, the nation joyously plunged in.

The history of the English peace movement in the Boer War extends beyond the scope of this study, but something must be said to indicate the utter feebleness which was revealed in the ranks of the peace forces. The Boer War seems to have been the first modern case of an entire nation completely abandoning itself to war hysteria. Technological advance and progress in education made it possible for the

first time for the contagion to spread into every home. It seemed as though from all but a few stout minds reason had taken its departure, all restraint had gone, and the sub-human passions of the brute within had been released to do their worst. The masses called for the head of "Oom Paul" Kruger and demanded that their generals give no quarter. Nor were apologists of war lacking. The propagandists of the Allies during the Great War never dug up any more eloquent defense of war in all the Pan-German literature than that of Professor Cramb, who declared in a lecture in 1900: "In the light of history, universal peace appears less as a dream than as a nightmare, which shall be realized only when the ice has crept to the heart of the sun, and the stars, left black and trackless, start from their orbits"⁸².

In the face of the war psychosis which gripped the nation the small forces which the peace men were able to muster were like reeds in the storm. The Churches, which the pacifists thought were becoming conscious of their Christian duty, fell quickly into line once the drums and trumpets sounded. Throughout the land the war cry echoed from the pulpits. The Established Church had a higher duty to the State, and its sanction of the "just war" could be understood, but what was disheartening was that even Nonconformist leaders were infected with the war fever. The most distressing apostasy was that of Reverend Hugh Price Hughes, a Methodist who had been connected with the Peace Society since 1878 and had often appeared on its lecture platforms⁸³.

The Friends held firm. The Yearly Meeting of 1900 declared: "We fail to see how any war can be waged in the Spirit of Jesus Christ"⁸⁴. Their members took a leading role in the organizations which were formed to protest the war. The position of the Liberals remained confused, and only a small group actively opposed the war. It included Campbell-Bannermann, Stanhope, Labouchere, Spence Watson, Lloyd George, and Lawson, and several others. John Morley's heart was with them, but he generally refrained from public action. Courtney headed the South Africa Conciliation Committee, which worked for a just settlement once the war was on. W. T. Stead was the soul of the more extreme Stop-the-War Committee. Labor leaders like Keir Hardie, Hyndman, and John Burns fought the war, but their influence among the workers was limited. Rationalists such as J. A. Hobson and J. M. Robertson kept their pens busy. The only important newspapers adopting an attitude of

⁸¹ Bertha von Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 134-135.

⁸² J. A. Cramb: *Origins and Destinies of Imperial Britain* (London, 1915), p.146; an account of the patriotic frenzy is given in J. A. Hobson: *Psychology of Jingoism* (London, 1901). Cf. also C. E. Playne: *The Pre-War Mind in Britain* (London, 1928), pp.184-198.

⁸³ *H.P.* (December, 1902), XXVIII. 320.

⁸⁴ Margaret E. Hirst: *The Quakers in Peace and War* (London, 1923), p.272.

uncompromising hostility to the war were C. P. Scott's *Manchester Guardian*, and two working-class papers.

The older peace societies failed to become rallying points for the campaign of opposition. The Peace Society remained silent. It refrained from holding meetings, on the theory that this would only mean "stirring up evil passions, from which no real gain to Peace could ensue"⁸⁵. The members of the committee of the International Arbitration and Peace Association did as much as they could, while Cremer and Burt of the International Arbitration League gave able support. There was little that could be done. In an effort to bring the war to an end the South African Conciliation Committee was suggesting conditions of peace hardly favorable to the Boers, but even so, they found no hearing. Anyone who considered the Boers as better than criminals was labelled "pro-Boer" and denounced as a traitor. "Pro-Boer" meetings were regularly broken up, property of "Pro-Boers" was damaged, and "Pro-Boers" received the coarsest sort of insulting letters in the mails. Lloyd George once had to be removed in disguise from one meeting which had been rushed; harmless old Moscheles had a penknife thrown at him when a mob of patriots rioted in Trafalgar Square while the peace advocates were attempting to talk. As one of the peace men admitted, "The South African War found us unprepared, and left us pulverised"⁸⁶. When the test came and the issue was clearly drawn between the forces of nationalism and the forces of peace, the English peace movement was shown to be as important as the peace movement on the Continent. And the Boer War, while a tremendous defeat for the English pacifists, was but a mild rehearsal for the events of not many years later⁸⁷.

The Peace Movement in Other Countries

In Germany, in France, and even in England, in the moment of trial, the peace movement meant only the individual efforts of a few zealous leaders with no popular support. Elsewhere the same was true. In Italy after the Franco-Italian crisis of 1889 was over, the peace movement suffered a relapse. The political rivalries made

⁸⁵ *H.P.* (1900), XXVII. 30, 66; (1902), XXVIII. 242.

⁸⁶ Perris in *Concord* (November, 1903), XIX. 161.

⁸⁷ G. P. Gooch: *Life of Lord Courtney* (London, 1920), ch. xviii, xix; Whyte: *Stead*, II. 167-190; S. E. Robson: *Joshua Rowntree* (London, 1916), pp.110-117; Percy Corder: *Life of Robert Spence Watson* (London, 1914), p.281; Wm. Haslam Mills: *The Manchester Guardian* (London, 1921), pp.134-137; Aaron Watson: *A Great Labour Leader* (London, 1908), pp.195-201; H.M. Hyndman: *Further Reminiscences* (London, 1912), pp.159-163; Most valuable is S. C. Cronwright-Schreiner: *The Land of Free Speech. Record of a Campaign on Behalf of Peace in England and Scotland in 1900* (London, 1906).

cooperation for peace impossible, and even the devoted Bonghi lost heart. In 1892 he wrote to Baroness von Suttner this note:

I am not discouraged, but I am weary. My country is interested in nothing. We have tried in vain; it does not budge: nothing moves it. ... I admire your enthusiasm and your faith. It is thus that one must be, as you are. Would that I could imitate you. But I am worn out. If you except the *Unione Lombarda*, which, however, is for the most part represented by radicals and republicans, there is only myself who has tried to do something; but with slight success.

After Bonghi's death in 1895, the Rome Association for International Arbitration ceased to exist. Now only the *Unione Lombarda* was left. In 1894 it counted no more than three hundred members, and most of the work was done by Moneta and Mazzoleni (whom Bonghi called, "*plus croyant et plus ingénu que moi*"). During the Abyssinian War the *Unione* helped organize the wide-spread popular opposition to the government's policy which ultimately led to Crispi's fall. But a peace movement must be founded upon living faith, not merely upon a psychological mood of the moment. The post-war history of pacifism seems to have demonstrated that without a doubt. Moreover, the *Unione Lombarda* was composed mostly of republicans who were Irredentists, and it is questionable whether their love for peace would have been as ardent during a conflict with Austria as it was during the difficulty with France. In later years the society made an effort to attract men of all political persuasions, and it became more respectable. But the Italian peace movement never prospered, and the pacifism of its leaders did not survive the Tripolitan War⁸⁸.

In Belgium a peace society was founded in 1889 and constituted in 1890 as a section of the International Arbitration and Peace Association. Henri La Fontaine, a moderate socialist, was Secretary, and a determined bid for working class support was made. The society made little headway, although La Fontaine became one of the leaders at the International Peace Congresses. The Belgians felt that their tiny country was powerless to aid in the cause of peace⁸⁹. There was the same objection in Holland. When van Eck died in the early nineties the spark of life went out of the Netherlands Peace Society. It remained in a state of suspended animation until 1901, when it united with the Dutch section of the Women's League for International Disarmament to form the association *Vrede door Recht*, which proved viable⁹⁰. Of all the small countries only in Switzerland, itself a United States of Europe in miniature, did the peace movement gain much of a foothold. There were over fifteen sections,

⁸⁸ Bonghi to Suttner, Nov. 29, 1892. Suttner MSS; *Concord* (1892), VII. 29, (1896), XI. 32; *Corr. Autogr.* (March, 1894), no.25, p. 2; Suttner: "Chronik", p.200.

⁸⁹ *Concord* (1889), III. 29, (1890), IV. 5; de Laveleye to Suttner, July 30, 189-. Suttner MSS.

⁹⁰ *H.P.* (Oct., 1891), pp.302-3, (Dec., 1895), p.303; Jong van Beek en Donk, *op.cit.*, p.11.

with numerous local groups, federated in the Swiss Peace Society, itself a section of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*.

The ideal of peace had lost little of the force of its appeal. Every once in a while the hearts of the pacifists would be cheered by such news as that of the great congress of peace and liberty which was held in Barcelona in 1889, at which four thousand people raised their voices in cries of "Long live Peace! Long live the brotherhood of peoples!"⁹¹ Yet the historical circumstances of the time soon acted to put a damper on such ardor. Numerous societies were founded by apostles like Pratt, who overcame all practical objections through his contagious enthusiasm. But in most cases the descent from the clouds was rapid, and the first disappointment was enough to bring such peace establishments to an end. Such a phenomenon was presented by the meteoric rise and fall of the Hungarian Peace Society. It was founded in December, 1895, by Leopold Katscher and Bertha von Suttner, in anticipation of the Seventh World Peace Congress which was scheduled for Budapest in 1896. Never was a peace society ushered into life amid more promising circumstances. A vice-president of the Chamber was president, and the Committee included two former ministers, an archbishop, the national poet, Jokai, several deputies, the editor of the *Pester Lloyd*, some great industrialists, and a number of ladies of high society. Budapest papers of all shades of opinion were friendly, and Premier Banffy even told Bertha von Suttner that the government would not only cooperate, but it would take the lead in preparing the Congress. After five months over eleven hundred members had been won. Yet Baroness von Suttner confessed to her friend Nobel that the great success was due to "a certain prestige which I possess at this moment - to a *vogue* of which I am the object". She put the question: "These moments of *vogue* - will they last?". And she had to admit that they did not. So it turned out. After the brilliant Budapest Congress of 1896, the Hungarian Peace Society quickly settled down into a period of decline⁹².

Out of Scandinavia came glowing reports. They told of societies with several thousands of members, of monster petitions to the sovereigns, of strong parliamentary committees actually subsidized by the governments. They told of how the great conflict between Norway and Sweden in 1895 had been allayed partly through the efforts of the Scandinavian pacifists. The other peace men took heart at such news, but the countries of the north were too far away from the center of things for the activity there to mean any more than that. Individuals such as Bajer of Denmark, Wawrinsky of Sweden, and Horst, Ullmann, and Lund of Norway, took prominent parts at the international conferences and congresses; the Norwegian writer Björnson

⁹¹ *E.-U.* (May 4, 1889).

⁹² Suttner to Nobel, Jan. 12, 1896. Nobel MSS; *D.W.N.* (1896), V. 9-12, 266; Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 85.

was a great moral influence; and Alfred Nobel was the great benefactor of the cause; but the organized movement in Scandinavia had little effect upon the development of the general European peace crusade⁹³.

By 1898 the peace movement was represented in fourteen countries of Europe. There were officially listed some eighty societies, comprising three hundred and fifty-five separate sections. As to how many of these were any more than phantom groups, there is no way of knowing. From the columns of the official bulletin of the International Peace Bureau, the *Correspondance Bi-Mensuelle*, which gave all the news of the peace movement, it appears that only in England, Switzerland, and Denmark was there set on foot any agitation of anything like even moderate dimensions. The French had little more to report than lectures; the Germans sent word of the establishment of group after group, but it actually meant very little. The pacifists themselves seemed to regard the international conferences and congresses as the most important part of their labors. Few people read their journals, which were maintained only with great sacrifices. Moscheles complained to Fried in 1889 that "the greatest question which mankind has to consider is represented only by a few miserable sheets. I know journals concerned with the affairs of tailors, milliners, or vegetable-eaters which in comparison with ours are abounding in wealth"⁹⁴.

Max Nordau, a sincere sympathizer in the cause, thus described the movement at the end of the century:

The number of the apostles of peace outside of individual poets, *literati*, artists, and thinkers, includes a few international and national peace societies, whose membership is not great, comprising but few representative men of the time. Sad but true. The official organs of these societies have an incomparably smaller circulation than the most insignificant financial or sporting journal, and their periodical congresses attract far less attention than a floral exhibition or a cattle show⁹⁵.

⁹³ *H.P.* (June, 1892), p. 69; *D.W.N.* (1893), II. 159; Wawrinsky to Peckover, Oct. 19, 1895. Peckover Album; Moe: *Prix Nobel*, I. 59-63; Grundel, *op. cit.*; Koht, *op.cit.* Unfortunately, the difficulty of the vernacular sources made it impossible for me to examine any more closely into the Scandinavian movement. Some very interesting developments took place in the north, such as the evolution of the theory of neutrality in Denmark and the part played by non-resistants in the Norwegian movement. It is to be hoped that some competent scholar will give us the whole story.

⁹⁴ Moscheles to Fried, October 30, 1899. Fried MSS.

⁹⁵ Max Nordau: "Philosophy and Morals of War", (in *North American Review* (December, 1899), CLXIX. 787-797), p.789.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST DECADE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE MOVEMENT 1890-1899

The pacifists expected great things from the Interparliamentary Conferences. Pratt hoped that they would be put to the use which he had originally planned, and he even succeeded in interesting Stanhope in his idea of an Anglo-French discussion of the Egyptian Question. Bajer wanted the Interparliamentary Conference to nominate a panel of judges from the members of the International Law Institute and the peace societies, from which the Conference would select an arbitral tribunal when a dispute arose. Passy regarded the interparliamentary body itself as the germ of the "international Areopagus", and he felt that in time of crisis, it, as the concentrated will of Europe's best citizens, could publish a declaration of the facts of the case, which would be irresistible¹.

Lemonnier had a clearer conception of just how far a body of politicians could be expected to go. "The Interparliamentary Conference is the transition from the old world to the new", he wrote, "it comes out of the past, it marches resolutely toward the future, but it is strongly and seriously bound in the present by the effective share which each of its members takes in the constant and necessary regulation of the politics of the day". All the pacifists were agreed that the Interparliamentary Conference and the Peace Congress should be closely allied, and a resolution at the Peace Congress of 1890 declared as much. The two bodies were felt to be merely different forms of the same movement, in the words of Bertha von Suttner, "the upper and lower house of the same parliament". The pacifists looked upon the Congress as representing the electors, and the Conference as representing their delegates; they wanted the Conference to follow the Congress, so that, in effect, the people would be submitting their decisions to their representatives. Such an interpretation was not at all to the liking of the parliamentarians. They were the duly elected representatives of the people, to be sure, but the peace societies had no power to represent anybody. The deputies refused to consider the two bodies bound together, as Pandolfi put it, "like Siamese twins"².

The first steps toward separation were taken in 1891. In both 1889 and 1890 the Conference had followed the Congress. Now Cremer insisted that the order be

¹ *Concord* (1889), IV. 104-5, (1890), V. 6-7.

² *E.-U.* (March, 1891); *Proceedings of the Universal Peace Congress, London, 1890*, pp.214-5; Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 370; *Concord* (July, 1891), VI. 100; Pandolfi to Bajer, June 21, 1891. Bajer MSS.

reversed, and he threatened to prevent the English delegation from coming to Rome if his wishes were not respected. The other pacifists were put out at what they regarded as "the ambitious and jealous views of Cremer"³, but they were powerless, for it was necessary at all costs to keep up the appearance of unity in the ranks. So Cremer won his point, and the order was changed. He was now an *homme politique*, and he had come to distrust the peace societies in a manner which the other pacifists could never understand⁴. After 1891 delegates from the International Arbitration League appeared no longer at International Peace Congresses held abroad.

Cremer's methods were a little abrupt, but the other parliamentarians were just as anxious as he to keep Congress and Conference separate. The ill-informed press usually referred to the two as one League of Peace, the resolutions of one body were attributed to the other, and the parliamentarians found themselves classed with the congressivists as Utopians. So in order to avoid any mistaken identity, after 1892 the Conferences were generally held in different cities and at different times than the Congresses. Although many of the parliamentarians were themselves members of peace societies, as a group they always treated them with a certain reserve. It was an attitude which characterized the German deputies to a greater extent than the others. When the parliamentarians secured space in the public prints, they stressed their moderation and their separate identity. For instance, when Trarieux was reporting the Conference of 1892, he declared that the Conference had taken care to distinguish clearly its program from those of peace societies. The only questions discussed, he pointed out, were those which could actually be introduced into parliaments. The peace societies watched this development with dismay. Yet they raised no protest against the unfair treatment, they quietly made all the sacrifices desired of them, and they went on sending their resolutions to the Conference just the same⁵.

The Interparliamentary Conference was a disappointment to its pacifist progenitors in more ways than one. Not only did the caution of the parliamentarians turn them away from the peace societies, but it inhibited an effective effort for peace. Few parliamentary motions for arbitration were inspired by the Conference, and those that were made were followed by no governmental action. The Conference of 1890 considered a proposal that there should be an interchange of views between interparliamentary committees when peace was threatened, but it was watered down before accepted; almost the only action of this sort was an address issued in 1893 by

³ Lemonnier to Ducommun, July 7 [1891]; B.I.P. MSS., VIII, A, 2.

⁴ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, pp 113-4.

⁵ F. Passy: "Congrès et Conférence", in *L'Arbitrage* (1899), III. 153-5; Pandolfi to Bajer, June 21, July 22, Nov. 23, 1891. Bajer MSS; L. Trarieux: "La Conférence Interparlementaire de Berne" in *Revue Bleue* (Sept. 17, 1892), L. 382-4; L. Quidde: "Die Geschichte des Pazifismus", (K. Lenz and W. Fabian, editors: *Die Friedensbewegung. Ein Handbuch* (Berlin, 1922), pp.6-35), p.14.

members of the Interparliamentary Bureau to French and Italian deputies in an attempt to relieve the tension which had arisen between the two nations. Despite the efforts of the English, the other members always discarded disarmament from the discussions, and this was at a time when statesmen were publicly professing an interest in it, and when even the judicious International Law Institute had raised the question. Propositions for the study of the problem of national minorities and for a projected permanent governmental peace conference never even reached the stage of debate. The parliamentarians were men of affairs, and these were dreams⁶.

The whole attention of the parliamentarians was focussed upon the principles and practice of arbitration. "They want the general court of arbitration, and really *nothing but this*", complained one of the members⁷. After all, the organization had arisen from attempts to promote arbitration treaties with America, and it still bore the title of the Interparliamentary Conference for International Arbitration. The primary object, as stated in the statutes of 1892, was to secure the recognition of the principle "that the differences between States shall be submitted to arbitration". The resolutions at the first two Conferences were confined to recommendations for treaties of arbitration. At the Conference of 1891 was first raised the question of the court of arbitration, the development of which was the *chef d'oeuvre* of the Interparliamentary Conference. The problem was studied carefully from session to session, and by 1895 the parliamentarians had approved a set of rules which were to form the basis for an arbitration tribunal. The president of the assembly that year, Chevalier Descamps, the Belgian Senator, was charged to call the project to the attention of the governments, and the memorandum which he worked out, the famous *Mémoire aux Puissances*, was a detailed plan for the organization of such a court. At the First Hague Peace Conference Descamps was the *rapporteur* of the Commission on Arbitration, and the International Court of Arbitration which that conference founded was largely based upon the scheme which had evolved from the deliberations of the Interparliamentary Conference⁸.

The conferences usually went off with a great deal of *éclat*. They came in for the official recognition of the governments; several even subsidized their national parliamentary committees. The hundred or so deputies who attended the first conferences became nearly three hundred by the end of the first decade, while the number of adhesions from all the parliaments of Europe ran into several thousands.

⁶ Lange: *Union Interparlementaire. Résolutions*, pp.37, 46-7, and *passim*; A. Gobat: "L'Union Interparlementaire", in *Conf. Interp.* (1893-1894), pp.47ff., 64ff., 79ff., 95ff., 112ff., 120ff., 142ff.; Evans: *Cremer*, pp.142-3, 146-8, 169-172, 176-181, 198-201.

⁷ Ludwig von Bar to Bajer, Nov. 3, 1894. Bajer MSS.

Yet the actual development of the Interparliamentary Conference proceeded slowly and painfully. The Conference of 1891 provided for the establishment of a bureau, which was established at Bern in 1892 with the prominent Swiss politician Albert Gobat as Secretary-General. As a connecting link between the members, an organ, *La Conférence Interparlementaire*, was founded in 1893. Gobat proclaimed that it would be "the tribune of the parliaments of Europe". It became nothing of the sort⁹. In fact, it is in Gobat's somber lines of lament in the journal rather than in the brilliancy of the international conferences that the true picture is revealed. The Interparliamentary Conference remained just that - a body having little independent life other than in the yearly gatherings. Few national parliamentary committees were formed in the nineties, and most groups could not even boast of a permanent president and secretary. France, for example, the very home of the Conference, for a long time had no organized committee. In the French-speaking countries the number of subscriptions to the official organ was small. Far from the journal becoming a "tribune", most of the parliamentarians never bothered to express themselves there at all, and the majority of articles were by Gobat himself, or by pacifists like Passy, Ducommun, and La Fontaine. Partly owing to the fear of Cremer and others that a strong executive would dominate them, but just as much a result of the lack of interest of the members themselves, the Bureau remained a weak link between the national groups. Events in the parliaments important for the cause were not even brought to its attention. But such events were few, and the majority of interparliamentary groups came to life only once a year for the conferences; in the interim it could be said that the Interparliamentary Conference hardly existed at all. At the gathering of 1897 Gobat asked for and received permission to bring the publication of *La Conférence Interparlementaire* to an end¹⁰.

The pacifists never ceased to regret the turn which events had taken. Speaking in 1904 of the interparliamentary body, then called the Interparliamentary Union, Pratt declared in a letter to Bajer, president of the International Peace Bureau:

The work of the latter has been exceedingly feeble and fragmentary owing to their having had no such Bureau as that over which you preside. Moreover they have ignored the Bureau to a foolish and mischievous extent. Our Congresses would have had far more influence if the members of the Interparliamentary Union had condescended to take part in our meetings. The absence of an *entente sérieuse* between the two bodies has been a great error¹¹.

⁸ Lange: *Résolutions*, p.47; *idem*: *Die Interparlamentarische Union und die Entwicklung des Völkerrechtes* (Kiel, 1927), pp.7-10, 14, 22-3; *idem*, editor: *The Inter-Parliamentary Union. Its Work and its Organization* (2nd ed., Geneva, 1921).

⁹ *Conf. Interp.* (July 1, 1893), pp.1-2.

¹⁰ Cf. Gobat's report at the Seventh Conference, in *Conf. Interp.* (1896), pp.523-4.

¹¹ Pratt to Bajer, August 18, 1904. Bajer MSS.

In the last decade before 1914 the Interparliamentary Union took on more significance. By the eve of the Great War twenty-four national groups had been permanently constituted, and the total membership of the Union had reached three thousand five hundred. The Union never became the "Parliament of Man", nor were its practical achievements of the first importance. Its chief concern was to give the work of the Hague Conferences a permanent character and to further the development of certain questions of international law. Yet even if the Interparliamentary Union did not dictate peace to the world, even if national hatreds remained as deep-rooted as ever in Europe, it is impossible not to see in those gatherings of public men of many nationalities who talked and banqueted and passed resolutions together a certain growth of international consciousness in the world. The Union helped promote the habit of cooperation across national boundaries; the type of international mind which it fostered was that whose supreme thought was embodied in the League of Nations. It is true, as Dr. Christian Lange has asserted, that "the Inter-Parliamentary Union may claim the honor of having, through the whole of its career, played the part of pioneer to this League"¹².

Not a house of the same parliament but a phase of the same movement, nevertheless, was the International Peace Congress. Before the end of the century the pacifists met in six congresses after the Paris Congress of 1889. In 1890 there was a large turn-out in London, where Dudley Field presided; in 1891 several hundred met in Rome amid bands and banners; in 1892 came Berne's turn. The scene was shifted to the New World in 1893 on the occasion of the Chicago World Fair. In 1894 the congress was held in Antwerp under royal patronage; 1896 was the year of the dazzling Budapest assembly, presided over by the old warrior General Türr; and in 1897 a great moral victory was scored when the pacifists gathered on German soil in Hamburg.

The first congresses resembled those of the mid-century, with much denunciation of war and a flock of well-meaning but rarely carefully considered resolutions. With time the congresses came to be better organized, especially after the establishment by the 1891 assembly of the International Peace Bureau at Berne, part of whose duties consisted in the preparation of the yearly meetings. The tirades against war were heard less as it came to be realized that there was little point in preaching peace to the pacifists. Baroness von Suttner struck the proper note at the Antwerp Congress of 1894 when she declared that "the time for abstract declarations on this subject is passed, and the pleadings for peace, in our assemblies at least, have

¹² Lange: *Inter-Parliamentary Union. Work and Organization*, p.22; cf. Moe: *Prix Nobel*, I. 114.

themselves become anachronisms”¹³. The routine which came to be adopted called first for the annual report by the Secretary of the Peace Bureau, Ducommun, whose magistral summary of the year's happenings was regarded as the pacifist "speech from the throne". Then the ceremony continued with the leading pacifist of each country speaking in the name of his fatherland and reporting of its peace movement, after which the delegates got to work. The study committees on Legislation and Propaganda submitted to the congress reports on the questions over which they had been brooding for the year past, and then ensued in orderly fashion the debates, which were generally of a high order, and the voting. This made for a business-like procedure, but after the main principles were laid down and the chief issues settled, the peace congress became more and more of a colorless affair, merely a convenient rendezvous for the peace workers of all lands, where they could meet again, renew old friendships, encourage one another, reaffirm the old principles, pay their respects to the Great God Arbitration, and depart. It was from these gatherings that the pacifists took heart and drew enough sustenance to be able to face for another year an ill-disposed and indifferent world. The fraternizing, the cooperation on the best of terms of men and women from all nations, the air of goodwill which prevailed - all this gave the pacifists a foretaste of the better time to come. As Baroness von Suttner wrote after her first congress, "We forgot that what we had come to battle for there is not yet arrived, that the world outside is still in the sign of Hate ..." ¹⁴

Yet it would be wrong to suppose that in the hothouse atmosphere of the congresses there flowered full uniformity of opinion. The deep-rooted conflict between religious and rational pacifism admitted of no conciliation. There could be compromise, but there could be no fundamental agreement, and disparity proved of paramount importance in the development of the international peace movement.

The spirit of compromise often prevailed. The Congress of London of 1890 was under the influence of the Christian branch of the movement, and the debates were given the doctrinaire flavor of the London Peace Society. Point One of the program for discussion was entitled, "Christian and other Religious Aspects of the Questions of Peace and War". Yet in order to spare the feelings of unbelievers it was decided not to open the congress with formal devotion, and such concessions were made as the amending of a resolution appealing to "ministers of the Gospel" so as to include "other teachers of religion and morality" as well. When the congress was all over, Darby, Secretary of the Peace Society, said at the farewell banquet with great relief that now he could speak freely on certain questions; it was then that he spoke his full mind on the religious basis of pacifism. Not long after the London Congress

¹³ *Bulletin Officiel*, p.39.

¹⁴ Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 371.

Darby felt it necessary to remind the readers of the *Herald of Peace* once more that "the maintenance of the World's Peace must mainly and permanently depend upon the observance of Christian principles and of a policy of justice and conciliation"¹⁵.

Hodgson Pratt immediately took up the question and gave a fair statement of the other side of the case:

How far do Christian principles animate the rulers, or even the peoples? It seems to us a delusion to shut one's eye to the fact that Christianity is almost put out of sight by politicians in their conflicts. Then, as to a policy of justice and conciliation, each ruler, blinded as he is by passion and false patriotism, is certain that justice is on his side alone. We must, indeed, hope and work for the progress of religious influence and of moral sense in the world; but we shall have to wait long. We cannot wait until Christ's rule is established. The Peace Societies which refuse to do more than wait for this will have as little influence in the future as they have had in the past. They must condescend to deal with international politics and appeal to men's self-interest as well as to their consciences; for in these matters the conscience has not been educated and speaks not¹⁶.

Pratt and the utilitarian school believed peace possible by political reform; the position of the Peace Society was logically that peace was possible only by moral reform. Yet the Society continued its political activities, with the assumption that this was an effort to Christianize politics. The peace societies might very well have paid more attention to the education of consciences; "passion and false patriotism" were not merely the result of lack of enlightenment.

At the Rome Congress of 1891 Darby and Howard, Secretary of the American Peace Society, proposed a resolution which invoked the Christian spirit in the crusade against war. The anti-clerical Italians voiced loud opposition. They maintained that the sole religion which should guide the pacifists was the religion of humanity, and they voted down the resolution amid a storm of applause¹⁷. The religious question did not come up again until 1901, when the religious pacifists had the congress in their own backyard at Glasgow. Ellen Robinson, a Friend, introduced a resolution that efforts should be made to show Christians that war was opposed to the spirit of Christ. There was some opposition from the continental contingent, but the resolution was carried¹⁸.

¹⁵ *Proceedings of the Universal Peace Congress, London, 1890*, pp.25-26, 82, 223; *H.P.* (January, 1891), n.s., XXII. 186-187.

¹⁶ *Concord* (1891), VI. 21.

¹⁷ *Troisième Congrès*, pp.158-159.

¹⁸ *Tenth Universal Peace Congress*, pp.58-63.

The continental pacifists esteemed highly their more Christian colleagues, even if they could not see eye to eye with them. Siccardi, an Italian retired army captain who had joined the cause, wrote to Miss Peckover, "The dove suits you very much; your letters and your portrait prove it; but if I am not a bird of prey I have the instinct of rebellion against every injustice and violence. You perhaps shall be afraid of my instinct of rebellion, you, who are the sweetness and the light personified, but I am as the Maker made me, and I can not change me."¹⁹

The French pacifists took an official position on the question of conscientious objectors at the National Congress of 1904. Pastor Allegret wanted the congress to recognize the right of the individual to choose some other service rather than that of killing for the fatherland. There was a charge that the conscientious objectors were supreme egotists, who put their own feelings above the law and above the nation. Whereupon Passy reminded the speaker that these were brave men, and when he condemned egotism, "did he not hold individual liberty too cheaply?" The debate continued over the protest of some of the delegates. The congress was clearly embarrassed. Most of those present felt with Arnaud, who said, "We are patriots in the good sense. We shall do nothing which could weaken *la patrie*; but that does not mean that we are reproaching those who understand their duty otherwise." There was much talk about duty toward the law and equality before the law, for the French pacifists always were good legalists. The resolution finally adopted read as follows:

The Congress, while admiring the acts of courage of those who do not wish to bear arms; [passed by a vote of 115 to 98]

And affirming, on the other hand, the principles of equality before the law;

Declares that it is incompetent to recommend any sort of behavior in circumstances arising solely from individual conscience.²⁰

The international congresses recognized the right of self-defense, implicitly in 1878, when the religious pacifists were still in the majority, explicitly in 1891, when the principles of international law which Arnaud had voted denied the right of conquest and even of self-help but which proclaimed the right of legitimate defense. The phraseology served to keep the peace movement at peace. As Miss Peckover explained, "The words *"défense légitime"* allow us to keep united, because we do believe in legitimate defense of all kinds, but hold warlike methods to be unlawful according to Divine Law". And the older continental pacifists had been in the habit of

¹⁹ Siccardi to Peckover, Dec. 21, 1891. Peckover Album.

²⁰ *II^e Congrès National des Sociétés Françaises de la Paix: Compte Rendu* (Nîmes, 1904), pp.40-51. Cf. also *Bulletin* (July, 1884), p.79.

shirking further consideration of the problem by taking the curious position that it was enough to outlaw offense, for if the right of attack were done away with, there could be no question of defense at all²¹.

The World Peace Congresses never did define just what was meant by legitimate defense. Gaston Moch attempted over a period of years to have this point clarified, but his efforts were thwarted every time by the stubborn opposition of the religious pacifists. He arrived at his final position by a circuitous route. He seems to have begun by proposing that arbitration clauses be added to all treaties of alliance, which was in line with the current pacifist demand that such clauses should be added to all treaties. Then, recognizing the danger to peace of secret alliances, which were always proclaimed to be defensive, he saw how they could actually be made defensive by acceptance of the principle of arbitration. He laid down the proposition that "the right of legitimate defense ... results ... from the fact that the nation under consideration has shown itself ready to submit them [its claims] in the dispute to a tribunal or to an arbitrator, while the opposing nation has resorted to violence". Moch suggested that the *casus foederis* of treaties of alliance should be brought into play only if the ally were placed in a state of legitimate defense, i.e., if the ally were attacked without preliminary negotiations for conciliation, or if the third power rejected a proposal of arbitration or refused to submit to an arbitral award. Here Moch anticipated much post-war theory and practice concerning the definition of the aggressor. Yet, although he kept insisting upon his principle from 1897 on, he was never able to have the World Peace Congresses approve it. It was endorsed by the French National Congress of 1902 and several times recommended by commissions at the World Congresses, but the English and American pacifists always succeeded in shelving it on the ground that the congresses were supposed to deal with questions of peace, not war²².

The inevitable conflict arose over the question of sanctions. It was Lemonnier who gave the impulse for the consideration of this vexed problem. His project for a general arbitration treaty was intended just to make a beginning in the gradual transformation of international relations, and it had been made as harmless as possible. But the incompleteness of the measure long worried him, and several years before his death Lemonnier set Montluc to studying sanctions. After serious

²¹ *Congrès International .. de la Paix* (Paris, 1880), pp 48ff.; *Troisième Congrès*, p.178; *Bulletin du VII^e Congrès Universel de la Paix*, pp.46-54 (Code of International Law, Article VII); Peckover to Bajer, June 13, 1910. Bajer MSS.

²² Moch to Ducommun, January 17, 1897. B.I.P. MSS: VB1; *Bulletin du VIII^e Congrès Universel de la Paix*, pp.37-45; *Premier Congrès National des Sociétés Françaises de la Paix: Compte Rendu* (Toulouse, 1903), pp.126-138; Gaston Moch: *Droit de Légitime Défense ... Mémoire ...* (Vincennes, 1910); Hans Wehberg: "Der Verteidigungskrieg auf den Weltfriedenskongressen der Vorkriegszeit", in *F.-W.* (1924), XXIV. 330-333.

deliberations they came to the decision that there either had to be execution by force of arbitral sentences, or there could be no effective arbitration at all. Their thought was approved by the Grenoble congress of the *Ligue* held in 1890 in the following resolution:

The assembly declares that in no case can the measures taken to lead to execution of an arbitral sentence have the character of acts of war, nor be reputed as such:

The assembly gives the opinion that, without derogating the indiscussable principle of their autonomy, signatory nations can legally authorize arbiters to sanction their sentence by a special disposition of the compromis²³

When Montluc redeemed the promise he had made to Lemonnier and brought this resolution before the World Peace Congress at Berne in 1892, the religious pacifists rose in revolt. They were not strong enough to defeat the proposal, but they succeeded in tacking on an amendment which greatly altered its practical significance. The measures taken to enforce arbitral awards were not only not to have the character of acts of war, but they were not to be such as "might lead to war, or the destruction of human life or of public or private property". Darby and his friends were still not satisfied, and so at the Antwerp Congress of 1894 the measures of enforcement were specifically qualified as "*sanctions pacifiques*"²⁴. Darby put his objection quite plainly: "Any departure from simple moral sanction means a return to the principle of physical warfare ..."²⁵. Although the Quaker William Penn's scheme for the Confederation of Europe had provided for a joint army, and John Bright had once proposed a plan for an international maritime police force²⁶, the pacifists of the Peace Society took the extreme position. As the Friend Joseph G. Alexander gently but firmly explained to Bajer:

I do not ask you, unless you can conscientiously do so, to accept my conviction that war, even defensive war, is contrary to the revealed will of the Divine Ruler of the Universe, and therefore under no circumstances permissible. But, on the other hand, you must not ask me to subscribe to any provision for war, even defensive, even by an international army.

²³ *E.-U.* (Sept, 1890); Emile Arnaud: *Les Traités d'Arbitrage Permanent entre Peuples* (Geneva and Paris, 1895), pp.12-13; Montluc: *Lemonnier*, p.19

²⁴ *Bulletin du IV^e Congrès de la Paix*, pp.64-81, 112-117, 204-207, 223-224; *Bulletin du VI^e Congrès de la Paix*, pp.58-60.

²⁵ Association for the Reform and Codification of International Law: *Genoa Conference*, 1892, Report, p.161.

²⁶ Mills: *Bright*, II. 284-285.

The non-resisters declared that if the Peace Congresses became committed to principles approving the use of force, they were fully prepared to withdraw from the congresses and do their work separately²⁷.

Because of this attitude, no thorough investigation of the question of sanctions at the World Peace Congresses was possible, for the effort was always made to avoid discussion of what Passy called "the questions which divide the assembly". Yet it is by no means certain that the congresses would have given the problem much constructive formulation. To be sure, most of the secular pacifists believed in the right of self-defense and even in the duty to protect the weak by force. At the Budapest Congress the peace men loudly cheered the fire-eating speech of James Capper demanding intervention to put an end to the Armenian massacres, and Bertha von Suttner noted in her diary, "We all feel it would be a legitimate use of force to protect the persecuted against force"²⁸. Yet most of the pacifists were averse to any kind of warlike sanctions. Some objected on the practical ground that no self-respecting State would sign a treaty which provided for execution of the arbitral award by force. In general, however, it was because they all had a great faith in the moral sanction of public opinion. At most, they felt that the threat of breaking off trade relations would suffice to hold a State to its engagements²⁹. In their belief that execution would be ensured by goodwill alone, the pacifists had the support of the international lawyers of the day. These learned gentlemen refused to believe that a State would not honor its obligations, and they persisted in this conviction until disillusioned by the World War. In admitting any kind of sanctions, even "pacific sanctions", the pacifists were a good deal farther advanced than the international jurists³⁰.

Although there were never any serious encounters in the congresses over it, the two pacifist parties were at odds on the question of nationalism. Enough has been said to indicate that while the patriotism of the continental peace advocates was held suspect they were actually the best of patriots. Patriotism with them was a sacred duty. They reversed Grillparzer's aphorism and had the road of modern civilization beginning with bestiality and passing through nationalism to humanity. *La patrie* itself was "a conquest over egoism", wrote Ruysen, "exploit it and orient it toward

²⁷ Alexander to Bajer, June 6, 1890; Peckover to Bajer, June 13, 1910. Bajer MSS.

²⁸ Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 118.

²⁹ Ducommun to Pratt, June 1, 1898. B.I.P. MSS. V,B,2; *D.W.N.* (1898), VII, 211; A. H. Fried: *Friedens-Katechismus* (2nd ed., Dresden, 1895), no.113.

³⁰ Hans Wehberg: *Theory & Practice of International Policing* (London, 1935), pp.51-60; *Idem*: *Outlawry of War* (Washington, 1931), p.7; O. Nippold: "Le Développement Historique du Droit International depuis le Congrès de Vienne", in (Académie du Droit International: *Recueil des Cours* (1924), II. 4-121) pp.86-87.

something which goes beyond the fatherland"³¹. The religious camp, on the other hand, rejected nationalism. Henry Richard spoke of it as "emphatically an unchristian idea", for it was inconsistent with the brotherhood of man, and he warned that a "bigoted attachment to the idea of nationality is opposed to the law of progressive civilization"³². Darby expressed a sentiment that would have been blasphemy in the mouth of a French, German, or Italian pacifist, when he wrote, "For my own part I am trying continually to become truly international and to forget wholly that I am British"³³. Darby never quite succeeded; the only Man without a Country among the pacifists was Moscheles, who was a cosmopolitan of cosmopolitans. As he once declared, "You know I am an Englishman - that is, as much as I can be one as a cosmopolitan"³⁴. It was Moscheles who penned the most damning portrait of patriotism in the pacifist literature of the time. As early as 1883 he broke his first lance for peace in a little essay entitled, "Patriotism as an Incentive to Warfare". Twenty years later he published another tract repeating his conclusion that it was not jingoism, but patriotism - *voilà l'ennemi!* :

When we are told ... that the Lion's tail or the Imperial moustache has been twisted, or that a feather of the Gallic cock has been ruffled, then there is not much to choose between the original Jingo and the hosts of militant patriots who stand ready to join in the popular cry. It is hard to say which is more michievous, arrogant Jingoism or self-complacent patriotism.

Moscheles maintained that the pacifists should "never lose sight of the fact that as long as every patriot takes a pride in supporting international anarchy, he must be prepared for the consequences and hold himself ready, when called upon, to cut this, that, or the other patriot's throat"³⁵.

The Peace Congress of 1892 charged the Bureau to prepare a report on Questions relating to Nationalities, and after long deliberation Ducommun submitted to the Congress of 1893 proposals for resolutions which incorporated the opinions of many of the pacifists. The Report declared that "the principle of nationality is by its very nature unsusceptible of an exact definition; but that it ought, in all cases, to be brought into accord with the general and higher interests of humanity". The good Mazzinian doctrine was contributed by Mazzoleni. The Report further suggested that "the sole undeniable characteristic of nationality is to be found in the free and

³¹ *P.D.* (1899), IX. 478. Cf. Richet in *L'Arbitrage* (1897), I. 19-24.

³² Quoted from *H.P.*, in *A.P.* (June, 1870), n.s., II. 243-244.

³³ Darby to Bajer, Nov. 9, 1898. Bajer MSS.

³⁴ *D.W.N.* (1892), I. 29.

³⁵ Felix Moscheles: *Patriotism Challenged* (London, n.d.), pp.2-3, 10. Moscheles welcomed the anti-patriotic ideas of Hervé, but he felt that it was rather through the action of the Churches that the evil would be broken.

permanent consent of the interested parties". Here spoke Renan and the French; it was the "standing plebiscite", nationalism by choice and not by blood, as the German theory had it. Then the Report asserted that each nation had the right of self-government and the right of self-determination, and that "the fundamental and indispensable condition of Peace between nations is that no nationality shall receive any loss of its natural and imprescriptible rights". This was the mature judgment of one party of pacifists. But it so happened that the Congress of 1893 was held in Chicago, with the religious peace party in control. Ducommun's Report was therefore discarded, and the resolution recommended was turned into a condemnation of nationalism as a force dividing men, who were actually "united by a common humanity whose solidarity and brotherhood are undeniable facts". The issue was sharply drawn, but the question never came before the congress in formal debate³⁶.

The divisions in the ranks of the friends of peace stood in the way of any effective centralization of the movement. At the congresses there were Christians and Freethinkers, royalists and republicans, non-resisters and sanctionists, patriots and anti-patriots, capitalists and socialists, all agreed on the necessity of peace, but not on the means to attain it. The measure of cooperation which they did achieve was something of an accomplishment in itself. The fruitless attempts of Pratt and others to form a federation indicated that the divergent groups could not be consolidated in a strong league; in fact, the peace societies were as jealous of their freedom and their independence as the States they hoped to unite. Yet the friends of peace realized that some sort of systematized cooperation was desirable, and that if federation was out of the question, the establishment of a central coordinating agency was not. The history of the International Peace Bureau at Berne is a history of the limits and the extent of pacifist collaboration.

The idea of a bureau was first put forward by Lemonnier at the Congress of 1878, when he sought a substitute for the proposed federation. He returned to the idea in 1880, when the *Ligue* considered the establishment of "an international bureau of arbitration and disarmament"³⁷. The next years witnessed the heroic efforts of Pratt to found his federation. He failed, but not before having spread ideas of peace far and wide and with them the thought of international cooperation among the pacifists. Lemonnier credited him with being the first to give any precise form to the idea of concentrating the affairs of peace in a single bureau³⁸.

³⁶ International Peace Bureau: *Report on Nationalities* (Berne, 1893); *Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress* (Boston, [1893]), pp.246-247.

³⁷ *E.-U.* (May 15, 1880).

³⁸ Pratt to Ducommun, March 10; Ducommun to Pratt, March 15, 1897. B.I.P. MSS., V,B,2.

It was finally Fredrik Bajer who took up the project after the international congresses had begun and did the most to make a reality of it. He dreamed in the grand manner of one powerful bureau coordinating and directing all the activities of the peace-makers, both parliamentarians and peace societies. It was to be a central executive which would be officially recognized by the governments, and it might even become the forerunner of an eventual congress of nations. But this could come only with time. For the present, Bajer contented himself with proposing a common secretariat for both the Interparliamentary Conference and the peace societies. When Pratt heard of it and revived his plans for federation, Bajer wrote him, in agreement with Lemonnier, that what was wanted was free cooperation between the pacifists and not a close alliance. At both the Peace Congress and the Conference of 1890 Bajer submitted his resolutions for the establishment of a permanent bureau. The Congress gave the idea a general recommendation, and so, apparently, did the Conference. But the record published in the *Arbitrator* by Cremer, who opposed the resolution, had it that the Conference had taken no official vote and had postponed the discussion. Cremer wrote to "my dear friend" Bajer: "I cannot imagine how you could have concluded that your resolution was adopted". He maintained that others agreed with him that it had been relegated to the next meeting. But Bajer had other accounts which showed that his proposal had been officially accepted, and he always suspected Cremer of conduct unbecoming a peacemaker³⁹.

Bajer now attempted to give effect to the recommendation of the Congress. With the support of Lemonnier, he had his project wholeheartedly endorsed by the assembly of the *Ligue* in 1890, and the Central Committee was charged to call together a meeting to plan the organization of the bureau. Representatives of nine societies, mostly French, met at Lemonnier's home during the winter of 1890-91, and in February they sent out a questionnaire to all the peace societies to elicit their views on the matter. At the same time Bajer distributed among the pacifists his pamphlet, "Plan of War for the Friends of Peace", which insisted upon the need for a general headquarters of the army of peace. He was careful to make it plain, for the benefit of those who feared an executive, that the general staff would be elected only in time of war. Most of the responses were favorable, although some concern was expressed that the scheme was too grandiose for the paltry finances of the peace societies. A note of dissent came from the Peace Society, which took up opposition to the Bureau from the very beginning⁴⁰.

³⁹ Lemonnier to Bajer, September 24, 1889, June 30, August 13, 1890. Cremer to Bajer, Nov. 7, 1890. Bajer MSS.; Lemonnier to Peckover, Jan. 26, 1890. Peckover Album; F. Bajer: *Les Origines du Bureau International de la Paix* (Berne, 1904), pp.3-4; *D.W.N.* (1892), I. 6-9; *Proceedings of the Universal Peace Congress*, London, 1890, pp. 215-6, 57-58; *E.-U.* (July, Sept., 1890).

⁴⁰ Bajer, *op. cit.*, pp.9-22; *E.-U.* (March, April, 1891). Miss Peckover published an English translation of Bajer's brochure, *Tactics for the Friends of Peace* (Wisbech, 1901).

Lemonnier regarded the creation of a permanent bureau as one of the chief tasks for the year 1891. He used all his influence with the other pacifists in an effort to round up support for Bajer's project, and the *Ligue's* delegates to the Congress of Rome were sent with instructions to win its approval of the move. He put himself into touch with the Swiss members of the *Ligue*, Ruchonnet, Jolissaint, and Ducommun, and the latter was selected in advance as *rapporteur* for the question at the congress. At Rome the Interparliamentary Conference met first. It adopted the resolution calling for the establishment of the secretariat, but it was to be kept separate from any foundation of the peace societies, and thus Bajer's original plan was lost. At the peace congress everything went along as planned and after a short debate, in which the English voiced objections, a committee was chosen to organize the International Peace Bureau at Berne. It elected Ducommun as Secretary-General and a subscription was begun to cover the costs. Characteristically enough, it was Pratt who gave the first check, while Baroness von Suttner made over to the Bureau the royalties from the Italian translation of *Die Waffen Nieder*. Lemonnier lived to give Ducommun final instructions for the organization of the institution which he had done so much to bring into being. When the great pacificator died on December 3, 1891, Ducommun was just entering upon his duties as director of the Bureau⁴¹.

Elie Ducommun, one of the most sympathetic of all the pacifists of the heroic period, was the right man in the right place. He was a man of universal talents, a gifted organizer, orator, and poet. He had been active in the peace movement ever since the early days of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*; he became, in effect, the soul of the Swiss peace movement. His connections with Swiss statesmen and Freemasons proved of the greatest help all along. Since 1873 Ducommun had been employing his genius for organization in the service of the Jura-Simplon Railroad, of which he was Secretary-General, and he retired from this position only in 1903 in order to devote his remaining years to the cause he loved. When he took the job of Secretary-General of the Peace Bureau, it was with the understanding that he would stay only until it was out of its swaddling clothes; then a paid secretary would be hired. "No one wishes more than I", he wrote to Bajer, "to see the Bureau resting on solid foundations, and definitely constituted for the future. Then I shall retire, satisfied at having stuck it out during the painful period of the birth of such a work." Ducommun was given a helper, but the day never came when a paid secretary took his place. In 1897, when Pratt's efforts to secure the necessary funds failed, Ducommun wrote: "It is sad, but understandable ... I must continue therefore to push the plough

⁴¹ Lemonnier Notebook, Entry, October 30, 1890; copy, Lemonnier to Pratt, August 3, 1891; Lemonnier File. B.I.P. MSS.; Bajer, *op.cit.*, pp.22-27; *Troisième Congrès*, pp.114-8, 174-5.

until my forces forsake me."⁴² And so he remained, directing the destinies of the Bureau with a sure and steady hand until his death. Ducommun was a busy man and would give only his nights to the Bureau. Yet he was a zealous and indefatigable worker. Nothing was left undone. No letter went unanswered; the most inconsequential request was attended to. The old records of the Bureau are still in apple-pie order today. At Berne as well as at the congresses Ducommun was always the great conciliator; somehow he contrived to wrap his own forceful personality in the cloak of detached impartiality. He wrote to Arnaud, "You are the advance-guard of the left wing of the army of Peace and I am the rallying point of the different corps of the army. As vice-president of the *Ligue* I support your inclinations, which are my own, but as Secretary of the Bureau I have no inclinations to make known, and I am not to impose on anyone my point of view - political, religious, or social."⁴³ For Ducommun as for Pratt, Passy, the Baroness von Suttner, Cremer, and the other leaders, the Apostolate of Peace became "a second nature, an imperious need"⁴⁴. When he died in harness in 1906, after having helped win for the Bureau half of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1902, the other pacifists realized that "the incomparable Ducommun" was not to be replaced. They all felt with Fried that "the Berne Bureau has become an orphan, the heart of the whole Peace Movement has ceased to beat"⁴⁵.

Darby, Secretary of the Peace Society, had been hostile to the idea of the Bureau since he first got wind of it in 1889. Bajer succeeded in converting Miss Peckover to his ideas and through her he tried to reach Darby, but all to no avail. Darby was new to his job in 1889 and he was just feeling his way along, but on this question he took a firm stand from the very beginning. He had studied the old documents at the Peace Society, and he knew how resolutely Henry Richard had opposed Hodgson Pratt's ideas in former times, and now it seemed that Bajer was attempting the very thing which Pratt had been unable to accomplish. The Peace Society could enter no federation; it could not take the chance of surrendering its independence for fear that the principles which it held sacred might be compromised. Darby soon became acquainted with Pratt's conception of the role of peace societies as institutions which should discover the just solutions of international controversies and force them upon the governments, and he knew that this was foreign to the Peace Society's tradition of remaining aloof from the political quarrels of the day. When he attended the assembly of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* in 1890, he was impressed with its "ultra-political proclivities"⁴⁶ and strengthened in his determination

⁴² Ducommun to Bajer, August 2, 1893, May 20, 1897. Bajer MSS.

⁴³ May 3, 1892. B.I.P. MSS. VB2.

⁴⁴ Ducommun to Pratt, Feb. 15, 1899. B.I.P. MSS., VI, I, 1a.

⁴⁵ *F.-W.* (1906), VIII. 221; Bajer to Suttner, January 1, 1907. Suttner MSS; *Concord* (1906), XXII. 153-156.

⁴⁶ *H.P.* (October, 1890), p. 143.

to keep the Peace Society independent. At the time that the campaign for the Peace Bureau gained momentum, Darby instituted a little campaign of his own in an effort to halt it. He preached opposition to Bajer's plan among certain pacifists on the Continent, advancing the financial objections and then taking the stand that the Peace Society was doing the job just as well itself and there was no need for a Bureau. Pratt wrote to Bajer that he was inclined to think "that Darby would like to establish the Bureau at the office of the Peace Society in New Broad Street"⁴⁷.

When he arrived at the Congress of Rome Darby immediately looked up Pratt to argue once more against the Bureau. Pratt could see that he feared the Bureau would divert funds from the Peace Society⁴⁸. But it was too late for Darby to muster any opposition, and Bajer's resolution was easily passed. The Secretary of the Peace Society returned home much irritated. He complained to Bajer about "the newcomers who carried the resolutions at Rome who had neither knowledge nor experience of the requirements of the work, were not converted with it a year ago and will not be after the first breath of chauvinisme"⁴⁹. In the *Herald of Peace* he made it appear that the *Ligue* had stuffed the Bureau down his and his friends' throats. He claimed that Ducommun's appointment gave the *Ligue* control over the Bureau, and once more he contended that "existing organizations" were already doing the work more effectively than could be done "by a new organization in an out-of-the-way continental town"⁵⁰. To Pratt he wrote "a most angry and improper letter, finding fault with my conduct at the Congress; but *specifying nothing*"; and he sent off a rather ill-tempered note to Bajer, who had protested that the Bureau did not mean federation; Darby insisted that whether Bajer wanted it or not, his colleagues intended "the Bureau to be a first step to Federation". To Darby federation appeared as the "logical and necessary consequence" of the establishment of the Bureau, and federation meant "money and authority". The Peace Society would not submit to authority; as for money, the peace movement had little enough as it was. In fact, Darby went so far as to dismiss Bajer's entire scheme as "wholly Utopian"⁵¹.

So the peace societies set up their International Peace Bureau without the approval of the oldest one among them, and what was more important, without its financial help. Ducommun had to begin on a modest scale, for his expenses could not exceed twenty-five dollars per month. By the end of the century the yearly income was close to two thousand dollars, and activity could be more extensive. The work of

⁴⁷ January 22, 1892. Bajer MSS.; *H.P.* (Dec., 1891), p.329.

⁴⁸ Pratt to Ducommun, August 11, 1892. B.I.P. MSS. VB2.

⁴⁹ Darby to Bajer, January 15, 1892. Bajer MSS.

⁵⁰ *H.P.* (March, April, 1892), pp.34, 38-39.

⁵¹ Pratt to Bajer, January 6, 1892; Darby to Bajer, July 6, 1892; Letters to Bajer from Peckover, 1889-1892. Bajer MSS.

the Bureau consisted in serving as a center of information for the peace movement, in keeping the pacifists in touch with one another between the congresses, in making the preparations for the congresses, and in giving effect to the resolutions of the congresses. Later it was the business of the Bureau to make preparations for Peace Day, which was a sort of test mobilization of international demonstrations for peace, observed by the societies every February 22. At the end of 1892 the Bureau was able to begin distribution of the *Correspondance Autographiée*, a bi-weekly circular written by hand, which gave the news of the peace movement. From 1895 on this was printed as the *Correspondance Bi-Mensuelle*. All this was progress, but it was a far cry from Bajer's original conception. In fact, so harmless did the Bureau appear after all, and such confidence did Ducommun inspire, that the Peace Society finally yielded to the entreaties of the other pacifists and in 1894 sent as a peace offering a large check to the Bureau⁵².

In a letter to the Baroness von Suttner, whose own letters had helped bring about the recognition of the Bureau by the Peace Society, Darby defended himself and his committee from charges of intrigue. He went on to confess that "the misrepresentations, the petty personal rivalries and ambitions which have sometimes been associated with the Peace movement have been a grief to me. We ought, all of us, to be above them ..." Another letter of Darby to the Baroness von Suttner so well reveals the mind of the Peace Society pacifist that it is worth quoting almost in full:

It is not our fault, however, that we have to maintain a quiet insistence of our distinctive principles, and the position which they compel us to take. We would much rather that they were taken for granted and quietly recognized, so that while lying behind our work as the very strength and inspiration of it, they may nevertheless remain unobtrusive. But I have found, especially in religious and ecclesiastical matters ... that those who make the greatest claim to breadth of tolerance are often the most sadly lacking in them ...

We are most of us Free Churchmen, "Dissenters", as we are called, who have had to fight (constitutionally, of course) from our very youth, for our civil and religious liberties. We are the descendants of those who have been doing this for two centuries, until they have made England in her noblest and best and strongest qualities, what she is today ...

Politically, some of us, in spite of all our caution, are Radicals of the Radicals, and Progressivists among the Reformers. But we are not unreasonable or unsympathetic. We are intractable only when there is any attempt at Coercion, for that is what we do not understand, and we are impatient when others claim for

⁵² Elie Ducommun: *Report on the Work of the International Peace Bureau* (Berne, 1893); Dumas to

themselves and deny to us qualities which we possess in common, and perhaps even to a larger extent.⁵³

Thus Darby in 1894 took up a more favorable attitude toward the Bureau, but the old suspicions still lingered. At the Budapest Congress of 1896 the commission submitted a resolution that the Bureau be given power to act in an emergency without consulting the peace societies, always provided that such action was in accord with previous resolutions of the congresses. The representatives of the Peace Society objected, but they were in a minority and the resolution was carried⁵⁴. Similarly, the Peace Society opposed the plan in 1905 to federate the English societies, as well as later attempts to strengthen the International Peace Bureau⁵⁵. The Bureau never took on the political role which Darby had feared that it might. From 1894 on it was subventioned by the Government of Switzerland and later by Denmark and Norway; and hence it had to move cautiously. Its relations with the governments were generally confined to the transmission of the resolutions of the congresses, as well as all peace literature, and a correspondence with foreign ministers regarding the conclusion of permanent treaties of arbitration. When there was war or threat of war, the Bureau usually issued an appeal for a peaceful settlement. For example, in 1895 the Bureau appealed to the King of the Belgians to offer his services as mediator of the Franco-Madagascar conflict. A courteous reply was received pointing out that Madagascar was a protectorate of France and mediation was therefore impossible. In 1899 telegrams were sent to Queen Victoria and to Kruger urging arbitration. When Kruger replied that he was willing to arbitrate, the Bureau notified Lord Salisbury of that fact. A prompt response from the Foreign Office declared that arbitration could not be considered. It was just three days later that the Boer War began. The Bureau was not a power in the world, but at least its existence was recognized and it gave the peace movement an authority, which it had not had before. Centralization of the peace movement was never achieved, but Ducommun exerted a strong moral influence over all the pacifists which acted to coordinate the movement *de facto*, if not *de jure*. After his death the Bureau declined rapidly and it proved entirely unable to cope with the new peace movement born in the Great War, which grew up outside of its influence. One last effort was made in 1913 to reorganize the Bureau as the executive of the peace movement, but it was cut short by the War. And it turned out

Ducommun, April 4, 1894, Ducommun to Dumas, April 16, Nov. 6, 1894; *H.P.* (1895), p.125.

⁵³ Darby to Suttner, September 8, 9, 1894. Suttner MSS.

⁵⁴ *Bulletin du VII^e Congrès*, pp.43-46.

⁵⁵ *H.P.* (1905), XXX. 68, 111; A. Gobat: *Développement du Bureau ...* (Berne, 1910); Darby to Mlle Montaudon, July 19, 1910. B.I.P. MSS., VIII, B,2.

that international organization came to the governments before it came to the peace societies⁵⁶.

The pacifists gave surprisingly little time to constructive thinking about the bases of international organization, although they sensed that the ultimate aim of their efforts was the federation of the world. The Congress of 1889 declared for the principle of federation and looked forward to the establishment as a result of the federative pact of a European council, which would decide all disputes, direct a general disarmament, establish free trade, propagate knowledge, and encourage colonization. At Rome the object of the peace men was stated to be the founding of a congress of nations, the United States of Europe, and the next year the assembly "enthusiastically" approved the resolution inviting the peace societies to "make a union of the European States, based upon the solidarity of their interests, the supreme end of their propaganda". Similarly, the Congress of 1894 approved the formation of the Balkan League, seeing in it the predecessor of the United States of Europe⁵⁷. But there was little or no discussion of federation at the pacifist assemblies, and no attempt was made to draw up the blue-prints for the temple of peace. In fact, in the whole period from 1867 to 1899 only one of the pacifists developed any sort of well-rounded theory of international organization. This was Lemonnier, and it was symptomatic that in the end he, too, was reduced to joining in the chorus for arbitration, even if he did insist upon his own tune.

Other minor aspects of international organization were touched upon here and there, but never developed. For example, the Congress of 1890 recommended the extension of the principle of neutralization, holding that it would constitute a step toward the Rule of Law. This much of the theory of Bajer and Lemonnier the London Congress could accept. But as to the means by which a neutralized State was to be protected against violation of the treaty, this was commended "to careful study" and never appeared again in the discussions⁵⁸. The idea of the "cooling-off period", later important in the Bryan treaties, was first advanced among the pacifists as early as 1867 and later discussed in 1893, but again the suggestion remained in embryo form and was not developed⁵⁹. The emphasis was always upon arbitration to the exclusion of all else. Every congress had its arbitration resolutions, although the theme varied from time to time. Once it was in favor of simple arbitration between States involved in a particular dispute, another time in favor of stipulated arbitration in all treaties,

⁵⁶ Gobat, *op.cit.*, Friends Peace Committee: Minute Books. 1895; B.I.P.: *Rapports sur les Manifestations de 1899 et 1900 relatives à la Guerre du Transvaal*, pp.5ff; *Proposed New Statutes of Berne Bureau* (Circular, 1913).

⁵⁷ *Bulletin du I^{er} Congrès*, pp.24-6; *Troisième Congrès*, pp.178ff., Résolution XII; *Bulletin du IV^e Congrès*, pp.224-225; *Bulletin du VI^e Congrès*, pp.165ff., Resolution V.

⁵⁸ *Proceedings*, pp. 206-207, 212; cf. also *Bulletin du IV^e Congrès*, p.225.

again for permanent arbitration treaties, and finally for the establishment of a permanent international arbitral tribunal.

The High Court of Arbitration had figured in earlier internationalist thought, such as in the schemes of Bentham, Ladd, Marcoartu, and de Laveleye, as a function of the congress of nations, as merely an agency of the general plan of pacification. When the emphasis was later shifted to the conception of peace by codification, the federative principle was weakened, and it was imagined that the warless era would arrive when the governments adopted a code of international law which provided for an international court to apply its principles. The final step was taken when the widespread practice of arbitration for business and boundary disputes made it appear that international legislation was not a necessary prerequisite for the institution of an international tribunal. The monumental pacifist contribution in this regard, the scheme of Descamps which was adapted by the First Hague Conference and given form in the Hague Tribunal, contained no provisions for a code of international law.

The pacifists first considered the arbitral tribunal as an institution apart in the Congress of 1878, which endorsed a vague proposal for the selection by each government of two delegates who would serve as international arbiters on an international court⁶⁰. In 1884 the *Société Française des Amis de la Paix* considered at one of their study sessions the question: "What are the practical means to arrive at the establishment of an international tribunal?"⁶¹ It was Hodgson Pratt who provided the inspiration for a closer examination of the subject. In 1886 he persuaded Henry Richard to have the Peace Society act as co-sponsor with his own society of the efforts of the English jurist Leone Levi to draw up a code which would serve as the basis for an international tribunal. Pratt planned to submit Levi's completed draft to an international assembly of jurists and publicists, but he failed to work up enough interest in the idea, and the proposed conference was called off. In 1887 a gathering did meet to approve the project, but it was attended mainly by English pacifists whose endorsement carried little weight. Levi's draft in itself was little more than a rough sketch and had little influence. The most interest aroused by the whole affair was apparently in the mind of Lemonnier, who came out in bitter opposition to the idea. He feared that the formation of an international tribunal at that time would mean "rather a peril than a guarantee for liberty, justice, and peace". To Lemonnier an international tribunal could come only as the judicial organ of the federation of Europe whose laws would be the principles of the *Ligue*, while the adoption of Levi's

⁵⁹ *Corr. Autogr.* (July, 1893), no.11, p.6.

⁶⁰ *Compte Rendu*, pp.153-155, Resolution XIII.

⁶¹ *Bulletin* (July, 1884), pp.69-78.

project would mean only the perpetuation of the unfair conditions which then existed⁶².

The Peace Congress of 1889 gave its approval to Levi's outline, and succeeding congresses showed interest in the problem, but after the Interparliamentary Conference took it up, the congresses confined themselves to support of the design of Descamps. Darby directed the attention of the International Law Association to the subject, and he himself made a compilation of all the schemes ever advanced for international tribunals. This most valuable work, entitled *International Tribunals*, was printed with the support of both the Peace Society and the International Law Association and copies were sent in 1897 to all the rulers of the civilized world. A second edition was distributed to the delegates at the Hague Conference. Individual jurists were occupied with the question, but the staid and sober International Law Institute, which represented the legal mind of the time, considered the subject of international tribunals of arbitration only with regard to the interpretation of the conventions of international unions⁶³.

The peace congresses did not contribute much to the theory of international tribunals, but they did elaborate the principles for a code of international law. The final product was the work of the Commission on Legislation, which was supervised by Henri La Fontaine in a very thorough manner. The principles were based upon the familiar doctrines of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*. Actually, their endorsement had been rushed through the Rome Congress in its closing session along with a group of other last-minute resolutions upon which there was no time for discussion, but the continental pacifists long persisted in regarding their proclamation as the "Declaration of the Rights of Nations". The declaration affirmed, first of all, that international relations were to be governed by the same principles of morality as regulated the relations of individuals. It was denied that any nation had the right to judge its own case or the right to declare war on another; all differences between nations were to be settled legally. The declaration insisted upon the right of self-government, the right of self-determination, and the right of self-defense for every nation and maintained that the nations were "*solidaires les unes des autres*". In La Fontaine's code a new principle found its first formulation: the doctrine of the collective responsibility of all the civilized nations for the backward races. Developed from the humanitarian apology for imperialism, this principle was to

⁶² Passy: *Pour la Paix*, p.97; *Concord* (1887-1888), III. 65-67, 113-117, 228-233; Lemonnier to Bajer, June 19, 1886, Pratt to Bajer, August 11, 1886, copy, Pratt to Lemonnier, August 17, 1886. Bajer MSS.; Report of General Assembly of *Ligue* in *E.-U.* (October 2, 1886).

⁶³ *Bulletin du I^{er} Congrès*, pp.27-30; *Bulletin du VII^e Congrès*, pp.78-80, 140; *Bulletin du VIII^e Congrès*, pp.96ff; International Law Association ... *Conference* ... 1899: Report, pp.38-39; Baron

become the kernel of the mandate system of later days. The imperialists of every nation had long regarded it as the sacred duty of their particular country to extend the benefits of civilization over the benighted heathen. The pacifist code now declared that "the right of guardianship results implicitly from a delegation accorded to one nation by the other civilized nations". On the theory that the backward nations were in a legal position similar to that of a child, the right of the colony to claim self-government on coming of age was recognized. And as colonies were presumed to have been established with the tacit assent of other nations, each nation was permitted the right to offer observations on the colonial administration of another nation, and if this went unheeded, the complainant had the right to call a conference to decide what measures to take. At the Congress of 1894 the view was expressed that a diplomatic entente should prevent the appropriation of colonies, but keep the territories open to the free activity of all nations, while Great Britain was invited to take the initiative to form an international colonial council to govern all the colonial territories⁶⁴.

At the center of the code was enshrined the high and mighty doctrine of State sovereignty, which Lemonnier called "this fundamental principle of modern law". But while in Kantian ethics the principle of autonomy might have made for private morality, as applied to international politics it made for international anarchy and in the last analysis it meant the sanction of international immorality. Lemonnier knew the objections to arbitration which were made in the name of State sovereignty. But he claimed that it was a false notion that a State surrendered its sovereignty in submitting to a tribunal. On the contrary, he declared, a State merely exercised its sovereignty by delegating it to an arbiter and agreeing of its own free will to abide by its decision⁶⁵. This theory of delegated sovereignty may have been a model of legal logic, but more than logic was needed to transform the basis of international politics. State sovereignty meant equality for all who had power and responsibility for none. It meant that each State alone was competent to decide what was necessary for its own security, and of any question which it considered to involve its vital interests or its national honor each State alone was the final judge. The pacifists had to admit that such questions could not always be arbitrated. Even such an inveterate arbitration addict as Henry Richard agreed that Arbitration was not an infallible solution for all international disputes. "It is freely admitted", he declared, "that cases may be conceived to which it does not apply"⁶⁶. The fact of the matter was that it was just from such cases, in which a State's vital interests were concerned, that wars arose; the

Descamps: *Tableau Décennal...de l'Institut de Droit International* (Paris, 1905), pp.150, 153; W. E.Darby: *International Tribunals* (London, 1904).

⁶⁴ *Troisième Congrès*, pp. 142-143; *Bulletin du VI^e Congrès*, pp.54-58, 162-163; *Bulletin du VII^e Congrès*, pp.46-54.

⁶⁵ *E.-U.* (May 16, 1885, September, 1889, September, 1890).

⁶⁶ Henry Richard: *Papers on the Reasonableness of International Arbitration* (London, [1887]), p.6.

questions which were settled by arbitration were "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier". The pacifists missed the essential fact that States went to war, not to win justice, but to further their own interests through force of might. If the issues were regarded as not worth fighting about, if the will existed upon both sides for a pacific settlement, then usually the resources of diplomacy were adequate for solving the difficulty; arbitration, if employed at all, was an instrument of diplomacy, not an instrument of pacification⁶⁷. Thus arbitration was not what the pacifists thought it was; most of them were putting their trust in a false god. Arbitration was more important as a technique of propaganda than as a means of instituting the millennium. It gave the pacifists something to shout. Its appeal was simple; everybody could understand Stead's battle-cry, "Always Arbitrate Before You Fight". It was all very logical and clear, and it could be made to sound very practical. All the elements were present for a successful propaganda: all, that is, save one - a receptive audience.

On the question of disarmament there developed a clear-cut difference of opinion between those who wanted immediate relief from the crushing burden of armaments and those who said that international organization would have to come first. The party of disarmament found its chief support among the English pacifists, while the opposing group drew its strength from the Continent. The division was by no means cut and dried. For example, it was the Italian, Captain Siccardi, who carried the motion in the Congress of 1891 that the peace societies should agitate for the calling of a governmental disarmament conference; while the best-known plea for disarmament in the early nineties came from Jules Simon, who appealed in 1893 for an arms truce to last until the end of the century. On the other hand, Pratt always maintained that armaments were a symptom and disarmament a consequence. But in the congresses the impulse for disarmament resolutions came regularly from the delegates of the Peace Society, while the resistance centered around the Frenchmen, Moch, Arnaud, and Richet, who were supported by the writings of Fried. After all, the English pacifists had been raised in the Manchester tradition and were unduly sensitive to armament increases, while the continentals were placed in a situation in which any emphasis upon disarmament on their part, no matter in what form, would have brought down upon them the reproach that they were unpatriotic⁶⁸.

The party of disarmament called the tune in the first congresses. Its opponents could hardly vote against the expression of a wish for disarmament, no matter how futile it might seem. But the position remained confused, as is apparent from the

⁶⁷ Cf. the excellent discussion of this point by Sir James Headlam-Morley: *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London, 1930), pp.10-50.

resolution of 1894, in which the Congress expressed its conviction that the conclusions of arbitration treaties would permit a reduction of armaments, but in view of the folly of the armament race, the Congress expressed its hope that one of the powers would call a disarmament conference. In 1897 Moch began to make an issue of the question, insisting that the cart should not be placed before the horse. The continental point of view was finally adopted by the Congress of 1901, which declared "that it considers disarmament as a result of the organization of peace rather than a means of arriving at peace, and the attempt of Byles, an English M.P., to change "rather than" to "as well as"" was defeated. But the debate continued in the succeeding years⁶⁹.

In their handling of the political questions of the day, the pacifists split into two groups. One group held that the pacifists should prevent wars by finding and propagating just solutions of all the dangerous political issues from which wars could develop; "Peace Through Justice" was its battle-cry. The other group believed that the pacifists should hold themselves aloof from politics but should strive to create a pacific climate of opinion in which these questions could easily be settled; this was the party of "Justice Through Peace". "Our work is to provide principles, not policies, for Governments", said its spokesman, Darby⁷⁰.

When the inevitable Pole raised the Polish Question at the Congress of 1892, Passy effectively silenced him and won the applause of the assembly with an eloquent speech on the theme: "We are not a Congress of diplomats here to remake the map of Europe. Our power is not immediate. Our task is to prepare, by our appeals to justice and to peace, the movement of opinion which can lead to the necessary reparations."⁷¹ As he saw it, the peace congress was not, and should not be, the sounding-board for all the nationalist grievances of Europe. He was keenly conscious that the congress, the peace movement itself, was rather the articulate voice of a sorely pressed humanity, an expression of the feelings of the masses, who only wanted the chance to work and to make a decent living. "In a word, the congresses represent the pressure of opinion; they are nothing else, and it would be wrong for them to claim to be anything else."⁷²

⁶⁸ *Troisième Congrès*, pp.173-4; A. H. Fried: *Das Abrüstungs-Problem. Eine Untersuchung* (Berlin, n.d.), pp.19-20, 22.

⁶⁹ *Bulletin du VI^e Congrès*, p.162; G. Moch: *Comment Se Fera le Désarmement* (Berne, 1897); *idem: Comment Se Fera le Désarmement* (Paris, 1935), pp.66-67; *Tenth Universal Peace Congress*, pp.90-92, 78; Wehberg: *Beschränkung*, pp.18-25.

⁷⁰ At the Peace Congress of 1893, *Report*, p.55.

⁷¹ *Bulletin du IV^e Congrès*, pp.127-128.

⁷² Passy to Ducommun, October 11, 1896. B.I.P. MSS., V,B,1.

Bertha von Suttner was another who conceived peace as the highest aim, above which no immediate aim could be placed. She often expressed her conviction that the pacifists could bind themselves beforehand to no one solution of political problems, for the political situation was transitory, the peace principles everlasting. As for the crucial question of Alsace-Lorraine: "What concerns them [the pacifists] is not *how* the reconciliation takes place, but *that* it takes place"⁷³. It was the Alsace-Lorraine Question which seemed most pregnant with danger, and it was over this issue that the two opposing parties came in conflict during the nineties.

In the first two congresses political questions were excluded, and an attempt to introduce the subject of France's lost provinces was ruled out of order. Darby took the position that the only solution of the question was acquiescence in the *status quo*, which would come with "the peaceful lapse of years". Pratt felt differently and an anonymous article appeared in *Concord* protesting that the 'ostrich policy', which shuts its eyes to facts, and utters nonsense about the 'influence of time', &., &., is the enemy of peace, because it lulls men into a false security"⁷⁴.

In March, 1891, Pratt was in Berlin, where he was sounding out opinion in high circles on the idea of having England call a European Congress to settle the vexed question⁷⁵. When nothing came of this effort, Pratt set about having political questions admitted to the agenda of the peace congress which was to meet in Rome that year. Bajer helped with a letter to the organizing committee, and a preparatory assembly of the Italian peace societies endorsed the proposal. Promptly the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* prepared a resolution for the congress proposing that a conference of powers be held to declare Alsace-Lorraine neutral, and Pratt's Association adhered⁷⁶.

But it was not long before the danger in the situation was brought home to the pacifists. Bonghi, who was scheduled to preside over the Interparliamentary Congress at Rome, published an article in the *Nuova Antologia*, in which he condemned the annexation of the two provinces by Germany. Immediately the German and Austrian deputies who had planned to attend the Conference announced that they could not take part, and Bonghi was forced to let Biancheri take the chair⁷⁷. When the pacifists came together for the congress, Baroness von Suttner exerted all her influence upon Pratt and the French and Italians and succeeded in persuading

⁷³ *D.W.N.* (1892), I. vii-viii, 48-58, (1893), II. 491-5, (1895), IV. 165.

⁷⁴ *Proceedings, 1890*, pp.208-209; *H.P.* (January, 1891), n.s., XXII. 186-187; *Concord* (1891), VI. 57.

⁷⁵ Drafts of letters from Lemonnier to Pratt, March 3, 4, 1891. Lemonnier MSS. The aid of some "princess" was enlisted; her identity cannot be determined.

⁷⁶ *Concord* (1891), VI. 35-36, 74-75, 88, 95, 177; draft, Bajer to Facelli, April 14, 1891; *E.-U.* (July, 1891).

them to leave the ticklish theme alone. So consequential did she regard her intervention at this point that five years later, when enumerating her services to the peace movement in a letter to Alfred Nobel, she wrote: "Through me the Congress of Rome kept away from a certain dispute which would have broken to pieces the frail edifice"⁷⁸.

Still undismayed, Pratt planned for 1892 a private international meeting which would take place before the Berne Congress and attempt to arrive at a solution of the delicate questions of the hour. Passy was hesitant, but he finally agreed to be present, and other continental peace men promised to take part. But Pratt met with an absolute refusal on the part of the Englishmen and the Germans, and he finally had to abandon the idea altogether⁷⁹. Experience had taught him that it was impossible to discuss the Alsace-Lorraine Question at any peace congress, that "to enter upon it would simply break up the meeting instantly"⁸⁰.

It was no easy task to ban the most acute question of the hour from the pacifist gatherings. The French pacifists heeded Lemonnier's paraphrase of Gambetta: "Think of it always and speak of it until the question is solved peacefully but according to justice and to law"⁸¹. Carrying on in the tradition of his master, Arnaud complained privately about the Baroness von Suttner, who, he wrote Ducommun, was an excellent worker, "but I think it would be well, before flattering her too much, to ask her adhesion - convert that she claims to be - to Liberty as well as to Peace". And he distrusted Passy, "who fought against the *Ligue* as long as it had no great influence"⁸².

It was not Arnaud, however, but a newcomer, who was to give the fatal question such prominence in the considerations of the pacifists. Gaston Moch, like a more famous contemporary of his, was of Alsatian origin, a Jew, and an army officer. He was still in his middle thirties when in 1893 he turned from his technical studies and found an interest in the Alsace-Lorraine Question, and, as had happened in the case of Bertha von Suttner, the book he wrote brought him into the peace movement. The ideas which Moch advanced were that peace, which he saw to be absolutely necessary, could come about only through the removal of certain international suspicions, chief among which were questions of nationality, and the Alsace-Lorraine Question first of all. He believed that the solution lay in according to the provinces

⁷⁷ *Concord* (1891), VI. 150-152; Suttner: *Memoirs*, I. 358-360.

⁷⁸ November, 15, 1896. Nobel MSS.

⁷⁹ Letters of Ducommun, Pratt, and Passy, February to August, 1892. In dossier: *Congrès politique spécial*, B.I.P. MSS., VB2.

⁸⁰ *Concord* (1894), IX. 143.

⁸¹ *E.-U.* (June, 1891).

the right of self-determination: they should be allowed to choose whether they wished to remain with Germany, return to France, or become independent and neutralized. As no government could take the initiative for such a solution, it would have to come from a private source, and the pacifists, detached beings with but a single aim, to end war, were the logical agents. Moch, deciding to turn his fertile brain and warlike talents to use in the struggle for international peace, resigned from the army and began an energetic and vigorous campaign to win the peace movement for his ideas⁸³.

In the *Almanach de la Paix* for 1895 Moch published an article on the "Mission of the Peace Societies", in which he appealed to them to leave the platonic ground of vague resolutions and to take up the Alsace-Lorraine Question. He proposed that the pacifists decide upon some general principle on the basis of which the problem could be solved and then agitate for its adoption. Moch, of course, had the general principle all ready for them. Dumas, the editor of *La Paix par le Droit*, ever with an eye for controversies, opened up a symposium on the subject which continued throughout 1895. Prominent pacifists like Bajer, Moneta, Novikov, the Russian sociologist, and, of course, Arnaud, spoke in favor of Moch's proposal, but Bertha von Suttner and Ducommun were dead set against it, and even Trarieux warned that it "would be war introduced into the camp of peace". At the same time Moch engaged in controversy with the Austrian pacifists in *Die Waffen Nieder*, and articles by Jean Heimweh, the well-known French propagandist of the Alsace-Lorraine Question, were published in *La Paix par le Droit*. Moch told Fried, "*Ce qui distingue un pacifique français d'un chauvin, c'est que le pacifique est convaincu que la question pourra un jour être réglée pacifiquement et qu'il travaille à hâter la venue de ce jour; mais cette question, il l'a proclamée aussi nettement que ceux qui veulent en faire une cause de guerre*". Which seemed all too true⁸⁴.

On the other side of the Rhine there was no Alsace-Lorraine Question. When Pratt began to harp upon the subject in 1891, Barth and others gave him to understand that international affairs would have to be regarded from the standpoint of the *status quo*, "otherwise we would forfeit any influence on public opinion"⁸⁵. The South German Radical, Richter, wrote Ducommun that if such ideas as Bonghi's were adopted, he and his friends would have to leave the peace movement⁸⁶. And Richter

⁸² Arnaud to Ducommun, April 21, 1892. B.I.P. MSS., VB2.

⁸³ Patiens [Gaston Moch]: *L'Alsace-Lorraine devant l'Europe* (Paris, 1893); *idem: Révision du Traité de Francfort* (leaflet, Paris n.d.); *idem: Désarmement* (1935), pp.11-12.

⁸⁴ *Almanach de la Paix pour 1895*, pp.40-44; *P.D.* (1895), V.8-14, 42-47, 50-53, 71-77, 80-81, 142-146, 161-167, 238-245; *D.W.N.* (1895), IV. 304-305, (1896), V.89-99, (1894), III. 110-112; Jean Heimweh: "Droit de Conquête et Plébiscite", in *P.D.* (January-April, 1896); Moch to Fried, April 16, 1897. Fried MSS.

⁸⁵ Fischer-Lette to Bajer, June 17, 1891, January 17, 1890. Bajer MSS.

⁸⁶ July 31, 1892. B.I.P. MSS., VB2.

had been the only German delegate to remain in the hall at the Congress of Rome when Arnaud presented his "Declaration of the Rights of Nations". The members of the Reichstag, who were there primarily for the Interparliamentary Conference, had immediately gotten up and left⁸⁷.

It was old Franz Wirth who gave the most publicity to the German side of the case, and in a way that left the French smarting and gave Bertha von Suttner a good deal of concern. An *enfant terrible* she called this septuagenarian who flaunted all the German prejudices in the face of the French. Wirth claimed that "the whole German people says unanimously that Alsace cannot be returned to France". "They are not partisans of peace who are always crying after Alsace", he wrote Ducommun, "for it is not to be regained without a war"⁸⁸. Wirth completely shared the opinion of his countrymen that the great danger to European peace came from France, and that only the existence of the Triple Alliance guaranteed the peace. It was in this sense that he edited the organ of the German Peace Society. That was not so bad, for few of the French pacifists could read German. But then Wirth used these same expressions in his letters to the foreign pacifists, and he even had the poor judgment to repeat the charges in an article in *La Paix par le Droit*, which to Bertha von Suttner was a "calamity" and to Moch the occasion for a bitter attack on the veteran⁸⁹.

The controversy spilled over into the pages of *Concord*, and the columns of the French and German correspondents of the magazine, filled with recriminations and counter-recriminations, began to take on the acrid smell of the battle-field. Moch had to admit in 1897 that his fine plans for the settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine Question had not worked out. The Germans were "not yet ripe", he said. They were all more or less "Franz Wirths" and no discussion was possible, "since they refuse to discuss it on principle"⁹⁰. All the German pacifists were not as violent in their prejudices or as ill-considered in their utterances as Franz Wirth, but on the whole, most of them showed as little sympathy for the French point of view as Pastor Umfrid, who flippantly declared that as Alsace-Lorraine had had two hundred years to learn to be French, it should be given another two hundred years to become German⁹¹.

A perfect entente was never reached between the French and German pacifists, but as the years went on, understanding increased on both sides. Resolutions were

⁸⁷ *E.-U.* (July-September, 1898).

⁸⁸ Wirth to Ducommun, April 9, 1892, February 12, 1894. B.I.P. MSS., VB6.

⁸⁹ Suttner to Fried, February 16, 17, 1895, May 21, 1896. Fried MSS.; Wirth to Ducommun, January to April, 1894. B.I.P. MSS., VB6; Passy to Ducommun, May 28, 1896. B.I.P. MSS., VB1; E. Arnaud: "M. Franz Wirth et la Paix" in *E.-U.* (March, 1895); *P.D.* (1896), VI. 152-154, 207-213; *D.W.N.* (1896), V. 315.

⁹⁰ Moch to Bajer, November 24, 1897. Bajer MSS.

⁹¹ *D.W.N.* (1896), V. 322; *Concord* (1893), VIII. 154, 208, (1895), X.5, 11, 22-23, 33-34.

passed at the peace congresses that a Franco-German rapprochement was necessary for world peace. And in 1904 the national assembly of the German Peace Society declared that the recognition of the *status quo* was "for the moment, the essential condition of all the pacific efforts" and the question of the legality of the annexation had to be adjourned. In return for this admission that there actually existed a question of law, the French national congress approved a resolution which declared: "The ultimate solution is the plebiscite ... We demand as the final object of our hopes the establishment of *la paix par le droit*; but we take it into account that the provisional method can be formulated contrariwise: the establishment of *le droit par la paix*." Farther than this neither side could be expected to go⁹².

Lemonnier had written in May, 1891, "The Congresses must be a practical school of internationalism, and the national biases and prejudices must melt away, evaporate, disappear in an atmosphere of goodwill and of fraternity"⁹³. Unfortunately for such hopes, the pacifists were never able to check their respective nationalisms at the door with their hats and coats when they entered the halls of their congresses.

So much for the treatment of immediate causes of war. As for underlying causes, it cannot be said that the pacifists gave them any thorough study in this period. In condemning international anarchy and the armament race, as well as in seeking to disarm international suspicions, they were dealing rather with symptoms than with fundamental forces. Indeed, through most of the peace literature of the time runs as a *Leitmotiv* what has been called "The Devil Theory of War", the theory that wars are brought about by wicked individuals, by evil kings and malevolent statesmen. Republicans of the school of Lemonnier saw the origins of wars in the deep dire plots of intriguers like Napoleon III or Bismarck, and they felt that morality could be introduced into international relations only when every nation was democratic and each people had its say. Similarly, the columns of the *Herald of Peace* are filled with a distrust of the very men of state to whose Christian consciences the Peace Society directed so many of its appeals. In his last years Henry Richard confessed that his hope for peace lay in public opinion rather than in the politics of Cabinets⁹⁴. He and Cremer both worked for the extension of Parliament's control over foreign affairs, while on the Continent Marcoartu long agitated for the granting to the people of the right to declare war, to be exercised by plebiscite⁹⁵. It was all good democratic theory, of course; every good Liberal believed that, in the last analysis, it was the governments, not the peoples, who made the wars. As her contribution to the problem of the causes of war Bertha von Suttner drew up two little lists: on one side were the

⁹² B.I.P.: *Commission pour le Rapprochement Franco-Allemand: Documents* (Berne, 1904, pp. 8-11).

⁹³ *E.-U.* (May, 1891).

⁹⁴ Miall: *Richard*, p.352.

powers of darkness, such as Authority, Militarism, Anti-Semitism, Nationalism, Confessionalism, and Trickery, which made for war; and on the other the powers of light, such as Free Inquiry, Democracy, Equal Rights for All, Cosmopolitanism, Religious Tolerance, Justice, and Truth, which made for peace⁹⁶. But she, too, laid great weight on individual causes of war. In answer to Fried's economic interpretation, she wrote, "When a Skobelev says: 'I want to have my war in order to be a famous man', or if a Bismarck falsifies the Ems Despatch and before that Eugénie plans '*une petite guerre*' - then the outbreak of war has nothing or only little to do with the profits of capitalists"⁹⁷. The pacifists did not deceive themselves as to the fate of the multitude of addresses to the rulers which they turned out. "It is certainly true", wrote the Baroness von Suttner to Bajer, "petitions always go into the waste-basket. Entreating doesn't help at all."⁹⁸ As the pacifists admitted among themselves, such appeals were not really expected to have any influence in the councils of the great; they were primarily calculated to impress public opinion⁹⁹.

The work of the pacifists was with the people. The phrase "public opinion" appeared on their lips almost as often as the word "peace" itself. Public opinion was the "queen of the world". They expected everything from it, once it was properly enlightened. Public opinion was to force governments to arbitrate disputes; it was to provide the sanction for the execution of arbitral awards; it was to withstand the belligerent impulses of the governments. Exclaimed one pacifist: "Archimedes said: 'Give me a fulcrum and I shall move the world'; we are more fortunate than Archimedes, we have a fulcrum: public opinion"¹⁰⁰. Said Pratt: "Public opinion is all-powerful, there is not a sovereign, not a Government of the world which can resist it, once it is organized". And again: "All changes in human affairs are in these days due to the all-powerful influence of public opinion"¹⁰¹.

As much as they honored public opinion, the societies never stopped to analyze it, but regarded it as the natural product of the rational workings of the popular mind. In the Nineteenth Century it was generally assumed that the popular mind worked rationally. It was to Reason that the pacifists appealed primarily; the religious and the ethical appeals were emphasized less and less as time went on, and in the 1900's Reason triumphed completely with the advent of Fried's "scientific socialism" and Angellism, the essence of logic. Bertha von Suttner, authoress of one of the greatest appeals to the heart in modern peace literature was forced to complain

⁹⁵ Marcoartu: *Internationalism*, p.28.

⁹⁶ *D.W.N.* (1899), VII. 412.

⁹⁷ Suttner to Fried, March 24, 1898.

⁹⁸ December 30, 1899 Bajer MSS.

⁹⁹ Passy to Ducommun, April 28, 1897. B.I.P. MSS., VB1.

¹⁰⁰ *Congrès international ... 1878*, p.144.

that "Pacifism has grown so terribly rational"¹⁰². The pacifists could not entirely overlook the part played by irrational influences in the motivation of men, especially when it was obvious that popular passions had something to do with the origin of war. In his list of the causes of war Pratt gave first place to Hate, "mere blind, unreasoning Hate"¹⁰³. Yet the role of the emotions was consistently underestimated, and the pacifists came to identify the rule of peace with the rule of Reason. The faith in the rational propensities of the average man was held most firmly. Pratt's creed, for example, could not be shaken. After he had undergone the unpleasant experience of having been howled down by the mob when he attempted to give expression to the voice of Reason during the Boer War, he wrote: "It was a rude awakening for old-fashioned reformers ... to witness the refusal by a mass meeting in London of the right of free speech. Fifty or sixty years ago we were sure that liberalism, universal suffrage, and vote by ballot, would ensure the disappearance of war and establish the reign of justice". Yet, a few years later, when the Liberals had come back into power, Pratt was his old self again. He assured Passy: "The British democracy is essentially pacific"¹⁰⁴. Similarly, Moscheles, who had had knives thrown at him when the rabble broke up the peace meeting in Trafalgar Square in 1899, could write a few years later about the man in the street: "He is a man you can argue with, for he has a keen appreciation of his material interests, and he not infrequently has a conscience"¹⁰⁵.

The friends of peace did understand that, if international mistrust was to be reasoned away, it was in the schools that they would have to start. As early as 1885 a certain Hermann Molkenboer, a Dutchman, began to collect adhesions of teachers in many countries to his plan for the establishment of an International Council of Education, whose members, to be appointed by the governments, would regulate the teaching in the schools in the interest of international understanding. The peace congresses of the nineties persistently recommended that teachers should inculcate ideas of peace in the young, that history should be taught with less emphasis upon the development of cannon and more upon the development of culture and civilization, and that each nation's textbooks should be revised to give foreign nations their just due. Actually little or nothing could be done in this direction. Each nation was girded for war and the national tradition was as much a part of its war strength as the rifles of its soldiers. Those in whose hands lay the security of a nation just as bitterly opposed any serious tampering with the nation's spiritual armaments as they did any demand for material disarmament. Any attempt to train the youth for peace rather than for war was serious. The outcry raised in Germany against the Baden schoolbook revision of

¹⁰¹ *Conférence Internationale ... 1882, Procès-Verbal*, p.11; Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 240.

¹⁰² *Gedankblättern Fried*, pp.34-35.

¹⁰³ *Report of Fifth Universal Peace Congress*, pp.231-232.

¹⁰⁴ *Concord* (Oct., 1899), XIV. 163; Pratt to Passy, Jan. 30, 1906. Passy MSS.

¹⁰⁵ *Concord* (February, 1901), XVI. 19.

1898 was not merely a regional phenomenon. When Julie Toussaint, the friend of Lemonnier, tried in 1887 to found a French branch of Molkenboer's Society of Peace by Education, she found that it was impossible, because, as she later reported, of the sentiment of nationalism and the fear of weakening it. The *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* was asking something that was impossible when it recommended in 1889 that instructors of history discard everything which was of a nature to excite and sustain international hatreds "without, however, weakening in any way the sentiment of patriotism"¹⁰⁶. Only in England was anything accomplished along this line. The book which won the prize offered by the International Arbitration and Peace Association for the best elementary treatment of the question of peace and war was actually introduced into the schools of Glasgow through the pressure of the peace society there¹⁰⁷.

In the struggle for international understanding the pacifists saw that one of their most dangerous opponents was the inflammatory newspaper press. They themselves had a long experience with indifference and hostility on the part of the journals of the day, and they had to look on while the newspapers, instead of casting their powerful influence on the side of peace, actually catered to the worst instincts of their readers and tended to incite the public opinion of the nations against each other. Nor did they fail to recognize the economic motivation of newspaper belligerency. The lessons of the Spanish-American War and the Boer War at the end of the century served to confirm their suspicions beyond a shadow of a doubt. *Concord* once carried an article by a young writer exposing the vested interest of the newspapers in war, which provoked a storm of righteous indignation among the English editors. Such sharp criticisms were rare, for the pacifists never lost hope that the press might be induced to listen to them and alter its conduct. Pratt's proposal for a remedy for the evil was for the pacifists themselves to found a great international daily, which would be edited impartially and counteract the baneful influence of the chauvinist press. The congress of 1891 approved the plan, but the pacifists never found the funds with which to carry it out. Something of the sort was achieved when the pacifist syndicate of Moch, Richet and Arnaud gained control of the important journal, *l'Indépendance Belge*. Otherwise, the peace men had to content themselves with vain appeals to the newspaper editors to be good and with their own activity in attempting to repair the damage when they were not¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁶ *Assemblées ... 1889, Bulletin Officiel*, pp.14-17.

¹⁰⁷ Hermann Molkenboer: *Die Internationale Erziehungs-Arbeit* (Flensburg, 1891); *E.-U.* (January 8, 1887); *Bulletins of the World Peace Congresses*, (1890), pp.85-100; (1891), pp.119-125, 171-173, 175-176; (1893), p.258; (1894), pp.164-165; (1896), pp.57-64. On the question of patriotism and education, cf. J. F. Scott: *Patriots in the Making* (N.Y., 1916).

¹⁰⁸ *Conférence Internationale ... 1882*, p.129; "Die gelbe Presse", in *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 220-221; A. T. Quiller-Couch: "The Press versus Peace", in *Concord* (February, 1899), XIV, 21-22, (March, 1899), XIV. 52-53, (1901), XVI. 118-120, 165-166, (1890), V. 40; *Troisième Congrès*, pp.129-142, 176-177.

The peacemakers saluted almost every expression of internationalism. They passed resolutions looking toward the facilitation of international intercourse in every possible way, they promoted international correspondence agencies, and it was under their auspices that was formed the first International Alliance of Universities in 1892¹⁰⁹. Pacifists were also active in the cause of the international language. Moch was one of the first to popularize Esperanto in France, and he made a number of converts among the other friends of peace. Many of the continental pacifists were Freemasons, and they attempted to win the aid of Freemasonry for the peace movement. On almost all of the movements which cut across state boundaries the pacifists looked with unqualified approval; but they withheld their favor from the most important of all, the Socialist Movement.

The peace movement had grown up in the Manchester tradition, and the pacifists had considered economic causes of war, although these were conceived as "economic interests badly understood". As anti-imperialists, the pacifists of the nineties insisted that prosperity could not rest upon the mere acquisition of territory. "Trade does not follow the flag", maintained Pratt, "but comes where demand is best satisfied"¹¹⁰. The congresses denounced imperialist rivalries as a cause of war, but they did not take up the question of their economic bases until at the Congress of 1901 Jules Prudhommeaux presented a report on "The Economic Causes of War". He insisted that modern wars were the result of the struggle for colonial markets, and he advocated as a solution the introduction of cooperatives, which would reconcile production and consumption and make the demand for new markets unnecessary. The congress recommended the idea of cooperation and ordered steps taken for the formation of a committee of economists to study the economic and social aspects of the international problem. It was a belated recognition of these vital factors, and the peace societies never did take up the cause of Cooperation in earnest. Against the wishes of some of the pacifists, earlier congresses had included in their desiderata hopes that the governments would work for a more equitable distribution of the products of labor and the settlement of social conflicts by arbitration. But while the pacifists wanted social justice as well as international justice, they never regarded the one as vital for the attainment of the other. Special appeals for support by workers' societies were made, on the ground that the working class had the most to lose from war. Liberal Economists such as Passy objected even then, rejecting any conception of society as divided into classes¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Jacques Dumas: *Les Origines du Mouvement Pacifiste au sein de la Jeunesse* (Nîmes, 1911).

¹¹⁰ *Concord* (1898), XIII. 35.

¹¹¹ J. Prudhommeaux: *Les Causes Economiques des Guerres Modernes. La Coopération et la Paix* (Lyon, 1901); E. Ducommun: *Rapport sur l'Exécution des Résolutions des Congrès de la Paix* (Berne, 1903), pp.19-28. *Congrès International*, 1878, pp. 48-55; *Troisième Congrès*, pp.109-112;

The pacifists were, to be sure, a bourgeois group. They wanted collaboration with the workers, but they would have nothing to do with the Social Democrats. Passy, tolerant though he was, would not so much as appear on the same platform with Jaurès. Theodor Barth accepted the position as honorary officer of Bajer's Danish Peace Society, but he remarked that it was no incentive for him that Liebknecht was also so honored. The Friends, who never missed an opportunity, once heard that there was to be an open air demonstration in Hyde Park by workers in the cause of international peace. Immediately the Peace Committee appointed a representative, only to learn to its horror that the planned resolution was to lay the cause of war on "landlordism and capitalism". The representative was speedily withdrawn¹¹².

Bertha von Suttner welcomed every sign of the internationalist spirit from no matter what quarter it came. She applauded the campaign of the German socialists against militarism, and she even gave space to articles from *Vorwärts* in *Die Waffen Nieder*. Yet she kept the peace cause above politics and above party. In 1895 she wrote Fried expressing approval of a certain protest of the Social Democrats:

Yes, those are the only outspoken friends of peace. But that is no reason why we should amalgamate with them. That would not help them any. Moreover, we can certainly have S. D. with us, but our *raison d'être* consists in showing that there are other 'elements' who protest against war and chauvinism as well as the 'Reds', and for real ends, not as a plank in a party platform or even from fear of the guardians of 'order'¹¹³.

Ducommun agreed, and this position, which he stated as follows, was the one which came to prevail:

Without holding ourselves too much at a distance from workers' organizations, we must limit our moral responsibility to those acts and aspirations alone which proceed directly from our pacific program. We should not seem to be yielding to the pressure of those who would like us to disavow the marks of sympathy that the Congresses have shown up to now to the workers and to their cause. There is a double peril to avoid¹¹⁴.

Bulletin du VI^e Congrès, 1894, pp.163-4; *Bulletin du VII^e Congrès*, 1896, pp. 87-90; *Tenth Universal Peace Congress*, 1901, pp.93-94.

¹¹² Friends Peace Committee, Minute Books, 1896; Barth to Bajer, Jan. 28, 1891. Bajer MSS.

¹¹³ Suttner to Fried, September 7, 1895. Fried MSS.

¹¹⁴ Ducommun to Suttner, April 20, 1897. Suttner MSS.

Pratt was the one who most ardently worked for the adhesion of working-class organizations to the peace movement. He felt all along that the peace societies were making a big mistake by appealing only to the richer classes. "This is not the way to carry a great revolution in human affairs", he insisted. But while he was able to do something in England, where Cremer had already lined up a certain measure of support among the workers, Pratt could never get his colleagues across the Channel to cooperate, for the working-class movement on the Continent was far too radical for the average bourgeois pacifists¹¹⁵.

At the Congress of 1896 the question came up as to the representation of workers' societies at the Peace Congresses. Moch and Passy feared that the socialists would seek to use the congresses for their own ends if given a deliberative vote. Where upon Emile Vandervelde, the prominent Belgian socialist, who happened to be present, arose and told the assembly how chimerical such a fear was, "for doubtlessly the socialists desire international peace, but they do not agree with the anodyne system which ... [the friends of peace] employ to obtain it"¹¹⁶. The Marxian position was that war was inherent in the capitalistic system and could be done away with only when the system itself was overthrown. From this point of view the activity of the pacifists was actually harmful, because they were deluding the people in promising something which only socialism could give. Yet the socialists themselves were hardly consistent. Their international congresses of the nineties declared in favor of reduction of armaments, arbitration, abolition of standing armies, and a popular plebiscite on war when the governments refused an arbitral decision - all half-measures if the cause of war lay in the social system. In 1893 the congress of the Socialist International even resolved that the Socialist party should support "all the associations which have for their aim universal peace"¹¹⁷. This they never did, although both La Fontaine and Fried made special efforts to bring the socialists into the Interparliamentary Conferences¹¹⁸. La Fontaine, the most prominent socialist in the pacifist ranks, said that he cooperated in the peace movement with the hope that the pacifists themselves would ultimately see the light and join the socialists¹¹⁹. The Social Democrats were not averse to borrowing whatever they thought useful from the pacifists. They took over from the friends of peace such weapons as the arbitration plank; while Moch's plea for a national army of defense, *L'Armée d'une Démocratie*, a study of the Swiss military system, was seized upon by the French socialists and had

¹¹⁵ *Concord* (1895), X. 19-20, (1901), BVI. 177-178; *Fifth Universal Peace Congress*, p.237.

¹¹⁶ *Bulletin du VII^e Congrès*, pp. 90-97.

¹¹⁷ Carl Grünberg: *Die Internationale und der Weltkrieg* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1916-1928), I. 5-13 (resolutions of pre-war congresses, 1867-1910); L. Graveraux: *Les Discussions sur le Patriotisme et le Militarisme dans les Congrès Socialistes* (Thesis, Paris, 1913).

¹¹⁸ Copy, Fried to Bebel, April 28, 1897. Fried MSS.; La Fontaine to Bajer, July 15, 1895. Bajer MSS. Jaurès was present at the Interparliamentary Conference at Paris in 1889, but not later.

¹¹⁹ *P.D.* (1900). X. 87-89.

an influence on Jaurès, as is apparent from his *L'Armée Nouvelle*¹²⁰. But even when their increase in political power gave the socialists a vested interest in peace and made it appear that war could be prevented even under the capitalist system, the socialists still refrained from any cooperation with the bourgeois pacifists. Bernstein later declared that the socialists had regarded the peace men as "partly honorable ideologists, with no sense for realities, partly as politically ambiguous elements". But the events of the World War demonstrated that the internationalism of the socialists themselves was powerless in the face of rampant nationalism¹²¹.

Socialism had an important influence on the peace movement through the great pacifist theoretician, Alfred Hermann Fried, who left the Social Democratic Party after the nineties but never forgot certain of the teachings of Marx. Fried demonstrated scientifically that the triumph of the pacifists was inevitable, that the whole development of the time led to internationalism, and that it was the task of the pacifists to understand the forces at work and to explain them to others, so that they could cooperate in hastening the evolutionary process. His "scientific pacifism" appealed particularly to international lawyers and scholars, many of whom were brought into the peace movement after 1900 through Fried's writings¹²².

As for the pacifists, they needed no such convincing. The way was hard and the trail long, but as to the final outcome there could be no doubt. As Darby wrote after some temporary set-back, "We have still to go on patiently plodding, believing that we have reason, right, the finer feelings and instincts of humanity, and God on our side and that ultimately our cause must triumph"¹²³.

¹²⁰ Moch to Fried, December 12, 1899.

¹²¹ Bernstein in Fried: *Gedankblattern*, pp.14-16; Merle Fainsod: *International Socialism and the World War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), esp. ch. 1; Harold R. Weinstein: *Jean Jaurès. A Study of Patriotism in the French Socialist Movement* (N.Y., 1936).

¹²² Cf. A. H. Fried: *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (2nd ed., 2 vols., 1911-1913), Volume I. 123.

¹²³ Darby to Bajer, May 9, 1889. Bajer MSS.

CHAPTER VII

THE PACIFISTS AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

The year 1898 began most inauspiciously for the peace movement. First it was the Dreyfus Case, which revealed the evils of the militarist system in a most lurid light; and the International Peace Bureau had to remain neutral because of divisions among the French pacifists themselves. But the crushing blow was when the United States declared war on Spain. Freedom-loving America, far removed from the spiteful prejudices and bitter quarrels of the Old World, that happy land where militarism had not cast its shadow had ever been the white hope of the European pacifists. It was to America that they looked for leadership in the banning of war from the earth. From Grant on down, American presidents had shown themselves favorable to the principle and practice of international arbitration, and their pacific utterances were eagerly grasped by the European pacifists, who set them up as good examples for their own statesmen to follow. True enough, efforts to get these fine sayings down in black and white in the shape of arbitration treaties had not proved so fortunate, but that was ascribed to the circumstances of the moment. The European pacifists persisted in their belief that some day the New World would be brought in to redress the balance of the Old.

All the greater, therefore, was the disillusionment of the pacifists when the United States ostentatiously joined the worshippers of Mars in 1898. *L'Arbitrage entre Nations* had an article by Charles Richet entitled: "Must We Despair?"; and the May number of *Die Waffen Nieder* appeared with its front page draped in black. "America", mourned Bertha von Suttner, "America, the cradle and the heart of the peace movement; America, which scarcely one year ago was on the point of making the long cherished ideal a living reality in the first permanent arbitration treaty; America, which knows no militarism - it had to be America where the war was unchained". And so she wrote Fried, "Yes, I, too, am deeply, deeply shaken and depressed over Sp-America. ... But we *must not let the standard fall!* ... Yes, great would be the temptation to lie down and give it all up ... but we *may not!* Darkness all around, but the little lights *are* little lights even so and they may not go out voluntarily. Courage, my comrade-in-arms - and the whole people works with us."¹

Again the pacifists filled the air with protests and petitions. On the eve of the war the International Peace Bureau sent letters to the Queen of Spain and President

¹ *L'Arbitrage* (July, 1898), II. 348-352; *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 169; Suttner to Fried, April 24, 1898. Fried MSS.

McKinley calling upon them to arbitrate; the *Société française pour l'Arbitrage entre Nations* despatched similar notes to the Spanish minister of foreign affairs and the American secretary of state; while the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté* addressed a telegram to the Spanish premier. And when hostilities began, the Bureau appealed to all the governments to offer their good offices to the belligerents. The result was only that the pacifists were reproached even by well-wishers for weakening the cause through such futile gestures. The advocates of peace by disarmament were discredited generally, but it was in Germany that the opponents seized most gleefully upon the opportunity to pour ridicule upon the whole movement. An inelegant epistle from "the German Michael" to "Dear Peace-Bertha" was printed first in a Munich weekly, reprinted by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and then by the whole conservative press. It asked, in effect: Where is your logic, Bertha? You say that militarism and armaments lead to war? Then why do the United States, Spain, Greece, and China have war, while Germany for all of twenty-seven years has had peace? And the attacks continued through the months. But Bertha von Suttner did not desist from her propaganda. After Cobden's rude experiences during the Crimean War, he had warned the friends of peace that it was useless to attempt anything while the war spirit was raging; and the Peace Society always followed this advice. Baroness von Suttner gave different counsel. "Nothing is so discrediting as inactivity", she declared. While it was true that propaganda for a new idea could succeed only in quiet times, that in times of flood dams were not built, that was no reason why the work should be interrupted. On the contrary, it should be persisted in with redoubled vigor. "Waving the little palm-branch does not stop the train - quite right; but it shows outsiders that the small band of palm-bearers remain at their post; then perhaps others will come in great crowds and strengthen the band in such a way that another train will have to put on its brakes in time. At least the little twig acts as a *signal*."²

The Spanish-American War was a bitter disappointment for the pacifists. And then the governments had paid no attention at all to the *Mémoire* of Descamps. In 1898 the peace men began to talk seriously of setting up the Court of Arbitration through private initiative, instead of waiting for official action³. But they were ready to write off the Nineteenth Century and pin all their hopes on the Twentieth, or even the Twenty-First. Even the faithful Miss Peckover remarked sorrowfully in July, 1898: "Truly the shadow of war seems to darken the face of God's beautiful earth". And in the same month Cremer observed in the *Arbitrator*, "Every progressive organization is suffering from the blight which seems to have settled upon our

² *Correspondance Bi-Mensuelle* (1898), III. 38-40, 67-68, and *passim*; *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 210-211, 316-317.

³ *P.D.* (1898), VIII. 5-7, 42-44, 116-120, 138-146, 204-209.

countrymen, the great bulk of whom appear to care very little for anything but football, cycling, racing, and betting The public conscience is seared and blunted."⁴

Such was the mood of the pacifists when, like a bolt out of the blue, there came word on August 24, 1898, two weeks after the close of the Spanish-American War, that the Tsar of Russia had proposed an international disarmament conference. The circular which his foreign minister, Count Muraviev, handed to the diplomatic representatives at St. Petersburg began with the words: "The maintenance of general peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations present themselves, in the existing condition of the whole world, as the ideal towards which the endeavors of all Governments should be directed". In phrases familiar to Peace Society tracts the document went on to speak of the growth of the longings for peace, of the failure of great military establishments to secure peace, of the economic waste of the armaments, and of the danger they created of bringing about "that very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the impending horrors of which are fearful to every human thought"⁵.

There had been much talk of disarmament in the nineties. British statemen, especially Salisbury, Gladstone, and Rosebery, made public declarations deploring the growth of armaments, and in 1891 there was a persistent rumor that Salisbury had forwarded a memorandum on the question to the Kaiser, in the hope that he would call a disarmament conference. In 1893 Jules Simon made his well-known proposal for an armament truce in *Figaro*. The English pacifists took up the idea in 1894 and promoted the national memorial to Rosebery, which demanded a halt in war budgets until 1900. It was in the same year that Rosebery actually took steps toward inducing Tsar Alexander III to call a disarmament conference⁶. Also in 1894 the Pope declared in his encyclical of January 20 that the armed peace was intolerable. Protests against mounting costs of military preparations were regularly heard in the legislatures. Disarmament had never become a regular part of the peace propaganda on the Continent; the subject had been shunned by the Interparliamentary Union, and the two law associations had never examined it. Now the greatest autocrat in Europe was actually proposing what the jurists and the parliamentarians and many pacifists had regarded as Utopian⁷.

⁴ Peckover to Bajer, July 19, 1898. Bajer MSS; *Arbitrator* (July, 1898), no. 310, in the Annual Report.

⁵ J. B. Scott, ed.: *Reports to the Hague Conferences* (Oxford, 1917), pp.1-2.

⁶ Baron A. Meyendorff: *Correspondance Diplomatique de M. de Staal* (2 vols., Paris 1929), II. 241ff.

The pacifists were no less jubilant at the unexpected turn of events. Hundreds of telegrams and letters of congratulation poured in upon Bertha von Suttner. She wrote Fried: "I am enraptured, dumbfounded, staggered, inspired". And again: "In view of this great universal joy I do not think about my mountain of cares. I could die peacefully. I believe the cause is in good hands."⁸ Ducommun immediately despatched a telegram of gratitude to the Tsar on behalf of the International Peace Bureau. His letter to Bertha von Suttner rejoiced, "What a sudden ray of light across the black sky!"⁹ The Friends Peace Committee went on record that "this Committee is thankful to God for the manifesto issued by the Tsar of Russia", and Miss Peckover wrote, "We may as well say 'What hath God wrought!' and may look for further surprises since our confidence is in Him rather than in princes"¹⁰. Spence Watson, Quaker and President of the Society for Friends of Russian Freedom, pronounced it "the greatest event of my life". Whatever were the motives of the Tsar, he said, his initiative should be supported¹¹.

There was no delirium of joy among the French pacifists, although they hoped for the best. Passy's article on the circular was optimistic but calm and reserved. Thiaudière was sceptical; Arnaud could hail the Tsar's proposal only by insisting upon the last words of the circular, which spoke of "a solemn avowal of the principles of equity and law, upon which repose the security of States and the welfare of peoples". And Arnaud's interpretation was not the official one. The *Association de la Paix par le Droit*, while lauding the Tsar's initiative, suggested that France use the conference to appeal to the conscience of the world in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine. The fact was that the French pacifists refused to conceive of any European disarmament without the settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine Question¹².

The first reaction of the world's press to the manifesto was one of utter astonishment. Then with surprising unanimity the Tsar's humanitarianism was praised and no journal attacked the aims he set forth, but with surprising unanimity his project was simply dismissed as unpracticable, as a beautiful dream impossible of realization. So strong was the scepticism that even the delicate stock exchanges, while influenced favorably, were not affected very strongly, and the fall in armament shares was very slight. It was even said in financial circles that there had been no

⁷ Wehberg: "La Contribution des Conférences de la Paix de La Haye au Progrès du Droit International (Académie de Droit International. *Recueil des Cours* (1931), XXXVII. 533-669), pp.538-9; idem: *Beschränkung, passim*.

⁸ August 29, 30, 1898. Fried MSS; cf. also *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 344, 377, 423-427.

⁹ August 31, 1898. B.I.P. MSS., VI, I.

¹⁰ Friends Peace Committee, Minute Books, September 1, 1898; Peckover to Bajer, March 30, 1899. Bajer MSS.

¹¹ Corder: *Watson*, p. 278.

such decline in the shares of English armament firms because the government had let it be known that there would be no reduction in England's naval forces, disarmament conference or no disarmament conference¹³. As time went on, the scepticism and cynicism grew rather than abated. The poisoned international atmosphere which made the Tsar's proposal unpracticable is quite apparent from the newspaper comments. The sincerity of Nicholas II was generally affirmed, but there was a tendency in some quarters to suspect his advisors of sinister political designs. Even so, the press of almost every nation declared that its own government was only too willing to go along with the Tsar, but that unfortunately there were others who would not. The *Patrie* declared that it was England which would obstruct the conference, while at the same time the *Pall Mall Gazette* was stating that England wanted nothing more than peace, but it could not be sure about France, Germany, and the United States. And so it went. To the French, the idea of acquiescence in the *status quo* was abhorrent, and disarmament meant just that; hence disarmament was impossible. Typical as well as authoritative was the *Temps*, which declared:

It is to be hoped that Europe, like France, will consider the Tsar's proposal in the spirit in which it was inspired. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that if France owes it to herself to aid in such an attempt, there is another part of her moral patrimony which she cannot abandon without abdicating the very reason of her existence.

For the first time the peace movement became news. Passy enjoyed the novel experience of having to barricade himself against reporters on the day on which the rescript was made public. In all countries the best magazines opened their doors to the pacifists and printed serious articles on questions of peace and disarmament¹⁴. Yet editorial policies remained unfriendly.

By the spring of 1899 the opposition of at least the English and German press to the coming conference was established. G. H. Perris, whose business it was to handle the newspaper world for Stead's International Peace Crusade, declared that except for some honorable exceptions, such as the *Manchester Guardian*, the majority of the English journals "have shown an almost diabolical ingenuity in picking the Tsar's project to pieces"¹⁵. Even in its original favorable acceptance of the Tsar's plan, doubtlessly inspired by the government, the German press had not reversed itself in its traditional attitude toward Bertha von Suttner. Some journals made an effort to trace the Tsar's initiative back to Elihu Burritt rather than to give any credit to the

¹² *L'Arbitrage* (1898), II. 397-399, (1899), III. 81-82, 91; *E.-U.* (July-Sept., 1898), p.1, (Oct.-Dec., 1898), pp. 17-18; *P.D.* (1898), VIII. 227-232.

¹³ *Neue Freie Presse*, August 29, 1898, quoted in *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 439-440.

¹⁴ Cf. Bibliography of the Peace Movement, *Provisional Lists*, pp.120-124.

novel *Die Waffen Nieder* and its authoress. Only the Left Liberal papers supported the idea of the conference; not only the conservative but also the *Freisinnige* and the Social Democratic journals soon took up a scoffing attitude. In April, 1899, after the German pacifists had been campaigning for months to win understanding and support for the conference, the Baroness von Suttner had to admit: "So far have we not yet come that the press is for us - it is still the greatest bulwark of war"¹⁶.

The pacifists always believed that they had some share in inspiring the Tsar's message. One story even had it that Nicholas composed his rescript after reading *Die Waffen Nieder*¹⁷. The influence of the pacifists and their ideas may be traced in the evolution of the document, but far more important in its issuance were immediate considerations of *Realpolitik*. It seems that in the spring of 1898 high government circles in St. Petersburg became much concerned over the armament race. Germany and France had far outstripped Austria and Russia in equipping their armies with the most up-to-date weapons, and it was imperative that the two eastern empires catch up. Somehow the realization came to Russia's war minister, Kuropatkin, that even if Austria and Russia did make new sacrifices the ratio between their forces would be the same as before. So in the blunt manner of the soldier Kuropatkin proposed that negotiations be opened with Austria for an agreement providing that neither side would introduce the new guns for ten years. When Kuropatkin's suggestion came before the foreign ministry, it was speedily seen that his plan was too transparent, that it would only reveal Russia's financial weakness, or even arouse Austria's suspicions. It so happened that an important official in the foreign ministry, one Basily, was a confirmed friend of peace. He had attended the Interparliamentary Conference at Budapest in 1896 as a spectator, and he had been so inspired that he and his subordinate Priklonsky had sent a report to St. Petersburg, not simply of the resolutions of the Conference, but of its origins and of the peace movement in general. The report had been promptly pigeon-holed and forgotten. Now Basily was head of the Asiatic Division in the foreign office, and it was he, again with the aid of Priklonsky, who developed Kuropatkin's ideas into a proposal for an international conference. His memorandum referred to the work of the Peace Congresses and Conferences, as well as to Rosebery's initiative of 1894. The support of the finance minister, Count Witte, was acquired beforehand to any attempt to spare the public

¹⁵ *Concord* (March, 1899), XIV. 52.

¹⁶ Suttner to Fried, August 30, 1898, April 18, 1899. Fried MSS. It has not been possible to make a systematic study of press opinion on the Tsar's manifesto, but I feel that enough indications have been gathered from the following sources to substantiate the general conclusions here presented: "Le Rescrit et la Presse" in *Le Mémorial Diplomatique* (August 28, 1898), pp. 564-567; "Peace and Disarmament", in *Public Opinion* (New York, September 8, 1898), XXV. 298-300; Wippermann's *Deutsche Geschichtskalender*, 1898, II. 379-382; *L'Arbitrage* (Sept, 1898), II. 401-414; August Junk: *Die Mächte auf der Ersten Haager Friedens-Conferenz* (Leipzig, 1928), pp.18ff.; A. H. Fried: *Die Haager Konferenz* (Berlin, n.d.), pp.13ff.; Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 199-200.

purse from armament expenditures, and Count Muraviev, the foreign minister, had his own reasons to support the project. He saw in Basily's memorandum a chance to bring the continental States together in an armament truce which would result in the isolation of England. Furthermore, the time was opportune because Russia was a "satisfied Power" for the moment, having just gained control of Port Arthur in the Far East.

The Tsar did not at first approve the scheme. It is known that he was influenced by the monumental work on War, which was presented to him by the author, Ivan Bloch, a Polish-Jewish economist and state councillor, at Easter, 1898. In fact, so impressed was the Tsar that he called Bloch in a private audience and together they went through the large work almost page by page¹⁸. In six fully documented tomes Bloch examined the problem of the effect of technological development on the waging of modern war and of war's sociological implications. He came to the conclusion that it was war, not peace, which had become "impossible", first because any great war would result in a stalemate, due to the immense advantage which improvement in weapons had given defense over offense; secondly, because of the practical difficulty in the way of controlling the huge masses of men who would be called to the colors; and thirdly, because of the inevitable collapse of the social and economic system under the strain of a long drawn-out war of such grand proportions. He also maintained that the armed peace itself was uneconomic as well as a cause of the spread of socialism. Bloch failed to realize the limits of man's powers of reason or the extent of man's powers of endurance. Otherwise his predictions of the "War of the Future" came true to a large extent in the World War¹⁹.

Whether or not Bloch's work helped the Tsar make up his mind, the fact remains that Russian policy was directed by his advisors rather than by Nicholas himself. The Priklonsky project seems to have been laid aside for several months and then taken up again in August when the Germans announced an army increase. Professor Langer has suggested that there were other circumstances at the time which made Muraviev's circular especially desirable. A conflict had arisen between Russia and England over Chinese railroads and on August 18 it threatened to assume serious proportions, despite the ardent wish of the Russians for peace. In less than a week the rescript was in the hands of the foreign governments. Whatever was the immediate occasion for the issuance of the document, it is clear that while the

¹⁷ Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 193.

¹⁸ *D.W.N.* (1899), VIII. 231-233; Suttner: *Die Haager Friedensconferenz. Tagebuchblätter* (Dresden, 1900), p.19.

¹⁹ Ivan S. Bliokh: *Der Krieg* (6 vols., Berlin, 1899); an English translation of the sixth volume was published by Stead as *Is War Now Impossible?* (London, 1899); "Has the Present War Justified M. Bloch's Predictions", in *Economist* (Jan. 1, 1916), LXXXII. 8-9.

language was that of pacifism, the thoughts behind it were the familiar ones of international diplomacy²⁰.

Diplomatic circles were not deceived by the camouflage. The only wonder is that the Russians should think they would be. Statesmen saw that Russia's gesture was not altruistic but had been prompted by economic necessity, and they relegated the idea of disarmament to the limbo of political Utopias. On September 8, 1898, the German Kaiser testified that he, at least, had not lost his grasp of political realities. In a speech in Westphalia he declared: "Peace will never be better assured than by a thoroughly drilled German army, ready for battle"²¹. But although the Kaiser was hostile to the Tsar's proposal from the beginning, his government, like the rest, felt compelled to accept the Tsar's invitation; otherwise the non-complying power would find itself losing caste in public opinion and at the same time the relations with Russia would be strained needlessly. The French proved to be the hardest to handle. Muraviev had to pay a special visit to Paris to assure them that there would be no disarmament but merely a discussion of arms limitation, and that all political questions would be banned from the discussion. He arrived in the middle of the Fashoda crisis, when the atmosphere was anything but pacific. Finally the French were placated, and they agreed to come to the Conference. Delcassé, the foreign minister, told the German ambassador what he thought about the Conference in these words:

We have quite the same interest at this Conference as you. You do not want to limit your armed force at this time and you do not want to enter into any proposals for disarmament - we are in exactly the same situation.

Both of us want to spare the Tsar and find a way to get around this question without letting ourselves in for anything that could weaken our armed force on both sides.

There was trouble with Italy, and for her sake the Pope was excluded from the Peace Conference. Balkan sentiments were indicated by a Serbian spokesman, who said:

The idea of disarmament does not please our people in any way. The Serbian race is split up under seven or eight different foreign Governments, and we cannot be

²⁰ Langer: *Imperialism*, II. 581-585, and references; for the story of the origins of the circular see especially Michael Prikonsky: "Die Vorgeschichte der ersten Haager Friedensconferenz", in *F.-W.* (1929), XXIX. 129-131; *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, no.4350; *The Times*, Dec. 16, 1898, quoted in Evans: *Cremer*, pp.176-181; *Berliner Monatshefte* (July, 1933), XI. 679-692, (April, 1934), XII. 320-331; Count Witte: *Memoirs*, pp.96-97; E. J. Dillon: *The Eclipse of Russia* (London, 1918), pp.269-273.

²¹ *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 441.

satisfied so long as this lasts. We live in the hope of getting something for ourselves out of the general conflagration, whenever it takes place²².

There was so much unfriendliness on all sides that more than once Muraviev was tempted to lay the whole thing aside. Even when the Russians decided that they had to go through with it, there was grand confusion in the foreign ministry at St. Petersburg over just what the Conference should discuss. Finally the legal advisor, von Martens, drew up an eight-point program, and Muraviev gave it out in a new circular on January 11, 1899. To the proposal for the non-augmentation of military forces was now added the suggestion for a discussion of pacific means for settling international disputes, such as good offices, mediation, and arbitration. It was decided that the Conference would meet at The Hague. Lord Salisbury regarded the whole thing as "not serious". In the first place, he pointed out, even if an arms agreement were reached, there would be no power to enforce it; while arbitration was out of the question where national honor and vital interests were concerned and only possible for smaller differences, which had no political significance. Other statesmen shared his sentiments. On January 19 the French War Minister spoke of the necessity for further coastal armament. In February the German Reichstag was requested to sanction an army increase; while on March 9 the First Lord of the Admiralty asked the House of Commons for nine new war-ships²³.

To the pacifists the Tsar's circular was very serious. W. T. Stead, impelled both by his love for peace and his Russophilism, threw himself into the campaign with the greatest of zeal. Starting out in September, 1898, he began a tour of Europe to discover how well prepared were men's minds for the idea of peace. He had intended to interview Europe's potentates on the way to Russia, where he was to see the Tsar. But in those days Europe's rulers were safe from even the most enterprising and influential of journalists, and Stead was received by neither Leopold of Belgium, by the Kaiser, nor by the Pope when he sought audiences. Nicholas graciously accorded the English editor an audience at Livadia and quite won him with his sincerity, but the general result of Stead's travels was to convince him that "men of the world, men of experience, above all, men who are deeply versed in the tortuous wiles of diplomacy, agree in expecting nothing from the Conference of Disarmament and in fearing much"²⁴.

²² *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, pp.139-196, esp. no. 4253; *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*. Ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (London, 1927), I, pp.215-227, esp. no. 268; *Berliner Monatshefte* (June, 1933), XI. 571-580.

²³ Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4; *Die Grosse Politik*, XV. no. 4237.

²⁴ Whyte: *Stead*, II. 125-150; Stead: *The United States of Europe* (London, 1899), p.193.

Stead was not disheartened. He had promised to "do business" for the Tsar, and on his return to England he immediately set about moving heaven and earth to arouse public opinion in preparation for the Conference. In the realm of public opinion Stead thought in continents. What he now began to organize was nothing less than an International Peace Crusade, from San Francisco to St. Petersburg, which was to mean the countersigning by the Democracy of the Rescript of the Autocrat. Meetings were to be held in all the towns of England, delegates elected for a national assembly, and this gathering was to elect a deputation to go on a peace crusade through Europe, together with a contingent chosen in the same way from America. The continental peace societies were to prepare colossal peace demonstrations at every capital, to be held when the English pacifists arrived, and when they left, their forces were to be swelled by those of the other national delegates. Then all the crusaders were to move on to St. Petersburg to thank the Tsar, and then back to The Hague, where they were to insist upon being heard as the representatives of the will of the peoples of Europe. Certainly no more ambitious project to move the masses for peace had ever been conceived.

The crusade was proclaimed on Peace Sunday, December 18, 1898, at a monster meeting at St. James's Hall. Stead's speech gives an idea of the religious fervor with which he conducted it:

I shall ask you each and all to make a solemn vow unto the Lord and to your fellowmen that from this day until the end of March you will enlist as soldiers in this campaign of Peace, the Holy War against war, in the same spirit and with the same earnestness that you would aid in defending your country against an invading foe. I shall ask you to give this Crusade of Peace precedence in your thoughts, in your words, in your actions, over all other political, social, or religious questions, over your business and over your pleasures, for it is a matter of life and death, of salvation or damnation to the nations. I want your time, I want your energies, I want your money, I want your life - for three months. That, and nothing else than that, is what I am asking.

An Executive Committee was constituted with the Bishop of London as chairman, offices were taken, and one million copies of a broadsheet explaining the movement and asking for volunteers were scattered over the land. Next Stead began to publish a weekly, *War Against War*, as organ of the Crusade. The office was soon flooded with letters, from hundreds of volunteers. Prominent Liberals promised support, although distrust of Russia kept many from signing up. In three months over two hundred meetings were held throughout the land. These were official meetings, "towns-meetings", presided over by the mayor, the chairman of the district council, or some local dignitary, and a determined effort was made to have them as representative as

possible. On March 21, 1899, the campaign culminated in two great demonstrations in London. Despite the fog and the snow they were crowded with delegates from all over England, many of them mayors in all their official trappings. With the greatest enthusiasm resolutions of support for the conference were passed, a telegram was addressed to the Tsar, and the deputation to present the memorial was chosen²⁵.

Stead's campaign was unique in English political life. It was the first time that an agitation for a humanitarian rather than a political purpose had been planned on such a grand scale. Yet despite the tremendous driving force of Stead, who worked like a man possessed, despite the glowing accounts of success after success in the pages of *War Against War*, despite all the brilliance of the huge meetings in London, the result was a great disappointment. More people were brought to think about peace than ever before, but they were mostly from the same classes from which the peace workers had always drawn their chief support, the Dissenters and the bourgeoisie of the provinces. With some justice the organ of the Peace Society could claim: "The support of our members was the backbone of the movement"²⁶. The wealthier and more influential sections of the population remained aloof, and while labor leaders gave their support, the masses were not touched. After it was all over, one of Stead's chief adjutants wrote:

If I do not come out of the campaign a full-blown pessimist, I certainly shake off the dust of it with a largely developed respect for the stout-heartedness, the patience, and the persistence of the earlier labourers in the domain of War against War and International Mediation and Arbitration.

The people in the mass have been more spectators ... The truth is, the prospect of war at present carries no terror into the mind of the predominant generations of Englishmen²⁷.

All along the older pacifists were puzzled by this rude and brusque foreigner to their ranks who came in a whirlwind, boldly proposing and carrying out ideas they would never have ventured themselves. They distrusted his fanatical Russophilism, they remembered his Big-Navyism, and they feared that he might make of the Crusade a demonstration of Anglo-Saxon solidarity. It was with their fingers crossed that they joined forces with Stead's organization. Cremer became chairman of the Labor Committee, G. H. Perris of the Press Committee, Darby handled relations with

²⁵ *Review of Reviews* (1898), XVIII. 555-558, (1899), XIX. 34-36, 130-133; *Peace Crusade* (Boston, March- April, 1899), no.1, pp.6-7, no.2, pp.8-9, no. 3, pp.7-8; Whyte: *Stead*, II. 147-152; information from Mr. C. E. Hecht, one of Stead's assistants.

²⁶ *H.P.* (1899), XXVI. 226-227.

²⁷ "The Crusade from the Inside: Views of Some Leading Organizers", in *Concord*, (April, 1899), XIV. 59-63.

the religious bodies, and the International Arbitration and Peace Association took care of the foreign correspondence. Yet Stead had never asked their cooperation, and he paid little attention to their ideas. He never mentioned the peace societies in his speeches, and, to the great annoyance of Darby, his lecturers were in the habit of specifically guarding themselves from any supposed connection with those who wanted Peace at any price. Moreover, Stead waged his whole campaign on the armament issue. Despite the pleas of the veterans, he flatly refused to give any place to arbitration, arguing that "the question of Armaments was more easily understood and more interesting to the public"²⁸. At the end the old-guard pacifists were on the whole grateful for the campaign, although they failed in their attempt to make permanent the peace organizations which it had called into life²⁹. The methods of Stead were a revelation to them, yet of practical accomplishment there was very little, and of permanent effect on the development of the English peace movement there was none. Not long after Stead had inflamed passions in his crusade against war, the same belligerent enthusiasms were whipped up in the crusade against the Boers. It might be permitted to wonder whether war against war is not the contradiction in fact which it is in figure.

A categorical note of disapproval from St. Petersburg called off Stead's pilgrimage of Peace through Europe³⁰. Similarly, when the continental pacifists had begun to organize a deputation to the Tsar which was to have been led by Bertha von Suttner and Prince Scipio Borghese, Muraviev had informed the baroness that Nicholas would not receive the delegation³¹. The continental peace workers were keenly disappointed at the news that the International Crusade was not to take place, for in Germany as well as in France and elsewhere they had made preparations to receive the brigade of peace. Yet it was true, as Stead had complained, that nothing approaching the English agitation had taken place on the Continent. Nor was such activity possible on the Continent, where the people were not used to petitions and meetings and resolutions, and above all to any such exercise of local initiative. The propaganda carried on by the continental friends of peace was almost insignificant next to Stead's heroic efforts in the British Isles.

In the first days after the publication of the Tsar's message the peace societies kept the wires humming with telegrams of congratulation and gratitude to St. Petersburg. The peace congress scheduled for 1898 had been called off, and in its

²⁸ Pratt to Bajer, March 4, 1899. Bajer MSS.; Pratt to Ducommun, March 24, 1899. B.I.P. MSS. VI, I, 1a.

²⁹ Peckover to Ducommun, April 5, 1899. B.I.P. MSS. VI, P, 1a; *H.P.* (April 1899), XXVI. 201, and *passim*; *Concord* (1899), XIV. 5-8, 49, 57-58.

³⁰ Pratt to Ducommun, March 27, 1899. B.I.P. MSS., VI, I, 1a.

stead an assembly of delegates of the peace societies was planned for Turin in September. With the announcement of the Tsar's manifesto the meeting assumed new importance. "We are all agreed", wrote Ducommun, "to examine thoroughly the question of carrying on an intense propaganda in all the countries to support the initiative of the Tsar. It is the moment, now or never, to move heaven and earth ..."³² Most of the leading pacifists attended the Turin gathering. No difficulty was met in resolving on another telegram of thanks to the Tsar or in the general resolution that the societies should get busy and stir up public opinion. The dispute came over the question of disarmament. The English, Alexander, Darby, and Moscheles, were insistent that an appeal to the governments be made on the proposal for disarmament alone. The continental delegates were just as determined that the governments should be called upon to codify international law and draw up a general treaty of arbitration in the conference. The compromise resolution which was adopted left the continental position practically intact³³.

It will be remembered that the Tsar's original call had been for a disarmament conference, and so it was officially designated until the publication of the eight-point program in January, 1899, which included the subjects of arbitration and the codification of the laws of war. From the start the continental pacifists had tried to drive home the lesson that arbitration had to come before disarmament. When Muraviev stopped off at Vienna on his way back from Paris in October, Bertha von Suttner interviewed him and tried to impress him with the importance of arbitration. At that time Muraviev was still not clear upon the program for the conference, and he seemed to favor some sort of arms truce³⁴. In December Passy advised the Conference that if it did not want to work in vain, it should concentrate upon the creation of permanent and general arbitration treaties. The French peace societies circulated petitions and sent a letter to the government to the same effect. After the Russian program was published, Passy wrote an open letter to the Queen of Holland, which stressed the importance of organizing an international court of arbitration at the coming conference. The article was widely noticed, and even acknowledged indirectly. In February Passy and Arnaud called on Delcassé, the foreign minister, to insist upon the necessity of supporting obligatory arbitration at The Hague. Delcassé replied that he would support mediation and arbitration, but solely facultative arbitration. When they went on to speak of an arbitration treaty with Great Britain,

³¹ Ducommun to Suttner, October 22, November 9, 1898. Suttner MSS.; Suttner to Ducommun, November 16, 1898. B.I.P. MSS., VB7.

³² Ducommun to Bajer, September 10, 1898. Bajer MSS.

³³ *Procès-Verbal de l'Assemblée Générale des Délégués des Sociétés de la Paix. Turin, 1898* (Berne, 1898); *P.D.* (1898), VIII. 258-287; *Manchester Guardian*, September 27 [or 29?], 1898. International Law Association clippings.

³⁴ *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 460-464; Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 217-220.

the statesman declared, "Let us first settle the boundaries of Africa"³⁵. Arnaud addressed to the members of the conference a lucid little pamphlet arguing the case for Lemonnier's arbitration treaty. As for disarmament, he maintained, "As long as there exists an international regime based upon war, it will not be possible to limit the means of defense of a people"³⁶. On March 1, all the French peace societies were represented at a banquet, at which a resolution was adopted asking the future conference to give formal recognition to the principle of arbitration. The French peace workers continued to spread the good word in lectures and articles, and perhaps they had an effect. In April, 1898, Delcassé explained to the German ambassador that in order to prevent a complete fiasco there would have to be made some concessions regarding arbitration, to spare not only the Tsar, but the public opinion of Europe, "for it has become excited because of the thoughtless step of the Russians"³⁷.

In Germany a remarkable movement had its beginnings. In September, 1898, Frau Leonore Selenka, wife of a Munich professor, persuaded the German Federation of Women's Unions to support the Tsar's circular. A moving appeal was drawn up which began: "We, the wives, the mothers, the sweethearts, the sisters of men whom today or tomorrow War may claim as sacrifice" Frau Selenka then put herself in touch with women's groups throughout the world, proposing an international demonstration in favor of the conference. Women of eighteen countries participated in the movement, and on May 15, 1899, five hundred and sixty-five meetings were held all over the world, at which resolutions were passed expressing hopes for the success of the conference. Thus the first great international manifestation of women's will was an appeal for world peace³⁸.

The *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft* and its branches came to life to pass resolutions and send telegrams to St. Petersburg. Baroness von Suttner and Fried founded a new group, a Committee for Publicizing the Peace Conference, which sponsored lectures, spread the Munich appeal, and sent an address to Chancellor Hohenlohe. It was at this time that Moritz von Egidy, former Prussian army officer and now an apostle of Reconciliation and "the warless era" came forward most energetically in the service of the peace movement, and gave many lectures in favor of the Tsar's initiative³⁹.

³⁵ *L'Arbitrage* (1899), III. 71; Passy to Ducommun, n.d. B.I.P. MSS., VI, I, 1a.

³⁶ Arnaud: *L'Organisation de la Paix* (Berne, 1899), p. 11.

³⁷ *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, no. 4253; *L'Arbitrage* (1898), II. 469-472, (1899), III. 53-55, 55-56, 89-91, 146-147; *P.D.* (1898), VIII. 319-321.

³⁸ M. L. Selenka: *The International Demonstration of Women for the Peace-Conference of May [sic] 15th 1899* (Munich, 1900).

³⁹ *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 428-433; (1899), VIII. 61-63, 96-101, 126-130, 254, and *passim*; Suttner; *Memoirs*, II. 230-231.

In Austria-Hungary, in Italy, and in Scandinavia there was similar activity. Yet the intensive propaganda promised at Turin was never carried out. In Holland, the seat of the conference, the Dutch Peace Society did not hold one public meeting during 1899⁴⁰. The members of the Bureau of the Interparliamentary Union sent off an address of felicitations to the Tsar, and their efforts stopped there. Gobat, the Secretary-general, seemed more concerned about the conference of parliamentarians scheduled for Christiania than about the coming conference at The Hague. Ducommun observed about the Interparliamentary Union, "It seems to me that in the human machinery of that institution there prevails a certain discouragement, in any case a certain apathy"⁴¹. The socialists, advocates of peace that they were, called the Tsar's proposal humbug. They reaffirmed their declaration that they alone could bring peace and disarmament, and they professed to look upon the manifesto of Nicholas as a symptom that the capitalist system was cracking⁴². Everywhere the masses remained apathetic, totally oblivious of the fact that for the first time in history the governments of the world were about to assemble in a conference not to liquidate a war or a diplomatic crisis, but to work for "the maintenance of general peace".

The delegates selected by the governments to lead the nations into paths of peace were, for the most part, white-haired diplomats, men who had grown old in one of the most realistic of professions. President of the Conference was the octogenarian Baron de Staal, dean of the Russian diplomatic corps. The German delegation was headed by the ancient Hanoverian aristocrat, Count Münster, most outspoken opponent of the whole idea of a Peace Conference, whose "snarling cynicism" was the despair of those sincere souls who hoped for some worthwhile accomplishments. Then there were the military men, sent in the capacity of technical advisors. There was Colonel Schwarzhoff from Germany, who was obsessed with the virtues of great armaments. There was a Dutch general who deplored the armament burden but maintained: "I do not believe in an eternal peace, I even think that the wars can in exceptional cases be inevitable and salutary, by purifying, like a storm, the political atmosphere, and by freeing us from several meannesses that materialism and love of money foster"⁴³. There were the Anglo-Saxon officers, perhaps the most militaristic of all, among whom were Captain Mahan from the United States, worshipper of British sea-power and opponent of arbitration; Sir John Ardagh, who gave a spirited defense of the dum-dum bullet; and Sir John Fisher, Britain's blustering seadog, who went about proclaiming that might was right, no matter what the Conference should

⁴⁰ Van Beek en Donk, *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁴¹ Ducommun to Bajer, January 27, 1899. Bajer MSS.

⁴² *D.W.N.* (1898), VII. 423; Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 231-232; Jean Jaurès: *Oeuvres* (ed. by Max Bonnafous, Paris, 1931-), I. 202. Jaurès himself thought that the socialists should support the Tsar's circular.

decide. Most misplaced of all the delegates at The Hague was the Munich professor of law, Baron von Stengel. On receipt of the news of the Tsar's rescript he had written a pamphlet, *Der ewige Friede*, to show all thinking Germans that eternal peace was neither possible nor desirable⁴⁴. All unwittingly the German Government had selected him as legal advisor as a concession to Bavaria, and now this enemy of peace was representing Germany at a Peace Conference, to the great delight of lampooners and caricaturists, but to the dismay of the pacifists. But there were others who had the cause of peace at heart. France sent Léon Bourgeois, a man in whom the pacifists had great confidence, and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, who was a friend and admirer of Charles Richet and who was to become an active peace worker. Representing England was Lord Pauncefote, to whom arbitration was meat and drink, and from the United States came Andrew White, diplomat and scholar, who felt himself to be a staunch disciple of Hugo Grotius.

It was in an atmosphere of gloom and pessimism that the representatives of twenty-six powers assembled for the opening of the Conference on May 18. White noted in his diary the night before: "Probably, since the world began, never has so large a body come together in a spirit of more hopeless scepticism as to any good result". Most of the delegates knew little or nothing about all that the pacifists had studied, discussed and planned for so many years, and they felt that all that could be done to save the situation would be the "expression of benevolent sentiments and of pious hopes for the preservation of peace"⁴⁵. But a remarkable change came to pass. As time went on the delegates became more and more optimistic about the results of the Conference, and they began to feel that something more concrete should and could be done in the cause of peace than the expression of mere wishes. D'Estournelles remarked to Stead on May 24, "I have never been on any diplomatic gathering which was so little diplomatic and so much human. There is everywhere the feeling that something must be done, and that we must set to work to bring it about. I have always been hopeful, but I am now more hopeful than ever."⁴⁶ There were more reasons than one for the change of heart. There was the attitude of Münster and others that such a gathering of eminent men, called together at the behest of the mighty Tsar of Russia, simply could not disperse without some practical accomplishments. The Russians felt that something had to be done if only to save the Tsar's face, and the desire not to alienate Russia was an important factor in ensuring the cooperation of at least the Germans. There was a feeling that a failure would

⁴³ J. B. Scott, ed.: *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences. Conference of 1899* (New York, 1920), p. 301.

⁴⁴ Karl Freiherr von Stengel: *Der Ewige Friede* (3rd ed., Munich, 1899).

⁴⁵ Andrew D. White: *Autobiography* (2 vols., N.Y., 1907), II. 256; dispatch of Pauncefote, *Brit. Doc.*, I. no.283; Bertha von Suttner: *Die Haager Friedensconferenz. Tagebuchblätter* (Dresden, 1900), p.11.

mean playing into the hands of the socialists. Yet there was something else. There was the contagious enthusiasm of Pauncefote, White, d'Estournelles, Bourgeois, and the other sincere workers. And there was more. In that quiet little Dutch town with its sleepy canals, so far removed from the hustle and bustle of modern life, the diplomats themselves were isolated to a certain extent from the intrigue and the trickery, the mutual suspicions and mutual hatreds, the realities of international politics. In the midst of the round of entertainment, of social functions of all sorts, of ten long weeks of collaboration official and unofficial, there came to be built up among the delegates a spirit of goodwill and cooperation, a spirit of harmony which made some concrete results possible. In the forming of this new climate of opinion the pacifists had some part.

The peace men flocked to The Hague. Their headquarters was the salon of the Suttners at the Hotel Central, which flew a white flag in honor of its pacifist guests. Here were to be found at one time or another during the Conference Novikov, Stead, Bajer, Darby, Moscheles, Pirquet, Dr Trueblood, La Fontaine, and other leaders. Much literature was distributed to the delegates but far more important were the personal contacts. The Suttners arranged many informal dinners which served to bring together the pacifists and the diplomats, and in turn, by virtue of their social rank, the baroness and her husband were invited to many of the gala affairs given for the delegates. Bloch was at The Hague and he presented his ideas in a series of public lectures, which, although dry and scholarly, were well attended. In accordance with the traditions of secret diplomacy the meetings of the Conference were held privately, but Stead had confidential sources of information, and he turned the searchlight of publicity upon the Conference by publishing a daily account of its doings in the local *Dagblad*. Letters and telegrams kept coming in to the delegates, and these and the activities of the pacifists at The Hague helped make them feel a responsibility before public opinion for the success of the undertaking. The diplomats were usually cordial toward the chieftains of the peace movement, and Pauncefote and others sincerely thanked them for their aid. Moscheles remarked that he felt awkward because he now was actually asked for his opinions on matters concerning the peace movement. "Matters have come to such a pass that more than once I have actually been treated with respect."⁴⁷

The pacifists did not expect too much from the Conference. In answer to a letter from Bertha von Suttner before it began, d'Estournelles replied that he was

⁴⁶ Stead's Diary at The Hague, May 24, 1898. MSS.

⁴⁷ *Concord* (1899), XIV. 91-92; *H.P.* (1899), XXVI. 245; Curti: *Peace or War*, pp.188-189; Suttner: *Friedensconferenz*, *passim*; Whyte: *Stead*, II. 152-156; Stead's Diary at The Hague. MSS.; Fried: *Unter der weissen Fahne* (Berlin, 1901), pp.193-202.

somewhat more optimistic regarding the results of the Conference than was she⁴⁸. To the pacifists the eighteenth of May, 1899, was "an epoch-making date in the history of the world"⁴⁹. But the Conference could only be the beginning, the corner-stone of the building that would take years to build. "As if the newly-born one has ever been of grand stature! But that *this* newcomer will conquer the world - that we boldly prophesy, we who long ago predicted his coming."⁵⁰

As for the question of disarmament, which was handled by the First Commission at the Conference, the pacifists were right in expecting nothing. Admiral Fisher, for one, was so confident of the superiority of the British navy that he was quite willing to agree to a limitation of naval construction. He told Stead, who had been a great propagandist for a strong navy,

If you made anything like the success out of the Peace Conference that you have made out of the British Navy it would be a thundering success and no mistake ... You have no idea how good the navy is at the present moment. Upon my word we could roll up the whole blessed lot of the navies of the world in our own service at the present moment. How good we are, nobody knows, except a few of the naval men here who have got some idea of it; but we had better say nothing about that.

As for the Conference, Fisher declared emphatically: "I am going to see that this thing succeeds - at least, if it cannot, it will not be my fault". He said that if limitation of naval building were agreed upon, there would have to be some sort of supervision by an international commission to prevent the powers from spending money saved on ships for indirect objects, such as naval construction works. He had talked the whole thing over with Goschen, he said, and the First Lord had put his foot down, saying that he would never tolerate "a foreign commission to come poking its nose into British dockyards". But Fisher would have no objection, "and what is more, I am quite willing to take my own stand and agree to it, for they can't throw me over after I have agreed to it"⁵¹. But whether Fisher's superiors shared his absolute faith in the present strength of the British Navy and were willing to agree to a limitation or not, the fact remained that such a truce was next to impossible. As Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court, another English technical delegate, explained in a memorandum:

The difficulties in the way of naval disarmament are not at the top of the graduated scale of naval Powers, but at the bottom; they are none the less almost insuperable, and the crux of the problem lies in the fact that no Power can call a halt

⁴⁸ Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 238-239.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, II. 249.

⁵⁰ Suttner: *Friedenskonferenz*, p.2.

⁵¹ Stead's Diary at The Hague, May 20, 1899. MSS.

while the one next below him on the scale continues to arm, and that the latter will not cease to arm until he has reached an equality with the rival above him⁵².

It was the German delegate, Colonel von Schwarzhoff, who, due to his linguistic abilities, took the lead in the discussions in the Commission. He not only pointed out the technical difficulties of an arms reduction, but he went farther and insisted that in Germany, at least, there was no groaning under the weight of great armaments, while as for compulsory military service [which nobody had mentioned], "the German does not regard it as a heavy burden, but as a sacred and patriotic duty, to the performance of which he owes his existence, his prosperity, his future". An eloquent improvisation of Bourgeois saved the principle, and the Conference finally declared itself "of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind"⁵³. Thus the conference which had been called to arrange a disarmament did nothing more about it than to agree with the terms of the original manifesto that something should be done.

That part of the Conference's labors which dealt with the laws of war the pacifists regarded as entirely out of place at a Peace Conference. They agreed with Admiral Fisher, who once exploded: "The humanizing of War. You might as well talk of Humanizing Hell!"⁵⁴. The peace men not only pointed out the futility of attempting to make war less horrible, but they utilized the opportunity to point out that the best way to care for the wounded was not to make any wounded at all. What the Conference was doing amounted to the same thing as regulating the temperature when boiling someone in oil. Passy's motto, which was approved by all the pacifists, ran like this: "*On n'humanise pas le carnage, on le condamne, parce qu'on s'humanise*"⁵⁵. It is interesting to observe that among the conventions and declarations adopted by the Conference regarding the laws and customs of war there was a condemnation of aerial bombardment and the use of poison gas.

It was upon the Third Commission, the Commission on Arbitration, that the pacifists fastened their attention. At the very outset the English and the Americans proposed the establishment of an international court of arbitration. The Russians, the French, and the Italians gave the idea their support, and there was even sentiment in favor of making the submission of a certain class of disputes obligatory. We know that the governments had no idea of allowing important political disputes to come before the tribunal, that, in all cases, arbitration would have been confined to those

⁵² *Brit. Doc.*, I. no.282.

⁵³ Scott: *Proceedings*, pp.308-310, 317-319.

⁵⁴ Admiral Bacon: *The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone* (2 vols., London, 1929), I. 121.

⁵⁵ Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 278.

"small differences which have no political significance", of which Salisbury spoke⁵⁶. Yet the Germans would have none of compulsory arbitration and they obstinately refused to accept the international court. They could not conceive of arbitration as anything other than a political instrument, and in this case they regarded it as directed against themselves. Although no questions were to be arbitrated which were important enough to lead to war, the Germans objected to the arbitration plan on the ground that all it would mean would be that other powers would be given the chance to catch up with Germany's more rapid mobilization in the event of war. But Germany was isolated at the Conference. Münster reported, "Almost all the delegates have become inspired in favor of the proposals for an arbitration court with an enthusiasm which to me is incomprehensible"⁵⁷. As a concession to Germany the plans for obligatory arbitration were dropped, and the permanent court became merely a panel of judges. Finally the Germans yielded, mainly in order not to antagonize the Tsar, but also so that Germany would not be blamed by public opinion as the wrecker of the Conference. So was founded the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

What are we to make out of this persistent feeling that the Conference should not be allowed to fail because of the repercussions that might have in public opinion? In reality, public opinion was stirred only in the United States. White brought this to the attention of the German Foreign Office in his special plea that they change their position on arbitration, and Bülow, secretary of state for foreign affairs, was obviously impressed by the fact that "in all the Churches in America now they pray for the success of the Peace Conference every Sunday"⁵⁸. But elsewhere such was not the case. There were attacks, especially in Germany, where Conservative papers talked of "the noxious nuisance now under way which must arouse righteous indignation in all right-thinking men and genuine Germans"⁵⁹. And the caricaturists of all nations made the most of the incongruities and hypocrisies of the Conference. But in general the main complaint of the pacifists was not so much that the Conference met with hostility as that it met with indifference. In the columns of the *Review of Reviews* Stead constantly lamented the fact that the world remained blind to the important events taking place at The Hague. The diary of the Baroness von Suttner tells the same story. In July a letter arrived at The Hague from one of the best news agencies in London ordering the curtailment of reports from the Conference. It ran, "No one in London cares for anything at present but the news from the Transvaal

⁵⁶ *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, no. 4237.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, XV, nos 4311, 4338.

⁵⁸ White: *Autobiography*, II. 309-314; *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, no. 4320. Commented the Kaiser when Bülow informed him of this: "May Heaven pardon these hypocritical Pharisees". On public opinion in the United States see also the declaration of the American delegate Holls, in Scott: *Proceedings*, pp.715-716.

and the latest scores of the test matches with the Australians"⁶⁰. Never since the newspaper became a power has a great international conference been so inadequately covered by the press. The correspondents were alienated at the start when it was learned that the proceedings would be kept secret, and most of them departed. The German press maintained an absolute silence, for the most part, except for the friendly articles of Fried, and Bertha von Suttner, who sent reports to the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna was the only correspondent who remained. Of the English newspapers, except for the trustworthy *Times*, which did an excellent job of reporting the Conference, the only journal to maintain a special correspondent at The Hague was the *Manchester Guardian*. The correspondent was Stead, and he and Bertha von Suttner did their best to repair the damage done by the withdrawal of most of the other reporters. As these two missed no opportunity to propagandize in favor of the arbitration tribunal, and as Germany was opposing the establishment of such an institution, the German delegates actually believed that they were Russian agents, and they reported home about the "press terrorism" being carried on against Germany. Münster informed the Wilhelmstrasse, "The Conference has drawn here the worst political riff-raff of the whole world, journalists of the worst sort like Stead, baptized Jews like Bloch, peace-women like Frau von Suttner, ..." They were all supposed to be working under Russian protection⁶¹. This attitude was in strange contrast with that of d'Estournelles, who told Stead, "I consider you and Baroness Suttner and M. Bloch and professor Richet, who is a great friend of mine, and everyone who works for a public impersonal end as good people, no matter what their point of view may be"⁶². In any case, whether it was their vigorous propaganda which led the delegates to overestimate the extent to which the world was concerned about the Conference, or whether it was because the peace workers represented in themselves the yearnings for peace of a suffering humanity, it seems certain that the pacifists had an important influence at The Hague⁶³.

The Conference at The Hague was a strange phenomenon. To the pacifists it was the beginning of a new era, to most of the rest of their contemporaries it was worthy of notice only as a curiosity. Mommsen dubbed it "a mis-print in history". But there are no mis-prints in history. The Conference was called because the burden of European armaments was becoming unbearable. The humanitarian smoke-screen

⁵⁹ Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 273-274.

⁶⁰ *Review of Reviews* (July, 15, 1899), XX. 3-4.

⁶¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, XV, nos., 4284, 4327, 4351. Stead was actually getting his information from Miyatovitch, head of the Serbian delegation, not from the Russians, who wanted to keep everything secret.

⁶² Stead's Diary at The Hague, May 24, 1899. MSS.

⁶³ Fried: "Die Presse und die Friedensconferenz", in *D.W.N.* (June, 1899), VIII. 235-238; cf. also *ibid.*, VIII 287-292; "The Newspapers and The Hague Conference", in *Concord* (Sept., 1899), XIV. 157-158; Suttner; *Friedenskonferenz, passim*; *La Caricature de la Conférence de la Paix* (Paris, 1908)

laid down by the Russians to conceal their financial embarrassment only testifies to the force of the ideal, at least in the opinion of the Russian statesmen, while their economic difficulties were inevitable results of the armed peace, which the pacifists had been condemning for decades. Once the Conference began to work, scepticism lessened, goodwill was abundant, and in temporary isolation from *Weltpolitik*, a seed was sown. That this should happen, that such a beginning was possible, the pacifists had been preaching for a century. And it was they who helped educate the delegates at The Hague in the ways of peace, it was they who helped create the hothouse conditions in which the young plant could grow. Through their preparatory work and through their activity at The Hague the friends of peace had some part in deciding the Conference to concentrate its best efforts on arbitration rather than on disarmament. That the first great pacifist lobby enjoyed a measure of success is undeniable. But when the diplomats departed, each to go his own separate way for the good of his country, when the speeches were over and the banquets and balls forgotten, then the hothouse conditions existed no longer, and the young plant withered and died in the cold blasts of power politics.

For the pacifists themselves the movement had entered upon a new stage: it had left the small circle of private enthusiasts and become a part of public life. For the governments themselves had officially recognized that their aim was the same as that of the pacifists and they had met in a Conference to legislate peace for the world. "Our main hope now rests upon the institution established at The Hague", wrote Baroness von Suttner after the Conference⁶⁴. As the pacifists saw it, their chief task lay in popularizing the work of The Hague, in explaining to the people what the governments had done there, and in trying to influence the governments to build upon the foundation there laid. There was not a Peace Congress or Conference after 1900 which failed to mention The Hague. And this increasing emphasis upon machinery came at the same time that Fried was making pacifism "scientific" with the aid of economists such as Bloch and sociologists such as Novikov and Jordan. The rational age of pacifism was at hand, and it was climaxed by the remarkable attempt of Norman Angell to stop war by proving that any notion that it paid was a great illusion.

Thus the pacifists had some influence upon the Hague Conference, and in turn the Hague Conference had a great influence upon them. But the greatest significance of the Conference for the history of the peace movement was its great demonstration that at the end of the Nineteenth Century the ideal of peace had very little appeal to the popular mind. The individual efforts of the pacifists could be dismissed as idle dreaming, but the summoning of the Peace Conference by the Tsar of Russia brought the idea of world peace down from the clouds of speculation. It called for serious

consideration of the question, and it gave the pacifists something concrete round which to rally public opinion - but the world was not interested! In a moment of despair Bertha von Suttner wrote in her diary:

This Conference ... how its work has met with misunderstanding and resistance both in the world outside and in its own midst! Nowhere enthusiastic aid - nay, not even eager curiosity, and not once a warm word from those who hold the power in their hands. Cold, cold are all the hearts - cold as the draft that penetrates through the rattling windows. I am chilled to the bone!⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Suttner to Bajer, Dec. 30, 1899. Bajer MSS.

⁶⁵ July 4, 1899. Suttner: *Memoirs*, II. 318-319.

REFLECTIONS

"Histoire douloureuse souvent, pénible presque toujours, et qui a eu ses déboires et ses martyrs, mais histoire glorieuse et encourageante ..." So Frédéric Passy described the peace crusade¹.

The history of the organized peace movement in the three decades after 1867 is the story of a long up-hill struggle, filled with defeats and disappointments; yet if there was at times discouragement in the ranks of pacifists, there was rarely despair, and there was much in this period that was of comfort to them.

In 1867, when the continental peace movement began, the only European peace societies were the London Peace Society and its affiliates, and the two peace leagues founded under French auspices as a protest against the warlike policy of Napoleon III. The Franco-Prussian War called forth new peace associations, the *Nederlandsch Vredesbond* in Holland and the Workmen's Peace Association in London; it was this great conflict, moreover, which, together with the successful Geneva Arbitration, provided the stimulus for the founding of two associations of international law, whose aim was the establishment of the reign of justice in international relations. These same events made for the success of the arbitration motion of Henry Richard in the House of Commons, and this in turn started off a series of similar resolutions in other parliaments which provoked plans for collaboration between peace-minded deputies. These plans were still premature, as was the attempt to centralize the peace movement made at the Peace Congress of 1878. In the next decade, however, the peace movement spread to new countries on the Continent, chiefly through the efforts of Hodgson Pratt, the leader of the new secular movement in England, while there was an increase of peace activity in the parliaments. By 1889 the Interparliamentary Conference was a reality, and the International Peace Congress was revived in earnest. In the nineties the peace movement finally became international with the founding of societies in Germany and the multiplication of peace work in other lands. International Bureaus were established at Berne as centers of the two divisions of the movement, and almost annually Congresses and Conferences were held to which came private individuals and public men with no other purpose than to bring peace to the world. The century ended with the acknowledgment by the governments that the aim of the pacifists was not illusionary. The first Governmental Peace Conference granted official recognition to the favorite pacifist principle of arbitration and established a High Court of Arbitration upon which the friends of peace could concentrate their future efforts.

Progress was incontestable; the distressing conditions of the armed peace were turning the minds of an increasing number of humanitarians to the search for some relief. They were the same kind of men of goodwill who were engaged in any number of other endeavors to cure various ills from which humanity was suffering; among the pacifists were social workers, prison reformers, suffragettes, temperance advocates, founders of cooperatives, reformers of all sorts. They were mostly of good Liberal bourgeois stock; they had a firm belief in Reason and Progress, which gave them the confidence that they could not fail; and more often than not they were moved by moral considerations. But there were pacifists and pacifists. There were the pacifists who were impelled by the religious and ethical ideals of the brotherhood of man and the worth of the individual. Such were the members of the Peace Society and intellectuals like Bertha von Suttner. Then there were the utilitarian pacifists, represented by Pratt, Cremer, Passy, the economist, and Fried, the theoretician. They were motivated not so much by a sense that war was morally wrong but by the conviction that it was an unnecessary evil in a world which man had the power to order rationally. Lastly there were the republican internationalists, such as the members of the *Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté*. They were not pacifists at all in the extreme sense of the word, for they placed Justice and Liberty high above Peace, but they were moved by a deep faith in the brotherhood of nations. The three groups were not always distinct, but in general it may be said that ethical or so-called "sentimental", pacifism was strongest among the English, while republican internationalism was confined almost exclusively to certain radical groups of continental pacifists. Utilitarian pacifism, on the other hand, was common to both England and the Continent; its methods were those adopted by the other two groups; and it set the tone for the whole organized peace movement.

Advance there was in these three decades, but at the end of the century the pacifists were still a small sect. They could make hopeful speeches in the congresses and pass resolutions with the greatest of enthusiasm, but they were prophets without honor in their own countries. What were some of the reasons for the weakness of the movement? The pacifists themselves recognized as their greatest foes the forces of apathy and scepticism. It is true that man rarely pays heed to the remakers of the world unless he is in desperate straits. It did little good to chant arbitration at the man in the street, and to set up a clamor about the better, the more Christian, the more reasonable way than war. He was concerned with making a living ; war was not near, and the day after tomorrow was too far ahead to worry about. The wars of the last thirty years of the century were merely good newspaper reading for the peoples of Western Europe. The masses did feel the armament burden, but then the pacifists did

¹ Passy: *Pour la Paix*, p.177.

not preach disarmament but only talked about some distant future when, as a result of international organization, it would be possible to ground arms. This was too involved for the average man. Stead knew what he was about when in his Peace Crusade he refused to take up the cause of arbitration and concentrated on the issue of disarmament. Peace itself was a pale reward when the socialists were offering Paradise. But the pacifists could never understand how the world could refuse to listen when they set forth solutions for the greatest problem that mankind had to face. By their failure to arouse any great enthusiasm for the Hague Conference it was shown how little popular interest there was in this problem. The Hague Conference did, however, direct attention to the question, and there was revealed an almost universal feeling that the aims of the friends of peace were utopian. No better proof could be offered of how widespread was the belief that war was inevitable.

The obstacles of social inertia and disbelief are encountered by all reformers; the pacifists were struggling against a much more formidable force. The Spirit of the Age was against them. It was an age of nationalism and imperialism, and the spirit of imperialist aggression was inconsistent with the spirit of world peace, while nationalist passions and prejudices stood in the way of international understanding. The story of the treatment of the Alsace-Lorraine Question by the French and German peacemakers reveals what a strong hold nationalism had even upon the minds of the exponents of international cooperation. At every turn, the continental pacifists were confronted with the charge that they were not good patriots and that they were weakening the fatherland. In teaching that war could be avoided, the pacifists were jeopardizing national defense, which demanded that every citizen hold himself ready for the war which was ever possible; and in preaching mutual respect and international goodwill the pacifists were diminishing that sense of patriotism which fed upon an exclusive national pride. The "spirit of disarmament" was, as Brunetière said, incompatible with the "spirit of patriotism".

The peace movement was the only humanitarian reform movement which touched upon the most vital concern of a State, its security, but it was never strong enough in the Nineteenth Century for governments to take active measures against it. The statesmen themselves professed peace as their goal, and they generally accorded to peace congresses the official blessing of the governments. In democratic countries, where governments were more responsive to pressure groups than elsewhere, marks of favor were even shown the pacifists at times. The French Government, for example, decorated Passy and Moch with the express purpose of showing that it was pursuing a peaceful policy. Peace could be a policy, and it often was, but the true aim of the States was not peace but security and power. The episode of the First Hague Conference only went to show how unwilling the governments were to take effective

measures for the achievement of the purpose which the Conference was convened to further, "the maintenance of general peace". These were the stern facts of international relations, and they prescribed the limits of any pacifist influence upon governmental policy.

Such were the conditions of the day with which the pacifists had to contend. But they had certain weaknesses of their own which contributed to the ineffectiveness of their work. First of all, there was the lack of unity in their ranks, which, while not unexpected among idealists, was nevertheless a factor in retarding the progress of the cause. Then they failed to discern some of the fundamental causes of war: the economic causes, which the socialists were pointing out, and the deep-lying psychological forces, which are not completely understood even today. The solutions which they proposed were only half-measures. Arbitration, to which they attached so many of their hopes, was no remedy at all. But they were confident that an improvement in political organization would mean the end of war, and they paid no heed when Tolstoy told them that it was not through reform of politics, but only through a reform of morals that peace on earth could be won. What they were demanding, in effect, was a great revolution in the nature of man. It meant an overthrow of ideas, of prejudices, of habits which were deeply rooted in man's very being. The pacifists themselves did not even succeed in banishing petty squabbles, personal rivalries, and jealousies from their own midst. They talked of international morality, and forgot that private morality had to be achieved first. They were not rebels; rather were they dreamers, whose ambition was to be thought practical men. So they left untouched the fundamental causes of the evil they were attacking. They wanted too much and not enough. They wanted a revolution; and they refused to be revolutionaries.

ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES OF PERIODICALS

<i>A.P.</i>	<i>Advocate of Peace.</i>
<i>Bulletin.</i>	<i>Bulletin de la Société des Amis de la Paix.</i>
<i>D.W.N.</i>	<i>Die Waffen Nieder.</i>
<i>E.-U.</i>	<i>Les Etats-Unis d'Europe.</i>
<i>F-W.</i>	<i>Die Friedens-Warte.</i>
<i>H.P.</i>	<i>Herald of Peace.</i>
<i>J. d. Econ.</i>	<i>Journal des Economistes.</i>
<i>P.D.</i>	<i>La Paix par le Droit.</i>
<i>R.P.</i>	<i>Revue de la Paix.</i>

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(N.B. In view of the impending publication of the great *Bibliographie du Mouvement de la Paix*, which is described below, it has not been thought necessary to itemize the mass of pamphlet and other fugitive material which has been sifted through in the course of preparation of this work.)

PLAN OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS

B. PRIMARY SOURCES

- I. Manuscript Material
- II. Documentary Sources
- III. Proceedings of Peace Congresses, Reports of Societies, Etc.
- IV. Periodicals

C. SECONDARY MATERIAL

- I. Memoirs, Biographies, Autobiographies, and Letters
- II. History of the Peace Movement
 - (1) Theoretical Treatments
 - (2) Scientific Accounts
 - (3) Articles
 - (4) Other Historical Accounts
- III. Other Subjects
 - (1) International Law, Arbitration, Disarmament
 - (2) Socialists
 - (3) The First Hague Peace Conference
 - (4) Other Works Mentioned or Found Especially Useful

A. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS

Bibliographie du Mouvement de la Paix, 1480-1898. This monumental work has been in preparation for over five years under the supervision of Dr. Jacob ter Meulen, Secretary of the Sub-Committee for the Bibliography of the Peace Movement in History, of the International Committee of Historical Sciences. When completed, it will present a chronological list of all the books, pamphlets, periodicals, and articles on peace and the peace movement which appeared during the years designated, together with annotations concerning the contents of the more important documents and indications where the material may be found. The *Provisional Lists* issued by Dr ter Meulen are already a great boon to the student. I have also been privileged to consult the working files of the bibliography at the Library of the Peace Palace at The Hague, where the project is in progress.

Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de l'Institut Nobel Norvégien. I. Littérature Pacifiste. Kristiania 1912. This library has one of the richest collections of the older material, and the topical arrangement of the catalogue makes it extremely useful.

Catalogue de la Bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix. The Hague, 1916-1937. This is the other great repository of the earlier European peace literature.

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B. PRIMARY SOURCES

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Bajer MSS. The letters of Fredrik Bajer, long a leader of the Danish peace movement and founder of the International Peace Bureau. Bajer had many connections with the other pacifist chiefs, and this collection is a most valuable source. At the Royal Library, Copenhagen.

B.I.P. MSS. The records of the International Peace Bureau, the official center of the movement after 1891. The personal correspondence of Ducommun, the secretary, with the other pacifists is included. The numbers following citations of documents from this source refer to their classification at the Bureau. This is the most important documentary collection for these years. At the International Peace Bureau, Geneva.

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Fried MSS. Part of the Fried-Suttner Collection of correspondence acquired some years ago by the Library of the League of Nations at Geneva and still waiting to be catalogued. Apparently Fried saved every letter he ever received, and he kept copies of all of the important letters which he wrote. When finally put into order, this will be a source of primary importance. As it is, some use has been made of the collection, but it has been found impossible to go through the material thoroughly.

Friends Peace Committee: Minute Books, 1888-1900. The minutes of the Peace Committee of the London Meeting for Sufferings. At the Library of Friends House, London.

Guébin Collection. An assortment of newscuttings and other material concerning the peace movement throughout this period. Guébin was long a colleague of Lemonnier. The material is still unclassified. At the Library of the Peace Palace.

International Arbitration League: *Minutes of the Council*, 1870-. Of the greatest importance for the origins of the Workmen's Peace Association and for its activity in the period before the publication of the *Arbitrator* was begun in 1872. At the offices of the International Arbitration League in London.

International Law Association. Newscuttings and MSS. A scrapbook of newspaper clippings and a few early letters have been preserved. At the office of the Association in London.

Lemonnier MSS. Journal, notebooks, and album of Charles Lemonnier, dating principally from 1887-1891. Very valuable. In the possession of M. Jules Puech in Paris.

Nobel MSS. The letters of Bertha von Suttner to Alfred Nobel, 1891-1896. Seventy pieces in all. They tell the story of her long endeavor to persuade Nobel to become an active helper in the peace movement. His replies are recorded in his copy-books and have been used by Schück and Sohlman in the official biography of Nobel, and by Moe in his history of the Nobel Prize. At the Nobel Foundation at Stockholm.

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Suttner MSS. Part of the Fried-Suttner Collection at the League of Nations Library. Consists of letters received by Bertha von Suttner, after about 1890, most of which have been classified. A source of the first order.

Peckover Album. A scrap-book on the peace movement compiled by Miss Priscilla Peckover long after the events to which it refers had taken place. Consists of clippings, pictures, and letters, with accompanying comments. From the period of the eighties on. Miss Peckover had many foreign contacts, and the section dealing with the origins of the *Jeunes Amis de la Paix* is especially important. At the Library of the Peace Palace.

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(N.B. There are some important papers of Henry Richard at the offices of the International Peace Society (formerly the Peace Society) in London, and apparently the old records of the Peace Society are also there, but they are not available to the investigator. The archives of the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberté* have also survived but they remain confidential. This is all the more pity because the archives of the *Association de la Paix par le Droit* were not kept, and those of the *Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft* and the International Arbitration and Peace Association as well as most of those of the International Arbitration League were destroyed. The greatest loss is that of Frédéric Passy's correspondence, which he kept intact until his death in 1912, after which these precious documents seem to have disappeared. Hodgson Pratt never saved any of his correspondence, and the greater part of the papers of Felix Moscheles were destroyed by his widow.)

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(3) The First Hague Peace Conference

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